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This dissertation examines images of China produced in early Soviet culture, focusing 
in particular on the mid-to-late 1920s, a period of heightened Soviet involvement in Chinese 
politics. It argues that China became in this period the primary testing ground for the creation 
of an “internationalist aesthetics”: a mode of representation that might express horizontal 
solidarity over vertical dominance, and inscribe China into the global map envisioned by 
Marist-Leninist theories of revolution. Seeking to produce a new China to replace the exotic 
Orient, Soviet artists and writers experimented with multiple genres and media—reportage, 
film, theatre, biography—in their search for the correct mode for internationalist aesthetics. 
The struggle over how to represent the world for a revolutionary society thus coalesces, in 
this period, around the question of how to represent China.  
Such an aesthetics is inevitably interconnected with politics, and internationalist 
aesthetics encountered and expressed the same ambiguities as the political project of Soviet 
internationalism: a liberatory, anti-imperial ideology that simultaneously sought to control 
political and historical narratives from the world revolution’s proclaimed centre in Moscow.  
Consequently, these disparate images are united by an insistence on the privileged position 
and perspective of the Soviet observer, who looks at Chinese reality with a combination of 
advanced modern knowledge, sympathy with oppression, and revolutionary experience that is 
purportedly inaccessible to other Europeans, or indeed to the Chinese themselves. This 
privileged perspective on China undergirds the claims of internationalist aesthetics to present 
a true image of the world. The search for an authoritative mode for internationalist aesthetics 
is hampered, however, by recurrent issues of access, mediation and translatability, and by 
	  	  
lingering parallels between this avowedly anti-imperialist discourse and the imperial systems 
of knowledge production it supposedly replaces. 
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Note on Transliterations and Translations 
 
All translations are my own unless otherwise specified. The original language is given 
alongside the translation at times when attention needs to be drawn to specific 
elements of the original text. Otherwise, the original is given in a footnote. 
 
For transliteration from Russian, I follow the Library of Congress system. Exceptions 
are made for proper names that have a widely accepted standard rendering in English: 
so Leon Trotsky not Lev Trotskii, Vladimir Mayakovsky not Vladimir Maiakovskii, 
etc. 
 
Transliterations from Chinese are given in pinyin. When Romanizing Chinese proper 
names, I largely follow standard contemporary pinyin usage, even though this 
sometimes conflicts with Russian usages of the 1920s. So, for example, I render the 
current Chinese capital 北京 as “Beijing,” not “Peking,” though the Soviet writers 
discussed below call it Пекин (Peking). Likewise “Guangzhou,” not “Canton” 
(Кантон), for 广州. An exception to this rule is made for Chinese proper names with 
established English versions that depart from pinyin: e.g. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-
shek. When Chinese names are taken from Russian texts where they are given in 
Cyrillic transliteration, I give the names transliterated from Cyrillic, with the pinyin in 
brackets if it can be clearly discerned. (For a fuller discussion of this issue, see 
Chapter Five, on “Den Shi-khua/Deng Shihua.”) 
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I. China and the Soviet Union in the 1920s: Politics, Aesthetics, Education 
Here, in this immense land that has for century upon century been for Asia what 
Greece and Rome were for Europe, here, in the struggle between two irreconcilable 
worlds for mastery of an immeasurable human ocean, the fates of our planet are 
being decided. Will we enter the kingdom of socialism, or will we transition to a 
new, higher phase of capitalism—the answer to this fateful question will be given 
by Asia, and above all by China, by China’s evolution over the coming decade.  
(A. A. Ivin, China and the Soviet Union, 1924)1  
 
In the mid-1920s, after the failure of proletarian revolutions in Europe and the rise of 
Ataturk in Turkey, China became the focal point of Soviet efforts to foster world revolution. 
This mission proceeded directly from the Second Conference of the Third Communist 
International (Comintern), held in July 1920, where Lenin’s “Theses on National and 
Colonial Questions” had established the principle that the capitalist powers could only be 
defeated by detaching the colonies that ensured their wealth. Therefore the Comintern, and 
the indigenous Communist parties under its direction, should form alliances with bourgeois 
liberation movements to assist nationalist anti-imperial revolutions in colonized and semi-
colonized countries. Once imperial rule had been overthrown, the Comintern would work 
through these local Communists, embedded within the national revolution, to guide 
developments towards the proletarian (and ultimately global) revolution.2  
China had been through its own revolution in 1911, overthrowing centuries of 
dynastic rule. But the Chinese Republic formed in its place lacked stability: control of the 
Beijing (Peking) government shifted between the political groups of various powerful 
generals, while the Nationalist Party (Guomingdang) under Sun Yat-sen formed its own 
power base in the south, in Guangzhou (Canton). True to the Leninist line in the Comintern, 
contact between the Bolsheviks and Sun Yat-sen’s Chinese Nationalist Party, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A. Ivin, Kitai i Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1924), 29. “Здесь, в необъятной стране, 
 
2 Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919–1927 (Richmond, UK: 
Curzon Press, 2000), 41–44. 
	  	   2	  
Guomindang (GMD), had been established as early as 1918; by 1922, a formal policy of 
alliance was in place, its existence made public with a Declaration signed by Sun and Soviet 
diplomat Adolf Joffe on 26 January, 1923.3 Comintern advisers such as Mikhail Borodin and 
Vasilii Bliukher arrived in Guangzhou in 1923–4, determined to reorganize the Guomindang 
into a Leninist party structure with a modern army at its disposal. 4 Comintern agents also 
travelled to the northern city of Kalgan in 1925 to assist the Nationalist Army (Guominjun) of 
General Feng Yuxiang.5 The traffic worked both ways, too: Guomindang leaders, including 
Chiang Kai-shek, travelled to Moscow to meet with Soviet dignitaries, and the Sun Yat-sen 
University for the Workers of China, headed by Karl Radek, opened in Moscow in November 
1925.6 Meanwhile the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in collaboration with the 
Comintern in 1921, was encouraged to form a strategic united front with the Guomindang, 
and assist the Nationalists in their campaign to reunify the country.7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 45–47, 57–58.  
 
4 C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and 
Nationalist China, 1920–1927 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 6–9. In June 1924, 
there were 25 Comintern advisers in southern China; by April 1926, that number had risen to 58. 
(Ibid., 7.) 
 
5 Ibid., 8, 10–11. 
 
6 On Chiang’s visit to Moscow in 1923, and the beginnings of his disillusionment with Russian 
alliance, see ibid., 87–89. For a detailed history of the Sun Yat-sen University for the Workers of 
China (Universitet trudiashchikhsia Kitaia imeni Sun Iat-sen—UTK, renamed in 1928 
Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Kitaia—KUTK), see L. Yu Min-ling, “Sun Yat-sen 
University in Moscow, 1925–1930,” Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1995. Before the 
founding of Sun Yat-sen University, Chinese students had also studied at the Communist University 
for the Workers of the East (KUTV). See N. N. Timofeeva, "Kommunisticheskii Universitet 
Trudiashchikhsia Vostoka (KUTV) 1921–1925," Narody Azii i Afriki 2 (1976): 47–57; and 
Timofeeva, "Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudiashchikhsia Vostoka (KUTV) 1926–1938," Narody 
Azii i Afriki 5 (1979): 30–42. 
 
7 On the Comintern’s involvement in the founding of the CCP, see Wilbur and How, Missionaries of 
Revolution, 24–30. The two Comintern agents closely involved in the founding of the CCP were 
Grigorii Voitinskii and Hendrikus Sneevleit (alias Maring), the latter playing a prominent role at the 
First Congress of the CCP in Shanghai, June 1921. 
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This plan backfired. By March 1927 the Guomindang army’s Northern Expedition, 
aided by Russian advisers, had marched successfully north from Guangzhou to the Yangzi 
river, and entered Shanghai. Here General Chiang Kai-shek orchestrated a purge of the labor 
unions and left-wing organizations in China’s most proletarian city, with hundreds killed in 
mid-April.8 That same month, police acting for Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian government raided 
the Soviet embassy in Beijing, confiscating documents and arresting several Chinese—
including Li Dazhao, the co-founder of the CCP, who was later executed.9 The alliance in 
Wuhan between the CCP and the “Left” Guomindang struggled on until July, when Borodin 
and other Comintern agents set off for Russia, fleeing through the Gobi desert by car.10 By 
August 1927, the Comintern mission in China was effectively over. Meanwhile, within the 
USSR, the argument over China policy and its failure became the focal point of a climactic 
confrontation between Stalin and the Left Opposition, a struggle for power that resulted in 
Leon Trotsky and Grigorii Zinoviev’s expulsion from the party in November 1927 and 
Stalin’s effective instalment as undisputed leader.11 The violent suppression of the Canton 
Uprising in December 1927, organized on the Comintern’s orders, marked the final defeat of 
Soviet efforts to shape China’s revolution.12  
 Parallel with this political mission to shape China’s future, a cultural project was 
underway to reshape the perception of China among inhabitants of the Soviet Union. A 
cogent summary of this project and the obstacles it faced can be found an article entitled 
“China and Soviet Russia: A Letter from Beijing,” which appeared in the prominent Soviet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 405–6. 
 
9 Ibid., 1, 403–4. 
 
10 Ibid., 423. 
 
11 Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 127–160. 
 
12 Ibid., 15. 
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journal Red Virgin Soil (Krasnaia nov’) in March 1924.13 Its author, A. Ivin (Chinese yiwen 
伊文, the pseudonym of Aleksei Alekseevich Ivanov), was a journalist and teacher, fluent in 
Chinese, who had lived in Beijing since 1917.14 Ivin’s in-depth, insider knowledge of 
contemporary China made the absence of such knowledge among his compatriots painfully 
clear. The central point of his article runs thus: if the Soviet reading public wants to grasp the 
current global moment and its revolutionary prospects, even the most committed socialists 
among them will have to overcome the Eurocentric bias within Russian culture and education. 
The enormous populations of colonized and semi-colonized countries in Asia make them an 
invaluable resource to the imperialist powers of the West, and a vital potential ally in Soviet 
Russia’s struggle to globalize its revolution. And yet, Ivin laments, the public knows almost 
nothing about Asia: the Eurocentric history taught in schools locates the origins of world 
history in the Mediterranean, and reduces the rest of the world to a “grey formless mass” 
subdued by superior European technology.15  
 China, Ivin argues, is the focal point of the current world situation. The future wealth 
of the Euro-American capitalist powers depends on exploiting its workforce and ensuring 
access to its markets. But China is also going through an unprecedented cultural 
transformation, a “revaluation of all values” in which imported foreign knowledge challenges 
traditional forms of understanding. In Ivin’s analysis, two forms of modernity, two aspects of 
what he calls the “Euro-American revolution,” compete to replace the “faded face of old 
China.” There is “Americanized China,” educated in missionary schools, dressed in a dinner 
jacket, dancing the foxtrot; and there is the “young, proud face of progressive China, so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A. Ivin, “Kitai i Sovetskaia Rossiia: Pis’mo iz Pekina,” Krasnaia nov’ 3 (1924): 183–192. 
Reprinted as “Kitai i Sovetskaia Rossiia” in Ivin, Kitai i Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1924), 
9–22.  
 
14 For biographical details on Ivin/Ivanov see V. N. Nikiforov, Sovetskie istoriki o problemakh Kitaia 
(Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1970), 144–6. 
 
15 Ivin, “Kitai i Sovetskaia Rossiia,” 10. 
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strikingly reminiscent of the face of revolutionary Russia.”16 If this third aspect is to win out 
over its rivals, Russia and China must be drawn closer together on the level of culture: Ivin’s 
term, kul’turnoe sblizhenie, suggests a literal reduction of distance between the two entities.17 
In other words, Ivin claims that, without a greater cultural understanding of China, without a 
greater sense of the history and human experience of the Chinese, any political project of 
solidarity and revolutionary alliance is bound to fail. If the revolution is truly to globalize, the 
Soviet people must overcome the Eurocentrism in their own culture, and strive to know Asian 
civilizations as equal and commensurable. 
However, this enhanced, revolutionary knowledge will not be easy to achieve, so 
great is the sense of China as distant and unfamiliar. “For tens of thousands of versts,” Ivin 
points out, “we share a border with a great and ancient country, an entire separate world 
comparable only to ancient Rome,” one of the “main branches of human civilization.”18 
Along this vast border, “we are neighbours to a country whose role in the global economy is 
growing with astonishing speed, neighbours to a people 400-million strong, whose imminent 
evolution will determine to a significant extent the fate of all of Asia.”19 And yet, the young 
Soviet population knows about as much about China “as if China was not our neighbor, but 
located on another planet.”20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 15. 
 
17 Ibid., 20. 
 
18 Ibid., 20. “На протяжении десяти тысяч верст мы граничим с великой древней страной, 
целым отдельным миром, который можно поставить в параллель лишь с миром древнего Рима, 
граничим с одной из главных ветвей человеческой цивилизации[.]” A verst is a traditional 
Russian unit of distance, roughly equal to a kilometer.  
 
19 Ibid., 21. “На протяжении десяти тысяч верст мы являемся соседями страны, роль которой в 
мировом хозяйстве растет с поразительной быстротой, соседями четырехсотмиллионого 
народа, ближайшая эволюция которого определит в значительной степени судьбы всей Азии.” 
 
20 Ibid., 20. “Столько же, как если бы Китай был не нашим соседом, а находился на другой 
планете.” 
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One solution that Ivin advocates is the widespread teaching of Chinese language in 
Soviet schools. Following the literary reforms spearheaded by Hu Shi, students could now 
focus on learning the vernacular language, which, Ivin somewhat dubiously claims, is as easy 
and quick to master as French or German. But the distance between image and reality 
remains a serious problem. Even a well-know fact such as the enormity of the Chinese 
population is too easily experienced as a geographical abstraction, rather than a living reality. 
Without contact, Ivin suggests—without felt bodily experience—the scale and significance of 
Chinese reality is hard to comprehend: 
In truth, one must wander oneself through the boundless expanses of Asia, 
observing up close the human beings that dwell there, in order to feel profoundly 
[глубоко ощутить] how small the Euro-American world is, and what enormous 
problems would arise tomorrow before the victorious Euro-American revolution, if 
it decided to become global.21  
 
The mobilization of the entire population for a walking tour of China is hard to envisage, 
however. How, then, is this movement from cognitive to corporeal understanding to be 
achieved? 
 The answer lies in the creation of an internationalist aesthetics, capable of 
transmitting and disseminating sensory experiences of foreign, distant spaces through the 
media of print, picture, photograph, film and live performance. This study explores the ways 
in which early Soviet culture furnished its audience with an aesthetic experience of China, 
and the reasons why such an experience was considered necessary. Ivin’s essay offers a 
concise summary of those reasons. China, Soviet Russia’s neighbour, was considered a vital 
knot in the contemporary geopolitical situation, understood from a Bolshevik perspective as a 
global battle for survival between imperial capitalism and revolutionary socialism. And yet, 
the Soviet public’s knowledge of this vast land and potential ally was distorted by distance, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., 11 (my emphasis). “Нужно, действительно, самому побродить по необозримым 
просторам Азии, ближе присмотреться к населяющему ее человечеству, чтобы глубоко 
ощутить, как мал евро-aмериканский мир и какие грандиозные проблемы встали бы завтра 
перед победоносной евро-американской революции, если бы она решила стать мировой.” 
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separation enforced by the clichés of mysterious Oriental exotica. A new form of knowledge 
was needed that would replace this exotic mirage with authentic, contemporary truth. 
However, Ivin’s insistence on bodily experience as a precursor to true understanding seems 
to suggest that this cognitive transformation needs to be accompanied by some form of 
sensory immediacy, if the distance separating Soviet Russians from China is truly to be 
collapsed. Aesthetics is the term I shall use to describe the reproduction or simulation of that 
immediacy. It is through a combination of sober knowledge and aesthetic agitation, analytical 
exposition and sympathetic connection, that these images of China seek to work on their 
audience. 
This need for a new cognitive and sensory experience of China was expressed most 
forcefully and eloquently by the poet, playwright, journalist, and cultural theorist Sergei 
Tret’iakov. Tret’iakov taught Russian alongside Ivin at Beijing University from 1924–5, and 
became the most prominent Soviet voice on China in the twenties. Tret’iakov’s sojourn in 
China coincided with his turn away from poetry and towards what he was later to call the 
“literature of fact” or “factography.” As Devin Fore has shown, factography was conceived 
as a mode of writing that would replace the distanced, contemplative representational systems 
of bourgeois aesthetics with a productivist “operativity” aimed at reorganizing the 
consciousness of readers through indexical connections to experienced reality.22 Factography 
advocated a materialist, productivist conception of literature’s social function that effectively 
rejected any mind-body split; textually transmitted facts were conceived as material objects 
that worked on the nervous system to organize the reader’s “patterns of consciousness,” 
transforming his or her perceptions of the world.23 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For an introduction to the literature of fact, see Nikolai Chuzhak, ed., Literatura fakta: pervyi 
sbornik materialov rabotnikov LEFa (Moscow: Izd-vo Federatsiia, 1929; repr., Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1972). On “operativity” and factography’s productivism, see Devin Fore, “Introduction,” 
October 118 (Fall 2006): 3–10; Fore, “‘All the Graphs’: Soviet and Weimar Documentary between 
the Wars,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2005. 
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 This elision of cognitive and corporeal experience is expressed vividly in the 
declaration that begins Den Shi-khua, Tret’iakov’s mediated biography of a Chinese student: 
“Our previous knowledge of China is like a crippled arm. It must first be broken, and then re-
set correctly.”24 This old knowledge is crippled because it depends on an exotic image, 
acquired primarily from Western literature, that renders China as a distanced object of 
contemplation and aesthetic pleasure. Tret’iakov’s literature of fact seeks to collapse distance 
and disrupt this comfortable representational illusion by introducing his reader to vivid, 
affective facts, culled from Chinese reality and guaranteed by the bodily experience of the 
writer. This factographic position took shape, indeed was pioneered, in Tret’iakov’s writings 
on China—the need to understand China became, for Tret’iakov, the testing ground for a new 
form of revolutionary truth-production. Using eyewitness sketches, agitational drama based 
on historical events, and the life-story of one of his own students, Tret’iakov sought to prove 
that “fantasy is greyer than reality”; that the factual reality of contemporary China was more 
thrilling than any exotic novel.25 This is a different kind of aesthetic effect to the exotica 
against which it is defined: internationalist aesthetics produces its power from a visceral 
sense of reality. 
 Tret’iakov will feature throughout this study as a committed mediator of 
contemporary China, but he was not the only cultural producer drawn to the Chinese theme in 
the 1920s. Other prominent writers, including Boris Pil’niak, Mikhail Bulgakov, Vsevolod 
Ivanov, and Isaac Babel’, deployed images of China in their works. Pil’niak, like Tret’iakov 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Fore, “’All the Graphs’,” 60. 
 
24 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Neskol’ko slov,” introduction to “Den Sy-Khua. (Bio-interv’iu.),” Novyi Lef 7 
(1927): 14. “Наше прежнее знание Китая похоже на изуродованную руку. Ее надо сперва 
сломать, а потом снова срастить правильно.” This was the first published extract of Den Shi-khua; 
the protagonist’s name has not yet acquired the Cyrillic form it was to take in the completed book 
edition.   
 
25 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo, 10. “Фантазия серее действительности.” 
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and a host of lesser writers (Galina Serebriakova, Nikolai Kostarev, Sergei Dalin, Oskar 
Erdberg), travelled to China and published an account of his eyewitness experiences there. In 
cinema, The Great Flight (Velikii perelet, 1925), filmed during a major aviation expedition 
from Moscow through Mongolia to Beijing, and Shanghai Document (Shankhaiskii 
dokument, 1928), an account of Shanghai during the Communist defeat of spring 1927, 
sought to convey China to Soviet spectators as a documentary reality. A trio of films about 
China to be directed by Sergei Eisenstein, with scripts by Tret’iakov, was planned but never 
made. The Soviet stage in the mid-1920s saw a host of China-themed productions, including 
Tret’iakov’s agitational drama Roar, China! and the revolutionary ballet The Red Poppy. All 
of these prominent cultural productions supplemented the daily presence of China stories and 
China images in the newspapers: Jeffrey Brooks estimates that China was the most covered 
country outside the West in the Soviet press of the 1920s.26 During the historical period 
roughly coinciding with the New Economic Policy (NEP), China was big news. 
A general sense of this topicality can be gained by searching in Pravda’s electronic 
archive for all articles in a given year that mention the word “Kitai.” The numbers rise 
gradually from 1920, when the word occurs only 47 times, through 1921 (75 times), 1922 
(161 times), and 1923 (218 times). The 1924 signing of the Sino-Soviet Agreement, widely 
trumpeted in the Soviet press as the first “equal” treaty between China and a European 
power, began the period of most intense interest in China: mentions in Pravda for this year 
rose to 380. In 1925, as the May 30 shooting of Shanghai protestors by British troops sparked 
strikes and protests around the country, China was mentioned 541 times; the following year, 
with the successes of the Comintern-assisted Northern Expedition looking likely to reunite 
the country, 668 times. 1927 was the high point of Soviet interest in China across the media 
spectrum, as the seizure of Shanghai by workers and their subsequent massacre by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War 
(Princeton University Press, 2001), 33. 
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Guomindang troops marked both the climax and catastrophe of Soviet policy in China. 
“Kitai” was mentioned 899 times in Pravda that year, the highest frequency of any year in 
the Soviet period. In 1928, with the failure of Stalin’s line apparent after the disastrous 
Canton Uprising, this figure plummets to 323; by 1931, it had bottomed out at 109, before 
building again in the late 1930s, in response to the Japanese invasion.27 
 The activities of Borodin and his Comintern colleagues in Guangzhou were not 
widely reported in the Soviet press: the official line in this period was that Soviet Russia was 
a close friend of the Chinese government in Beijing, and it would hardly have done to admit 
that Soviеt agents were simultaneously trying to bring down that government in league with 
the Guomindang. But the other category of “agents,” writers, film-makers, and dramatists 
working in the sphere of culture, were far more visible. The images of China they produced 
accompanied the Comintern’s political project with a cultural project: to transform the 
attitudes of the Soviet public in line with Ivin’s prescriptions, and to produce internationalism 
as both a cognitive and an aesthetic experience. 
II. Anti-Imperial Aesthetics? 
Tret’iakov conceived his new, “factographic” knowledge of China as entering into 
direct competition with the culture of the West and of pre-revolutionary Russia: in 
contemporary shorthand, the culture of “imperialism.” The USSR, successor state to a 
Russian Empire whose imperial legacy it ostensibly rejected, asserted itself on the world 
stage of the 1920s as the anti-imperial, liberatory alternative to the Euro-American 
domination of the globe. Nowhere was this reversal more dramatic than in the case of China. 
Tsarist Russia, after all, had participated enthusiastically in the “carving of the Chinese 
melon,” the accelerating detachment of territorial concessions from the Chinese Empire that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Figures from search conducted through Pravda Digital Archive, accessed 24 February, 2014 via 
Columbia University Library Services: 
http://dlib.eastview.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/browse/publication/9305.  
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had occupied the European powers and Japan through the second half of the nineteenth and 
into the early twentieth century. 
 In July 1919 and September 1920, on either side of the Second Comintern Congress 
which set the Comintern’s “Eastern” policy, the Soviet government issued the two Karakhan 
Manifestos, addressed to China. These pledged to restore to China the rights it had lost to 
Tsarist Russia, ending the indemnities paid since the defeat of the Boxer Rebellion, 
renouncing the much-disputed right to “extraterritoriality,” and conceding Chinese 
sovereignty, in theory at least, over Manchuria.28 In addition, the Declarations exhorted 
China to turn towards Soviet Russia, the workers’ and peasants’ state, to avoid becoming 
another Korea or India, another nation lost under the yoke of imperialism (亡国 wang guo, 
“lost country,” in the Chinese discourse of the time). 29 Lev Karakhan, deputy People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs at the time of the Declarations, later became the first Soviet 
Ambassador to China, concluding a treaty of mutual recognition between the two 
governments on May 31, 1924, and winning significant popularity in Chinese intellectual 
circles.30 
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union remained a foreign power sending agents to control the 
political direction of China, which by that time had served as a battleground of rival 
imperialist powers for almost 100 years. Outside observers were not slow to suggest that this 
supposedly liberational activity was simply a new, “Red” form of imperialism, and the 
Comintern a tool for extending Soviet power across the globe. In 1928, the French novelist 
André Malraux published The Conquerors (Les Conquérants), a semi-fictionalized account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution, 20–22. See also Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia 
(Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), 16. 
 
29 On the term wang guo see Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the 
Twentieth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 15. 
 
30 Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution, 5–6. 
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of Comintern agents and their activities in Guangzhou during the general strike of summer 
1925. Malraux’s title suggests an ambiguity that his novel declines to resolve: are these 
European men, who bring guns and expertise to Guangzhou and turn them against the 
imperialist British, in fact simply the latest in a long line of foreign conquerors that have 
come to China in pursuit of power?31 
Nor was this paradox entirely absent from Soviet rhetoric. Leon Trotsky, writing in 
Pravda shortly after the shooting of Chinese protestors by British police in Shanghai on May 
30, 1925, describes the very blood of the slain and wounded carrying forward the 
Comintern’s mission: “Their blood, evaporating on Shanghai pavements, is infecting the 
masses with the “spirit of Moscow.” This spirit is all-pervading and indomitable. It will 
subjugate the entire world by setting it free.”32 Trotsky is using this language of conquest for 
rhetorical effect: Soviet political rhetoric at this time was infused with a sense of permanent 
war and global struggle as its sources of legitimation. Nonetheless, Trotsky’s phrase neatly 
encapsulates the contradictions within Soviet anti-imperialist internationalism. The activities 
of the Comintern aimed to liberate countries from Western imperial dominance while 
simultaneously seeking to shape their futures in line with a political and ideological model 
exported from Moscow. 
I believe that this paradox should be taken seriously, not simply reduced to a 
dismissive summation of the Comintern as a hypocritical continuation of Russian imperial 
aspirations under a red mask. Soviet policy sought to position the USSR as the globe’s 
revolutionary vanguard, while simultaneously pursuing the national interests of a state 
obliged to compete within an existing international system of sovereign nation states. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 André Malraux, Les conquérants (Paris: B. Grasset, 1928). 	  
32 Leon Trotsky, “Moskovskii dukh,” Pravda, June 6, 1925. “их кровь, испаряясь на шанхайских 
мостовых, заражает массы «московским духом». Он, этот дух, всепроникающий и непобедим. 
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clearest example of this is the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Built through Chinese 
territory under the auspices of the Russian Imperial state at the turn of the century, the CER 
was taken over by Chinese forces in 1917, operating subsequently under Chinese, French, 
and White Russian joint administration.33 Despite the Karakhan Declarations’ apparent 
renunciation of all Tsarist privileges in China, including the CER, the Soviet government 
made joint Sino-Soviet administration of the railway a central condition of the mutual 
recognition treaty concluded in 1924.34 Countering claims that the railway remained an 
“instrument of imperialism,” Trotsky argued in 1927 that the CER would be returned “[t]he 
moment the Chinese people has created its own democratic unified government.”35 After 
1927, the Soviet government was unlikely to evaluate any Guomindang administration as 
either democratic or unified. Instead, the railway provoked a Sino-Soviet confrontation: in 
1929, the forces of Manchurian warlord General Zhang Xueliang, with the support of Chiang 
Kaishek’s Nationalist government, attempted to seize outright control over the CER, 
provoking a border conflict and brief invasion by Soviet troops.36  
Given these complexities, it seems worthwhile to inquire whether and in what ways 
the utopian aspirations of Soviet internationalism were compromised by such realities as 
existing balances of geopolitical power, existing systems of knowledge and identity, and 
existing technologies of representation and knowledge dissemination. Considerable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 R. K. I. Quested, Sino–Russian Relations: A Short History (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 
92. 
 
34 Wei, China and Soviet Russia, 25–38. During the negotiations, Karakhan had authorized versions 
of the Declarations published in Beijing’s English-language newspapers. These omitted the clause 
about unconditionally returning the CER; it seems the Soviet missions attempted to claim that this 
clause had been inserted by mistake during the original Declaration’s translation from Russian into 
French. Wei, China and Soviet Russia, 31. See also Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern 
China, 2nd ed.(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), 297. 
 
35 Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 113. 
 
36 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 368–9. The Soviet government eventually ceded control of 
the CER to the Japanese-controlled Manchukuo government in the mid-1930s. 
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scholarship in recent decades has been devoted to the exposure and analysis of what might be 
called “imperial aesthetics”: cultural and artistic products that support and perpetuate 
imperial forms of power. The foundational text of this trend in Western academic 
scholarship, Edward Said’s Orientalism, argues that, while European states were pursuing 
political domination of non-European groups, European cultural systems (art, scholarship) 
produced images of these latter groups that present them as inevitably fit for subjugation.37 
David Spurr begins his study of The Rhetoric of Empire by referencing Jacques Derrida’s 
equation of anthropology with warfare, enacting a “violence of the letter” imposed by one 
culture on another, a violence “of difference, of classification, and of the system of 
appelations.”38 Equating Derrida’s “violence of the letter” with Antonio Gramsci’s notion of 
ideological hegemony, Spurr sees this violence expanding beyond anthropology to include 
“the entire system by which one culture comes to interpret, to represent, and finally to 
dominate another.”39  
These approaches tend to conceive knowledge production by one culture about 
another as inevitably a form of domination. Seeking a more positive model of global 
imagining, Frederic Jameson offers the term “cognitive mapping” to designate an aesthetic 
that seeks to map the social (ultimately global) totality for its audience, overcoming the 
separation between subjective phenomenological experience and objective social structure 
that pertains under imperial capitalism.40 The cognitive map, for Jameson, performs spatially 
the function ascribed by Louis Althusser to ideology, mapping in imaginary form the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
 
38 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and 
Imperial Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 4. 
 
39 Ibid., 6, 4.  
 
40 Frederic Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Gary 
Nelson and Laurence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 348–50. 
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subject’s relationship to their objective conditions of existence.41 This connection between 
the individual and the totality is what makes cognitive mapping, for Jameson, a necessarily 
aesthetic activity: Jameson credits aesthetics with the power to forge connections between 
individual experience and social totality in a manner denied to the abstract, subject-less 
discourse of social science.42  
An aesthetic of cognitive mapping, Jameson insists, “is an integral part of any 
socialist political project,” since “without a conception of the social totality (and the 
possibility of transforming a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is 
possible.”43 If this is true, then cognitive mapping—the spatial representation of a socialist 
ideology to replace the destroyed world picture of the vanquished, pre-revolutionary social 
order—must have been of primary importance for early Soviet culture.44 Indeed, Emma 
Widdis has recently applied Jameson’s notion of the cognitive map to the mapping of the new 
Soviet land through the medium of film.45 Widdis focuses on the representation and 
consolidation of national space within the USSR, which might seem to contradict Jameson’s 
aspiration that cognitive mapping could represent a global social totality and its inter-
relations. In fact, Widdis’ study charts a familiar path from the “horizontal” 1920s to the 
“vertical” 1930s, a movement away from internationalism and towards the Stalinist doctrine 
of socialism in one country.46 The 1920s remain, however, a moment when an alternative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., 353. 
42 Response to Nancy Fraser, ibid., 358. 
 
43 Ibid., 355. 
 
44 As Clifford Geertz argues, conscious, explicit articulations of ideology become more necessary in 
periods when traditional modes of understanding and behavior are interrupted. Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 218. 
 
45 Emma Widdis, Visions of a New Land: Soviet Film from the Revolution to the Second World War 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2, 197n1. 
 
46 Vladimir Papernyi proposes the model of a “horizontal” 1920s, “Culture One,” under which “the 
values of the periphery become more important than those of the center[,]” and its replacement in the 
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global map seemed possible: when “[b]orders were not protective divides that demarcated 
self from other, but rather represented the exciting spaces of transition into the workers' 
International, the global socialist space.”47  
Perhaps the key border of this period was the one that separated and connected Russia 
and China: neighbouring countries from very different cultural traditions brought together by 
the course of modern history. The images considered below are constantly crossing or 
reducing this border, by land and by air. The most dramatic border crossing was enacted by 
the Great Flight of 1925, a pioneering aviation expedition from Moscow through Mongolia to 
Beijing that became a multi-media event relayed through newspapers, books, and a 
documentary film (see Chapter Three). But the physical border between the states also offers 
a metaphor for the cultural distance that Ivin identified and Tret’iakov sought to transcend.  
Indeed, Jameson’s notion of the cognitive map coincides on several key points with 
Tret’iakov’s statements about how the Soviet image of China needs to be transformed. 
Jameson’s choice of terminology presents an apparent contradiction—does not a “map” 
constitute a distanced symbol, a representation that appeals to the cognitive faculties but 
remains detached from the immediacy of individual, corporeal experience? This contradiction 
also faced the early Soviet producers of China images: how, as Ivin asked, can abstract 
knowledge of China (such as a map) be communicated to a distanced audience as visceral, 
sensory experience? The collapsing of this distance between representations of knowledge 
and corporeal experience, between the map and the body, is precisely the function that 
Jameson ascribes to aesthetics. The aesthetic appeal to the body, Jameson hopes, can render 
the abstract concrete, and render the non-present present. This is the function that the early 	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Soviet imaginers of China called on aesthetics to perform: to collapse the distance between 
China and the Soviet audience by an aesthetic appeal to the senses that would complement 
and make concrete the superior knowledge produced by Marxist tools of analysis. 
Tret’iakov makes this project clear in an article entitled “To Love China” (“Liubit’ 
Kitai”). First published in 1925, this short text was reprinted as a programmatic introduction 
to the collected volume of Tret’iakov’s China sketches, Chzhungo (1927, republished 1930—
the title is a Cyrillic rendering of Zhongguo, “Middle Country,” one of the names for “China” 
in Chinese).48 Tret’iakov begins by summarizing the false, inherited image of China that 
predominates among the general public:  
A mysterious country. An inscrutable people. 
Chinese porcelain. Chinese shadows. Chinese silk. Chinese tea. The Chinese wall. 
Chinese writing. Chinese umbrellas. 
“Ah, those refined Chinese tortures! The Chinese princess Turandot, porcelain 
nodding dolls, Chinese fans, Chinese gowns, ah, opium dens!”  groans in addition 
one of our “sensitive” laywomen, attracted to the theatre and exotic books.49 
 
This China is known first of all through its commodities: the famous exports such as 
porcelain, silk, and tea that became so desirable and so profitable in the European world. 
Under the Marxist logic of commodity fetishism, the commodity is an appearance that 
becomes an illusion: the social nature of labour is embodied in and then concealed behind the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Liubit’ Kitai,” Shkval 25 (1925): 14-15. Reprinted in Tret’iakov, Chzhungo, 7–
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49 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Liubit’ Kitai,” Shkval, 1925, 5. Reprinted in Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 7. 
“Таинственная страна. Загадочный народ. 
Китайский фарфор. Китайские тени. Китайский шелк. Китайский чай.  Китайская стена. 
Китайская грамота. Китайский зонтик. 
— Ах, китайские утонченные пытки! Китайская принцесса Турандот, фарфоровые болванчики, 
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reference to Turandot, repeated two pages later, hints at the topicality of Tret'iakov's concerns: the 
Vakhtangov Theatre's production of Printsessa Turandot was one of the most popular and influential 
theatre productions of the early 1920s, while Puccini's opera debuted in Moscow in 1927. (See 
Chapter Four.) 
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abundance of commodities and their inter-relation through exchange value.50 The commodity 
logic of global capitalism, Tret’iakov implies, reduces relations with China to possession of 
or desire for objects.  
This illusory logic extends into the sphere of representations, “the theatre and exotic 
books,” which also constitute, in a commodity economy, commodities for consumption. 
Hence Tret’iakov’s list of fetishized exotica incorporates stereotypical images that circulate 
through popular culture, depicting vices and tempers both disturbing and alluring: torture, 
opium dens, Turandot. These images of China are produced for consumption by the literature 
of the colonial exotic: in a later essay, Tret'iakov lambasts Western writers such as Pierre 
Loti, Claude Farrère, and Gustave Mirbeau for presenting China as a “land of mysterious 
wonders, opium narcoses, the refined sensuality of torture, knife-wielding conspirators 
behind every corner[.]”51 The cumulative effect of commodification is that Chinese people 
themselves are effaced; dubbed “mysterious” at the head of Tret’iakov’s list, they then vanish 
behind a catalogue of their products and stereotypical appearances in illusory representational 
systems. Their true position in the global system is concealed. 
Tret’iakov’s sketches will seek to provide factual, eyewitness information in order to 
reveal this true position, to “map” China’s real relation to the global system as understood by 
Marxist-Leninist analysis. But the aesthetic dimension of the task, in “To Love China,” 
remains fundamental, since the enemy chooses to do battle on aesthetic territory. The 
illusions of exotic stereotype, Tret’iakov claims, are defended by their supporters on the 
grounds that “reality is greyer than the fantastic and exotic.”52 This is the assertion that 
Tret'iakov and his literature of fact must disprove. His eyewitness accounts will show a China 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 163–5. 
 
51 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 199. “удивляли людей былью и небылью об этой стране 
таинственных чудес, опиумных наркозов, утонченного сладострастия пыток, заговорщиков с 
ножом из-за угла[.]” 
 
52 Ibid., 8. “Действительность серее фантастической экзотики.” 
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that is not statically, irreducibly different, but transforming in a manner that brings it closer to 
Russian experience. Scholars hunched over their calligraphy give way to university 
sportsmen working in laboratories with Bunsen burners; palanquins are pushed off the street 
by bicycles; Chinese workers and students are organizing unions and protests. “Before this 
new, explosive China,” Tret’iakov proclaims, “the nodding Chinese dolls of fantasy will 
crumble into dust. Fantasy is greyer than reality.” 53  
This overcoming of fantasy by vivid reality cannot simply be achieved, however, by 
abstract, dispassionate analysis. Instead, only sensory and emotional engagement, relayed 
through the bodily presence of the reporter, can dispel these illusions: “This formula will be 
evident to us,” Tret'iakov insists, “when we manage not simply to understand China 
schematically, but to feel our way around it with our own hands, to fix it with a steady gaze, 
when we come to know and love China as our own kith and kin.”54 Tret'iakov wants his 
readers to see and feel China as if they themselves were present. Only this aesthetic 
experience can produce the feelings of closeness and kinship that enable internationalist 
solidarity: “kith and kin” here translates rodnoi i blizkii, literally “kindred and close.” The 
infinitive in “To Love China” becomes an imperative: consistent with Fore’s definition of 
factography as  “a mode of writing that both manipulates and produces at the same time that 
it denotes and refers,” Tret’iakov’s China writings seek to produce this feeling of closeness 
and love for China in the reader.55 
Is “aesthetics” the correct word for this process? Tret’iakov himself often uses the 
term and its cognates to suggest something distanced from reality, confined to a zone of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., 10. “Перед этим новым, взрывчатым, на дыбы встающим Китаем в пыль рассыпаются 
болванчики фантазии. Фантазия серее действительности.” 
 
54 Ibid. “Эта формула будет для нас очевидна, когда мы не только схематически поймем Китай, 
но когда возьмем его наощупь, на пристальный разгляд, когда мы его, родного и близкого, 
узнаем и полюбим.” 
 
55 Fore, “‘All the Graphs’,” 87. 
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pleasure and distraction set apart from the realities of social life. There is more than one way 
to understand aesthetics, however. In outlining his notion of the cognitive map, Jameson 
argues that Marxist conceptions of aesthetics typically reject the notion of the work of art as 
an object of disinterested contemplation and pleasure, insisting instead that aesthetic 
experience should perform a cognitive, educational function. “To teach, to move, to delight”: 
Jameson turns to Cicero, unattributed, for this summary of the functions of the work of art, 
adding that the first task is often set aside in modern, non-Marxist perspectives.56 Cicero’s 
original quote, however, is in fact a description of rhetoric: “The supreme orator,” he insists, 
“is one whose speech instructs, delights and moves the minds of its audience.”57 While 
“delight” seems closer to the form of exotic aesthetics Tret’iakov seeks to overthrow, a 
combination of educating and “moving the minds” of his audience summarizes well the intent 
of his China project—especially if we translate Cicero’s “permovet” into something closer to 
1920s Soviet language, as “agitate.” These images of China, in other words, are explicitly 
and consciously rhetorical, asserting a particular interpretation of reality on their audience 
through a combination of reason and emotion. I retain the term “aesthetics,” however, to 
reflect the fact that these images took shape across a whole spectrum of genres and media, 
and to emphasise the various appeals they make to the senses, to sight and sound in 
particular. 
Although not all of the cultural producers who feature in this study ascribed to 
Tret’iakov’s literature of fact movement, the desire to produce China as both a cognitive and 
emotional experience runs through these texts. The Soviet perspective on China claims 
epistemological validity on the grounds of possessing a “scientific” tool, Marxist class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping,” 347–48. 
 
57 Marcus Tullius Cicero, “De Optimo Genere Oratorum,” in De Inventione, De Optimo Genere 
Oratorum, Topica, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 356–57. 
“Optimus est enim orator qui dicendo animos audientium et docet et delectat et permovet.” 
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analysis, through which to explain what is really happening in this distant foreign place. At 
the same time, these cultural producers seek to generate an emotional connection to China 
that overcomes distance and enables solidarity through a sensory experience of Chinese 
“reality.” 
An objection arises, flagged by scare quotes: how do we, as readers, distinguish 
fantasy from reality? How do we differentiate between enlightening and deceptive aesthetic 
experiences? What if Soviet culture simply produces a new false or concealing image of 
China, removed from the colonial exotic yet shaped to fit the aspiring hegemonic discourse of 
Soviet-led Leninist internationalism? At their crudest, many of these new images of China 
can be relegated to what Michael Smith, writing on early Soviet films about the East, has 
dubbed the aesthetic of “national realism”: national identity is reduced to a tradition-mired 
backwardness that socialist modernity has come to redeem.58 Taken as a whole, these texts 
sometimes give the impression that China, ostensibly de-exoticized, is in fact re-reified, and 
always basically the same: a turbulent storm of oppressed coolies, devious missionaries, 
battered rickshaw drivers, arrogant Englishmen, treacherous white Russians, and imprisoned 
women. Beyond the convenience of shocking, titillating or otherwise energising clichés, what 
reification really means here is that “China”—a vast and complex human world of social 
multiplicities, historical complexities, and competing agencies—is ascribed a stable set of 
meanings within the aspiring hegemonic discourse of Soviet internationalism.  
Any representation of a complex social reality will be partial; these images, 
furthermore, are generally open about their political agenda. Rather than interrogate the 
correspondence of these texts to some externally affirmative “reality” of 1920s China, it may 
be more profitable to explore the strategies through which they claim the authority to 
represent that reality. These images assert the power and validity of a specifically Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Michael G. Smith, “Cinema for the ‘Soviet East’: National Fact and Revolutionary Fiction in Early 
Azerbaijani Film,” Slavic Review, Vol. 56, no. 4 (Winter, 1997): 677. 
	  	   22	  
perspective on the world, a travelling subjectivity that combined anti-imperialist, egalitarian 
sentiment with a strong sense of the global entitlement of Marxist-Leninist scientific 
discourse. This is why we repeatedly meet the claim, throughout this study, that the Soviet 
eyewitness observer is uniquely empowered to understand and penetrate contemporary 
China. 
III. 
The Authority of the Soviet Perspective: 
Analysis and Sympathy, Observation and Translation 
 
How does an observing outsider produce an authoritative description of a foreign 
culture? James Clifford ask precisely this question in his examination of ethnography’s 
transformation of “unruly experience” into a stable and authoritative written account of a 
discreet “other world”: 
In analyzing this complex transformation one must bear in mind the fact that 
ethnography is from beginning to end enmeshed in writing. This writing includes, 
minimally, a translation of experience into textual form. The process is complicated 
by the action of multiple subjectivities and political constraints beyond the control 
of the writer. In response to these forces ethnographic writing enacts a specific 
strategy of authority. This has classically involved an unquestioned claim to appear 
as the purveyor of truth in the text.59 
 
What strategy of authority does the Soviet observer enact, in translating experience of China 
into textual form? Put simply, these images conceive China as a contested territory split 
between two opposing parties: “the Chinese,” meaning the oppressed and powerless 
segments of the population; and “imperialism,” an alliance of foreign capital, the native 
bourgeoisie, and Chinese militarism. The Soviet perspective introduces a third position that 
can perceive the true nature of the Chinese social situation because it incorporates elements 
of the other two, combining the technological achievements and political innovations of 
Western modernity with a deep sense of solidarity, born of common experience, towards the 
oppressed Chinese. Time and again, we are told that it is this unique combination of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Authority,” Representations 2 (Spring 1983): 120. 
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knowledge and sympathy that enables the representatives of Soviet subjectivity to “map” 
China more correctly than anyone else, and to connect that map to the personal experiences 
of the Soviet public.  
Take for example this quote from Nikolai Karintsev’s Around the World in an 
Aeroplane (Vokrug sveta na aeroplane), an adventure serial for young readers published in 
1926. The serial’s plot neatly expresses the aforementioned combination of Western 
technology and anti-imperial sympathy. Fleeing the First World War, a young Russian 
Communist named Nikolai Kurdin winds up in New York City, where he admires the 
achievements of American technology but laments that they are subordinated to the rule of 
the dollar. Seeking to reach Soviet Russia, Kurdin and his friends take part in an aeroplane 
race around the world, in competition with a cheating capitalist. Their plane touches down in 
China, where they befriend Chinese revolutionaries and have a private audience with Sun 
Yat-sen.  
They also meet Elena Larionova, a White-turned-Red Russian who gives them a 
detailed run-down of recent Chinese history and the role of peasant uprisings. Elena claims 
that her understanding of China comes simply from the fact that she lives there and is 
interested in what surrounds her. Kurdin, however, disputes this explanation of her authority: 
“Comrade Elena is being modest,” said Kurdin. “The point is not that she has talked 
and read a lot, but that she has been able to get close to the essence of the China 
problem and absorb the horror and grief of an oppressed people. She looked at 
China, not with the rapacious eyes of the lovers of dollars and their ilk, but with the 
friendly gaze of a Communist.  The workers of the whole world look at China with 
such a gaze.”60  
 
The quality of Elena’s gaze, as a Red Russian, is fundamentally different to the perspectives 
of other foreigners, motivated by sympathy not domination. To paraphrase Mary-Louise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Nikolai Karintsev, Vokrug sveta na aeroplane (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1926) vypusk 4, 49. 
“— Товарищ Елена скромничает, —сказал Кудрин. — Дело не в том только, что она 
беседовала и читала, а в том, что она сумела близко подойти к существу китайского вопроса и 
воспринять ужас и горе забитого народа. Она смотрела на Китай не хищными глaзами 
любителей долларов и иже с ними, а дружеским взглядом коммуниста. И таким же взглядом на 
Китай смотрят трудящиеся всего мира.” 
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Pratt’s study of travel writing and imperial culture, we might say that Soviet Russians claim 
to look at China with “anti-imperial eyes.”61 Tret’iakov, introducing the serialization of his 
travel sketches in Rabochaia Moskva, also describes a form of vision that departs 
fundamentally from the imperialist gaze: “We, the people from this Soviet land, have the 
honourable role of truly seeing China for the first time, not in the shape of a rapacious and 
dangerous beast, behind the bars of a cage, but in the form of a human being: vast, backward, 
tormented, and begging for a comradely hand-shake.”62 The Soviet gaze humanizes China for 
the first time. 
This sympathy purportedly derived from experience. In a speech to a meeting of the 
“Hands off China!” society, held at the Bolshoi Theatre on 22 September 1924, Karl Radek, 
rector of the Sun Yat-sen University for the Workers of China and a prominent public voice 
on China, explains how this sympathy can be produced among Soviet workers when they 
know so little about China: 
The events taking place in China have aroused profound interest among the 
working masses in our country. Russians workers, it goes without saying, know 
little about China and its history, and when they read in a telegram the strange-
sounding surnames of Chinese public figures, they often can’t tell them apart. But 
Russian workers know from their own experience what civil war is, what imperialist 
intervention is, and therefore when they learn that English, French, American and 
Japanese military vessels have gathered in Canton to threaten the revolutionary 
democratic government of the South, and are at present preparing to move towards 
Shanghai—this information is enough for Russian workers to understand that the 
same criminal act is brewing there that the workers of Russia fought against for 
many years, with weapons in their hands. But our instinctive sympathy for the 
Chinese people is not enough, sympathy will not make their lot any easier. It is our 
obligation to help the Chinese working masses in their struggle, and in order to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Mary-Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 
1992). 
 
62 Sergei Tret’iakov, “U Zheltogo moria—zhelt’ i sin’,” Rabochaia Moskva, 21 May 1927, 3. “У 
нас—людей из советской страны—почетная роль впервые увидать Китай, не в образе хищного 
и опасного зверя, за решеткой, а в виде огромного, отсталого, замученного и просящего о 
товарищеском рукопожатии человека.” 
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able to help them, our first duty is to try and understand what is happening in 
China.63  
 
This instinctive sympathy that Russian workers feel for China, Radek claims, is born from 
their own bodily experience, from living through revolution and the imperialist encirclement 
during the Civil War. For Radek, this reserve of instinctive sympathy, written into Soviet 
bodies by experience, allows the first hurdle, popular ignorance of China, to be bypassed. 
Sympathy is not enough in itself, however. Soviet collective consciousness (here voiced by 
Radek) must then proceed to apply the scientific tool of Marxist class analysis to Chinese 
social reality, thereby revealing that China is in chaos because no one class has been strong 
enough to seize power since the end of dynastic rule in 1911.64 This combination of 
sympathy derived from experience and analysis derived from Marxism underpins the claim 
that the Soviet perspective on China possesses an interpretative authority unavailable to other 
foreigners, or, indeed, to the Chinese themselves. 
Marxist method encouraged Soviet intellectuals and their audience to view the world 
in terms of underlying socio-economic structure, in contrast to which the super-structure of 
culture provides merely a surface illusion. On these grounds, Russia and China could be seen 
not as culturally distant, which they were, but as socio-economically similar: rural 	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Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet im. M. V. Lomonosov, 2005), esp. Pantsov’s introductory 
essay, “Karl Radek — kitaeved.” 
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autocracies entering modernity at a lag from the industrialized West, marked by the uneven 
development and combination of historical stages that Trotsky noted in his history of the 
Russian revolution, and Chinese intellectuals like Li Dazhao saw all over their country’s 
major cities.65 Providing a platform for such structural understandings of trans-cultural 
similarity, Lenin argued that “national” culture was essentially a creation and projection of 
the dominating classes, and disguised an underlying commonality of democratic, socialist 
culture that unites the exploited masses across the globe: 
The elements of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary 
form, in every national culture, since in every nation there are toiling and exploited 
masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy 
and socialism. But every nation also possesses a bourgeois culture (and most 
nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the form, not merely of 
“elements,” but of the dominant culture. Therefore, the general “national culture” is 
the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie.66 
 
The power of the Soviet perspective in China will express itself, time and again, in the 
capacity to see through or past this imposed, dominant national culture. Beneath the 
difference that dominant culture proclaims, the Soviet perspective discerns a commonality 
and commensurability of historical experience. At times, this will expand into notions of 
trans-Eurasian identity, or collapse back into exotic difference. But the simplest trope is 
kinship: Soviet Russia undertakes a fraternal but also paternal role in nurturing the Chinese 
social revolution, a revolution that is conceived as essentially an offspring of its Russian 
ancestor. 
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 The language I have been using, it may be noted, foregrounds metaphors of vision 
and perception: perspective, gaze, viewing, seeing through. Soviet interpretative authority 
over China is frequently expressed as a capacity to see clearly, to master the field of the 
visual: most notably through the media of travel writing and documentary cinema. The link 
between visuality and modern forms of power has been widely theorized, perhaps most 
famously with Michel Foucault’s model of the “panopticon.” Foucault’s panopticism, Spurr 
argues, can illuminate any situation wherein a dissymmetry of vision between observer and 
observed. This principle, Spurr writes, “has bearing on any occasion where the superior and 
invulnerable position of the observer coincides with the role of affirming the political order 
that makes that position possible.”67 This is precisely what Pratt finds in her analysis of 
colonial travel writing: the travel account presents distant territory as available and accessible 
to subordination and colonization, thus implicating the metropolitan readership in the 
colonial project. But do we not also find this dynamic in the travel sketches of Tret’iakov, 
whose claims to observational and interpretative power affirm the superiority of the Marxist-
Leninist worldview, as his images of China assert the readiness of that society to join the 
Soviet internationalist order?  
 This is not to claim the simple identity of “imperial” and “anti-imperial,” “colonial” 
and “Soviet” aesthetics. It is rather to suggest an abiding contradiction at the heart of the 
Soviet internationalist project. For all its liberational ideology, the attempt to impose Marxist-
Leninist internationalism as a hegemonic vision of global politics represents an assertion of 
power. As Rey Chow notes, the twentieth century offered new technical resources to help in 
the production of hegemonic world pictures: print media began to incorporate photographs, 
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while cinema extended its images across the world.68 Fore astutely notes that these media 
innovations accelerated massively in Russia in the 1920s, alongside the Soviet project to 
reimagine the world.69 Technologized visuality is brought to bear, as Widdis notes, on the 
reclaiming of Soviet territory; but its ultimate purpose is the creation of a global cognitive 
map, and China is the first significant testing ground. Thus China is wrenched out of one 
world picture, only to be inscribed into another.  
 As Clifford has argued in the case of ethnography, an emphasis on visuality and the 
interpretative power of the observing gaze can obscure questions of linguistic and cultural 
translation.70 How does the internationalist gaze account for the fact that different cultures 
have different systems of communication, different ways of understanding the world? Of the 
Soviet writers and artists considered here, only Ivin/Ivanov had a full command of Chinese 
speech and writing together with protracted, embedded exposure to Chinese social life. The 
problems of language and translation will surface in every chapter below. They raise the 
problem of difference from another perspective, one that may be illuminated by considering 
the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas argues that the relation of the self to 
alterity can either be possessive, an “imperialism of the same” that identifies the other 
ultimately as part of the self; or it can be metaphysical, retaining the absolute Other at a 
distance that does not permit incorporation into a self-centred system. Only the second 
relation, for Levinas, can truly ground ethics; the first remains a relation of power. The 
medium of the first system, or “totality,” is vision; the medium of the second, or “infinity,” is 
language.71 Perhaps the Soviet rejection of exotic difference effaces an otherness that, in 	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69 Devin Fore, “Introduction,” October 118 (Fall 2006): 6. 
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71 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague: M. Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1979), 37–9. 
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Levinas’ terms, potentially possesses ethical value? By privileging visuality over the 
language of the other, does the Soviet embrace of the Chinese within the internationalist gaze 
create a new “imperialism of the same”? 
To put it another way: is there anything “dialogic” about this encounter? Do the 
Chinese speak to the Soviet audience thru the mediation of these images, or are they spoken 
for? And if what we find here is a Soviet monologue about “China,” is there any real 
difference between imperial and anti-imperial aesthetics?  
Besides the intense contacts between Comintern agents and members of the GMD and 
CCP, there seems to have been some interaction between Chinese intellectuals and those 
Soviet writers and scholars that made it to 1920s China. Ivin spoke and read Chinese well, 
and frequently quotes Chinese newspapers and other sources in his Russian-language articles. 
Those articles were in turn, it seems, mentioned with approval in the Chinese press.72 Lu Xun 
recalls talking to Ivin about Russian literature in the mid-1920s, and mentions that Ivin and 
Tret’iakov helped him to translate Aleksandr Blok’s poem “The Twelve” (“Dvenadtsat’”).73 
The Sinologist Boris Vasil’ev met Cao Jinghua, translator of Russian literature and former 
student of Tret’iakov, in Kaifeng in 1925: through Cao’s mediation, Vasil’ev produced the 
first Russian translation of Lu Xun’s short stories, published in Leningrad in 1929.74 
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Chinese readers’ sense of Russian literature lagging behind revolutionary developments, taking place 
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While Vasil’ev’s translation appears not to have made much impact on Soviet readers, 
the status and influence of Russian literature among Chinese readers in this period was 
enormous. Seeking an alternative path to modernity that would evade the imperialist 
associations of the West, many Chinese intellectuals looked to Russian literature, in the 
words of Mark Gamsa’s extensive study, as both a “moral example” and a “manual of 
practice.” The classics of nineteenth century Russian literature were received in China 
primarily as works of social criticism that championed the “insulted and injured,” while the 
new Soviet literature was welcomed by some as a repository of positive revolutionary 
values.75  
Given these various levels of contact, we might observe that Soviet images of China 
in the 1920s share many typical features with the image of China that emerges from 
contemporary Chinese critical realist literature, a trend typically connected to the May Fourth 
Movement.76 The anti-imperialism that fuelled the demonstrations of May 4th, 1919 was also 
a central theme of Soviet internationalism. Both approaches to China deplore the evil 
influence of Confucian tradition, with its strict hierarchies and veneration of the past: Lu 
Xun’s madman reading Chinese tradition as thinly disguised cannibalism lies in close 
sympathy with Sergei Tret’iakov’s description of China as “this country in which the dead 
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hold the living by the throat like nowhere else.”77 Oppressed coolies and rickshaw drivers, an 
obligatory presence in Soviet images of China, also provide the central characters for seminal 
Chinese texts of the period, from Lu Xun’s True Story of Ah Q (A Q Zhengzhuan阿 Q正传, 
1921–2) to Lao She’s Rickshaw/Camel Xiangzi (Luotuo Xiangzi 骆驼祥子, 1937). Indeed, 
Richard So argues that in this period the term kuli 苦力, a loan word whose Chinese form 
translates literally as “bitter labor,” expanded its referent from migrant hired workers to 
embrace anyone “Chinese, poor, and without power or agency.”78 These are precisely the 
forms of oppression that Soviet observers sought to highlight in China, particularly with their 
focus on the coolie work-cry, which was mobilized as a generalized and trans-cultural 
symbol of oppressed toil (see Chapter Two).  
Could it be that the Soviet image of China in fact betrays the influence of May Fourth 
discourse, refracted into Soviet culture through Ivin and then Tret’iakov? Tret’iakov admits 
that it was Ivin who first taught him to “see” China; Tret’iakov’s texts in turn became the 
most prominent attempts to change the image of China held in the mind of the Soviet 
public.79 There may be a line of influence here, but its contours are obscured. It is tempting to 
imagine Tret’iakov, Ivin, Lu Xun and Li Dazhao locked in conversation somewhere in 
Beijing some time in 1925, but concrete evidence is scarce.  If we attempt to measure 
influence in terms of translation, meanwhile, it must be acknowledged that the rapidly 
expanding interest in translating modern Russian literature into Chinese that Gamsa describes 	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was not matched by a similar demand for translated Chinese literature among readers of 
Russian.80  
This attraction to Russian culture drew significant numbers of Chinese writers and 
students out of China and into Soviet Russia. Writers including Qu Qiubai, Jiang Kanghu, 
Lin Keduo and Hu Yuzhi published accounts of journeys to Soviet Russia in the 1920s and 
1930s.81 Chinese students travelled to Moscow in even greater numbers, to study at the 
Communist University for the Workers of the East and, later, the Sun Yat-sen University for 
the Workers of China. Here they learned Russian, took Russian names, and had affairs with 
Russian women. They also contributed to many of the texts that are discussed in this study: 
Chinese students advised on stage decorations for Tret’iakov’s play Roar, China, and offered 
up their life-stories for Tret’iakov’s “bio-interview,” Den Shi-khua; they translated slogans 
for the ballet The Red Poppy, and helped the composer Reinhold Glière to form his sense of 
Chinese music.82 All this is part of a complex and long-standing historical experience that 
Elizabeth McGuire calls the “Sino-Soviet romance.”83  
What we begin to sense through these connections and interactions is the hidden and 
overt presence of Chinese intermediaries, who stand behind these Soviet images of China. 	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Their contribution is sometimes openly acknowledged—Tret’iakov, for example, admits at 
several moments in his sketches that his Chinese students helped him to understand what was 
really happening in Beijing. Elsewhere, Chinese mediation lingers as a suggested or 
unacknowledged presence. In any case, the representational balance of power is such that we 
cannot access any possible Chinese original directly; everything is filtered through an 
authoritative Russian translation.   
The most compelling exploration of this dynamic will be found in the discussion of 
Sergei Tret’iakov’s “bio-interview” Den Shi-khua, which closes this dissertation’s final 
chapter. Tret’iakov presents this long, detailed text as the authentic life story of “Den Shi-
khua” (Deng Shihua), one of his former students from Beijing. Den purportedly relayed his 
autobiography in a series of interviews over six months in Moscow, and Tret’iakov then 
shaped this “factual material” into a coherent Russian narrative. Here we have what appears 
to be a productive dialogue between the most prominent Soviet producer of China images 
and a Chinese “native informant” who promises factual access to Chinese reality. Yet 
Tret’iakov’s text ultimately represents a translation without an original. How are we to access 
Den’s true voice, when we are told that he spoke Russian with difficulty and often resorted to 
sketches to express his meaning, yet the narrative of his life proceeds in smooth literary 
Russian?  
The complex power dynamic and open-ended conclusion of Den Shi-khua expresses 
both the Soviet desire to shape the narrative of the Chinese revolution, and the limitations 
that Soviet representational authority encountered. Although Den Shi-khua gestures towards 
the standard shape of a Communist Bildungsroman, Tret’iakov’s factual approach refuses to 
conceal that fact that Den ultimately remained committed to the Guomindang, and did not 
join the Communists. As Roy Chan points out, other Soviet representations of China often 
prefer to obscure the important fact that the radical Chinese response to modernity was 
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primarily nationalist, not internationalist, in character.84 The New Culture and May Fourth 
movements sought to use the imported foreign form of literary realism to enact a national 
revival, to compensate for the perceived failure of the political revolution.85 Soviet 
internationalist aesthetics, in the 1920s at least, produced images of China as vivid, urgent 
microcosms of a scientifically determined process of world revolution. (As Soviet culture 
became more nationally focused in the 1930s, the image of China changed, as we shall see in 
the Epilogue.) The material from Chinese reality on which these discourses choose to focus 
may be similar, but the parameters of the world they imagine are quite different. The texts 
considered below seek to incorporate China into a total image of the world both revealed by 
and exclusively available to the privileged Soviet perspective. 
IV. Genre and Media, Documentary and Myth 
The question of authority is not limited to analytical perspective and instinctive 
sympathy. At issue is also the authority of particular generic modes and media forms to 
represent the world in a correct, revolutionary manner. The urgency of representing China 
anew in the 1920s means that these two contests for authority coincide. In the newly 
mediatized environment described by Fore, fiction and the travel narrative compete with 
photography and film, classical ballet stakes its claims against Meyerholdian biodynamics, 
and the battleground in each case is “China.”  
For this reason, this study is structured around different generic and media forms, 
rather then individual authors or strict chronology. The search for an internationalist 
aesthetics led its participants to move between genres and even invent new ones, as they tried 
to overcome the flaws in Soviet knowledge of China. Take this study’s most prominent 
author, Sergei Tret’iakov. “Each epoch,” Tret’iakov declared, “must produce and master 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Roy Chan, “Broken Tongues: Race, Sacrifice, and Geopolitics in the Far East in Vsevolod Ivanov’s 
Bronepoezd No. 14–69,” Sibirica, Vol. 10, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 31, 38, 44–5. 
 
85 Anderson, Limits of Realism, 3. 
	  	   35	  
aesthetic techniques that are adequate to its specific historical moment.”86 Tret’iakov’s search 
for aesthetic techniques adequate to the new era received vital impetus from his involvement 
in China: beginning with poetry, Tret’iakov’s China texts move into sketch-prose, embrace 
drama and the screenplay, and end with biography. Boris Pilniak shows similar variation in 
his approach to “China” as a theme, beginning in impenetrable ornamentalism and 
progressing through subjective journo-travelogue to end, too, with biography. One of the first 
Soviet expedition films, 1925’s The Great Flight, charted a journey to China. The Red Poppy 
(premiered 1927), one of the earliest attempts to create a truly revolutionary ballet on a 
contemporary theme, is set in China. China was at the centre of the great search for new 
forms that characterized early Soviet culture.  
Chapter One deals primarily with fiction about the Civil War, exploring the 
ambiguous symbolic role played by the figure of the Chinese Red partisan: a migrant soldier 
equally capable of standing for internationalist solidarity or foreign threat. Chapter Two is 
devoted to reportage and travel writing, focused around a comparison between the anti-exotic 
sketches of Sergei Tret’iakov and Boris Pil’niak’s “Chinese Story,” which flits fragmentarily 
between documentary, diary, and fiction. Chapter Three considers the internationalist gaze as 
expressed in cinema, incorporating fiction film but centring on two prominent documentary 
films on 1920s China: The Great Flight (Velikii perelet, 1925) and Shanghai Document 
(Shankhaiskii dokument, 1928). Chapter Four watches China being performed on the Soviet 
stage of the 1920s, and finds the documentary urge coexisting with motifs of revolutionary 
sacrifice in two seemingly very different productions: the Meyerhold Theater’s Roar, China! 
(Rychi, Kitai!, 1926) and the Bolshoi ballet The Red Poppy (Krasnyi mak, 1927). Lastly, 
Chapter Five explores the biographical form in fiction and the literature of fact, concluding 
with a reading of Tret’iakov’s “bio-interview,” Den Shi-khua, within the confessional context 
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of Soviet political culture. Such an arrangement makes clear to what extent the vital contests 
of early Soviet culture—contests about the correct way to represent the world for a 
revolutionary society— were played out over the issue of China. In each chapter, 
furthermore, a tension and contradiction can be sensed between two trends, which might be 
dubbed the documentary and mythical tendencies. 
The existence of a “documentary moment” in early Soviet culture has been confirmed 
in recent studies by Elizabeth Papazian and Devin Fore.87 Both focus heavily of Tret’iakov as 
a key figure in this documentary moment, though neither explicitly consider why it might 
have been Tret’iakov’s trip to Beijing in 1924–5 that initiated his documentary practice and 
“factographical” experiments. In cinema, Widdis notes that one of the pioneers of the Soviet 
“expedition film,” Vladimir Shneiderov, followed his first film, Around Uzbekistan, with The 
Great Flight, a documentary account of an aviation expedition to China.88 Important debates 
over representation, exoticism, and the liberatory possibilities of ethnography receive their 
early focus in images of contemporary China. In writing, film, and theater, there is a striking 
congruence between the urge towards documentary and the urge to “see” China anew.  
Borrowing a term from the theorist of documentary film Bill Nichols, we might 
consider this documentary mode a “discourse of sobriety,” under which the superficial 
exotic—including the neo-exotic of revolutionary China as chaotic adventure space—gives 
way to calm sociological truth.  A. Adjarov begins one of his “Sketches of Contemporary 
China,” published in Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow) in 1925, with a plea to replace 
decoration with substance:  
The procession of exotic generals’ names, the crackle of the machine gun, the 
clanging of spurs, the rustle of English pounds and American dollars – all this is the 	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shiny tinsel of Chinese events that fills the newspaper columns. But it is not this 
tinsel that imbues the history of this genuine Chinese Renaissance with content. All 
that is but tomorrow’s dust of history. A new China has arisen to political agency: 
not “gold,” but red.89 
 
This discourse of sobriety was intended to replace older knowledge systems that were tainted 
by their imperial associations. As Widdis notes, debates on ethnography in the later 1920s 
“focused on the need to discover a mode of objective representation that would liberate 
ethnography from the complex heritage of Tsarist colonialism.”90 In the 1920s, Widdis 
argues, “knowledge was consistently articulated as the means of liberating the nation from 
repressive Imperial structures and building an equal society. […] ‘Authentic’ ethnographic 
detail was presented as a prerequisite for the genuine equality of the peoples.”91 Widdis is 
speaking here of ethnographic studies of peoples within the Soviet Union; but her analysis 
also fits the drive to produce new, “authentic” knowledge of China. The “sober” tools of the 
ethnographic gaze and the documentary camera eye were put forward as the best media for 
transmitting that truth. 
Other texts, however, employ what Nichols calls “intoxicated” discourse, a discourse 
of inspiration and possession. These largely fictional texts present the Chinese revolution as a 
sacred process of cleansing violence and blood sacrifice, set in a world defined by cruelty, 
brutality, and bravery. To place these two discourses in opposition, however, is to ignore the 
degree to which they interpenetrate one another. As we saw in Tret’iakov’s exhortation to 
“Love China,” the documentary discourse of sobriety is never entirely free from the 
inspirational, intoxicating urges that mark the discourse of rapture.  	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Indeed we might sense here a tension at the heart of the Soviet project, one that Peter 
Holquist identifies as a conflation of the scientific and the aesthetic in Soviet society’s self-
conceptions.92 Holquist is perhaps following the lead of Michel Foucault, who asks in his 
History of Madness: “What figure of science, however coherent or tight it might be, does not 
allow more or less obscure forms of practical, moral or mythological consciousness to 
gravitate around it?”93 Soviet society aspired to a new, scientific form of total knowledge, but 
that knowledge appeared encircled by vivid and compelling myths about the bright future, 
utopia, and the violence of the struggle towards its attainment. These revolutionary myths 
borrowed from older mythical forms, primarily religious, but reshaped them into foundational 
narratives for the new society: thus it is perhaps better to call this impulse in Soviet culture 
not mythological, but rather mythopoetic. Offering a key contribution to this mythopoetic 
perspective on Soviet culture, Katerina Clark reads the Socialist Realist novel as a ritual 
enactment through biography of the eschatological narrative of history offered by Marxist-
Leninist theory. Central to this ritual, Clark notes, is the motif of sacrifice; and as we shall 
see, it is self-sacrifice, accompanied usually by intense, visceral levels of violence, that 
dominates the mythical shape of these China images.94 
Documentary and myth are not mutually exclusive; rather, the combination of both—
sober knowledge of Marxist truth, and reverent commitment to the new terms of the 
revolutionary sacred—are what guarantee the power of the Soviet perspective. This point will 
be illustrated most vividly in Chapter Four, where the documentary and mythical impulses 
collide onstage. Tret’iakov’s agitational “docu-drama” Roar, China! processed a newspaper 	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93 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 163. 
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event into a paradigmatic myth of the Chinese masses achieving consciousness through self-
sacrifice. Likewise, the collective that staged The Red Poppy at the Bolshoi Theatre evoked a 
documentary aesthetic while employing the key tropes of revolutionary sacralisation: self-
sacrifice and the repayment of unjust with just violence. In this repeated trope of violent 
sacrifice—glimpsed even in the documentary film Shanghai Document—we see the mythical 
image of Russia’s revolution projected, proprietorially, onto its Chinese sibling. 
V. China in the Russian Cultural Imagination 
 
These new images of China did not emerge into a vacuum. Over two centuries of 
Sino-Russian cultural contact had produced a significant canon of China images in Russian 
culture, sometimes distinguished from and sometimes blending into a generalized “Asia.” 
These images of China have received considerable attention in recent scholarship, in the 
wake of a broadly postcolonial turn in Russian studies since the mid-1990s and an increased 
interest in Russia’s relation to “the East.” Book-length studies by Aleksandr Lukin (The Bear 
Watches the Dragon) and Susanna Lim (China and Japan in the Russian Cultural 
Imagination), complemented by various monographs, articles, chapters and dissertations, 
have attempted to trace the development of the Russian image of China.95 Here I will draw on 
their findings to provide a pre-history to my own study, and seek to elucidate some striking 
patterns that either endure or expire with the advent of Soviet society.  	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European culture, broadly speaking, has for centuries positioned China as one of its 
paradigmatic others, a parallel yet alien civilization on the opposite side of the globe. 
Geographical distance offers here an effective metaphor for cultural difference, note the 
editors of the recent volume Sinographies: “distance corresponds via metaphor to a felt 
difference, so that discussion of China take place in the mode of the faraway (as Roland 
Barthes says of his invented Japan), with the distance serving to explain the difference, and 
vice versa.”96 Geography’s ideological signification changes, however, when we reach 
Russia, a geopolitical space that, as Mark Bassin has argued, troubles and disrupts the neat 
separation of Europe and Asia.97 This confluence of geography and ideology leads us 
immediately to the crucial difference between Russian and Western images of China. 
“China” from a Russian perspective is both distant and adjacent, both “distant China” 
(dalekii Kitai) and a neighbouring country with a common border stretching for several 
thousand kilometres. Echoing this geographical ambiguity, Russian images of China display 
over time a complex shuttling between the poles of difference and similarity, distance and 
proximity, in a manner that distinguishes them from their Western counterparts. This tension 
shapes the discourse of the 1920s, which proclaims revolutionary commensurability despite 
the abiding presence of cultural difference. It runs, however, through several centuries of 
contact. 
The earliest and least documented period of Sino-Russian contact comes with the 
almost simultaneous conquest of Rus’ and Jin-Dynasty China by the Mongols, and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Eric Hayot, Haun Saussy and Steven G. Yao, “Sinographies: An Introduction,” in Hayot, Saussy 
and Yao, eds, Sinographies: Writing China (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), viii. 
 
97 Mark Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical 
Space,” Slavic Review , Vol. 50, 1 (Spring, 1991): 1–17. 
 
	  	   41	  
incorporation into the Mongol Empire.98 Though direct contact between these distant parts of 
the Mongol domain appears to have been limited, this moment of Eurasian imperial union set 
a precedent: it was across the Eurasian steppes, and not by sea, that Russia was to develop its 
contacts with China.99 Indeed, the Sinologist A. S. Martynov identifies a geo-economic 
commensurability between Russia and China as the “two greatest centers of agriculture” on 
the Eurasian continent, connected and divided, “like the two bowls of a scale,” by a “long 
balance beam: the endless belt of Eurasian steppes and deserts, stretching from the 
Carpathians to the Great Wall of China.”100 From a geographically determinist perspective, 
this “battle between field and steppe,” between settled agriculture and nomadic invasion, 
shaped political and economic development—contributing, some historians contend, to the 
dominance of autocracy in both states.101 
Although Mikhail Fyodorovich, the first Romanov tsar, sent an (unsuccessful) envoy 
to China as early as 1618, modern Russo-Chinese political relations took shape in the late 
seventeenth century, when the establishment of Cossack fortresses on the Amur river 
provoked armed reaction from Kangxi’s Qing Empire.102 In 1685 Qing forces destroyed the 
fortress at Albazin, taking some 50 Russians back to China as prisoners. Emperor Kangxi 
made them bannermen, and granted them the right to maintain their Orthodox religion. The 	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Russian Orthodox Mission in Beijing, established in 1715 to tend to the spiritual needs of the 
Albazintsy and their descendents, persisted into the twentieth century, serving as an informal 
embassy and the foundational point for Russian sinology.103 The border between the Russian 
and Chinese empires, meanwhile, was fixed for the first (but not last) time at the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk in 1689—the first such treaty between China and a European power.104 
Barbara Maggs identifies a distinctive ambiguity in the images of China available to 
Russians in the eighteenth century. Accounts written by Russians engaged in religious, 
political and economic missions to China display an unflattering negativity.105 At the same 
time, large numbers of Western European works praising Chinese civilization found their 
way into Russian, building on accounts of the Qing Empire disseminated by Jesuit 
missionaries.106 Perhaps the most influential were the writings of Voltaire, who held up China 
as a positive example of a rational polity ruled by a benevolent monarch: a perspective with 
obvious relevance to the Romanov dynasty and the people living under them.107 Thus Russia, 
facing Europe, participated in le rêve chinois that captivated French society of the time, while 
Russia’s direct contacts with its East Asian neighbour produced a more critical perspective.108 	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Maggs finds here an illustration of a “‘geographic’ theory of images” that she ascribes to 
Voltaire: images of neighbouring, rival countries are more typically critical, while images of 
distant, unreal places can embrace admiration without risk.109 Russia’s idiosyncratic position, 
looking culturally towards Europe while abutting China geographically, produces a complex 
image distinct from its European counterparts. 
In the nineteenth century, as European economic designs on China increased, the 
prevailing European stereotype of China shifted. The Jesuits’ image of an enlightened 
monarchy was replaced with a stagnant despotism outside history, an attitude encapsulated in 
Johann Gottfried Herder’s description of China as “an embalmed mummy wrapped in 
silk.” 110  Filtered through Russia’s idiosyncratic position, Petr Chaadaev and Vissarion 
Belinskii used Chinese stagnation—kitaishchina—as an Asiatic mirror image for the 
despotism and historical belatedness they perceived in Tsarist Russia. 111 Flipping this 
equation in search of a more positive vision of Russia’s future, Alexander Herzen argued that 
a Chinese form of stagnation had, in the wake of 1848, enveloped western Europe.112 In this 
formulation, which was to be echoed by the Eurasianists in the early twentieth century, 
Russia stood as a young and vibrant cultural force between the two stagnant poles of Europe 
and China.  
Representations of China increased in intensity and significance in the later part of the 
nineteenth century, as Russian imperial expansion, its southern movement checked by the 
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Crimean War, turned towards Central Asia and then the Far East.113 As Susanna Lim 
cogently argues, China at the turn of the twentieth century fuelled, in the Russian 
imagination, both fantasies of power and anxieties over powerlessness.114 On the one hand, 
imperial dreams of Russia’s Pacific destiny reached their peak in the reign of Nicholas II. 
The most prominent political Asianist, Prince Esper Ukhtmoskii, argued that Russia and Asia 
already belonged to each other, in a kind of inevitable organic union that equated to the 
imperial rule of the latter by the former: 
 Asia—we have always belonged to it. [...] Through us the Orient has gradually 
arrived at a consciousness of itself, at a superior life... We have nothing to 
conquer. All these peoples of various races feel themselves drawn to us, and are 
ours, by blood, by tradition, and by ideas. [...] This great and mysterious Orient is 
ready to become ours.115 
 
These dreams, borne east along the tracks of the newly constructed trans-Siberian railroad, 
were dashed by Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5).  
Even before that defeat, however, the Russian expansion into East Asia had provoked 
anxieties over the role the once stagnant, now modernizing nations of China and Japan might 
play in world history. These anxieties receive their most famous expression in the writings of 
the religious philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev. In the essay “China and Europe” (“Kitai i 
Evropa,” 1890), Solov’ev declared that China’s insistence on cultural uniqueness, alongside 
its newfound attraction to the technological progress of the profane West, constituted a 
significant obstacle to the final victory of universal Christianity (vseedinstvo). 116  The 
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outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 led Solov’ev to pen the poem “Pan-Mongolism” 
(“Pan-Mongolizm,” 1894), which anticipates an apocalypse carried to Russia by the risen 
peoples of the Far East.  
This vision of a new Mongol conquest is developed in “A Short Tale of Antichrist” 
(“Kratkaia povest’ ob antikhriste”) the concluding section of Three Conversations (Tri 
razgovora, 1900). Solov’ev forecasts a future invasion of Russia and Europe by a risen 
Chinese army, trained and led by the Japanese under the banner of Pan-Mongolism: a 
movement created in imitation of such European movements as Pan-Hellenism and Pan-
Slavism, but turned against European dominance. The same year that Solov’ev’s “Tale” was 
published, the anti-foreign Yihetuan Movement, or Boxer Uprising, broke out in China. 
Solov’ev read in these convulsions a vindication of his predictions, declaring: “The 
knowledge of the events of May and June in China could only have been obtained by means 
of clairvoyance.”117 For Solov’ev, a China rising from historical stagnation marked the 
commencement of the apocalypse. 
Solov’ev’s anxiety about the threat from the Far East echoes through Silver Age 
literature. Again, however, the axis shifts from difference to similarity: the traces of Yellow 
Peril anxiety in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg posit a threatening Asiatic presence already within 
Russia, a part of Russian identity. “What was unique about the Silver Age was its 
identification of the coming apocalypse as something internal rather than coming from 
abroad,” argues David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye. “To Bely and his contemporaries, the 
other, whether as Mongol or Scythian, was even more distinctly part of Russia's exotic 
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self.”118 Such attitudes are vividly summarized by this excerpt from the diary of Aleksandr 
Blok in 1911: 
China is already among us. Irredeemably, impetuously, the purple blood of the 
Aryans is becoming yellow blood […] there remains only one last small act to 
play – the visible conquest of Europe. This will be achieved without noise and 
without apparent brutality[.]119 
 
An external threat in Solov’ev, Blok’s China is internalized, a part of the metaphorical racial 
body. 
A more positive turn towards Asiatic identity distinguishes the pronouncements of the 
group known as the Eurasianists, which formed in exile in the 1920s. However, Nikolai 
Trubetskoi, one of the movement’s founders, excluded China from his religiously unified 
Eurasian cultural space. The Chinese religious mentality, he declared, was “absolutely alien” 
to the Slavo-Turanian identity he sought to define.120 A more inclusive vision of pan-Asian 
identity can be found in the pronouncements of the Futurist poet Velimir Khlebnikov. 
Vividly combining the Eurasianist perspective on geography and history with the 
internationalist rhetoric of the recently victorious Bolshevik Revolution, Khlebnikov wrote a 
series of manifestos in 1918 calling for “Asiaunion” and an “Indo-Russian Union”:  
We proclaim ourselves the first Asiatics, aware of our insular unity.  
May the citizens of our island pass from the Yellow Sea to the Baltic, from the White 
Sea to the Indian Ocean, without ever encountering a frontier. […] 
We summon Russia to immediate unification with young China for the education of 
the world’s great interior, Asia, the greater Switzerland.121 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism, 223. For an overview of this motif in the 
work of Andrei Belyi and Dmitri Merezhkovskii, see Georges Nivat, “Du ‘Panmongolisme’ au 
‘Mouvement Eurasien’: Histoire d’un theme littéraire,” Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 7, no. 3 
(1966): 460–478.  
 
119 Quoted in Nivat, “’Panmongolisme’,” 469–70. 
 
120 Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetzkoy, The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's 
Identity (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991), 131. 
 
121 Velimir Khlebnikov, “An Indo-Russian Union,” in Khlebnikov, Collected Works of Velimir 
Khlebnikov, vol. 1, Letters and Theoretical Writings, trans. Paul Schmidt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 341–2. Harsha Ram significantly alters the translation of the last sentence 
from the same manuscript in RGALI, reading “южным” (“southern”) where Schmidt clearly reads 
	  	   47	  
 
Khlebnikov’s manifestos, Harsha Ram argues, stand at the intersection of imperial ambitions, 
Pan-Mongolist visions of history, and the emergence of Leninist internationalism. Converting 
Solov’ev’s fears into historical destiny and celebrating the Russian turn to Asia as Russia 
made Asiatic, the poet envisions in an ecstatic mode the contours of what became the 
internationalist political project for extending the Russian Revolution over Eurasia.122  
Khlebnikov thus serves as a transitional figure, demonstrating how existing ideologies 
of empire and geographical identity endure in revitalized form through the apparent temporal 
rift of 1917. Can such long-standing traditions of thought and representation be simply 
eradicated by the Revolution, by the proclaimed inauguration of a new episteme and new 
aesthetics? Or do they, in certain ways and to certain extents, remain? Ukhtomskii’s interest 
in “blood” and “mystery” would be rejected by Tret’iakov as the worst kind of mystification. 
Yet the concept of an East awakened to consciousness by Russia, and progressing inevitably 
towards union with a Russia-centred political power, is not so far from the image of China 
presented by the writers considered below.  
A central question that this study must pose, even if it cannot be answered 
definitively, is this: how do we understand these continuities between the Imperial and Soviet 
periods? It seems simplistic to say that the Soviets simply dusted off and continued 
Ukhtomskii’s project for a Russia-dominated Asia, or positioned themselves as the latest 
inheritors of the Empire of Genghis Khan. And yet, the similarities demand our attention. For 
the retention and rebranding of existing images of China and East Asia both facilitated, and 
ultimately hindered, the development of an internationalist aesthetics. 
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Chapter One 
Violent Strangers and Foreigner Talk: The Image of the Chinese Migrant in 
Revolutionary Russia 
 
“I am Chinese, nobody understands me.” 
(Я китаец, никто меня не понимает.)123 
Osip Mandelstam, 4th Prose 
 
Before we travel with our Soviet observers to revolutionary China, this preliminary 
chapter explores the images of Chinese migrants within Soviet Russia that were produced in 
1920s literature. The key figure here is the Chinese Red partisan, whose ubiquity testifies to 
the significant number of Chinese migrants that did in fact fight in the Russian Civil War. 
The literary Chinese partisan represents more than a historical trend, however; his 
combination of revolutionary affiliation and ethnic strangeness offers a testing ground for the 
power of internationalist sentiment to overcome cultural boundaries. These texts thus present 
both an introduction and a challenge to internationalist aesthetics. The grotesque appearances, 
estranged language, and shocking violence we find below constitute aesthetic effects that, in 
different hands, can both affirm and undermine internationalist sympathy. 
 
I. Chinese Migrants as Historical Reality and Grotesque Image 
 
 Even before Comintern policy and diplomatic recognition provided the impetus for an 
outburst of China images in the mid-1920s, Chinese migrant workers had become a visible 
presence in Russian society in an unprecedented manner over the previous decade. Chinese 
immigration into Russian territory, overwhelmingly male in composition, was concentrated 
from the mid-nineteenth century in the Priamur and Primor'e regions, which had been ceded 
from Chinese control by the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860).124 After the Qing 
government loosened restrictions on migration into Manchuria in 1878, an estimated 200,000 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Osip Mandel’shtam, “Chetvertaia proza,” in Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh, vol. 2, proza 
(New York: Inter-Language Literary Associates, 1971), 183. 
 
124 On the background to and negotiation of the Aigun and Peking treaties, see R. K. I. Quested, The 
Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857-1860 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968); 
Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions, chapter 4. 
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Chinese migrants entered the Russian Far East between 1878 and 1908.125 At the turn of the 
century, territorial expansion into China and the enhanced possibilities of movement 
provided by the Trans-Siberian, China Eastern and Amur railways raised racialized fears of a 
demographic invasion by the “yellow” peoples of China and Korea, prompting exclusionary 
policies on labour and land leasing.126 Following the outbreak of the First World War in 
1914, however, the demand within Russia for cheap labour greatly increased, and much of 
this demand was satisfied by Chinese workers. Russian figures suggest that some 160,000 
Chinese workers entered the Russian Empire between January 1915 and April 1917, though 
other estimates are much higher.127 This marked the first time that Chinese workers migrated 
in significant numbers into European Russia, where their labour was primarily needed.  
 With the collapse of the Russian economy following the revolution and civil war, and 
with the new administration unable to repatriate fully this migrant population, as of mid-1921 
there were some 90,000 Chinese without permanent employment in the European part of 
Russia, and around 30,000 in the Red-controlled regions of Siberia.128 Whether through 
simple need or genuine attraction to Bolshevik ideology—which did after all promise both 
the empowerment of workers and the rejection of trans-national prejudice—many Chinese 
migrants joined the Red Army and Red partisans. Various estimates suggest that between 
30,000 and 70,000 Chinese fought on the side of the Reds in the Civil War.129 Perhaps more 
from novelty than numbers, the Chinese Red partisan became something of a stock literary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 John Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 71. 
By contrast, Stephan estimates that some 243,000 peasants migrated into the Russian Far East from 
other regions in the Russian Empire between 1882 and 1907. (Ibid., 65.)  
 
126 For a discussion of how race became an element in Russian Imperial policy in the Far East at this 
time, see Chia Yin Hsu, “A Tale of Two Railroads: ‘Yellow Labor,’ Agrarian Colonization, and the 
Making of Russianness at the Far Eastern Frontier, 1890s–1910s,” Ab Imperio 3 (2006): 217–53. 
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128 Ibid., 75. 
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figure in Civil War literature, appearing most famously in Vsevolod Ivanov's 1922 tale 
Armoured Train 14-69 (Bronepoezd No. 14-69) and the highly popular 1927 stage adaptation. 
Elsewhere, Chinese migrants were most conspicuous in the role of laundry workers in 
Moscow and other urban cities. The Chinese laundry worker also entered the Russian literary 
system, striking an ambiguous posture of comedy and threat in Mikhail Bulgakov’s 1925 
play Zoika’s Apartment (Zoikina kvartira). 
 We might expect the figure of the Chinese partisan, at least, to offer a positive 
example of international solidarity and new forms of trans-cultural affiliation. Such an image 
can indeed be found in Iosif Utkin’s 1925 poem, “A friend from the Sungari” (“Sungariiski 
drug”). Utkin’s lyric nostalgically recounts a friendship forged in battle with a Chinese 
partisan from the Sungari river, which flows through Manchuria and the city of Harbin. In a 
“turbulent age” (Тревожен век), Utkin’s lyric persona has been obliged to wander beyond 
his accustomed boundaries (мне пришлось скитаться), but this disruption of normalcy has 
brought him together with a sad-eyed Chinese comrade in defence against “attacks from all 
around” (круговых атак) on Utkin’s homeland.130 Fighting together under the banner of an 
idea, Utkin and his friend from the “distant” Sungari discover a new form of kinship that 
transcends the ties of blood implied in a visually marked racial difference: 
Да, 
Никогда нам так не породниться, 
Как под единым знаменем идей! 
И в ногу шли: 
Китаец желтолицый 
И бледнолицый иудей.131 
 
[Yes, / Never could we be brought so close in kinship / As under the united 
banner of ideas! /And in step there marched: / A yellow-faced Chinese / And a 
pale-faced Jew.] 
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This union, however, is only temporary, an act of solidarity in a time of war. Once the danger 
has passed, Utkin’s Chinese friend returns to the Sungari, where he belongs: “Мой друг 
живет на дальнем берегу, / На дальней Сунгари – / И это неизбежно” (My friend lives on 
a distant shore, / On the distant Sungari – / And this is inevitable), the poem remarks in a 
common-sense register. If war ever comes to the Sungari, they will of course join forces 
again; but until then, Utkin would not think of inviting his friend to leave his proper home 
and come to Russia: 
Я не скажу ему: 
"Сюда, мой друг, скорей!" 
Я не скажу, 
Прекрасно понимая, 
Что родину и матерей 
Никто и никогда не забывает!132 
 
[I will not say to him: / “Come here, quickly, my friend!” / I will not say this, / 
Understanding perfectly / That nobody ever forgets / Their homeland and their 
mothers.] 
 
This attachment to home, family, and origins is expressed as a self-evident truth. The model 
of internationalism put forward and celebrated in Utkin’s poem has each nation located in its 
fixed home, a place of roots and belonging, but coming together in mutual defense at times of 
danger. The friend from the Sungari came to Russia, fought in solidarity, and then went home 
to his proper place; he did not stay and look for work after the Civil War, as did the Chinese 
migrants who became a visible part of the social landscape in 1920s Russia. 
Utkin’s friend, in other words, is not a “stranger” in the same way as these latter 
migrants, if we accept the definition of a “stranger” given in Georg Simmel’s 1908 essay of 
that name. Simmel characterizes the relationship with “the stranger” through a combination 
of proximity and distance. The stranger, as Simmel describes him, is not simply a transient 
wanderer, but rather a “potential wanderer;” not simply someone “who comes today and goes 
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tomorrow,” but rather “the person who comes today and stays tomorrow.”133 Coming from 
outside the group and staying within it, he has not belonged to the group from the beginning 
and the possibility always remains that he will leave. The stranger is physically present, but 
culturally different, retaining a sense of distance even though close. Those who are absent or 
entirely imagined do not produce this peculiar combination of proximity and estrangement. 
There is a key difference, in other words, between the alien who lives in his distant place, “at 
home,” and the alien who comes to live among “us.” 
Simmel’s explanation of what makes a stranger strange employs a gradation of 
possible degrees of commonality. Relationships, Simmel suggests, are based around certain 
“common features”: attributes or characteristics that individuals hold in common. But there is 
a significant difference, Simmel argues, between something that members of a group 
consider common to them and only to them, and something they consider common also to a 
wider group, or even to humanity in general. Everyone eats, for example, but only we eat this 
particular dish. The greater the exclusivity of a common feature, the more the relationship 
based on that feature will be felt to be necessary and organic. By contrast, the more 
widespread a common feature within humanity as a whole, the more the relationship’s 
intensity is diluted: such a relationship could be had with anyone. 
In other words, Simmel is saying, the stranger may be similar in many ways, but this 
similarity is not enough to make us feel a close, “organic” connection with him, because 
these connections could just as well connect us to anyone else. There is no motivation for a 
specific connection with the stranger: “The stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between 
him and ourselves common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, 
nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond him or us, and 
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connect us only because they connect a great many people.”134 Simmel’s position on the 
stranger clearly poses serious questions for any concept of international solidarity. 
Relationships based on generalizable common features, he implies, will always retain a 
degree of abstraction and coolness. By implication, the more specific the common features 
that can be found, the closer the relationship will be. 
 Simmel does not specifically invoke the category of “ethnicity” in his essay, though 
he gestures towards it when he notes that the Jews in Europe are the classical model for the 
kind of stranger he is talking about. But Simmel’s scheme of commonalities provides a logic 
for understanding ethnic identity as determined by relative degrees of commonality and 
difference. When Chinese figures appear in early Soviet literature, they do so largely as 
representatives of an ethnicity. These individual representatives of the Chinese ethnicity are 
sufficiently tied to their ethnic identity that it can often stand in for or entirely replace their 
individual names (which in turn essentially function as indicators of ethnic identity). Colleen 
Lye deploys the concept of “racial form” to describe how stereotypes of Asian economic 
efficiency in American culture at the turn of the twentieth century express cultural anxieties 
about loss of Anglo-Saxon frontier identity and the rise of industrial capitalism.135 Adapting 
this perspective, we might ask: what did “Chineseness” mean, as an “ethnic form,” in these 
early Soviet images of Chinese migrants? What cultural transformations and anxieties are 
refracted symbolically through the image of the ethnically Chinese migrant in literature?  
This chapter will argue that the Chinese stranger signifies a world in turmoil; he is 
one of many markers in this period that suggest a social order turned upside down, its borders 
breached and its hierarchies disrupted, in a manner that slides along the scale of value from 
positive to negative. More explicitly, we might say that Chinese migrants come to be used as 	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symbolic figures that explore the problems of ethnic difference and its implications for the 
post-revolutionary world. The difference and strangeness of the Chinese in revolutionary 
Russia suggest challenges to established identities that can be interpreted as liberatory or 
destructive, two sides of the same historical coin. 
Chinese difference is expressed in these images primarily through appearance and 
language, both of which are subject to distortions that might summarily be described as 
grotesque.136 The grotesque combines elements whose proper place might be considered to be 
in separate spheres: animal and human, animate and inanimate, the comic and the horrific, 
laughter and disgust. This dynamic of mutual invasion by opposing spheres is the opposite of 
purity, operating in a zone of violent, unsettling ambivalence. Philip Thomson defines it as 
“the unresolved clash of incompatibles in work and response,” meaning both the work of art 
and the response it provokes are characterized by this unresolvable ambivalence.137 This 
dynamic of confusion, Thomson suggests, may explain why “the grotesque mode in art and 
literature tends to be prevalent in societies and eras marked by strife, radical change or 
disorientation.”138 It is not hard to see in post-revolutionary Russia just such a society and an 
era. Furthermore, this dynamic of juxtaposition and contradiction mirrors the movement of 
the stranger from his own sphere into the sphere in which he is now present as a strange 
element. Like an animal head on a human body, he is out of place, and the effect is jarring. In 
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this sense the Chinese stranger carries the ideological load of working out symbolically the 
post-revolutionary period’s sense of its own grotesque nature.  
The aesthetic of the grotesque is usually linked primarily to the human body and 
physical form, and examples of grotesque appearance indeed abound in early Soviet images 
of Chinese migrants, as we shall see. Language, however, is also a primary site of 
estrangement, and the speech of the literary Chinese migrant can be seen as producing 
grotesque effects through its distortions of linguistic purity and parodic reductions of 
revolutionary discourse. Language was well prepared as a site of Chinese difference: the 
Russian phrase “Chinese writing” (kitaiskaia gramota), as K. F. Pchelintseva notes, had long 
been used in colloquial speech to denote incomprehensibility.139 Language was also a focal 
point for some of the more utopian aspirations of early Soviet culture, which imagined 
socialist internationalism as a creed that could overcome linguistic difference with the power 
of its message. According to Daniel Collins, early Soviet ideology adapted the spiritual 
model of the Pentecost to represent revolutionary enthusiasm’s capacity to transcend 
communicative boundaries, in such a way that “enthusiastic communists are able to achieve 
mutual understanding regardless of differences in linguistic form.”140 The various images of 
linguistic heterogenity that Collins identifies in production novels may thus be interpreted “as 
a manifestation of a linguistic myth—the  emergence of  a  pan-proletarian language, which 
would eventually embrace all humanity in the classless society of the triumphant collective 
spirit.”141 Although the texts to be considered here pre-date the Five Year Plan period that 
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forms the centre of Collins’ analysis, this ideological signification of linguistic difference and 
the utopian implications of its transcendence can be detected in the early 1920s as well.  
The distinctive characteristics of the Russo-Chinese relationship must also be taken 
into account. Despite the common perception of absolute distance implied by the colloquial 
connotations of “Chinese writing,” Sino-Russian contact since the seventeenth century had 
been mediated by the existence of a contact language, most commonly designated as Chinese 
pidgin Russian.142 This existed in slightly differing forms in the three main areas where 
Chinese- and Russian-speakers came into contact: Kyakhta, Manchuria, and Ussuri Krai. 
Although never subject to creolization, this pidgin’s high degree of stability can be attributed 
to the fact that it was embraced and normalized by the Chinese state, which established a 
school at Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) where merchants trading with Russia were obliged to take 
exams in “Russian” (in fact, Chinese pidgin Russian).143 According to Johanna Nichols, some 
distinctive features of Chinese pidgin Russian include the loss of inflection, the use of the 
Russian imperative form for most predicate stems, and the use of possessive pronouns in 
place of personal pronouns (without stable adherence to gender, so “moia” for “ia,” but “ego” 
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for “on”).144 Despite the name, this pidgin was also learned and used by individuals whose 
first language was neither Russian nor Chinese. Hence the most famous literary speaker of 
Chinese pidgin Russian is the Gold’ trapper Dersu Uzala, and it is Dersu Uzala’s speech as 
relayed by V. K. Arsen’ev that Nichols uses as her basic source for the pidgin.145  
While all the writers we shall consider in this chapter use elements of Chinese pidgin 
Russian, it seems unlikely that any of them had sufficient exposure to the pidgin to reproduce 
it with full accuracy. They combine Chinese pidgin Russian with other strategies to represent 
Chinese discourse as “foreigner talk”: the marked speech of a foreigner. Working in the field 
of sociolinguistics, Charles Ferguson has identified “foreigner talk” as a form of simplified 
speech that the speaker of a language believes is appropriate to use in conversation with a 
foreigner (i.e. anyone who is not a native speaker of the language in question). Native 
speakers then tend to attribute this foreigner talk to foreigners themselves, even though it may 
not coincide with the way foreigners actually speak the language. Thus, for example, “a 
novelist may use foreigner talk in representing the speech of persons whom he wants to 
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Nichols (405–6) also offers the hypothesis that Chinese pidgin Russian may in fact descend from an 
earlier Russian-Uralic or Russian-Turkic contact language, which was then stabilized through its 
adoption by Chinese traders at Kyakhta. E. Perekhval’skaia endorses this theory to the extent of 
naming the pidgin “Siberian pidgin Russian” rather than “Chinese pidgin Russian,” on the grounds 
that “it was not only used in contact situations with the Chinese” and “did not in fact develop in the 
course of contact between Russians and Chinese.” Perekhval’skaia instead argues that Siberian pidgin 
is ultimately derived from a standard form of “foreigner talk” in use in Russia since at least the 
seventeenth century, possibly in connection with the presence of English traders at the Angliiskii dvor 
in Moscow. E. Perekhval’skaia, Russkie pidzhiny (Saint Petersburg: Aleteia, 2008), 80–1, 116–128. 
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characterize as foreign, even though in the situation portrayed such a person would not in fact 
speak in that way.”146  
While Ferguson seeks the rules of a generic English-language foreigner talk that can 
be used in all situations of talking to foreigners, it seems to me that what we see reflected in 
the texts I will consider here is the existence of a particular Chinese-foreigner talk among 
Russian speakers in the early twentieth century. This specific imitation of the way the 
Chinese were thought to speak Russian implies a certain degree of familiarity with Chinese 
pidgin Russian, which itself gestures to the validity of Simmel’s stranger model: the Chinese 
stranger was a sufficiently established presence for his marked speech to be widely familiar. 
But we also find extended use of what Nichols calls “Simplified Russian.” Whereas Chinese 
pidgin Russian, Nichols insists, is a fully functioning pidgin with observable rules, and 
“Broken Russian” is Russian produced with mistakes, “Simplified Russian” is defined as 
“Russian without actual grammatical errors, but distinctive in its simple syntax, word order, 
lexical infelicities, etc.” Simplified Russian, Nichols suggests, is often used to produce a 
Russian version of Ferguson’s foreigner talk.147 In addition, we find consistent mutations of 
printed language in these texts, in a manner intended to convey distortions in pronunciation. 
The Chinese migrant’s simplified syntax is thus rendered complex once more by the barrier 
of his accent, an aspect that moves us away from foreigner talk as Ferguson understands it.148 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Charles A. Ferguson, ‘Toward a Characterization of English Foreigner Talk,” Anthropological 
Linguistics 17, no. 1 (Jan., 1975): 2. See also Charles A. Ferguson, “Absence of Copula and the 
Notion of Simplicity: A Study of Normal Speech, Baby Talk, Foreigner Talk, and Pidgins,” in 
Pidginization and Creolization of Language, ed. Dell Hymes (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971), 141–50. 
 
147 Nichols, “Chinese Pidgin Russian,” 398–9. 
 
148 Though it is perhaps important to note that one of the earliest accounts of Kyakhta pidgin, 
commonly attributed to Iakinf and published in Moskovskii telegraf (21, 1831), reproduces the pidgin 
in a form heavily distorted by accent. “Э-дин лю-ди бо-ли-ше-лэ” corresponds to “один человек 
пришел” (one person came). “Ти-би, бу-ли-я-ти-л, я не ше-на-лэ” is translated as “Тебя, приятель, 
я не знаю” (Friend, I do not know you). Quoted in Yang, “Zabaikal’sko-Man’chzhurskii prepidzhin,” 
70.  
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This double movement of simplification and alienation produces, I argue, a grotesque effect. 
As simplicity of syntax and lexicon renders the Chinese migrant simple, even childish, with 
all the comic potential of such a reduction, so the barrier of accent and non-normative usage 
makes his language strange and impenetrable, alienating and troubling—an effect enhanced 
by the authors’ frequent use of elaborate, distancing metaphors to describe his appearance. 
All these elements—the simultaneous proximity and distance of the stranger, 
expressed in grotesque forms of both appearance and marked foreigner speech—combine to 
express the Chinese migrant’s difference as a riddle to be solved or a problem to be 
overcome. As a first example, let us take Vladimir Mayakovsky’s agit-poem “Muscovite 
China” (“Moskovskii Kitai”), published in Prozehktor in 1926 (see overleaf).149 Mayakovsky 
begins with a specific aspect of linguistic strangeness, Chinese names, which appear to 
estrange the Cyrillic alphabet itself: 
 Чжан Цзо-лин да У Пей-фу да Суй да Фуй — 
разбирайся, от усилий в мыле! 
Натощак попробуй расшифруй  
путаницу раскитаенных фамилий! 
 
[Zhang Zuo-lin and Wu Pei-fu and Sui and Fui — / good luck working that out, 
while the soap is flying! / Try on an empty stomach to decipher / the tangle of 
Sinified surnames!] 
 
As with many of his agitational poems, Mayakovsky here adopts a kind of “man-in-the-
street” voice to present the common opinion he will subsequently attempt to refine. Hence the 
colloquial conjunction “da” above, or the interrogative phrase “chto li” in the following 
section, which seeks an explanation for the presence of this stranger at work in the heart of 
Moscow:  
Что несет их к синькам и крахмалам, 
за 6 тысяч верст сюда кидает? 
Там земля плохая? Рису, что ли, мало? 
Или грязи мало для мытья в Китае? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Vladimir Mayakovsky, “Moskovskii Kitai,” Prozhektor 9 (1927): 28. All subsequent quotations 
are from this page. 
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[What carries them to the suds and starch, / Flings them here over 6 thousand 
versts? / Is the land there bad? Not enough rice, or something? / Is there not plenty 
of dirt to wash in China?] 
 
The answer is intended as the first step on the road from estrangement to solidarity: civil war 
back in China could mean possible death, whereas here, “любой рабочий защищен” (“every 
worker is protected”). Chinese linguistic strangeness abides, however. Mayakovsky describes 
the impetus to work in a Sino-Russian voice: “надо шибака работать” (“must work good”). 
The Siberian dialectical terms shibko (“very,” ochen’) was a popular term in Chinese pidgin, 
often appearing in the combination shibko shango (“very good,” ochen’ khorosho).150 The 
mutation of shibko into shibaka, in turn, is an additional marker of foreigner talk, transposing 
into accented Russian the tendency of Chinese syllables to consist of a consonant sound 
followed by a vowel sound. This strangeness, reinforced by an illustration that shows a 
skeletal man with a small head, tiny eyes and extended neck beside a relatively normal-
looking cat, expands into racial insult, placed at a distance in the mouths of young children: 
 
  Figure 1: Vladimir Mayakovsky, "Muscovite China," 1927 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Perekhval’skaia, Russkie pidzhiny, 344. 
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Мальчишки орут: — У-у-у! Китаёзы! — 
Повернется, взглядом подарив, 
от которого зажглось лицо осеннее... 
 
[Little boys shout: — Oo-oh! Chinkies! / He turns, struck by a glance / that 
inflames his autumnal face…] 
 
Again, Mayakovsky offers this example of racial hostility in an attempt to transcend such 
behaviour. What he hopes will overturn this aggression towards the Chinese stranger is his 
similarity in one important detail—his readiness, when the time comes, to rise up against his 
oppressors with violent reprisal: 
 Знаю, что — когда в Китай придут октябрьские повторы 
и сшибется класс о класс — 
он покажет им, народ, который 
косоглаз. 
 
[I know, that when October’s refrain comes to China / and class collides with 
class, they will show them, this people with slanted eyes.] 
 
Mayakovsky's rhetoric may seem simplistic, and shot through with the language of 
racial difference that sustains the imperialism his political stance seeks to overthrow. 
Nonetheless, his poem offers an attempt to deal with the figure of the stranger along lines 
quite similar to those laid down by Simmel. The Chinese laundry worker is by now a fixture 
of Moscow life: he is “close,” yet he remains distant, in part because his origins and the 
motivations for his presence are unclear. By revealing those motivations and projecting 
forwards to future uprising, Mayakovsky does not necessarily reduce strangeness: reactions 
of confusion and even hostility to ethnic difference remain active forces in the poem’s world. 
But a common cause in class struggle is presented as something that can transcend, without 
necessarily erasing, those differences. The question that Simmel’s analysis raises is, would 
the holding in common of such a generalizable cause be enough to overcome the racial 
hostility that Mayakovsky’s poem acknowledges? 
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II. Boris Pil’niak: “This is from his, China’s, wanderings…” 
A more “metaphysical” account of the Chinese stranger can be found in the early 
works of Boris Pil’niak. In The Naked Year (Golyi god, 1921), Pil’niak exploits the place 
name “Kitai-gorod”—which translates as “China-town” yet refers to an old district of 
Moscow that was never in fact occupied by Chinese people—to position “Kitai” as the 
symbol of a sinister Asiatic element present in the heart of Russia.151 Pil’niak’s Kitai, though 
abstract, symbolic and vague, shares several features with the stranger as described by 
Simmel. If we look closely at Pil’niak’s elusive and allusive uses of this symbol, we will find 
that the positioning of “Kitai” in The Naked Year replicates the spatial contradictions 
embodied in Simmel’s stranger: the paradoxical combination of distance and proximity.  
Like the stranger, Pil’niak’s Kitai is a wanderer: “This is from his, China’s, 
wanderings,” begins the section of the novel entitled “Kitai-gorod.”152 This Kitai is 
encountered first of all in the heart of Moscow, the location of the historical Kitai-gorod, 
where Kitai’s presence is described in the past tense: “They began in Moscow, in China-
town, behind the Chinese wall, in the stone side streets and town houses, among the gas-
lamps—a stone desert.”153Already here geographical clarity is under threat. Is this “Chinese 
wall” simply the wall around Moscow’s Kitai-gorod, or rather its more obvious referent, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Peter Jensen suggests that the true etymology of Moscow’s “Kitai-gorod” connects it to the word 
“kita” — “a kind of rope used to secure the palisades around the central part of the town in the 16th 
century.” Peter Jensen, Nature as Code: Тhe Achievement of Boris Pilnjak, 1915–1924 (Copenhagen: 
Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1979), 177. At a recent conference on “Russia in East Asia” at Columbia 
University in February 2014, Mark Gamsa suggested the “kitai” in “kitai-gorod” could also be a 
corruption of Italian “città,” in reference to Ivan IV’s Italian architects: this would then create a 
tautology, “city-city.” The name “Kitai” for China, according to Susanna Lim, derives from the 
Khitan, a Mongolic nomadic people who founded the Liao Dynasty that ruled over much of what is 
now Mongolia, the Russian Far East, northern Korea, and northern China in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries AD. Lim, China and Japan, 18. 
 
152 Boris Pil’niak, Golyi god, in Sobranie sochinenii v 6 tomakh (Moscow: Terra-knizhnyi klub, 
2003—henceforth SS), 1:37. “Это из его, Китая, бродяжеств.” 
 
153 Pil’niak, SS, 1:37. “Начали в Москве, в Китай-Городе, за китайской стеной, в каменных 
закоулках и подворьях, в газовых фонарях — каменная пустыня.” 
Translation taken from Boris Pilnyak, The Naked Year, trans. Alexander R. Tulloch (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Ardis, 1975), 31.  
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Great Wall that so iconically separates China from the outside world? This spatial confusion 
only increases as we read on. By day, we are told, this Kitai-gorod was a bustling site of 
modern, capitalist trade, “all bowler-hatted, altogether Europe.”154 At night, however, the 
bowler hats disappeared, and “peoplelessness and silence” (безлюдье и безмолвье) arrived 
in their place. And then Kitai made its first appearance: 
And then, in this desert, out of the courtyards and from under the gates it crawled: 
China without a bowler hat on, The Celestial Empire, which lies somewhere 
beyond the steppes to the East, beyond the Great Stone Wall, and looks at the world 
with slanting eyes, like the buttons of Russian soldiers’ greatcoats.155  
 
This Kitai, it seems, is both here and far away. Crawling out into the deserted streets of 
Moscow in the past tense, it is also, in the present, firmly located somewhere out to the east, 
behind its famous wall. This spatial contradiction is complemented by a series of 
combinations from separate spheres that add a grotesque character to the image. This is an 
empire that somehow crawls, an embodied, hatless country with eyes. Those eyes, in turn, are 
likened to something from the realm of the inanimate: the buttons from a soldier’s greatcoat.  
Next Kitai moves, or migrates, producing two additional locations for Kitai-gorod 
(described now in the present tense). The second Kitai-gorod is located at the Kanavino 
market in Nizhnii-Novgorod, where September’s vibrant international trade sees an 
abundance of goods exchanged for “rubles, francs, marks, sterling, dollars, lira and so forth,” 
and October passes in a similarly global debauchery, “under the curtain of wines poured by 
the Volga, caviars, ‘Venice,’ ‘Europeans,’ ‘Tatars,’ ‘Persians,’ ‘Chinese,’ and litres of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 “Kitaj-gorod had previously been presented as the quintessence of capitalist enterprise, namely by 
P. D. Boborykin in the novel Kitaj-gorod (1882).” Jensen, Nature as Code, 177. 
 
155 Pil’niak, SS, 1:37. “И тогда в этой пустыне из подворий и подворотен выползал тот: Китай 
без котелка, Небесная Империя, что лежит где-то за степями на востоке, за Великой Каменной 
Стеной, и смотрит на мир раскосыми глазами, похожими на пуговицы русских солдатских 
шинелей.” 
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spermatozoa[.]”156 But in November the snow returns, the stalls are boarded up, 
“peoplelessness” (безлюдье) returns, and Kitai emerges once more: “China. Silence. 
Inscrutability. Without a hat. Soldier’s buttons instead of eyes.”157 As the Moscow Kitai 
appeared at night, so this Kitai appears in winter, at a time of darkness and inactivity: when 
spring comes, Kitai is washed down the Volga and into the Caspian Sea. Finally, Kitai 
appears in a third place, an unnamed location “further that way” (там дальше)—further East, 
if the trajectory from Moscow to Nizhnii Novgorod is maintained. Here, in a hollow near a 
town, a factory stands idle, its shop floor given over to snow and rust. And out of the “steel 
silence” (стальная тишина) of the abandoned machines stares “China, the soldier’s buttons 
grin (how they can grin!)”158 
The Kitai-gorod motif is repeated once in its entirety, and appears in flashes at several 
other moments in The Naked Year: as has often been noted, Pil’niak’s early, ornamentalist 
poetics rely heavily on repetition to provide unity to an otherwise fragmentary collage of 
textual elements.159 Such interpreters of the novel as Georges Nivat, Peter Jensen, and 
Tatiana Filimonova all broadly concur that Pil’niak uses Kitai here as a metonymic symbol 
for Asia, structuring Russian space and history through a triptych of West–Russia–East 
inherited from the writers of the Silver Age.160 Europe, the West, represents activity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Ibid. “после сентябрьских миллионов пудов, бочек, штук, аршин и четвертей товаров, 
смененных на рубли, франки, марки, стерлинги, доллары, лиры и прочие, — после 
октябрьского разгулья, под занавес разлившегося Волгой вин, икор, «Венеции», 
«европейских», «татарских», «персицких», «китайских» и литрами сперматозоидов[.]”  
 
157 Ibid., 38. “Китай. Безмолвие. Неразгадка. Без котелка. Солдатские пуговицы — вместо глаз.” 
 
158 Ibid. “Китай, усмехаются [как могут усмехаться!] солдатские пуговицы.” 
 
159 For a contemporary critique of this device as “mechanical” and superficial, see Viktor Shklovskii, 
“O Pil’niake,” Lef 3 (1925): 126–36. 
 
160 This genealogical argument is outlined convincingly in Nivat, “‘Panmongolisme’,” passim. In her 
recent dissertation, Tatiana Filimonova argues that Russia in The Naked Year offers a positive model 
of Eurasian community that stands between the mechanized emptiness of the West and the sinister 
chaos of the East. Tatiana Filimonova, “From Scythia to a Eurasian Empire,” 98–104. 
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modernity, and efficiency in the light of day. China, the East, is linked to inactivity, the 
desert, “peoplelessness and silence”—even, in the arresting image of the soldier-button eyes, 
the war currently sweeping through Russia. Both West and East are positioned right in the 
heart of Russia, which thereby contains them both but is not entirely defined by them.  
The Civil War thus becomes, in Pil’niak’s novel, a war over Russia’s historical and 
civilizational identity. In a dynamic reminiscent of Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg, Russia is both 
Occidentalized and Orientalized, invaded from both West and East. Pil’niak’s novel seeks an 
authentic Russian cultural identity between these two civilizational poles, to be uncovered by 
the revolution’s transformative violence. Jensen argues that the leather-jacketed Bolsheviks 
of The Naked Year represent just such a third historical alternative, offering Asia-defying 
activity without a return to capitalism.161 Gary Browning, likewise, links the Kitai-gorod 
motif to the novel’s constant oscillation between “the poles of motion and rest, civilization 
and primitiveness, progress and stagnation, order and anarchy,” pitting revolutionary Russia 
as a battleground between “native” and “foreign” cultural systems.162 Furthermore, Browning 
sees in the motif’s repetition a kind of progress—a movement discernable also in the shift 
from past to present tense noted above. By the time we reach the third “Kitai-gorod,” the 
deserted factory, Kitai has been driven out of Moscow, located in the spatio-temporal past: 
“There, a thousand versts away, in Moscow the vast millstone of the Revolution has ground 
down Ilin’ka, and China has crawled away, has crawled to…” Here unattributed voices enter 
the text: “‘To where?’ ‘Has it crawled as far as Taezheva?’ ‘You’re lying! You’re lying! 
You’re lying! The blast furnace will be lit again, the blocks will start rolling, the lathes and 
mills will dance once more!’”163 By the time of the motif’s later repetition, Browning notes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Jensen, Nature as Code, 178. 
 
162 Gary Browning, Boris Pilniak: Scythian at a Typewriter (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1985), 121. 
 
163 Pil’niak, SS, 1:38. “Там, за тысячу верст, в Москве огромный жернов революции смолол 
Ильинку, и Китай выполз с Ильинки, пополз… 
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the hopes of this last voice are fulfilled, and factory in the third tableau is up and running; 
“Chinese” stagnation has been driven out by Bolshevik activity.164 
Pil’niak’s “Kitai” taps into a lengthy heritage of China images. In the discourse of 
many nineteenth-century Russian and European thinkers, from Hegel and Mill to Belinskii 
and Herzen, China figures as the paradigm of stagnant immobility, supposedly inward-
looking and uninterested in the outside world.165 Pil’niak’s China retains the sense of 
stagnant inactivity, but has become a de-centred wanderer, stretched paradoxically between 
home and abroad: the Middle Kingdom is indeed far away behind its stone wall, yet it is also 
here in the heart of old Russia. In this he echoes Silver Age writers such as Vladimir 
Solov’ev and Dmitri Merezhkovskii, who, alarmed by the apparent entry into modernity of 
East Asian nations such as China and Japan, voiced fears of a new “Mongol” invasion and 
penetration into Russia.166 Pil’niak’s China, hidden yet present, recalls Merezhkovskii’s fears 
of insidious invasion, but without the latter’s racial rhetoric and implicit identification 
(inherited from Herzen) of China with the embourgeoisement of Europe.167 In his firm 
juxtaposition of Europe and China as civilizational opposites fighting over the Russian soul, 
Pil’niak’s real predecessor, as he himself admitted, is Belyi.168 The East as expressed through 




— Дополз до Таежева?! 
— Врешь! Врешь! Врешь! Загорит еще домна, покатят болванки, запляшут еще аяксы и 
фрезеры!” 
 
164 Browning, Boris Pilniak, 122. 
 
165 See Introduction. On Belinskii and Herzen’s attitudes towards China, see Lukin, The Bear Watches 
the Dragon, 17–20. 
 
166 See Nivat, “‘Panmongolisme’,” 460–478. 
 
167 Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, 25. 
 
168 “I came out of Belyi and Bunin” (Я вышел из Белого и Бунина), admits Pil’niak in the foreword 
to Machines and Wolves, written 1923–4. Pil’niak, SS, 2:8. On the influence of Belyi’s writing on The 
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his abstract “China” suggests a kind of spiritual death, a loss of vigour and energy, both 
“invasive and anaesthetic” in Nivat’s succinct formulation.169 
When Pil’niak attempts to introduce a more concrete, historical China into his 
writing, however, the results are very different. The enigmatic short story “Sankt-Piter-
Burkh” (1921) interweaves Russian and Chinese history as they oscillate between imperial 
construction and revolutionary destruction. Once again we have the familiar triptych, West—
Russia—East, though Europe and Asia so dominate that Russia itself is hard to locate. In the 
story’s opening chapter, scenes of Peter the Great founding St Petersburg in the eighteenth 
century—bringing “distant” Europe “close” to Russia—are interspersed with scenes from the 
dawn of Chinese imperial history. Pil’niak, as Nivat notes, is asserting a historical parallel 
across two millennia between two great founder-Emperors: Peter I and Qin Shi Huangdi, who 
consolidated China into an empire and began construction of the Great Wall.170 These two 
lines come together in the present, when both empires fell to revolutions within a six-year 
period (1911, 1917). As far as a coherent plot can be discerned, it goes as follows: the 
Chinese peasant Li-yang, fleeing the turmoil and violence of post-revolutionary China, 
migrates into Russia to become the Red Guardist Liyanov. In Petersburg, suspected of 
treason when English coins are found on his person, he is imprisoned by a professor with a 
comically Russian name, Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov. Ivan Ivanovich is later compelled to execute 
his friend, the engineer Andrei Liudogovskii; Liyanov, however, is released, and 
incongruously sets about tilling the soil in war-torn Petersburg. Finally we return to China, 
where Ivan Ivanovich’s brother, a White Russian officer named Petr, ends the story begging 
on the streets of Beijing.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Naked Year, see Vladimir Alexandrov, “Belyi Subtexts in Pil’njak’s Golyi god,” The Slavic and East 
European Journal 27, no. 1 (1983): 81–90. 
 
169 Nivat, “‘Panmongolisme’,” 474.  
 
170 Ibid., 475–6. 
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The juxtaposition and interweaving of the Russian and Chinese historical narratives 
seem prefigured in the story’s opening image, which represents history as a deck of playing 
cards: “The centuries stack up sedately like packs of cards. The packs of the centuries are 
encrusted with years, and the years are shuffled into ages—with Chinese cards.”171 This 
metaphor of history as a succession of solidified epochs is linked from the start to China, the 
epitome of dynastic periodization, as well as the place where playing cards were reportedly 
invented.172 This card-deck metaphor seems to suggest at this point a definite linearity to 
historical progression: the centuries fall one by one, card after card, and the “encrustation” of 
certain years shuffles the deck into ages or epochs.  
As the story proceeds, however, this repeated motif changes to imply a form of 
historical repetition, mimicking the way that the Russian and Chinese narratives are 
“shuffled” together by the course of history: “The centuries stack up sedately, like packs of 
cards: the years repeat the packs of the centuries once, and twice, because history repeats 
itself.”173 This repetition is enacted on a symbolic level, as Nirman Moraniak-Bamburach has 
observed, through the motif of stone.174 “Sankt-Piter-Burkh” is translated, through a pun on 
Peter/petros/stone, as “Sviatoi-Kamen’-Gorod,” “Sacred-Stone-Town.”175 This then forms a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Boris Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” in Povest’ Peterburgskaia (Berlin: Gelikon, 1922), 9. 
(Столетия ложатся степенно колодами. Столетий колоды годы инкрустируют, чтоб тасовать 
годы векам — китайскими картами.) I have used and slightly adapted Beatrice Scott’s translation in 
Boris Pilnyak, The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon and Other Stories, trans. Beatrice Scott (New 
York: Washington Square Press, 1967), 99. 
 
172 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 1:131–2. 
 
173 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” 19. “Столетья ложатся степенно, колодами: столетий колоды 
годы повторяют и раз, и два, ибо история — повторяется.” 
 
174 Nirman Moraniak-Bamburach, “B. A. Pil’niak i ‘Peterburgskii tekst’,” in B. A. Pil’niak: 
issledovaniia i materialy (Kolomna, Kolomenskii pedagogicheskii institut, 1991), 45. 
 
175 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” 25. 
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parallel with China’s “Great Stone Wall,” built by the first Chinese Emperor, Qin Shi 
Huangdi, as stone Petersburg was built by the first Russian Emperor, Peter.  
Construction in stone links the two Eurasian empires, these two “Empires of the Middle,” 
and juxtaposes them in both cases to the desert: the Gobi beyond the Wall, and the desert that 
was the Neva until Peter arrived.176 The equation of these two Eurasian agricultural empires is 
not unique to Pil’niak. As noted in the Introduction, the Sinologist A. S. Martynov identifies 
Russia and China as the “two greatest centers of agriculture” on the Eurasian continent, 
balancing the great expanse of steppe and desert between them.177 Commensurabilities 
between the two polities can be traced, Martynov claims, to the fact that they have been 
shaped by the same fundamental dynamic: the battle of the field with the steppe.178 As 
Filimonova points out, however, Russia and China are also connected as historical entities 
that have wrestled with intrusions from the West. Our Chinese protagonist’s father fought in 
the Boxer Uprising, the major anti-foreigner rebellion in 1900 that prompted Solov’ev to 
claim clairvoyancy. In Russia, meanwhile, the building of Petersburg is presented as a foreign 
intrusion into the native culture. By having Li-yang settle down to farm the land in the 
Moscow district of Petersburg, Filimonova argues, Pil’niak presents an anti-Western, 
agricultural union between the two great Eurasian agricultural powers as a positive, 
regenerative force.179 
Expanding on Filimonova’s analysis, I want to explore how Pil’niak takes the Silver 
Age’s tropes of sinister Asiatic invasion and revalorizes them as positive Eurasian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Ibid., 14, 47. 
 




179 Filimonova, “From Scythia to a Eurasian Empire,” 104–6. Filimonova relies in part here on the 
analysis of this story given in Khe Fan’s dissertation, which unfortunately I have been unable to 
access. Khe Fan, “Evraziistvo i russkaia literature 1920–1930kh godov XX veka,” PhD dissertation, 
Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2004. 
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interconnection. As several scholars have noted, the rejection of Petersburg as foreign and 
tainted links Pil’niak’s story to the canonical “Petersburg text,” most notably Andrei Belyi’s 
novel Petersburg.180 Pil’niak’s Petersburg, like Belyi’s, is unreal, un-Russian, and penetrated 
by an Asiatic element. Consider the office of Ivan Ivanovich’s friend, the engineer Andrei 
Liudogovskii, wherein East and West are equally cold and uncomforting: “Masks of Chinese 
devils grimaced in the engineer's study—bone, bronze and porcelain—grimaced with a cold 
solidity; and there was a cold Venetian window in the study, facing out onto the white nights 
with the coolness of white study walls.”181 The Red Guardist Liyanov has the same face as 
these grimacing masks, a face whose alterity is grotesque and incomprehensible (and grins 
like Kitai in the frozen factory): “The Chinaman's face was… all teeth, strange teeth, the jaw 
of a horse; with these he grinned: who will understand?”182 Besides this toothy face, Liyanov 
has other grotesque physical traits: a “feminine gait,” nostrils “like a prostitute’s” above that 
horsey jaw, and a “dead smile.”183 In Ivan Ivanovich’s feverish dreams, the map of the world 
becomes a chessboard across which Liyanov crawls—the same form of locomotion favoured 
by Kitai in The Naked Year. China crawls across Europe; the sunset above the Neva turns an 
ominous yellow, and the Great Wall itself rears up through the fog on the riverbank.184 No 
wonder Georges Nivat identifies here the final link in a chain that leads back to Solovev’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 See for example Moraniak-Bamburach, “B. A. Pil’niak i ‘Peterburgskii tekst’,”; M. Iu. Liubimova, 
“O Peterburgskikh povestiiakh B. Pil’niaka,” Boris Pil’niak: Opyt segodniashchnego prochteniia 
(Moscow: Nasledie, 1995), 55–62. The latter points out that Pil’niak visited Petersburg for the first 
time in 1921, the year he wrote the story (Liubimova, “O Peterburgskikh povestiakh,” 59). 
 
181 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 31. “У инженера корчили хари в кабинете китайские черти, 
кость, бронза и фарфор — твердым холодком корчили хари; и было в кабинете холодное 
венецианское окно, уходившее в белые ночи холодком белых стен кабинета.” Translation from 
Pil’nyak, Tale, 108 (slightly modified). 
 
182 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 37. “На лице у китайца были — только зубы, чужие, лошадиная 
челюсть, он ими усмехался: — кто поймет?” Translation from Pilnyak, Tale, 110. 
 
183 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 43. 
 
184 Ibid. 40, 47. 
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“panmongolism” and the “sinification” fears of Merezhkovskii.185 Pil’niak himself claimed in 
his letters that he wrote “Sankt-Piter-Burkh” in honour of Aleksandr Blok, who had recently 
died.186 The same Blok, echoing Merezhkovskii, had written in his 1911 diary: “China is 
already among us. Irredeemably, impetuously, the purple blood of the Aryans is becoming 
yellow blood […] there remains only one last small act to play: the visible conquest of 
Europe.”187 In the 1922 Gelikon printing, this “sinification” is announced on the title page, 
where the name of Sankt-Piter-Burkh is translated into Chinese characters that hover above 
the Cyrillic title.188 
This reading of Liyanov as a symbol of the Yellow Peril, however, only really takes 
into account the second of the story’s three chapters. A reading of the story as a whole 
suggests that Liyanov only becomes strange, grotesque and threatening once he appears in 
the context of Petersburg, when he mutates nominally from Li-yang into Liyanov. In the first 
chapter his early life is recounted as the gradual acquisition of a legitimate and 
comprehensible cultural system. Within this Chinese world Li-yang is not strange at all, he is 
normal, he is learning how to be normal in the terms of his home culture: 
The boy learned the meaning of his fathers’ toil, he understood what it meant to 
plow a field by hand, to bring manure from Argali-Jiang by hand, to strip each 
clump of maize and kaoliang by hand, so as not to starve and to live in the loess — 
and he learned to work. He learned about yin and yang, and the Two Powers. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Nivat, “‘Panmongolisme’,” 473–7. 
 
186 Boris Pil’niak, Pis’ma (Moskva: IMLI RAN, 2010), vol. 1, 364, 367, 371. 
 
187 Nivat, “‘Panmongolisme’,” 469–70.  
 
188 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 7. The Chinese translation given here is 彼得保, bǐdébǎo, a phonetic 
approximation of “Petersburg.” (Contemporary standard usage in Mandarin uses a different character 
with the sound bǎo, 堡, which could be considered a better match as it has the meaning of “fortress,” 
as does the German root “Burg.”) Although the “Sankt” here is not actually translated, the three 
Chinese characters line up neatly on the title page with the three elements in the city’s name, which 
Pil’niak will later translate again, this time into Russian, as “Sviatoi-Kamen’-Gorod.” Thus the city 
with three elements to its name also has three different versions of that name in the 1922 edition, to go 
with the three chapters that comprise the text. This constant playing with the city’s name as subject of 
seemingly inevitable translation chimes with the fact that the city’s name had recently been 
“translated” into Russian, as Petrograd, the name it officially bore when Pil’niak was writing his story. 
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world, and his ancestors, stood before him by the will of Lao-zi, for whom the 
Great Wall had once been built, for Lao-zi spoke of Dao, the Great Equivalent.189  
 
For another page or so, Pil’niak bombards his reader with authentic Chinese cultural detail, 
describing how Li-yang mastered the Four Books and Five Classics of Confucian tradition, 
the eight “gua” (trigrams) used in divination, and “like everyone,” the Book of Odes.190 
Aspects of this world would no doubt strike the Russian reader as exotic and confusing: who 
is Laozi, what are “yin,” “yang” and “gua”? But there is nothing grotesque as such about 
these descriptions; they are located in a place where they can be assumed to make sense. 
They also introduce elements that render prerevolutionary China more commensurable with 
pre-Petrine Russia. If in The Naked Year Kitai was equated with the desert, Li-yang’s China 
is an agricultural world opposed, like Russia, to desert and nomadic steppe. Furthermore, this 
social world dominated by patriarchal religious tradition recalls the positive image of pre-
Petrine Russia endorsed by such opponents of “Europeanization” as Nikolai Trubetskoy, one 
of the early theorizers of Russian Eurasianism.191 Indeed, we might say that Pil’niak 
deliberately uses the device of a child’s perspective here to introduce us to a world that is 
strange yet fundamentally commensurable, located in Russia’s agricultural double on the 
other side of Eurasia.192  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Ibid., 18. “Мальчик узнал, что значит труд отцов, что значит руками вспахать землю, руками 
принести а Аргели-дзян назем, руками охолоть каждый куст кукурузы и гаоляна, чтобы не 
умереть с голода и жить в лессе, — и он научился трудиться. Он узнал и ян и ин, и Двух Силах, 
— мир, как его отцы, стал перед ним в воле Лао-дзы, для него некогда строилась Великая 
Стена, ибо Лао-дзы сказал о Тао, Великом Равнодействующем.” Translation from Pilnyak, Tale, 
102, with modifications. 
 
190 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 19. To judge by the text, Pil’niak’s research does not seem to have 
clarified that both the eight trigrams, which make up the Yi Jing or Classic of Changes, and the Shi 
Jing, which Pil’niak calls the “books of odes” (книга од), are actually included within the five 
classics. 
 
191 See Trubetskoy, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, 190–209. 
 
192 For example, as a child, Li-yang is afraid to go into the caves where the mysterious rites of 
ancestor worship takes place—his own culture is as strange and unnerving for him here as it might be 
for Pil’niak’s readers Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” 17. 
 
	  	   73	  
Li-yang begins the story inhabiting a human world that makes sense on its own terms, 
only to be driven from that world by revolution and political chaos. He is presented, in this 
first chapter, as the image of the small individual whose life is disrupted by historical forces 
beyond his understanding or control. After his father, a veteran of the anti-Western Boxer 
Uprising, is killed in post-revolutionary violence, Li-yang, who “understood nothing,” flees 
across Mongolia towards Russia, “to confuse in his memory Vladivostok, Port-Said, 
oceans.”193 On his way he passes a marble block, on which is carved a memorial to a military 
expedition against the Mongols by the Ming Emperor Yongle. This block had been 
mentioned already in the Russo-Chinese imperial parallelisms that began the chapter, but 
here it means nothing to Li-yang, who thinks only of his personal situation on a small, 
familial scale: 
But her did not know this; his only thought was that his mother came from here, 
from the village of Sudetoi; here his mother had caught lizards when she was little, 
his mother, whom he, like all the others, had abandoned as a woman. And with him 
went dozens of others, men who had lost all, abandoned all—fathers, mothers, sons 
and fatherland.194 
 
This is hardly the marauding Asiatic army of Solov’ev’s nightmares; more a trickle of 
homeless, bereaved individuals, as much the victims of cosmic confusion as its perpetrators.  
The elements of grotesque alterity only appear when Li-yang reaches Russia and 
becomes Liyanov. Now the descriptions of his strange, distorted appearance begin, and are 
matched by distortions in language: the one word he produces in Russian is “kius-no,” a 
heavily marked distortion of “skuchno” (boring).195 In line with Simmel, the stranger is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Ibid. 23. 
 
194 Ibid. 24. Но он не знал этого, он думал лишь тогда о том, что отсюда, из деревни Судетоу — 
его мать: его мать здесь ловила ящерок маленькой, — его мать, которого он бросил, как все, 
как женщину. И вместе с ним шли десятки других, потерявших, бросивших — и отцов, и 
матерей, и братьев, и отечество.” Pilnyak, Tale, 105, with slight modifications. 
 
195 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 43. Even here, we are reminded of the estrangement produced by a 
foreign cultural environment when Liyanov talks to the Chinese prison guard in whispered Chinese. 
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produced by expansion beyond the narrow boundaries of the ethnic group. Pil’niak’s 
juxtapositions and interweavings of three cultural spheres—Europe, Russia, China—suggest 
that strangeness is a matter of perspective, not essence. And perspectives in this Petersburg 
seem decidedly warped. The marauding Chinese soldier crawling across Europe is produced 
by the feverish visions of Ivan Ivanovich. The Great Wall rearing out of the Neva fog is 
witnessed by an improbable collection of Romanov empresses out for a boatride, who are 
dubbed the “twelve buxom sisters of fever.”196 At the end of chapter two, as the engineer 
Liudogovskii is led to execution, we see the Chinese faces of his executioners explicitly from 
his point of view: “—oh, what slanting eyes! And who touched the face, pressing it in, 
smashing the bridge of the nose, this face, like a poster, with inset teeth? And the gait of the 
Chinese is feminine…”197 This observation, with its grotesque comparison of a three-
dimensional, living face to a flat, inanimate poster, is clearly from Liudogovskii’s perspective. 
But chapter two as a whole is characterized by constant repetitions, unattributed utterances 
and an almost complete lack of sequential clarity. The boundaries between characters’ 
subjectivities and the narrator’s voice are unclear, and the impression arises that this 
Petersburg is the mutual delirium of Ivanov and Liudogovskii, a delirium inherited from 
Belyi, a feverish neurosis in which the threatening image of China takes shape. 
At the beginning of the third and final chapter, we are referred briefly back to the 
earlier description of Li-yang’s childhood, where it was revealed that, living on the fringes of 
Mongolia, he had not known trees. Now seemingly released, Li-yang, referred to in this final 
chapter only as kitaets (“a Chinese man”), takes to cultivation, cutting down trees and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Here, speaking his own, undistorted language, he is able once more to assert his real, pre-distortion 
name, declaring: “Vo xin Li Yan” (wǒ xìng Li Yang, “my name is Li Yang”). Ibid., 47.  
 
196 Ibid., 46–7. “двенадцать дебелых сестер лихорадок.” 
 
197 Ibid., 50. “— ах, какие косые глаза! — и кто так провел по лицу, чтоб вдавить лицо внутрь, 
раздавив переносицу, лицо, как плакат, с приставными зубами? — а походка — у китайцев — 
женская...” Translation from Pilnyak, Tale, 115, with modifications. 
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planting corn, millet and potatoes in the “wasteland” (pustyr’) behind a deserted house. This 
house and its adjoining wasteland appeared at the beginning of chapter two, which described 
war- and revolution-ravaged Petersburg as a dying city returning to desert. The house has 
been abandoned in a foul state by its Russian inhabitants. Li-yang, “with his own hands” (a 
phrase repeated three times), working from dawn till dusk, gathers human excrement from all 
corners of this collapsing house to fertilize the soil outside. The Asiatic intruder here is not 
destructive, he is constructive: he rebuilds agricultural order on a human scale out of the 
collapse of stone-bound imperial grandeur.  
Li-yang’s ultimate agricultural role departs from Simmel’s stranger, who “is by nature 
no ‘owner of soil.’”198 Li-yang seems to act out of cultural automation: he does what we saw 
him learning to do in chapter one, but now he does it alone, removed from his cultural 
context. Nonetheless, it is not inappropriate: this migrant from the other Eurasian agricultural 
empire simply reverts to the economic order that existed before Peter’s city attempted its 
acceleration into European modernity. As Filimonova notes, this return to agriculture takes 
place in a region of Petersburg called the “Moscow” district, suggesting a reversion to the 
pre-Petrine order of Muscovite Rus’.199 This Asian migrant does not destroy Russia, he 
renews its authentic past.  
As he works, Li-yang sings a martial song from the Boxer Uprising, in which his 
father participated. We heard the song’s first two lines, in their own cultural context, back in 
chapter one.200 Here we get four lines, and a translation: 
  Тен-да-тен мынь кай! 
Ди-да-ди мынь кай! 
Жо сюэ тен шень куй. — 
Во цин ши-фу лай! — 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Simmel, “The Stranger,” 403.  
 
199 Filimonova, “From Scythia to a Eurasian Empire,” 106. 
 
200 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-burkh,” 21.  
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песню, в которoй говорилось о том, чтоб — «небо растворило небесные ворота, 
земля растворила земные ворота, чтобы постигнуть сонм небесных духов[.]» 
 
[Ten-da-ten myn’ kai! 
Di-da-di myn’ kai! 
Zho siue ten shen’ kui. — 
Vo tsin shi-fu lai! — 
a song which exhorts “heaven to burst open its heavenly gates, earth to burst open its 
earthly gates, so as to grasp the host of heavenly spirits.”]201 
 
The Boxer Uprising was met with considerable alarm in Imperial Russia, perhaps most 
famously provoking Solov’ev to declare that his “Panmongolist” predictions had been 
justified by history.202 This alarm was strongest in the Russian Far East: the Priamur region 
was put on military alert, and a possible attack on Vladivostok was anticipated. Fearing an 
uprising, the administration of Blagoveshchensk, on the Russo-Chinese border, drove the 
Chinese population of the city into the Amur River, where several thousand drowned.203  
Russian troops subsequently joined the international expeditionary force that 
suppressed the Boxer Uprising. Indeed, it seems likely that Pil’niak found this song recorded 
in the memoirs of Dmitrii Grigorevich Ianchevetskii, a correspondent for Novyi Krai who 
witnessed the Boxer attack on Tianjin in 1900 and the subsequent Russian participation in the 
storming of Beijing. Pil’niak’s transcription matches Ianchevetskii’s almost exactly, though 
he renders his translation more mysterious by omitting the fourth line: “I call on the teacher 
to come.”204 In the chapter where he quotes the song, Ianchevetskii describes a group of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Ibid., 53.  
 
202 Lim, “Solov’ev and the East,” 339. 
 
203 Larin, Kitaitsy v Rossii, 41–2. 
 
204 Dmitrii Grigorevich Ianchevetskii, U sten nedvizhnovo Kitaia (St Petersburg: Izd-vo P. A. 
Artem’eva, 1903), republished as 1900: Russkie shturmuiut Pekin (Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2008). 
The song is quoted on p. 145 in the 2008 edition. Ianchevetskii in line three has хуй where Pil’niak, 
perhaps blushing, writes куй. His translation uses imperatives that Pil’niak, following the чтоб in his 
own text, transforms into past tense forms: “Небо! Раствори небесные врата! / Земля! Раствори 
земные врата! / Чтобы постигнуть сонм небесных духов, / Я молю учителя сойти!” (Heaven, 
burst open your heavenly gates! Earth, burst open your earthly gates! So as to grasp the host of 
heavenly spirits, I call on the teacher to come!) In Chinese, I have found this song rendered thus: “天
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heavily-armed Boxers stirred into frenzy by a leader who urges them to “punish traitors with 
the most terrible punishments and cut out the heart of every yangguizi [trans: foreign 
devil]!”205 Any Russian reader familiar with Ianchevetskii’s text or the history of the Boxer 
Uprising more generally might be expected to connect this song with the threat of savage 
Chinese violence, and indeed it appears in Pil’niak’s second chapter as an inhuman, animal 
howl: “he howled, like a dog at the moon—the Chinese man began to sing a martial 
song[.]”206 But when the song recurs in chapter three, it proves capable of provoking 
sympathy, resounding “with unbelievable melancholy to a Russian ear.”207 The threatening 
collective war song has become a lone work song tinged with sadness. 
Li-yang in these final scenes is a figure that inspires not fear or confusion but 
sympathy, a lonely migrant whose sadness we are encouraged to feel. When the cousins of 
Maiakovskii’s abusive schoolchildren make an appearance, the insults that they shout only 
increase our sense of Li-yang's isolation: “Hey, khodia, you slant-eyed devil! Who cut off 
your pigtail?”208 Khodia (ходя) was a term used to refer to Chinese migrants in China in the 
early twentieth century—it occurs in most of the texts considered below.209 Its combination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
打天门开，地打地门来，要学神拳术，搬请师傅来” (pinyin: tiān dǎ tiān mén kāi, dì dǎ dì mén 
lái, yào xué shén quán shù, bānqǐng shīfu lái). The third line is notably different from Ianchevetskii’s 
version. English: “Break open the gates of heaven, break open the gates of earth. If you want to study 
the sacred technique of the fist, call the master to come.” Jian Bozan, Yi he tuan (Shanghai: Shanghai 
ren min chu ban she, 1957), vol. 1. Quoted in http://2011.yingkou.net.cn/zjyk/2007/08/14/2623.html, 
accessed 4.17.14. 
 
205 Ianchevetskii, 1900, 144. 
 
206 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” 46. “завыл, как собака при луне, — запел боевую песню 
китаец[.]” 
 
207 Ibid., 53. 
 
208 Ibid. 53. “— Эй, ходя, косоглазый чорт! Кто тебе косу то обрил?”  
 
209 The etymology of khodia is disputed, but most variants suggest the idea of migrant traders: some 
link it to the Russian verb khodit’, in the sense of “come and go,” while others find a connection with 
the Chinese term 货家, huojia, meaning “trader in goods” or, in Russian, “коробейник.” See for 
example http://laowaicast.ru/2013/05/solinado/, accessed 05.12.2014. 
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with generic ethnic stereotypes here increases our sense that Li-yang, never referred to by 
name in this final chapter, has become, in his isolation, simply a signifier for his ethnicity. 
Our final images of Li-yang emphasise the pathetic loneliness of the stranger, masturbating at 
night in the room he has repaired, unknowable (“What was the Chinese man thinking, who 
knows?”) and isolated in his difference (“alone, foreign to everyone, slant-eyed”).210  
If Li-yang remains different and strange, he is also given a backstory that replaces the 
threatening image of the migrant stranger with a sympathetic portrait of a lonely human being. 
This sympathetic connection to Li-yang is reinforced by his concluding juxtaposition to Petr 
Ivanovich Ivanov, the brother of Ivan Ivanovich, who ends the story begging on the streets of 
Beijing. In this final leap between the Russian and Chinese cultural zones, parallelisms 
preserve the link to Petersburg and to Li-yang. Although Petr’s perspective sees only 
strangeness—“what a strange sight for the eyes of a European!”—Beijing, like the Russian 
city founded by his namesake, is made up of stone slabs and stone bridges.211 Up on the city 
walls, in the “silence and peoplelessness” (тишина и безлюдье) that characterized Pil’niak’s 
Kitai-gorod, Petr sleeps on a “granite block” (гранитная глыба); the material points to 
Petersburg as the object echoes the monument to Yongle that Li-yang passed on his way out 
of China.212 Passing the execution ground, Petr observes with horror the decapitated heads on 
bamboo poles, an echo of the death of Li-yang’s father.213 A concluding list of Petr’s 
predicates shows him to be Li-yang’s inverted double: “White Guardist, lord, officer of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Pil’niak, “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” 54. “Что думал китаец, кто знает? […] один, всем чужой, 
косоглазый.” 
 
211 Ibid., 55. “какое странное зрелище для глаз европейца!” 
 
212 Ibid., 56. 
 
213 Ibid., 59. 
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Russian Army, emigrant, brother, Petr Ivanovich Ivanov.”214 A similar list for his mirror-
image Li-yang might read: “Red Guardist, peasant, soldier of the Soviet Army, emigrant, son, 
Li-yang.”  
This carefully organized diptych of the Chinese and Russian migrants, fleeing their 
own revolutions to each other’s countries, introduces a dimension that was lacking in the 
Symbolist attitude to the threatening Orient. Solov’ev, Merezhkovskii and Blok portrayed the 
East as a potential invader at a time when Tsarist Russia was working to assert itself in East 
Asia and seize territory from China. These Panmongolist fears survive in Pil’niak, in the 
sinister symbolism of The Naked Year or the feverish nightmares of “Sankt-Piter-Burkh.” But 
the growing presence of Chinese strangers in Russia and a commensurate movement of 
Russians to China encourages Pil’niak to set up a new model of historical parallelism 
between the two countries, one that enables sympathy through a commonality of suffering 
and confusion. In the context of a world thrown into unprecedented chaos, Li-yang holds the 
Eurasian mirror up to Russia. 
 Pil’niak was not the only writer drawn to the Chinese migrant wandering Petrograd as 
an image of post-revolutionary disintegration and disorientation. In the Petrograd of 1919, a 
city that had “become overgrown, like a camp abandoned by troops,” Viktor Shklovskii 
recalls Issac Babel “watching with slow deliberation the hungry whoring of the city.”215 As 
Shklovskii remembers it, at that time Babel’ “wrote slowly, but stubbornly. Always one and 
the same story about two Chinese in a brothel. […] The Chinese and the women kept 
changing. They got younger, they got older, they smashed the windows, they beat the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Ibid., 60. “Белогвардеец, барин, офицер русской армии, эмигрант, брат, Петр Иванович 
Иванов.” 
 
215 Viktor Shklovskii, “I. Babel': kriticheskii romans,” Lef 6 (1924): 153. “Бабель жил, неторопливо 
рассматривая голодный блуд города.” 
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women, they tried it every which way.”216 Shklovskii recalls Babel’s leaving Petrograd with 
the story unfinished. A fragmentary text on this theme was published, however, in 1923, 
under the title “Khodia.” A subtitle to that first publication claims this story is an extract from 
“Peterburg, 1918,” though no such book ever appeared.217  
Babel’s short, elusive fragment echoes the dark, deserted atmosphere in which the 
“China” of Pil’niak’s Naked Year first appeared: “Nobody on Nevsky. Ink bubbles burst in 
the sky. Two o’clock in the morning. Implacable night.”218 The only people on the street are 
readily identifiable as “former people” fallen on hard times: a prostitute named Glafira and an 
older man, Aristarkh Terent’ich, who seems to be helping her to find customers. A Chinese 
man in a leather jacket—the uniform of the Bolsheviks made famous, inter alia, by The 
Naked Year—walks by and begins to negotiate. Glafira asks that Aristarkh Terent’ich, who 
she says is her godfather, be allowed to come with them and sleep by the wall. “The Chinese 
slowly nodded his head. O, wise solemnity of the East!”219  
At the hotel, the sexual act is elliptically omitted, and the near-silent Chinese man 
seems to be slipping back into the night: “Late in the night the Chinese got out of bed and set 
off into the darkness.”220 But when Glafira asks him where he is going, he leans down to 
wake Aristarkh Terent’ich and indicates that he, too, should copulate with Glafira. “Get 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Ibid. “Бабель писал мало, но упорно. Все одну и ту же повесть о двух китайцах в публичном 
доме. […] Китайцы и женщины изменялись. Они молодели, старели, били стекла, били 
женщину, устраивали и так и эдак.” 
 
 
217 Isaak Babel’, Sobranie sochinenii v chetyrekh tomakh, vol. 1, Odesskie rasskazy (Moscow: 
Vremia, 2005), note to “Khodia,” 555. 
 
218 Ibid., 270. “Никого на Невском. Чернильные пузыри лопаются в небе. Два часа ночи. 
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away, you dog,” she objects, “your Chinese has finished me off” (lit. “killed me”).221 But the 
Chinese man insists, in his longest utterance of the story, rendered in heavily accented 
foreigner talk: “‘Me friend,’ said the Chinese man. ‘He cahn. Eh, slat…’” (— Ми друг, — 
сказал китаец. — Он — можна. Э, стерфь…).222 Glafira takes Aristarkh Terent’ich to her, 
whispering in conclusion that he is old and understands nothing. Here the story ends, with 
none of the positive reconstruction attached to Pil’niak’s Chinese migrant. This short, dark 
fragment, with its atmosphere of dread and invocations of incest, blasphemy and murder, 
links the collapse of the social order to the enigmatic figure of the Chinese man in a leather 
jacket wandering through post-revolutionary Russia. 
III. The Chinese Partisan: Violence and Comedy 
 A very different model of the Chinese partisan as symbolic figure is offered in 
Vsevolod Ivanov’s novella Armoured Train 14-69 (Bronepoezd No. 14-69), first published in 
1922. This hugely popular Civil War tale, based on a true story and adapted into a hit play in 
1927, recounts the attempts of a group of Red Partisans to stop an armoured train heading to 
a Russian Far Eastern town to put down an uprising.223 When the original plan to blow up a 
bridge falls through, the single Chinese member of the partisan brigade, Sin-Bin-U, lies down 
on the rails and shoots himself. The train stops, the driver is shot, and after a protracted battle, 
the train is captured.  
 In a recent article on the ideological functions enacted by the figure of Sin-Bin-U, 
Roy Chan reads Armoured Train 14-69 as expressing both the utopian horizons of Soviet 
internationalism and the enduring obstacles that hinder the attainment of those horizons. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




223 Although the self-sacrificing partisan in the historical incident was reportedly Chinese, Roy Chan 
notes that Ivanov changed the location of the event from Western Siberia to the Far East. Roy Chan, 
“Broken Tongues: Race, Sacrifice and Geopolitics in the Far East in Vesvolod Ivanov’s Bronepoezd 
No. 14-69,” Sibirica, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 2011), 31.	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utopian element is communicated, for Chan, primarily through the text’s treatment of 
language. The various characters in the story express themselves in a range of confusing and 
sometimes mutually incomprehensible modes of speech, from Sin-Bin-U’s pidgin-inflected 
broken Russian to the Far Eastern Russian dialect of the other partisans and the English of a 
captured American soldier. The surpassing of these linguistic divisions in turn implies the 
power of the Soviet message to transcend cultural and linguistic difference. Sin-Bin-U’s 
readiness to sacrifice himself can be taken as the ultimate expression of this power. 
On the other hand, Chan suggests that Sin-Bin-U’s commitment to the internationalist 
cause conceals the fact that nationalism, not internationalism, was the dominant Chinese 
response to its early twentieth century sovereignty crisis—and Chinese nationalism 
represented a potential challenge to Soviet sovereignty over this contested Far Eastern 
territory. This overriding of Chinese nationalism by Soviet internationalism is encapsulated 
in the moment when, his home and family destroyed by the Japanese, Sin-Bin-U throws his 
copy of the Chinese Classic of Poetry, or Shijing, down a well and heads off to join the Red 
partisans.224 The utopianism of a fractured yet transcendent language is counterbalanced, for 
Chan, by the abiding concerns of inter-state Realpolitik: “This text and its successors 
promulgate a vision of the utopian possibilities of linguistic internationalism while 
simultaneously and paradoxically reminding the reader of the difficulty and perhaps 
impossibility of making commensurate competing visions of nation and history.”225 Sin-Bin-
U becomes the ethnic outsider whose body and distinct history must be sacrificed for the 
greater good of the Soviet project. This in effect constitutes a Soviet-internationalist 
reworking of the “Butterfly myth,” a “longstanding narrative by which the subordinate Asian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Chan, “Broken Tongues,” 44–5. Note that this is the same “Book of Odes” that Pil’niak’s Li-yang 
read in childhood: in both texts the Shijing represents an embeddedness in Chinese culture that must 
be abandoned. 
 
225 Ibid., 30. 
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is granted acceptance by White society, but only through sacrifice.”226 In assigning important 
but subordinate roles to ethnic minority figures within a Russian-led project to control the Far 
East, Chan concludes, the new Soviet internationalism ends up looking markedly similar to 
the old Tsarist imperialism.227 
 Both Sin-Bin-U and Li-yang are forced from their homes in a stable Chinese cultural 
universe by war and violence, becoming exiles from their own tradition in a manner symbolic 
of their culture’s traumatic passage into modernity. Nevertheless, the differences between 
them are significant. Li-yang’s presence in Russia and the Red Army is a product of 
confusion and flight with no clear ideological basis or commitment. At the story’s end, he 
reverts to agriculture through a kind of cultural automatism, not from any explicit 
commitment to post-revolutionary reconstruction. Sin-Bin-U, by contrast, is presented as an 
ideologically committed member of the Red cause. True, his commitment apparently stems 
from a personal desire for vengeance against the Japanese rather than any grand global vision 
of socialist justice. But the motivations of Ivanov’s other partisans are similarly local, tied to 
their land and their immediate concerns. 
 Nevertheless, Sin-Bin-U’s strangeness, like Li-yang’s, is constantly marked in a 
grotesque manner that distances him from the rest of the partisans. Whereas Li-yang became 
grotesque and sinister in the fevered perspectives of Petersburg, Sin-Bin-U, right up to his 
sacrificial suicide, is primarily a comic figure. Take, for example, his first extended set of 
utterances: 
Син-Бин-У сказал громко: 
     - Казаки цхау-жа! Нипонса куна, мадама бери мала-мала. Нехао, казака 
нехао! Кырасна русска*1... 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Ibid., 47. Chan borrows the concept of the “Butterfly myth” from Gina Marchetti, who identifies 
narrative echoes of Madame Butterfly in classic Hollywood cinema. See Gina Marchetti, Romance 
and the “Yellow Peril”: Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993). We shall return to this myth when considering the narrative 
dynamics of the ballet The Red Poppy in Chapter Four. 
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Он, скосив губы, швыркнул слюной сквозь зубы, и лицо его, цвета песка 
золотых россыпей, с узенькими, как семячки дыни, разрезами глаз, радостно 
заулыбалось. 
     - Шанго*2!.. 
Син-Бин-У в знак одобрения поднял кверху большой палец руки. 
Но не слыша, как всегда, хохота партизан, китаец уныло сказал: 
     - Пылыоха-о*3... 
И тоскливо оглянулся. 
 
[Sin-Bin-U said loudly, “The Cossacks are bad! The Japs are scoundlels, they lape 
women… That’s not good. The Cossacks are bad! The ‘Russ’ are good…” 
Tightening his lips, he flung a gob of spit through his teeth; his face, the color of the 
sand of gold mines, with little narrow slits like melon seeds for eyes, broke into a 
joyful smile, “It’s good!..” 
As a sign of approval Sin-Bin-U stuck up his thumb.  
But, as usual, he didn’t hear the laughter of the partisans and said sadly, “It’s 
bad…” 
And he looked back wistfully.]228 
 
Sin-Bin-U’s language shows several signs of familiarity with Chinese pidgin Russian, most 
notably the use of the imperative (beri) as an indicative verb, and the pidgin lexical items 
kuna (girl or young woman, from Chinese gūniang 姑娘), mala-mala (nemnogo, “a little”), 
and shango (khorosho, “good”).229 But these combine with markers of accentual 
complication (“Kyrasna” for “krasnaia”) and deliberate admixtures of Russian and Chinese 
lexemes. “Нехао” (nekhao) is a combination of Russian не, “not,” and Chinese hǎo 好, 
“good”; “цхау-жа” (tsau-zha), which Ivanov translates in his footnote as “плохи” (bad, bad 
people), probably originates from càozhe 肏者, “fuckers.”  
The immediate effect of such non-normative speech is jolting and disorienting to the 
native speaker of Russian; but alongside this unnerving effect there is also potential comedy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Vsevolod Ivanov, “Bronepoezd No. 14-69,” Krasnaia nov’ 1 (1922): 81. Translation is Frank 
Miller’s, from Evgeny Zamyatin, The Islanders / Vsevolod Ivanov, Armoured Train 14-69 (Ann 
Arbor: Trilogy, 1978), 55. Miller makes no attempt to translate Sin-Bin-U's broken pidgin, opting 
instead to translate, with a few accentual marks, the translations into Russian provided by Ivanov with 
the original text:  




229 Perekhval’skaia, Russkie pidzhiny, 324, 326, 344. 
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in any example of simplified foreigner talk. This combination of the frightening and the 
funny is typically grotesque, though Chan sees in this grotesque appearance the possibility of 
a more utopian reading. In particular, Chan picks out the utterances “nekhao” (see above) and 
“pylyokha-o” (an inventive splicing of Russian plokho with Chinese bù hǎo, the negated 
hǎo/“good”) as concrete representations of Sin-Bin-U’s attempts to transcend linguistic 
boundaries for the sake of a common cause.230  
Yet the utopian implications of Sin-Bin-U’s language are offset by the inherent comic 
potential of foreigner talk and the comic figure he presents through the commentary of the 
narrator. Quite apart from the grotesque introduction of mineral and vegetable connotations 
into the human image through his golden-sand face and melon-seed eyes, Sin-Bin-U’s 
conduct is simplistic and exaggerated, in a broad, comic manner. He speaks loudly, yet 
incomprehensibly. The Manichean worldview contained in his utterances is exaggerated by 
the confirmatory gesture made with his thumb, and by the speed with which he swings from 
the poles of positive and negative, from smiling “joyfully” (radostno) to speaking “sadly” 
(unylo) and looking around “mournfully” (tosklivo). The reader is perhaps encouraged to join 
the partisans in their laughter; Sin-Bin-U’s failure to notice said laughter, consumed as he is 
by the journey from “shango” to “pylyokha-o,” can only increase his comicality.  
 Most of Sin-Bin-U’s appearances in the story have him enacting this polarized swing 
between the positive and the negative in a comical vein. In his first spoken words, he is 
explaining to the passing partisans, “with malice” (so zlost’iu), how they need to fight the 
Japanese: 
— Японса била надо... у-у-ух, как била! 
И, широко разводя руками, показывал, как надо бить японца. 
 
[“You should have beat the hell out of the Japs… o-oh, how you should have!” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Chan, “Broken Tongues,” 34. 
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And spreading his arms widely, he showed how they should have beaten the 
Japanese.]231 
 
His statements are once again backed up with expansive physical gestures. But here the 
message is immediately endorsed by the partisans’ captain, Vershinin, who confirms the 
cruelty of the Japanese towards the Chinese. Hearing himself discussed, Sin-Bin-U reacts 
with almost childish pleasure: “The Chinese man liked this conversation about himself and 
started walking beside Vershinin and the others.”232 Once again we see the sudden and 
complete switch in moods, from malice to joy.  
Words describing joy and malice, from the roots rad and zlo, occur with striking 
frequency in Armoured Train 14-69. The adverb radostno, “joyfully,” occurs 13 times in the 
1922 text, together with one instance of the adjective radostnaia, three appearances of the 
noun radost’ and six uses of the verb ob/radovat’sia. Meanwhile the nouns zlost’ and zloba 
both occur five times, as does the adverb zlobno, with one appearance apiece for the 
adjectives zlobnoe and zloi and the adverb zlo. Though not every instance can be cited, it can 
be generally postulated that the rad-root words accrue largely to the Red partisans, to nature, 
or to the narrator, while zlo roots are more or less equally associated with the Whites and the 
Reds. At the end of the first chapter, for example, the armoured train filled with White 
soldiers and officers is described hurtling through the darkness, carrying within it “hundreds 
of human bodies, filled with melancholy and anger [zloboi].”233 Shortly afterwards, the Red 
partisans are described “rushing off into the hills in confusion and anger [zlobe].”234 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Ibid. 80. Translation from Miller, Armored Train, 54. 
 
232 Ibid. “Китаец обрадовался разговору о себе и пошел с ними рядом.” 
 
233 Ibid., 79. “летели в тьму тяжелые стальные коробки вагонов, несущих в себе сотни 
человеческих тел, наполненных тоской и злобой.” (My emphasis.) 
 
234 Ibid., 81. “Партизаны, как стадо кабанов от лесного пожара, кинув логовища, в смятении и 
злобе рвались в горы.” (My emphasis.) 
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As early as 1922, Aleksandr Voronskii—the editor of the journal Krasnaia nov’, in 
which Armoured Train 14-69 was first published—had identified radostnost’ as the key 
element in Ivanov’s poetics. Voronskii declared that Ivanov’s achievement was to experience 
all the blood and horror of the Civil War and yet transform it into writing infused with “a 
great, loving, warm, life-affirming feeling, joyfulness, intoxication with the gifts of life.”235 
This aptitude, for Voronskii, emerges from Ivanov’s childhood in Siberia and close 
connection to the vital energies of nature.236 If we introduce the zlo words as a counter-tone 
to rad, however, we can see Armoured Train 14-69 as offering two alternative motivations 
for the fighting in which all its characters are engaged: hate or love. The greater ability of the 
Red partisans to move successfully from zlo to rad indicates that they, unlike their enemies, 
have discovered a positive model of solidarity that does not simply depend on hatred of the 
opposition. Moments of trans-national communication serve as key demonstrations of that 
solidarity. 
Thus the interplay of rad and zlo is especially stark in the famous scene where the 
partisans attempt to “convert” a captured American soldier. A muzhik on horseback 
“joyfully” informs the partisans (“radostno orala glotka”) that the American had been 
caught.237 As they crowd around him, however, the mood changes, their bodies emitting a 
“dry, chilling malice” (“sukhaia, znobiashchaia zlost’”).238 However, the general consensus 
to execute the captive is interrupted by Znobov, who suggests “propagandizing” him instead. 
After bashing his head against the problem of trans-lingual communication, Znobov makes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
235 A. K. Voronskii, “Literaturnye siluety: II. Vsevolod Ivanov,” Krasnaia nov’ 5 (1922): 256. 
“большое, любовное, теплое, жизнепринимающее чувство, радостность, опьяненность дарами 
жизни.” 
 
236 Ibid., 258. 
 
237 Ivanov, “Bronepoezd,” 83. 
 
238 Ibid., 84. 
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the breakthrough when he pronounces the single word “Lenin”: “The American’s whole body 
started; his eyes shone, and he answered joyfully [radostno], “There’s a chap!”239 When he 
responds to the words “sovetska respublika” with the exclamation “that is pretty indeed!,” joy 
spreads to the previously malicious crowd: “The peasants began to laugh joyfully”.240 The 
passage from emnity to brotherhood is sealed by one final, joyous utterance from the captive: 
“The American pointed at his chest with his hand and in a drawling stammer pronounced 
joyfully and proudly, ‘Pro-le-tar-i-at… We!’ The peasants hugged the American, felt his 
clothing, and squeezed his hands and shoulders as hard as they could.”241 
What is Sin-Bin-U’s role in all of this? He enters the conversion struggle after the 
victory has already been won, and performs in typically comic fashion, rushing forward and 
speaking at great speed while trying to prevent his trousers from falling down: 
Син-Бин-У подскочил к американцу и, подтягивая спадающие штаны, 
торопливо проговорил: 
— Русики ресыпубылика-а. Кытайси ресыпубылика-а. Мериканысы 
ресыпубылика-а пухао. Нипонсы, пухао, надо, надо ресыпубылика-а. Кыра-а-
сна ресыпубылика-а нада-нада*1. 
     И, оглядевшись кругом, встал на цыпочки, и, медленно подымая большой 
палец руки кверху, проговорил: 
— Шанго. 
 
[Sin-Bin-U jumped over to the American, and holding up his pants which were 
falling down, said hurriedly, “Lussia is a lepublic, China is a lepublic, Amelica is 
bad lepublic. The Japanese ale all bad, we need Led Lepublic.” 
And looking around, he stood on his tiptoes, stuck up his thumb slowly, and said, 
“Good.”]242 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Ibid., 86. “Американец вздрогнул всем телом, блеснул глазами и радостно ответил: 
— There's a chap!” Translation from Miller, Armored Train, 61. (My emphasis.) 
 
240 Ivanov, “Bronepoezd,” 86. “Мужики радостно захохотали” 
 
241 Ibid., 86. “Американец указал себе рукой на грудь и, протяжно и радостно заикаясь, гордо 
проговорил: — Про ле та ри-ат... We! Мужики обнимали американца, щупали его одежду и изо 
всей силы жали его руки, плечи.” (My emphasis.) Miller, perhaps tired of the repetition, translates 
радостно as “happily” here.  
 
242 Ibid., 86–7. Again, Miller (Armored Train, 62) translates and accentually distorts the translation in 
the footnote, including the word “sovsem,” “all,” which does not have an equivalent in Sin-Bin-U’s 
original utterance. Ivanov’s footnote reads thus: “*1 Россия - республика, Китай - республика, 
Америка - плохая республика, Японец - совсем плох, надо красную республику.” 
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This binary system of “good” and “bad” is essentially the same logic Znobov used to 
“propagandize” the American. But Sin-Bin-U expresses it in a crude, caricatured form, 
emphasised by the repetition of the accentually distorted “resypubylika-a” for “respublika,” 
and the repeated alternatives of “nado” (need, must have) and “pukhao” (Chinese bù hǎo不
好, “not good”). The exaggerated physical gestures and simplistic repetitiveness of Sin-Bin-
U’s speech lend his contribution a comic quality that is absent from the partisans’ noble 
forgiveness or the American’s frightened salvation.  
Of the two available motivations, hatred and love, it seems Sin-Bin-U is primarily 
driven by the first. His single-minded hatred for the Japanese and desire for revenge is 
expressed in almost every utterance he makes. This violent resentment presents a threatening 
contrast to the comic elements in his demeanour: after killing three Japanese, we are told, 
Sin-Bin-U “needs nothing, he is content.”243 When the partisans are debating whether to try 
and stop the train, their leader Vershinin argues that the Japanese are losing the will to fight. 
Immediately Sin-Bin-U jumps up and makes a long speech, whose incomprehensibility 
Ivanov describes with a metaphorical flourish, before offering a short and simple translation:  
Sin-Bin-U got up on the walker, and, as if emitting from his mouth a colored paper 
ribbon that rustled incomprehensibly, spent a long time saying why it was necessary 
to stop the armoured train that very day.244 
 
The eccentricities of his speech conceal always the same message; their volume and 
repetitiveness assert the depth of his anger, and the comparative absence of other emotions. 
Earlier, when Vershinin asks him what all this war, chaos and destruction is really for, Sin-
Bin-U offers only ignorance: “— Ни зынаю, Кита. Гори-гори!.. Ни зынаю!.. [...]- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Ibid., 88. “Син-Бин-У убил трех японцев и пока китайцу ничего не надо, он доволен.” 
 
244 Ibid., 103. “Син-Бин-У влез на ходок и долго, будто выпуская изо рта цветную и непонятно 
шебурчащую бумажную ленту, говорил: почему нужно сегодня задержать бронепоезд.” 
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Нисиво!.. нисиво ни зынаю!..” (I no knowee, Kita. It just misely! I no knowee!.. […] I no 
knowee nothing!.. Nothing!..).245 
Sin-Bin-U is motivated by a violent desire for vengeance. In René Girard's account of 
the institution of sacrifice in human societies, this is precisely the urge that sacrifice seeks to 
minimize. Girard reads sacrifice as a means of rechannelling the violent impulses that would 
otherwise seek release within a community onto a victim whose death will not incur reprisal: 
“sacrifice is primarily an act of violence without risk of vengeance.”246 Yet at the climactic 
(and highly ambiguous) moment of sacrifice, Sin-Bin-U seems driven by a different emotion. 
When the suggestion is made that a body on the rails is the only way to stop the train—for the 
somewhat implausible reason that the driver will have to stop to fill out a report—red-haired 
former miner Vas'ka Okorok steps forward and lies down on the rails. When Vas'ka cries out 
in fear—“Не могу-у!.. душа-а!..” (I can’t do it!.. My soul!..)—the muzhiki remain silent. But 
Sin-Bin-U rushes forward to join him, saying: “Сыкмуучна-а!.. Васикьа!” (Lowwenely-y! 
Vasika!)247 This first word seems to be a distorted rendering of skuchno, a term most 
commonly translated as “boring.” This, coincidentally, is the single Russian word that Li-
yang speaks (as kius-no) in his Petersburg jail.248 Pitched somewhere between question and 
affirmation, Li-yang's kius-no neatly fits the immediate tedium of incarceration. But within 
the wider scope of the story, which sets in parallel the isolated, exiled fates of Li-yang and 
Petr Ivanovich, “kius-no/skushno” takes on the extra connotation of loneliness, closer to the 
verb skuchat’ (to miss somebody or something). This, surely, is Sin-Bin-U’s meaning: 
Vas’ka is lonely up there on the rails, so he goes to keep him company. Interpreted this way, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Ibid., 89. Translation from Miller, Armored Train, 65. 
 
246 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (London: Continuum, 2005), 13. 
 
247 Ivanov, “Bronepoezd,” 110.  
 
248 Pil’niak, “Povest’ Peterburgskaia,” 43, 47. 
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Sin-Bin-U’s sacrifice becomes an act of empathetic love, unconnected at the moment of 
action to hatred of the Japanese or some abstract notion of international revolution.  
But Sin-Bin-U is not well repaid for his brotherly love. Almost immediately Vas’ka 
abandons him, and the last words any partisan addresses to him are not sympathetic but 
demanding: “— Ковш тот брось суды, манза!.. Да и ливорвер-то бы оставил. Куды тебе 
ево?.. Ей!.. А мне сгодится!..” (Throw the ladle over here, Chink!.. And you could also 
leave your livorver here. What do you need it for?.. Eh!.. But I can use it!..)249 Manza (in 
Chinese manzi—满子) is a term of disputed origin applied to Chinese inhabitants of Ussuri 
krai from the time of its acquisition by Russia in 1860.250 At the moment of his sacrifice, Sin-
Bin-U is not even addressed by name—he remains defined, for his comrades, by his ethnicity. 
After his death he is mentioned only once more. Vas’ka does not, in the end, survive the 
battle, and after the fighting is over an unattributed drunken voice recalls fallen heroes: 
“Someone is crying drunkenly behind the doors, ‘Vaska… the bastards, Vaska—they killed 
him… I’ll rip open the guts of five of them—for Vaska and the Chinaman… Bastards…’ 
‘Well they can all… Dogs…’ ‘I’ll get them… for Vaska!’”251 Sin-Bin-U, once more reduced 
to racial generality, is remembered second and then forgotten again. His sacrifice may be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Ivanov, “Bronepoezd,” 110. Translation from Miller, Armored Train, 91. Miller smooths out, 
however, the peasant’s mangling of revol’ver as livovrer, which illustrates the point that Sin-Bin-U is 
not the only character who floats on the margins of “correct” speech. A. Voronskii argued that 
Ivanov’s Far East is entirely exotic, the local Russians as much as the Chinese: “У Вс. Иванова 
Сибирь экзотична. О ней и о людях ее читаешь, как об Австралии” (The Siberia of Vs. Ivanov is 
exotic. One reads about it and the people that live there as if it were Australia). “Literaturnye siluety”; 
quoted in A. Kruchenykh, Novoe v pisatel’skoe tekhnike (Moscow: Izdanie Vserossiiskogo Soiuza 
Poetov, 1927), 24. Kruchenykh links this to a moment of flux and chaos in the Siberian countryside, 
when “Смешались сибиряки, китайцы, японцы и американцы! Слова распоясались” (The 
Siberians, Chinese, Japanese and Americans all mixed together! Words were ungirdled). Ibid., 21. 
 
250 See e.g. V. K. Aresn’ev, Kitaitsy v Ussuriiskom krae (Moscow: Kraft, 2004), 67. 
 
251 Ivanov, “Bronepoezd,” 120. “За дверцами кто-то плачет пьяно: — Ваську-то... сволочи, 
Ваську - убили... Я им за Ваську пятерям брюхо вспорю - за Ваську и за китайца... Сволочи... 
— Ну их к... Собаки... — Я их... за Ваську-то!..” Translation from Miller, Armored Train, 103. 
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one thing readers remember about Armoured Train 14-69, but the text itself forgets him quite 
easily. 
Even at his climactic moment of sacrifice, description serves to make Sin-Bin-U as 
inaccessible as possible, even dehumanized. His head on the rails is “flat and emerald-eyed, 
like a cobra”; twice the “emerald-eyed cobra” lifts its head to look around at its silent, 
watching comrades. In response to the request for his gun, he appears to move to throw it into 
the bushes, only to shoot himself suddenly in the back of the head. Is there a hint of mocking 
reply here to the peasant’s insistence that Sin-Bin-U no longer needs the gun, or simply a 
forestalling of any potential second thoughts? Perhaps this gesture contains a note of defiance 
directed at his watching comrades as much as at the onrushing train. But Ivanov leaves Sin-
Bin-U’s final actions open for interpretation, undisturbed by any reports from inside the 
cobra’s head.  
The comic elements in the image of Sin-Bin-U thus coexist with a significant capacity 
for violent anger and a fearlessness in the face of death that approaches the inhuman. Such a 
composite, contradictory figure provokes responses that might be considered typical towards 
strangers. Their inability to communicate or behave correctly suggests a kind of childishness 
that can be comic, yet they are also suspected of “abnormal” and possibly threatening 
powers. In the context of the history of China images, Sin-Bin-U retains some of the sense of 
threat inherent in the “Yellow Peril” mentality, while ostensibly embodying a positive image 
of revolutionary progress. In his ambiguity, expressed through the dynamic of the grotesque, 
we see a paradigmatic overlaying of “old” and “new” attitudes towards China. 
By embracing death on the train tracks when none of his Russian comrades can, Sin-
Bin-U taps into an established stereotype about the abnormal fearlessness of Chinese 
partisans. Perhaps we can sense in this trope an echo of the anxieties provoked by the Boxers, 
whose claims to magical invulnerability were relayed to Russian readers by eyewitnesses 
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such as Ianchevetskii.252 Consider the following assessment by the Soviet military 
commander I. E. Iakir, who commanded a battalion including Chinese soldiers: 
 The Chinese is tough, he fears nothing. His own brother gets killed in battle, and he 
won’t bat an eye: he’ll go to him, close his eyes, and that’ll be the end of it. Then 
he’ll sit down next to him, with ammunition in his cap, and he’ll calmly fire off 
round after round. If he understands that he is up against an enemy, that’s bad news 
for the enemy. A Chinese will fight to the last.253 
 
These qualities of unsentimentality and compsure in the face of battle are presented by Iakir 
in a tone of admiration. This is not even a question of bravery, which would suggest the 
overcoming of fear. Iakir’s Chinese soldiers instead possess a seemingly superhuman 
capacity not to feel fear at all.254  
One clear literary descendent of Sin-Bin-U who displays these qualities of committed 
fearlessness can be found in Nikolai Ostrovskii’s Socialist Realist classic How the Steel was 
Tempered (Kak zakalialas’ stal’, 1932–34). Here a Chinese partisan appears at the head of 
some Red Army troops, heavily armed and battle-crazed: “A bronzed Chinese with bloodshot 
eyes, clad in an undershirt and girded with machine-gun belts, runs fully upright, a grenade in 
each hand.”255 As with Sin-Bin-U, however, this fearlessness and readiness for violence is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Ianchevetskii, 1900, 144–5. 
 
253 Quoted in Larin, Kitaitsy v Rossii, 92. “Китаец — он стоек, он ничего не боится. Брат родной 
погибнет в бою, а он и глазом не моргнет, подойдет, глаза ему прикроет, и все тут. Опять возле 
него сядет, в фуражке — патроны, и будет спокойно патрон за патроном выпускать. Если он 
понимает, что против него враг, то плохо этому врагу. Китаец будет драться до последнего.” 
 
254 The trope of Chinese fearlessness was not confined to early Soviet Russia. In his hugely influential 
1894 book Chinese Characteristics, the American missionary Arthur Smith argued that the Chinese 
physiognomy was distinguished by an “absence of nerves,” which enabled the Chinese not to feel 
pain. Quoted in Colleen Lye, America’s Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893–1945 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 54. Smith’s book was widely translated; Russian 
translations appeared in 1904 and 1916. See A. G. Smith, Kharakteristiki kitaitsev, ed. E. Spal’vina 
(Vladivostok: Dal’nyi Vostok, 1904); Smith, Kharakteristiki kitaitsev, trans. E. A. Laberbis 
(Vladivostok: Dalekaia okraina, 1916). 
 
255 Nikolai Ostrovskii, Kak zakalialas’ stal’ (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1936), 107. “Не  
скрываясь,  бежит загорелый,  с воспаленными  глазами  китаец, в  нижней рубашке,  
перепоясанный пулеметными лентами,  с гранатами в  обеих руках.” Translation modified from 
Nikolai Ostrovsky, How the Steel was Tempered: A Novel in Two Parts, trans. R. Prokofieva 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 150. 
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combined with a joyous embrace of comradeship. Thus the unnamed “Chinese” vouches for 
Serezha Bruzhak to the suspicious partisans:  
— Моя его знает, — радостно улыбался китаец. — Его клицала: "Длавствуй, 
товалиса!" Его больсевика - наса, молодой, холосая, - добавил он восхищенно, 
хлопая Сережу по плечу.256 
 
[“Me know him,” the Chinese smiled joyously. “Him shouted: ‘Gleetings, 
comlades!’ Him Bolsevik — one of us, young, good,” he added with delight, 
slapping Serezha on the shoulder.] 
 
This kitaets exhibits similar speech distortions to those of Sin-Bin-U, an admixture of pidgin 
Russian (“moia,” “ego” and the SOV word order of his first phrase) with correct but simple 
Russian (a pidgin speaker would not produce “znaet”) and distorted pronunciation. His accent 
is if anything more comically distorted—the s for sh, the d for zd, the l for r—and stands out 
more in a text that, by contrast with Ivanov, is marked far less by distortions from a relatively 
clean, standard literary Russian. Nonetheless, it is this marked linguistic outsider that 
welcomes Bruzhak as “nasa” (“ours”): this distorted affirmation of comradeship insists that 
allegiance, in the world the novel describes, transcends ethnic boundaries. 
This generic image of the Chinese partisan as both fearless and cheerful is reduced to 
grotesque simplicity in a brief scene from Andrei Platonov’s Chevengur (1926–28). 
Aleksandr Dvanov hops a train home, and travels briefly with some “sailors and Chinese” 
headed for Tsaritsyn. On the way they stop at a meal station so the sailors can beat up the 
commandant and take his soup. The participation of the Chinese in the narrative is confined 
to these two sentences: 
The Chinese ate up all the fish soup, which the Russian sailors turned down, then 
gathered up with bread all the nutritious moisture from the walls of the soup pails 
and said to the sailors, in response to their question about death: “We love death! 
We love it very much!” Then the Chinese, sated, lay down to sleep.257 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
256 Ostrovskii, Kak zakalialas’ stal’, 108. (My emphases.) 
 
257 Andrei Platonov, Chevengur. Kotlovan. Rasskazy (Moskva: Eksmo, 2011), 95. “Китайцы поели 
весь рыбный суп, от какого отказались русские матросы, затем собрали хлебом всю 
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These Chinese act and speak simplistically and in chorus, displaying a collective 
interweaving of pleasure and death drives. The communal refrain of “we love death!” 
perfectly attains the grotesque balance of unsettling comedy: a child-like enthusiasm for the 
end of life, followed by a collective mimesis of death in sleep. Pchelintseva presents this 
passage as a typical example of the “incomprehensibility” that the Chinese theme represents 
in 1920s prose; however, the accumulation of such examples leads me to see it rather as 
common knowledge taken to grotesque extremes.258 Chinese in post-revolutionary Russia 
were jobless, penniless and often starving, with little to lose and a natural hatred of the ruling 
classes; such historical circumstances could feasibly produce this image of the Chinese 
migrant-partisan as both preoccupied with survival and fearless to the point of irrationality in 
the face of death. Platonov, however, condenses a generalized cliché to the level of absurdity. 
His Chinese partisans reduce the fascination with death that runs through Chevengur to its 
most simplistic extreme. Sin-Bin-U’s individual act of heroism is replaced by a collective 
death drive so free of reflection as to become disturbing, and the super-human elements that 
Iakir admires take on a sub-human cast.  
 A similar structural balance between foreigner comedy and violent sacrifice can be 
found in Aleksandr Samokhoilov’s short story for older children and teenagers, “Khodia” 
(1927). Samokholiov’s titular Chinese migrant combines comic incomprehension with a 
single-minded and indeed violent devotion to what his broken Russian dubs “Zavetska 
vlast’!” (“Sawviet power!”). The story is recounted in the skaz-toned Far Eastern Russian of 
a fellow partisan, whose sense of the “khodia’s” strangeness and absurdity is openly 
expressed. Kicked out of a train carriage, the khodia is later found by the narrator sleeping on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
питательную влагу со стенок супных ведер и сказали матросам в ответ на их вопрос о смерти: 
‘Мы любим смерть! Мы очень ее любим!’ Потом китайцы сытыми легли спать.” 
 
258 Pchelintseva, “Kitai i kitaitsy,” 162. 
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the buffers, covered in snow. Later, put on guard duty, the khodia refuses to let the narrator 
pass unless he produces the password, “midge” (mushka). Our narrаtor appeals to his past 
favours until the khodia offers them the answer: “you mangy devil, say “midge”—you can 
go. You don’t say “midge”—you can’t go!”259 Later, however, it transpires that the confused 
khodia approached each passing group in turn with both a threat and the password: “Say 
midge, say midge, or I'll kill you on the spot!”260  
Comedy is inevitably followed, however, by heroic sacrifice. When the partisans 
defend a village against their Polish enemies, they station the nameless khodia in a windmill, 
armed with a machine-gun, which he operates with aggressive commitment: “he turned the 
heat on from there! Relentlessly!”261 However, commitment is repayed, as for Sin-Bin-U, 
with his comrades’ indifference: when the partisans withdraw, they forget the khodia, who 
stays at his post in the windmill, firing away. The Polish soldiers call up to him that the 
village is taken and he had better surrender: 
 — Слезай, сукин сын, — ты пленный! 
 А ходя с мельницы: 
 — Ты сам пленный, белая сволочь! Моя Завецка власть! 
 — Слезай, говорят тебе, башка дубовая! Деревня наша! 
 А ходя кроет: 
 — Пошел сам, чорт паршивый. Я тебе пулеметом дырку сделаю! 
 А ферт этот не унимается: 
 —Слезай добром, так тебя да раз–эдак, а нет нулей сниму! 
— Ах ты, чорт паршивый! Не ты меня посадил, не ты меня снимай. Завецка 
власть!262   
 
[“Come down, you son of a bitch, you're captured!” 
But the khodia replied from the windmill: 
“You’re the captured one, you white bastard! Me Sawviet power! 
“Come down, we’re telling you, oak-head! The village is ours!” 
But the khodia snaps back: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Aleksandr Samokhoilov, Khodia (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1927), 26. “— чорт паршивый, скажи 
'мушка'—тогда едешь. Не скажешь 'мушка'—тогда не едешь!” 
 
260 Ibid., 28. “Cкажи мушка, скажи мушка, а то убью на месте!” 
 
261 Ibid., 35. “жарил оттуда! Отчаянно!” 
 
262 Ibid.  
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“Get out of here, you mangy devil. I’ll put a hole in you with my machine gun! 
But this young buck doesn’t give up: 
“Come down for goodness’ sake, or we’ll knock you down double-quick!” 
“Ah you mangy devil! You didn't put me here, you no take me down. Sawviet 
power!”]  
 
Combining comic simplicity with violent heroism in this final scene is not enough to save 
this Chinese partisan, however: the narrator casually mentions his sacrificial death in a final 
line. 
 Aleksandr Bogdanov's poem “Van Iu-Chan” offers less comedy and less heroism, but 
repeats the basic structure of a Chinese migrant-turned-partisan who eventually sacrifices 
himself for the Leninist cause. The opening of the poem accentuates Van’s debased, drunken 
victimhood as a migrant worker in pre-revolutionary Vladivostok, with a family waiting for 
him in Qufu. Plague and Japanese occupation only add to his misery. Enraged at his lot, he 
curses Confucius for condemning the Chinese to servitude: 
 Рогульщики, ходи и кули, 
Как черви, ползем на ступени...  
Мы высохли, черны, как тени. 
Мы в гное, в грязи утонули. 
 
[Porters, khodias and coolies, / We crawl on our feet, like worms… / We're dried out, 
black as shadows. / We've drowned in the mud and mire.]263 
 
From these depths of worm-like debasement, Van is recruited by a Red Army captain, who 
skillfully translates Leninist rhetoric into Sino-Russian dialect:  
Капитан:  В большой стране был плач и стон, 
   Но вот пришел тайфун. 
  Богатых мандарин – вон, 
   А бедным кули – тун... [footnote: все] 
   О–го! 
Ван Ю-Чан:  Шанго!.. 
Капитан:  Там мудрый, пламенный старик, 
Талойе [footnote: Большой человек] Ленин встал. 
Для бедных ходей, кули, рикш 
Его слов – устав... 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Aleksandr Alekseevich Bogdanov, Van Iun-Chan: poema (Moscow: Moskovskoe tovarichestvo 
pisatelei, 1933), 21. 
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О-го! 
Ван Ю-Чан:  Шанго!..264 
 
[Captain:  In a great country there was weeping and groaning,/ But then a 
typhoon came. / The rich mandarins – out! / The poor coolies – dong… 
[footnote: everything] / O-ho! 
 Wang Yuchang:  Good! 
 Kapitan: Тhere a wise, fiery old man / The Taloie [footnote: great man] Lenin 
arose. / For poor khodias, coolies, and rickshaw drivers  / His words 
were a command… / O-ho! 
 Wang Yuchang:  Good!] 
 
This manipulation of Sino-Russian pidgin into Russian verse, accomplished with extensive 
footnotes and glossary, is the poem’s most striking characteristic. Bogdanov shows 
considerable familiarity with Sino-Russian pidgin, as when he has his hero sing “Солнце 
юла и миюла,” an attested pidgin translation of the convict song “Солнце всходит и 
заходит” (The Sun Rises and Sets).265 Van, meanwhile, spreads the Leninist message among 
his compatriots, and becomes a Red scout. Captured and tortured by the Japanese, he is 
rescued by his Red comrades, and survives to address Confucius one more time: 
Конфуций! Не было в мире чудес, 
Сказаний не знала таких голытьба, 
Какие слагал в эти годы лес, 
Какие творила геройством борьба!266 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Ibid., 33. 
 
265 Ibid., 15. “Солнце юла и миюла, / Чега фанза пушанго! / Караула юла-юла, / Мию фангули в 
окно.” (Bogdanov, Van Iun-Chan, 15.) “юла/iula” renders Chinese youle 有了, “appeared”;  
“миюла/miiula” corresponds to meiyoule 没有了, “disappeared.” Translation: “Солнце есть и нет, / 
Это жилище плохое, / Караул здесь сидит, / Я не разбиваю окно” (The sun appears and 
disappears, / This house is no good, / There is a guard sitting here, / I do not break the window). 
Bogdanov's version differs slightly from the version recorded by the Sinologist Aleksandr Shprints 
(1907–74) in the Russian Far East on the cusp of the 1920s and 1930s—in Shprints’ version, the 
guard is asleep, and the window is broken: “Солнца юла и миюла, / Чега фанза бушанго, / Караула 
сыпила юла, / Мая фангули акыно” Translation: “Солнце есть и нет, / Это жилище плохое, / 
Караул уснул, / Я разбил окно” (The sun appears and disappears, / This house is not good, / The 
guard has fallen asleep, / I broke the window). Quoted in N. B. Vakhtin and E. V. Golovko, 
Sociolinguistics and the Sociology of Language (St Petersburg: European University in St Petersburg, 
2004), 145. 
 
266 Bogdanov, Van Iun-Chan, 49. 
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[Confucius! There were never such miracles in the world, / the people never knew 
such legends, / as those the forest composed in these years, / or battle created with its 
heroism!] 
 
This rejection of the past and its now inadequate myths echoes the moment noted by Chan in 
Armoured Train 14–69, when Sin-Bin-U threw the Shijing down a well and went off to enlist 
in the Red Army. These rival national traditions must be overthrown for new forms of 
filiation and loyalty to coalesce. 
IV. Mikhail Bulgakov and the Violent Chinese Stranger 
By 1923 the image of the Chinese partisan as both fearlessly violent and comically 
strange was sufficiently established to become the object of parody. This is what we find in 
Mikhail Bulgakov’s “A Chinese Story” (“Kitaiskaia istoriia”). Bulgakov, a writer far from 
positive in his attitude towards the Soviet regime, reproduces to an extent the image of the 
Red Chinese partisan found in White propaganda from the Civil War. According to the White 
perspective, these Chinese partisans were not volunteers giving their lives for the revolution, 
but hired foreign mercenaries, paid killers whose especial savagery came from their lack of 
cultural sympathy with the native population.267 Bulgakov’s Chinese protagonist in “A 
Chinese Story,” who adopts and inverts many of the aesthetic elements we have seen above, 
can thus be seen as expressing a critique and even rejection of “internationalist” values. 
Even at the time of publication, the critic Leonid Averbakh attacked Bulgakov’s tale 
of a Chinese migrant who joins the Red partisans and becomes an expert machine-gunner as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 For a summary and indeed revival of this perspective, see Viktor Suvorov, Ochishchenie: Zachem 
Stalin obezglavil svoiu armiiu? (Moscow: Izd. AST, 1998), 179–189. It is also striking that, in the 
wake of recent inter-ethnic tension and violence in Moscow, this history has been rediscovered in the 
right-wing Russian media, and presented as an example of the danger posed by hired immigrants with 
no cultural connection to the native population. See for example Vladimir Tikhomirov, “Kak 
migranty otomstili Rossii,” Istoricheskaia Pravda, October 17, 2013 
(http://www.istpravda.ru/research/5598/ accessed 03.11.14), which contains some remarkable 
reproductions of White propaganda posters showing Chinese Red partisan brutality in the Civil War. 
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cynical parody of Ivanov.268 For a start, there is his name, Sen-Zin-Po, which mimics the 
double-hyphenated graphic form of Sin-Bin-U and copies two out of three letters in the first 
two syllables. Then there is his career, which seems to undermine the kind of internationalist 
solidarity that Ivanov (albeit ambiguously) endorses. Sen-Zin-Po joins the Red army after 
trading all his money and clothes for opium. Whereas Sin-Bin-U knows enough broken Sino-
Russian to preach his Manichean internationalism to comrades and converts, Sen-Zin-Po’s 
Russian consists entirely of parroting useful or important-sounding words, including 
obscenities. It turns out, however, that the clueless Sen-Zin-Po is remarkably good at 
shooting a machine gun. Seemingly incomprehending of the military situation he finds 
himself in, Sen-Zin-Po practices his lethal skill until he is killed in a White attack.  
Bulgakov’s Chinese partisan is defined by incomprehension, both unknowable and 
unknowing. At the beginning of the story he sits by the riverbank in an unnamed Russian 
city, though a number of details conspire to suggest he is by the Kremlin in Moscow. These 
include onion domes, crenellated walls, tram lines, and a black clock with yellow hands on a 
tower—surely a reference to the clock on the Kremlin’s Spasskaya tower. The Chinese 
stranger, as in Pil’niak’s Naked Year, is once more in the heart of Russia. His presence, 
however, is not given the motivational backstory that both Pil’niak and Ivanov supplied, but 
instead is described as an inexplicable, almost magical fact: “Nobody knows why the 
mysterious khodia flew several thousand versts, like a dry leaf, and wound up on the bank of 
a river beneath a chewed-up, serrated wall.”269 Note that yet another metaphor from a non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Leonid Averbakh, “M. Bulgakov. ‘Diaboliada,’” Izvestiia, September 20, 1925. Referenced in 
Lesley Milne, Mikhail Bulgakov: A Critical Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 56. 
 
269 Mikhail Bulgakov, “Kitaiskaia istoriia,” first published in Illustratsii Petrogradskoi pravdy 7, May 
6, 1923. Reprinted in Mikhail Bulgakov, Diavolida: rasskazy (Moscow: Izd-vo Nedra, 1925), 135. 
“Никто не знает, почему загадочный ходя пролетел, как сухой листик, несколько тысяч верст и 
оказался на берегу реки под изгрызенной зубчатой стеной.” In supplying translations for this 
story, I have consulted Carl R. Proffer’s translation, published in Mikhail Bulgakov, Diaboliad and 
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human sphere (“like a dry leaf”) provides here an additional touch of grotesque alienation. 
Like his presence, the utterances of this “mysterious” arrival are, predictably, 
incomprehensible: “ ‘O-o-o!’ The khodia muttered something and added a few more words 
mournfully in a language that no one understood.”270 The addition of “nikomu” (no one) 
emphasizes the stranger’s isolation, but it also reminds us that he is incomprehensible only to 
a certain audience, and implicitly identifies the readers as that audience.  
Bulgakov’s narrator, however, identifies only partially with this position of 
incomprehension in which he has placed his audience, thereby establishing an ironic 
narratorial tone that plays with ignorance while simultaneously knowing more than it at first 
claims. An example comes in the story’s first line: “This was a remarkable khodia, a real 
saffron representative of the Celestial Empire, about 25 years old, or maybe forty. The devil 
only knows! Apparently, he was 23.”271 After rhetorically throwing up his hands in 
exasperation at the impossibility of establishing the Chinese stranger’s age, the narrator 
comes straight back with the right figure. Later he will go on to translate large chunks of the 
“incomprehensible” language of his protagonist. By establishing a limited narrator who then 
reveals himself to be much closer to omniscience, Bulgakov prepares the ground for the 
representation of his Chinese stranger as both mysterious and, ultimately, transparent. 
 Despite these mysteries, then, we now learn that the narrator can in fact gain access to 
this Chinese migrant’s mind. Therein we find a commensurable mood of incomprehension 
and alienation with demonic overtones: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Other Stories, ed. Ellendea Proffer and Carl R. Proffer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1972). 
 
270 Bulgakov, Diavoliad, 136. “— О-о-о! — что-то пробормотал ходя и еще тоскливо прибавил 
несколько слов на никому не понятном языке.” 
 
271 Ibid., 135. “Это был замечательный ходя, настоящий шафранный представитель Небесной 
империи, лет 25, а может быть, и сорока? Черт его знает! Кажется, ему было 23 года.” 
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One look at the river was enough to be convinced that this was a devilishly cold, 
alien river. Behind the khodia was an empty tram line, in front of the khodia porous 
granite, beyond the granite on the slope a rowboat with a broken bottom, beyond 
the rowboat that same damned river, beyond the river more granite, and beyond the 
granite were houses, stone houses, the devil knows how many houses. For some 
reason the stupid river flowed right through the center of the city.272 
 
This landscape of cold, unwelcoming granite recalls the stony Petersburg that greeted 
Pil’niak’s Li-yang. The Russian urban scene is represented through Sen-Zin-Po’s eyes as 
strange, demonic, and incomprehensible—as incomprehensible to him as his presence and 
speech are to others. This ignorance is compounded by structure: the text is subtitled “six 
pictures/scenes instead of a story,” and the connecting incidents between the scenes are not 
necessarily clear. When we twice encounter the statement that Sen-Zin-Po set off “in an 
unknown direction,” it is unclear even to whom this direction is unclear: to the narrator, to us, 
or to Sen-Zin-Po.  
In the second scene we are transported from the heart of the city to the outskirts, on the 
edge of that wilderness (pustyr’) that seemed always to frame Pil’niak’s China images. Here 
we meet a second, older Chinese character, who expands the demonic motif that Sen-Zin-Po 
first linked to the river. An opium dealer, he sits in a dilapidated shack on the edge of the city 
feeding woodchips into a small, smoke-belching stove. His eyes, in the flickering light of the 
stove, alternate between “evil like a demon’s” and “cold, deep and sad.” When he blows on 
the woodchips in the stove, his inflated cheeks give him the look of “a Chinese evil spirit.”273 
We may recall here Liyanov’s resemblance to the Chinese devil masks in Liudogovskii’s 
study; but Bulgakov employs these sinister associations to contrast the older man’s 
devilishness with Sen-Zin-Po’s clueless naivety. For it is the old man who leads him astray. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Ibid., 135–36. “Одного взгляда на реку было достаточно, чтобы убедиться, что это 
дьявольски холодная, чужая река. Позади ходи была пустая трамвайная линия, перед ходей - 
ноздреватый гранит, за гранитом на откосе лодка с пробитым днищем, за лодкой эта самая 
проклятая река, за рекой опять гранит, а за гранитом дома, каменные дома, черт знает сколько 
домов. Дурацкая река зачем-то затекла в самую середину города.” 
 
273 Ibid., 137–38.  
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Despite insisting once more that no one, Sen-Zin-Po excepted, can understand this 
man’s speech, the narrator is in fact able to “translate” a good section of it into Russian. This 
translation renders the old man’s discourse in largely standard, if simplistic, Russian, a 
combination of what Johanna Nichols calls “Broken Russian” and “Simplified Russian.” As 
mentioned above, Nichols defines Broken Russian as Russian produced with grammatical 
errors, while “Simplified Russian” represents “Russian without actual grammatical errors, but 
distinctive in its simple syntax, word order, lexical infelicities, etc.” Other characteristic 
features of Simplified Russian include “unvaried choppy sentences” and the “absence of 
subordinating conjunctions and particles[.]”274  
These elements can all be found in Bulgakov’s translated “Chinese.” The old man’s 
speech is simplistic but not excessively deformed, with a basic grasp of inflection. His 
discourse patterns also echo the binary structure that we saw in Sin-Bin-U’s utterances, 
representing a world made up of presences and absences: “По-русски было бы так: Хлеб — 
нет. Никакой — нет. Сам — голодный. Торговать — нет и нет. Кокаин — мало есть. 
Опиум — нет.”275 (In Russian it would go like this: Bread — no. None. I’m hungry myself. 
To sell — nothing at all. Cocaine — there’s a little. Opium — no.) At first it seems that 
absence dominates. But as the room gets hotter and his interlocutor more sleepy, the old man 
moves onto a string of positives: “Ленин — есть. Самый главный очень есть. Буржуи — 
нет, о, нет! Зато Красная армия есть. Много — есть. Музыка? Да, да. Музыка, потому 
что Ленин. В башне с часами — сиди, сиди. За башней? За башней — Красная 
армия.”276 (Lenin is. Most important, very much is. Bourzhuis – no, oh no! Instead the Red 
Army is. Much there is. Music? Yes, yes. Music, because Lenin. In the tower with the clock 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Nichols, “Chinese Pidgin Russian,” 399. 
 
275 Ibid., 137. 
 
276 Ibid., 138 
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— sit, sit. Behind the tower? Behind the tower is the Red Army.) The Spasskaya tower 
returns here. Already in the first scene, Sen-Zin-Po had been struck by the music of its bells, 
which seemed to “want to play some melody fluently and triumphantly” (складно и 
победоносно).277 Now the tower with its music is explicitly connected to Lenin and his Red 
Army.  
The old man’s words have influence. After finally pleading his way to some opium, 
Sen-Zin-Po falls into an opium trance on the floor. In his dream he lives in a “crystal hall” 
where the golden-handed black clock strikes every minute, its movements controlled by a 
distinctly Sinified, joyous Lenin: 
a very joyous Lenin walked out wearing a yellow jacket, with a huge, shiny, tightly 
wound queue, wearing a cap with a button on the crown. He grabbed the pointer-
pendulum by the tail and pushed it to the right—then the clock rang out to the left, 
but when he pushed it to the left—the bells rang out on the right. Having rung the 
bells loudly for a while, he took the coolie out onto the balcony, to show him the 
Red Army.278 
 
This “crystal hall,” reminiscent of the “crystal palace” of scientific socialism that 
Dostoevskii’s Underground Man railed so famously against, is offered here to Sen-Zin-Po by 
Lenin and his newfound power over Russia’s historical time.  
But Sen-Zin-Po’s motivations for desiring the crystal hall have nothing to do with the 
triumph of reason or global justice. The crystal hall appeals, first of all, because it is warm, 
and second of all, because the “indescribable beauty” Nast’ka is there, walking across the 
mirrored room with feet small enough to “hide inside a nostril.” Third, Nast’ka’s 
“scoundrel,” who wounded the older Chinese with a Finnish knife, can here be dispatched by 
Sen-Zin-Po, who, “brave as a giant,” decapitates his rival. In reward Lenin hangs a star on his 
chest and plays a “thunderous” melody on the bells, and at the dream’s conclusion the crystal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Ibid., 136. 
 
278 Ibid., 139. “выходил очень радостный Ленин в желтой кофте, с огромной блестящей и тугой 
косой, в шапочке с пуговкой на темени. Он схватывал за хвост стрелу-маятник и гнал ее 
вправо - тогда часы звенели налево, а когда гнал влево - колокола звенели направо. Погремев в 
колокола, Ленин водил ходю на балкон - показывать Красную армию.” 
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hall is transformed into a vision of Sen-Zin-Po’s childhood, echoing motifs familiar from 
Pil’niak and Ivanov: sorghum, scorching sun, his mother carrying water towards him.279 But 
Sen-Zin-Po takes on none of Lenin’s ideology along with his blessing: his motivations are 
limited to survival, lust, petty hatred, and homesickness. 
 So Sen-Zin-Po goes off to join the Red Army. His first encounter with his comrades 
recalls in simplistic, comic form the complex, ambiguous notion of camaraderie developed in 
Ivanov. Feeling obliged to speak, he rattles off the sum total of words that he learned on his 
journey from China to Russia: “khleb” (“bread”), “pusti vagon” (simplified version of “let 
me into the train carriage”), “karas-ni” (distorted pronunciation of “red”), “kitai-sa” (distorted 
pronunciation of “Chinese”), and a three-word obscenity that, experience tells him, has 
“miraculous” effects. In this case the reaction is, once more, joy, though far from the fraternal 
joy of communion that ran through Armoured Train 14-69:  
In this case the consequences were happy ones. A thundering wave of laughter 
struck the arched hall and washed up to the very ceiling. The khodia replied to this 
first roll with smile No. 2—it had a slight conspiratorial shade—and a repetition of 
the three words. After this he thought he would be deafened. A piercing voice cut 
through the racket: 
“Vanya! Get over here! This Chinese volunteer does a great job of mother-
swearing!”280 
 
Sin-Bin-U’s first utterance, we recall, was also marked by an obscenity, though one given in 
Chinese. Furthemore, his curse was produced out of authentic hatred for the Japanese, not a 
clueless desire to please. The joy of this laughter, meanwhile, is caused by difference, not 
communion. When the partisans laughed at Sin-Bin-U, he did not notice; Sen-Zin-Po is 
delighted by his comic effect and seeks repetition. Four times in this scene we are told that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Ibid., 139–40. 
 
280 Ibid., 141. “В данном случае произошли радостные последствия. Громовой вал смеха ударил 
в сводчатом зале и взмыл до самого потолка. Ходя ответил на первый раскат улыбкой No. 2 с 
несколько заговорщическим оттенком и повторением трех слов. После этого он думал, что он 
оглохнет. Пронзительный голос прорезал грохот: — Ваня! Вали сюда! Вольноопределяющийся 
китаец по матери знаменито кроет!” 
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Sen-Zin-Po is smiling. But these smiles are the opposite of communication. Sen-Zin-Po’s 
smile compensates for an absence of communicability, as when he responds to repeated 
demands for his name with only a repeated grin: “The khodia shrouded himself in a radiant 
and sated smile.”281 
 This name is not in fact learned until the fifth of six scenes. Until then the protagonist 
is designated simply as khodia (in distinction to the older Chinese character, who is 
consistently referred to as kitaets). As khodia, then, he is not simply a representative of an 
ethnicity but specifically a representative of Chinese migrants in Russia. His name, when it 
does appear, serves in its strange gibberish to enhance his “Chineseness,” while also offering 
a parodic nod to Ivanov. But the appearance of his name in fact coincides with a general shift 
in the story from ignorance to knowledge. As the skies clear over the changing seasons, so 
the air of mystery surrounding the Chinese stranger is dispelled somewhat by the discovery 
of his true purpose: 
And when the sky turned from gray into blue with puffy cream-coloured clouds, 
everyone already knew that just as Franz Lizst was born to play his monstrous 
rhapsodies on the piano, so the khodia Sen-Zin-Po appeared in the world in order to 
shoot a machine-gun.282 
 
The comparison with Lizst carries over into later descriptions of Sen-Zin-Po in battle, playing 
a “terrible rhapsody” on his machine gun. This, it seems, is the “music” whose existence is 
guaranteed by Lenin and his Red Army. 
 Despite finding his true essence in the automatic, mechanical operation of a Maxim 
gun, Sen-Zin-Po remains bemused about everything else. The final scene, ironically entitled 
“A Brilliant Debut,” recounts his death in battle after he fails to realize that his side has 
retreated. This situation, it will be noted, is closely reminiscent of Samokhoilov’s Khodia, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Ibid., 142. “Ходя замкнулся в лучезарной и сытой улыбке.” 
 
282 Ibid., 142. “И когда небо из серого превратилось в голубое, с кремовыми пузатыми 
облаками, все уже знали, что как Франц Лист был рожден, чтобы играть на рояле свои 
чудовищные рапсодии, ходя Сен-Зин-По явился в мир, чтобы стрелять из пулемета.” 
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which was in fact published after “Kitaiskaia istoriia”—except that there is nothing heroic 
about Sen-Zin-Po’s resistance. Even when his commander shoots himself in front of him, 
Sen-Zin-Po turns back to his gun and keeps firing—but not out of bravery, commitment, or 
self-sacrifice. Rather he does not understand what is happening, and does not know how to do 
anything else; or, as Lesley Milne suggests, he does not know the word for “surrender.”283 
The only words he can muster are a mangled reproduction of the promises of financial reward 
earlier made in recognition of his talent: “—Премиали... карасий виртузи... палата! 
палати!” (i.e.: “премиальные... красный виртуоз... плата! плати!” Rendered by Carl 
Proffer as: “Bo-noose… Led Almy viltuosi… payee! Payee!”)284 But soon his relatively 
useless voice is silenced when a junker stabs him in the throat. His last thoughts are of home, 
and then finally of the black clock, the bells and the crystal hall. Somehow the hall protects 
him from pain, and he dies “painless and peaceful,” with a frozen smile on his face. 
 If I am right to identify the crystal hall with the promise of scientific socialism, and if 
we read the Spassky clock, through its association with Lenin and the Red Army, as 
signifying the centre of the new Soviet power, then it seems Averbakh may have 
underestimated the degree to which Bulgakov’s story subverts the model of internationalist 
solidarity that Ivanov (albeit ambiguously) explored. This is serious satire. Bulgakov’s 
khodia, who understands nothing and seeks only pleasure and relief from pain, is led to the 
socialist cause by a combination of necessity and narcotic hallucination. His mechanical 
aptitude for killing is unconnected to any apparent sense of the identity of his targets. He 
really just wants to go home. At his isolated and violent death, however, the fantasy of the 
“crystal hall” returns to offer him a kind of sanctity, the ironic compensation of a delusion. If 
the preceding images of Chinese partisans complicate the notion of internationalist solidarity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Milne, Bulgakov, 56. 
 
284 Bulgakov, Diavoliad, 145; translation from Proffer, Diaboliad, 158. 
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with their estranged language and grotesque combinations of comedy and violence, 
Bulgakov’s story dismisses the idea of solidarity entirely, reducing Sen-Zin-Po’s motivation 
to confusion and self-interested opportunism.  
Bulgakov later reworked many of the motifs from “A Chinese Story,” along with the 
story’s dubious attitude towards international brotherhood, when he included two Chinese 
characters in his 1926 stage comedy of NEP-era vice, Zoika’s Apartment (Zoikina kvartira). 
As in “A Chinese Story,” we have in the play one older Chinese man and one younger.285 The 
younger man shares the same name as the earlier figure, Sen-Dzin-Po, though this name is 
mentioned only once. In the cast list and through most of the play he is referred to, for 
reasons that will become clear, as “Kheruvim.” The elder man’s name, exploiting the tri-
syllabic arrangement common in Chinese names to humorous effect, is “Gan-Dza-Lin, also 
known as Gazolin [i.e. Gasoline].”286 The Civil War is over, and the NEP era offers 
somewhat less heroic stereotypical occupations for Chinese migrants in Russia. Gazolin and 
Kheruvim run a laundry, though their real source of income seems to come (again, as in the 
earlier story) from selling narcotics. They come into contact with Zoya and her apartment 
because Zoya’s husband, the ruined aristocrat Obol’ianinov, has become a hopeless morphine 
addict. Kheruvim, who brings the morphine to the apartment, falls in love with the maid, 
Maniushka. Determined to return with his beloved to Shanghai, Kheruvim murders corrupt 
local Party boss Gus’ with a Finnish knife—the same knife wielded by Sen-Zin-Po‘s love 
rival in “A Chinese Story.” As the play ends, Kheruvim flees with Gus’s money and 
Maniushka. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 The exclusively male gender of the Chinese migrant figures in these texts corresponds to the 
historical composition of the Chinese migrant population in Russia from the mid-nineteenth century 
on. Larin estimates that the gender ratio was 7 women to every hundred men in the mid-1920s. Larin, 
Kitaitsy v Rossii, 123. 
 
286 Mikhail Bulgakov, “Zoikina kvartira,” in Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh, vol. 3, p’esy 
(Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1992), 77.  
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 Language is the primary mark of difference in the play’s text, though the “Chinese” 
appearance taken on by Russian actors, to judge by a recent Moscow production, can also be 
exploited for exotic effect.287 Bulgakov's interest in using Chinese foreigner talk in his 
comedy is neither anthropological nor utopian but, of course, primarily comic: the speech of 
his Chinese characters must be audibly strange while still understandable to a non-specialist 
audience. Thus his Chinese characters, as in “A Chinese Story,” do not speak Chinese pidgin 
Russian but rather a mixture of what Nichols calls Broken Russian and Simplified Russian, 
with occasional elements that gesture towards Chinese pidgin Russian. They are also 
encouraged by the printed text to speak with a systematically deformed accent. Regular 
features include l for r, s for sh, ts for ch, and the interspersion of extra vowels between 
consonants (e.g. palakhoi for plokhoi).  
Take, for example, this first exchange between Gazolin and Kheruvim. Realistically, 
we would expect this conversation to take place in Chinese. For the sake of the play, 
however, it must proceed in a language that is comprehensible to the audience while still 
recognizably Sinified. The result is a form of foreigner talk explicitly manipulated for comic 
effect: 
 Г а з о л и н. Ты зулик китайский. Бандит! Цесуцю украл, кокаин украл. Где 
пропадаль? А? Как верить, кто? А? 
Х е р у в и м. Мал-мала малци! Сама бандити есть. Московски басак. 
Г а з о л и н. Уходи сицас, уходи с працесной. Ты вор. Сухарски вор. 
Х е р у в и м. Сто? Гониси бетни китайси? Сто? Мене украли сесуцю на 
Светном, кокаин отбил бандит, цуть мал-мала меня убиваль. Смотли. 
(Показывает шрам на руке.) Я тебе работал, а тепель гониси! Кусать сто бетни 
китаси будет Москве? Палахой товалис! Убить тебе надо. 
 
[GASOLINE: Chinese bandit! You crook! You steal silk, you steal cocaine! Where 
you go so long time? How can believe you? 
CHERUBIM: Hold on, hold on, shut up! You bandit, you!  
GASOLINE: Get out my laundry, you thief! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 In 2013 I saw the Hermitage Theater’s production in Moscow, which has been running since 1998. 
The Chinese characters, stripped to the waist in heavy facial make-up, appeared in a cloud of smoke 
on the left of the stage. Beside them on far stage left there sat a huge golden Buddha, which glowed 
threateningly at moments when Kheruvim’s plot was formed and accomplished.  
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CHERUBIM: What? What? You kick out poor Chinaman? They steal silk! On 
Svetnoy Boulevard! Some bandit steal cocaine, try kill me, look, look! (Shows the 
scar on his hand.) I work for you, now kick me out! Where get food, one poor 
Chinaman in Moscow? You bad comrade! Should be kill.]288 
 
There are gestures here to Chinese pidgin Russian, suggesting that Bulgakov shared a general 
cultural awareness of its patterns. Kheruvim’s repeated use of “mal-mala” recalls the 
popularity of “malo-malo” as a phrase in Chinese pidgin Russian, attested for example in the 
speech of Dersu Uzala. Kheruvim’s use of the dative pronoun in place of prepositional 
pronoun phrases (“mene ukrali” for “u menia ukrali,” “ia tebe rabotal” for “ia dlia tebia 
rabotal”) mirrors Chinese pidgin Russian’s tendency to eliminate prepositions. The feminine 
“sama” used to refer to Gazolin may echo Chinese pidgin Russian’s gender-disregarding use 
of “moia” and “tvoia” as universal personal pronouns, though it may equally reflect the 
accentual distortion rule whereby a consonant must be followed by a vowel. Later in the 
scene, Gazolin will refer to Kheruvim as “ona” (she), a mistake the maid Maniushka 
emphasises by parroting: “A ona umeet?”—“And she can?” 
However, features such as declension (“s prasetsnoi” for “s prachechnoi”), 
conjugation (“gonisi” for “gonish’,” again reflecting the consonant-vowel model but also 
echoing Chinese pidgin Russian’s use of the imperative as the basic verb form), and the use 
of the past tense are decidedly alien to Chinese pidgin Russian. “Moskve,” given in the 
prepositional but without the preposition “v” (in), is pure Broken Russian, made more jarring 
by the fact that Kheruvim has just produced the correct prepositional phrase “na Svetnom.” In 
the main, Bulgakov uses parataxis in place of subordination—a tendency Nichols identifies 
as a primary feature of Simplified Russian—and adds a range of accentual distortions to 
render this dialogue as foreigner talk. The range of potential utterances is limited to simple, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Bulgakov, Sobranie sochinenii, 3: 84–5. Translation taken from Mikhail Bulgakov, Zoya’s 
Apartment: A Tragic Farce in Three Acts, trans. Nicholas Saunders and Frank Dwyer (Totonto: 
Samuel French, 1990), 18. This translation makes no attempt to replicate the accentual distortions of 
Bulgakov’s original, but rather aims at a convincing form of English foreigner talk suitable to a stage 
Chinaman from the Anglophone theatrical tradition. 
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one-phrase questions and assertions, which once more reduce complexity to a binary universe 
where all is either “good” or “bad.” 
The proximity of foreigner talk to baby talk is offset, however, by the criminality and 
violence that make up the dialogue’s content. We are first given to suspect here that Gazolin 
and Kheruvim’s main occupation is not laundering but selling narcotics. This in itself does 
not set them apart in any great way from the majority of the play’s characters, all of whom 
are engaged in various shady and illegal forms of activity. The comic exposure of the seedy 
underbelly of NEP society is, after all, the play’s satirical target and primary source of 
humorous effect. What is more particular to the Chinese characters is the emphasis on theft, 
violence and murder. These themes, presented on our first acquaintance with these characters, 
anticipate Kheruvim’s climactic murder of Gus’ and theft of his money. They may also have 
been themes that a contemporary audience for Zoika’s Apartment’s would have readily 
associated with Moscow’s Chinese population. Milne peruses the contemporary press in 
search of Bulgakov’s sources:  
a survey of Vechernaya Moskva (Evening Moscow) from July to November 1925, 
the period of the play’s gestation, produced the following: the discovery of no 
fewer than five brothels, seven opium dens (three of them run by Chinamen), three 
cases of drug-running, three cases of drug addiction, and the murder of one 
Chinaman by another; on 3 November there was a report of an opium den that had 
for three years been operating behind the front of a Chinese laundry.289   
 
An audience member who read the papers would be well prepared to regard the Chinese 
migrant population as a potentially dangerous criminal element. 
But we can also see here a connection of the Chinese migrant to violence and death 
that links back to Ivanov and Bulgakov’s earlier story. The sense of childishness produced by 
the approximation of foreigner talk to baby talk once more stands juxtaposed to a jarring 
capacity for serious, adult action beyond the barrier of language. Beneath baby talk lurks 
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frightening violence. This linguistic deception is compounded in Kheruvim’s case by 
appearance. Indeed, his “Russian” name itself derives from the Russian characters’ repeated 
exclamations over his cherubic appearance. When Maniushka first meets him she declares: 
“Ah, isn’t he beautiful. Like a cherub.”290 Later Obol’ianinov and Gus’, who both become his 
victims in different ways, repeat the assertion. The original Sen-Zin-Po was similarly angelic: 
repeating the word “virtuoso” that he had heard applied to his shooting skills, he took on the 
appearance of a “Chinese angel.”291 But where Sen-Zin-Po was defined by naivety to the end, 
Kheruvim is increasingly revealed as a demon in cherubic form.  
This devilishness is expressed in a ruthless pursuit of self-interested acquisition. At 
the moment when he tempts Obol’ianinov with a constant supply of morphine, and also 
offers to tattoo him, the stage directions explicitly state that Kheruvim becomes “strange and 
terrifying.”292 His lust for Maniushka is violently acquisitive: we learn of it at the end of their 
first scene together, when he describes her as “fine” (“khorosaia,” a distorted “khoroshaia”) 
and then, voraciously, “tasty” (vkusnaia).293 Once it is revealed that she reciprocates his 
attraction, he informs her matter-of-factly that they will soon be leaving for Shanghai, where 
he will sell opium and she will produce “seven, eight, nine children.” When she appears 
disappointed by the lack of romance in this proposal, Kheruvim, suspecting Maniushka of 
wanting to marry Gazolin instead, threatens her with a knife to the throat. Maniushka 
eventually acquiesces to what she calls this “Shanghai-style proposal… a fiancé with a 
dagger!”294 Kheruvim promises he will not beat her in their future life together, though if she 
kisses anyone else he will cut her throat.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Bulgakov, Sobranie sochinenii, 85. “Ах, какой хорошенький. На херувима похож.” 
 
291 Bulgakov, Diavoliada, 143. “стал похож на китайского ангела.” 
 
292 Bulgakov, Sobranie sochinenii, 87. “странен и страшен.” 
 
293 Ibid., 86. 
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Later in the same scene, Gazolin arrives with a knife to make his own proposal to 
Maniushka. As they fight over her with their knives, Maniushka calls both Chinese characters 
“d'iavoly;” on two other occasions, the second after he has committed the murder, she calls 
Kheruvim a devil (“d’iavol” – the only uses of this word in the play, which is otherwise 
overflowing with another devil word, “chert”).295 Once he has Maniushka, all he needs is the 
money to return to Shanghai, and he pursues it with fetishistic determination. Allowed by a 
drunk and despondent Gus’ to touch his money, Kheruvim whispers “Ah, tsirvontsiki, lovely 
tsirvonchiki” (twice mangling the word chervonets, meaning a ten-ruble coin), before 
stabbing Gus’ in the back.296 His last words are a threat to cut Maniushka’s throat if she will 
not go with him. 
If Zoika’s Apartment stages NEP-era vice unsuccessfully hidden behind innocent 
exteriors, Kheruvim is the character that expresses this dynamic to its fullest extent: angelic 
in appearance, comic in accent, murderous in intent. While Ivanov’s Sin-Bin-U pursued the 
internationalist ideal to a dramatic act of self-sacrifice, and the first Sen-Zin-Po expressed 
displaced alienation within the chaos of civil war, Kheruvim represents the extreme reduction 
of the materialist, acquisitive drive that Bulgakov’s play identifies and satirizes within NEP 
culture. Even his consuming desire for the money to return to Shanghai mirrors, in the 
opposite direction and to greater success, the longing of Russian characters such as Alla to 
escape Moscow for Paris. But Kheruvim is the most ruthless, the most single-minded, and the 
most successful. Like the language he speaks, the character of the Chinese migrant is a 
distillation of the moral situation that pertains among the Russian characters, revealing the 
essence of that moral situation in exaggerated, distorted form. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Ibid., 125. “Ай, предложение шанхайское! Ай, женишок с ножичком!” 
 
295 Ibid., 126, 129, 144. 
 
296 Ibid., 143. “А, цирвонцики, цирвончики миленьки.” 
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While the Chinese Red partisan offered a ready symbol of trans-national solidarity, 
the Chinese migrant within Russia, as a literary figure, was obliged to represent many of the 
basic social anxieties of the age: confusion, violence, the grotesque distortion of a disrupted 
world. Many of these anxieties link back to the Orientophobia of the late Imperial period, 
which arose when Russia’s Pacific ambitions encountered the alarming rise of East Asia as a 
possible threat to European global dominance, as expressed in such events as the Boxer 
rebellion and the Russo-Japanese war.297 The examples in this chapter show that these 
anxieties lived on into the post-revolutionary period, compromising the notions of trans-
national solidarity that figures such as the Chinese partisan could potentially express. Even 
the partisans we have seen are ambiguous: alternately comic and disturbingly violent, their 
dedication seems tainted by a linguistically asserted simplicity that tends towards 
childishness or sub-humanity.  
The model of internationalism suggested by Utkin’s “Sungarskii drug,” wherein each 
nationality remains in its native place with fond memories of the time they came together in 
battle, seems far more comfortable than the historical situation reflected in the unsettling 
strangers who actually stay. As we proceed to explore the images of internationalist solidarity 
produced by writers and film-makers who actually travelled to China, we would do well to 
remember that these other Chinese images were also in circulation in the Soviet cultural 
system of the time, and offered an ambiguous, at times threatening impression of Chinese 
foreignness when introduced into the destabilized space of home. 
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Chapter Two 
Unmasking the Exotic: Reporting the Chinese Revolution 
 
Beginning in 1924, as the Soviet Union won diplomatic recognition from the Beijing 
government and Comintern agents cemented their influence with the Guomindang in 
Guangzhou, a series of Soviet reporters travelled to China to produce eyewitness accounts of 
this distant neighbour moving towards revolution. These claimed to depart from the long 
tradition of Russian and European travel writing about China. According to their most 
prominent practitioner and theorist, Sergei Tret’iakov, the task of Soviet reports on China 
was not to produce exotic tales of Oriental difference, but instead to unmask the exotic image 
of China and replace it with an authentic account of contemporary Chinese reality. This 
improved, authentic image was not simply produced, however, by the presence of the 
reporter. Instead, it was the privileged position and perspective of the Soviet eyewitness in 
China, armed with the analytical power of Marxist thought but also infused with a sympathy 
for oppressed China born of Russian experience, that ensured the validity of his account.  
In aesthetic terms, this means an emphasis on the power of observation to strip away 
fantasy and delusion, and a translational focus on non-linguistic sounds and signs from the 
sphere of everyday life, that can be reinvested with revolutionary meaning. These standard 
tools of internationalist aesthetics are both endorsed and subverted in the “Chinese Tale” of 
Boris Pil’niak, with which this chapter concludes. 
I. Erdberg and the Orientalists 
In 1929 a Comintern activist named Oskar Tarkhanov published Chinese Novellas, an 
account of his experiences in China. Tarkhanov, who wrote under the name of Oskar 
Erdberg, had worked on the staff of Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern’s chief agent in 
Guangzhou during the alliance with the Chinese Nationalists (Guomindang). After the 
collapse of the Comintern’s China policy in 1927, Tarkhanov escaped with Borodin through 
the Gobi Desert by car. Tarkhanov, in other words, was one of the titular “conquerors” from 
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André Malraux’s 1927 novel The Conquerors: an agent from a European country who sought 
to influence political developments in China while claiming to act out of solidarity with the 
Chinese people. I begin with his Chinese Novellas because they vindicate this complex and 
ambiguous positionality by claiming for the Soviet reporter in China a special form of 
authority. The construction and deconstruction of that authority shall be the subject of this 
chapter.  
A foreword “from the author” finds our narrator sitting in the smoking room of a 
plush Peking hotel, eavesdropping on a group of Western Orientalists ensconced in leather 
chairs as they trade Egyptian, Indian and Chinese reincarnation myths. These men 
demonstrate great skill in deploying the knowledge that is the source of their prestige: linking 
Orientalist knowledge to another trope of Western privilege, Tarkhanov/Erdberg describes 
them moving through the realm of mythology “with the ease of fox-trotting pairs on the 
parquet floors of dance halls.”298 For Erdberg the critical eavesdropper, however, their total 
control over “China” as a set of mythical and religious narratives serves only to obscure the 
transformations taking place in the contemporary social reality around them: “They speak of 
resurrections, transfigurations and metamorphoses in the myths of Buddhist and Daoist 
legend,” he chides, “so as not to see those transfigurations that are happening in front of their 
eyes in China.”299 These men fail, indeed refuse, to be eyewitnesses, hiding from reality in a 
mythical space they can control. Half a century before Edward Said, the Soviet observer is 
already unmasking Orientalist knowledge as a form of imperial power.  
Later, when the newspapers come, the Orientalists read only the economic and 
political news of the foreign community in China: the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Oskar Erdberg, Kitaiskie novelly (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1959), 11. “с такой же легкостью, 
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299 Ibid., 12. Emphasis in original. “Они говорят о возрождениях, перевоплощениях и 
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Diplomatic Corpus, the British-controlled Customs Service. In these newspapers, for 
Erdberg, “there is no China”; only a “no man’s land” criss-crossed by foreign interests.300 In 
both cases the accusation is the same: real, contemporary China is invisible to these 
Europeans, even as they participate in its domination. Erdberg, by contrast, returns to his 
room and a different text: the volume of Lenin he left open on the table. Here he seems to 
find the conversation about resurrections, transfigurations and metamorphoses continued, but 
in a radically different key: “A population hundreds of millions strong, downtrodden and 
made savage in their medieval stagnation, is now awakening to new life and to the struggle 
for the elementary rights of man.”301 Erdberg’s China is being “transfigured” in the 
“inextinguishable fire of struggle”: the language of metamorphosis is appropriated from 
colonial discourse and repurposed within the figurative discourse of Leninist 
internationalism.302  
Two things should be noted about this scene. The first is the position Tarkhanov 
occupies: embedded in the European world within China, he nonetheless views it critically, 
from the outside. In the collection’s first story, “The 18th of March,” he expands this position 
in the other direction. Visiting the tomb of Sun Yat-sen—a symbolic place from which to 
begin Tarkhanov’s narrative of the Guomindang’s corruption and betrayal—Erdberg 
befriends a group of students. Later he joins them at the violently suppressed student 
demonstration that took place in Beijing on May 18, 1926.303 After the massacre, one of the 
students, a Korean Communist named Pando, asks Erdberg to take him as his companion and 
translator on his journey south. The true purpose of Erdberg’s southwards journey—	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огнем борьбы. И в этом огне Китай очищается, плавится, перевоплощается.” 
 
303 On this massacre, see Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution, 263. 
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revolutionary agitation on Comintern orders—is suppressed in the text. But his trans-national 
companion and interpreter enables him to enter a world that his Western Orientalist 
counterparts cannot see, their vision blocked by their deep leather chairs. 
The second important element to note is that Soviet discourse on China explicitly 
defines itself as an inversion of Western, imperialist discourse. Erdberg’s stories claim to 
unmask the illusory, exotic image of China propagated by that discourse, replacing it with an 
authentic image produced from eyewitness experience. To this end, every story concludes 
with a precise date and location, a marker of historical authenticity. But as we have seen, 
Erdberg adopts and inverts the terms of the discourse he seeks to undermine, transposing the 
trope of “metamorphosis” from myth to Leninist theory. Can this be done without 
transforming Leninist theory into myth? Does inversion actually escape the structures of 
imperial discourse?  
In the story “On Lushan Mountain,” for example, Erdberg describes his eagerness to 
see the Chinese rivers he had read about in books, “serene streams” nourishing “immortal 
civilizations” of “unity, harmony, skilled craftsmanship and idyllic peace.”304 This distanced 
image is demolished when Erdberg encounters waterways choked with foreign warships and 
rotting corpses. In place of the “serene streams” of fantasy, Erdberg sees “enormous 
abscesses on the infected, expiring organism of a country exhausted by the fevers of war and 
wounded by the venomous stings of foreigners.”305 This unmasking, however, simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
304 Ibid., 117. “благостные потоки, несущие влагу от хрустальных снегов Памира на жаждущие 
поля земледельцев, прохладу тенистых рощ на их берегах, бессмертные цивилизации, 
возникшие под тысячелетний шепот их быстрых струй, торжествующий труд в плодоносных 
лёссовых равнинах, единение, гармонию, искусные ремесла и идиллический мир среди 
прибрежных жителей.” 
 
305 Ibid. 118. “И все эти благостные потоки, все эти родники древнейшей культуры 
представлялись мне огромными гнойниками на зараженном, изнуренном лихорадками войн, 
израненном ядовитыми укусами иностранцев, гибнущем организме страны.” 
	  	   119	  
replaces one figure with another: the peaceful Middle Kingdom is transformed into the Sick 
Man of the East, whose ailments can only be cured by revolution.306 
Erdberg presents his time in China as a personal journey from ignorance to 
understanding, and offers through the retelling of his experiences to draw the reader down the 
same path. But to unmask the illusions of the Sinologists, Erdberg does not head straight for 
the streets. Instead, he returns first to the volume of Lenin in his room. His observations must 
be transformed into an interpretation, and that interpretation requires a framework: the 
Leninist theory of revolutionary internationalism. After the European socialist revolutions 
predicted by Marx failed to materialize in the wake of World War I, Bolshevik theory had to 
explain how backward Russia had become the vanguard of world revolution. Trotsky’s 
theory of uneven development, first expounded in Results and Prospects (1906), now came to 
the fore, as the Comintern congresses of 1920–21 shifted the focus of the revolutionary future 
to the colonized world. This theory suggested that the contradictions produced by uneven 
development in the non-West—the disparity between the advanced capitalist mode of 
production introduced by the imperialists, and the heritage of medieval society still present in 
the daily life of the majority—could generate a revolutionary dynamic.  
China, vast, neighbouring, and seized by transitional turmoil, became the site where 
this theory of revolutionary developmentalism was to be tested. Accordingly, Soviet reporters 
in China tended to focus upon what Ernst Bloch, writing of Germany in the early 1930s, 
called “non-synchronism,” the simultaneous coexistence of seemingly contradictory 
historical phases: the wooden Chinese junk alongside a steel destroyer in Shanghai harbour, 
or the steam train that passes through fields arranged under the principles of ancestor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
306 On the rhetorical figure of China as the Sick Man of the East, a title originally conferred on 
Turkey, see Rebecca Karl, Staging the World, 39. 
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worship.307 The clash of these antagonisms was expected to awaken the Chinese into a 
properly revolutionary consciousness.  
This theoretical perspective rendered Russia and China broadly commensurable as 
spaces of belated development, within a Marxist-Leninist sociology that posited 
fundamentally identical structures of oppression across cultures. In contrast to the salvational 
impulses of Western ethnography, Soviet images of China do not seek to capture a culture 
apparently untouched by modernity, but on the contrary describe a culture in the process of 
being forced out of tradition into modernity by the contradictions of imperialist capitalism. 
Marxist ethnography is, as Elizabeth Papazian notes, inherently modernizing.308  
The basic contours of this ethnographic image of China describe a culture whose 
strangeness is dying, overcome by the economic forces pushing it towards global revolution. 
For example, Galina Serebriakova, the wife of a Soviet diplomat stationed in China, 
published her Sketches of China (Zarisovki Kitaia) in 1927. One sketch, entitled “The Culture 
of Disappearing China” (Byt ukhodiashchego Kitaia), presents an ethnographic portrait of a 
place whose cultural system is, paradoxically, both resiliently ancient and on the very brink 
of transformation: 
Having preserved intact their national costumes, like the Japanese, and cherishing 
the wise verses of Confucius, most Chinese venerate the cult of ancestors, which is 
dying for the last time, together with the old China. New forms of culture and 
social life, however, are bursting forth and despotically accelerating the process of 
metamorphosis. This new, nascent China will transform and erase many of its 
archaic customs, which are as obsolete and useless as the great Chinese wall, the 
ghost of disappearing China.309  	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309 Galina Serebriakova, Zarisovki Kitaia (Moscow: Ogonek, 1927), 8–11. “Сохранив, подобно 
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процесс перерождения. Новый нарождающийся Китай резко изменит и вычеркнет многое из 
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Serebriakova observes the endurance of Chinese tradition only to assert confidently its 
imminent collapse. Echoing Erdberg, she employs the language of “metamorphosis” 
(перерождение) in a sense more biological than mythological, a process of transformation 
whose despotic speed is incontestable. Here we see the combination of Marxist cultural 
evolutionism with the Leninist belief in acceleration that, for Francine Hirsh, defines the 
Soviet ethnographic attitude.310 As with Erdberg, the illusion (“ghost”) of the past, revealed 
in all its frailty, is to be replaced by the powerful (“despotic”), inevitable development of the 
future.  
Soviet discourse on China presents itself as explicitly anti-imperial, defining itself in 
opposition to a colonial discourse of power that it critiques in terms strikingly similar to the 
post-colonial critiques of more recent times. At the same time, however, these Soviet images 
seek to inscribe China into a new discourse of power, one that proclaims the hegemony of 
revolutionary internationalism as a developmental force driven by the contradictions 
produced by global capitalism. In proclaiming the hegemony of this new global model, 
Soviet reporters in fact perpetuate many of the tropes and technologies of colonial discourse 
in ostensibly inverted form.  
This chapter will focus on the techniques of observation and translation, both of which 
have been accused of complicity in the extension of imperial power. In their studies of travel 
writing and journalism, Mary-Louise Pratt and David Spurr invoke Foucault’s analysis of the 
panopticon and Heidegger’s critique of the technological attitude to read the relation between 
the detached observer and the objectified, observed world as an assertion of dominance and 	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possession.311  Talal Asad, meanwhile, provides an illuminating critique of the concept of 
“translation” as applied to the study of societies. Asad claims that the conception of 
ethnography as translation maintains a power dynamic in which the ethnographer reserves the 
right to assert the “true” meaning of foreign social practices, which are thereby removed from 
active social context to be inscribed into the master discourse of Western theory.312  
We will find the most famous Soviet reporter of China, Sergei Tret’iakov, to be 
preoccupied with the problem of point of view, and the conversion of visual experience into 
knowledge. The solution enacted by Tret’iakov and his Beijing University colleague A. A. 
Ivin confirms the power of the Soviet gaze through a narrative movement from illusion to 
truth, while relocating China within a developmental chronotope issuing from Moscow. 
Tret’iakov performs a similar overcoming of the translation barrier; both he and the reporter 
Nikolai Kostarev find that the universal significance of Soviet revolutionary discourse can 
overcome the problem of linguistic difference. Observation and translation are stretched to 
the point of collapse, however, in the Chinese travelogue of Boris Pil’niak, where the 
nostalgic desire for the nation undermines the authority of the internationalist narrative. 
II. Observation: The Soviet Point of View  
In the period between the two world wars, the reporter became something of a heroic 
figure for global leftist culture, his commitment to witnessing the traumas and 
transformations of the present elevated by advocates above the fantasies of fiction.313 Recent 
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investigations into 1920s Soviet culture have also focused on the prominence of documentary 
techniques in the public culture of this period.314 Within the Soviet Union, this post-war drive 
to document a changed world was linked to the political desires of the new Bolshevik 
government. For the Bolsheviks, the representation of their country and the wider world as 
progressing in line with a teleology inaugurated by the October Revolution was an essential 
part of forming the new, Soviet identity, which in turn would legitimize their rule.  
The attraction of Soviet cultural producers to documentary forms must therefore be 
viewed in terms of their relationship to the revolutionary project. For the leftist avant-garde, 
it was the task of art to contribute to the construction of a revolutionized social reality. The 
members of the Left Front of the Arts (Levyi front iskusstv—LEF), particularly Nikolai 
Chuzhak and Sergei Tret’iakov, developed the concept of a  “literature of fact” to describe 
this new documentary imperative. Chuzhak and Tret’iakov rejected fictional literature as a 
relic of previous class dominations, an idealist, contemplative “literature of knowledge of 
life” (литература жизнепознания) that needed to be replaced by a materialist, 
interventionist “literature of construction of life” (литература жизнестроения). Rejecting 
fantasy, abstraction, and subjective experience, this new literature would focus on the 
concrete details of social life, thereby assisting in its organization.315  
Soviet reportage on China sought to “organize” its audience, shaping in them a 
worldview that would influence their actions. Partly this discursive authority came through 
institutional support. Tret’iakov’s articles on China, for example, were published in Pravda, 	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Rabochaia Moskva, Krasnaia nov’ and the photo-journal Prozhektor: high-profile 
publications that played a major role in forming the Soviet citizen’s sense of the world. 
Jeffrey Brooks has noted that one of the first things the Bolsheviks did after seizing power 
was assert monopoly control over the press, recognizing its capacity to impose “a structure on 
thinking even among nonbelievers.”316 In the high period of Soviet involvement in China, 
between the diplomatic treaty between the two countries in March 1924 and the catastrophic 
defeat of the Canton Uprising in December 1927, the Soviet press covered China with greater 
intensity than any foreign country outside the West.  
Reportage aspires to an indexical form of writing, staking its discursive authority on the 
presence and experience of the writer in the world he represents.317 This indexicality is often 
asserted through the use of photographs to accompany the text: China coverage, for example, 
was particularly high in Prozhektor, the photo-journal sister publication to Pravda. But the 
claims of the Soviet reporter in China, as we have seen in Erdberg, go beyond presence to 
assert a particular kind of positionality. Soviet policy proclaimed a complete reversal in 
Russia’s relationship with China: where Tsarist Russia had been one of the imperialist 
powers scheming to carve up the Chinese melon, Soviet Russia now presented itself as 
China’s ally against imperialist encirclement. Popular feeling in China at this time does 
indeed seem to have been favourable towards the Soviet Union, and many intellectuals 
looked to Soviet Russia for an alternative path to modernity after the West’s betrayal at the 
Treaty of Versailles.318 Building on these factors, the Soviet reporter claimed to occupy a 
fundamentally different position to his “imperialist” equivalents, Tsarist or Western. The 
combination of a Marxist-Leninist theoretical framework and the trust and acceptance of the 
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Chinese population enabled these reporters, according to themselves, to produce a more 
truthful account of contemporary China.  
Many early Soviet writers on China were, like Erdberg, political activists first and 
writers second. Early post-revolutionary monographs on China were written by Vladimir 
Dmitrevich Vilenskii-Sibiriakov and Grigorii Naumovich Voitinskii, who were among the 
first Soviet agents to enter China in 1920.319 A. E. Khodorov, who worked for the Soviet 
news agency ROSTA in Beijing from 1919–1922, published Global Imperialism and China 
(Mirovoi imperializm i Kitai) in 1922 with the progressive Russian newspaper Shanghai Life 
(Shankhaiskaia zhizn’).320 Sergei Alekseevich Dalin, author of the eyewitness accounts In the 
Ranks of the Chinese Revolution (V riadakh kitaiskoi revoliutsii, 1926) and Sketches of the 
Revolution in China (Ocherki revoliutsii v Kitae, 1927), began his career working in the 
Komsomol in Orel’ and Orenburg.321 His first two trips to China (in 1922 and 1924) were to 
attend communist youth meetings. By the time of his third visit, in 1926–7, Dalin was 
teaching at Moscow’s Sun Yat-sen University for the Workers of China and looking to 
recruit students.322 Galina Serebriakova, a member of the Bolshevik Party from 1919, came 
to China as the wife of Leonid Petrovich Serebriakov, a significant figure in the Trotskyist 	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opposition conducting diplomatic negotiations for the Soviet state.323 The journalists A. 
Lebedenko, V. Mikhel’s and Zinaida Rikhter accompanied the Great Flight in 1925, an 
aviation expedition from Moscow through Mongolia to China; all three published books 
endorsing the symbolic significance of the flight as a connective spatial act linking Russia to 
China, and positioning themselves as representatives of their state. (See Chapter Three.)  
The most prominent Soviet reporter on China in the 1920s, however, was the writer, 
theorist, and prominent LEFist Sergei Tret'iakov. Tret'iakov first entered China in 1921, 
fleeing White-occupied Vladivostok and passing through Tianjin, Beijing and Harbin on his 
way to Chita.324 That visit produced the poem “Night. Beijing,” which drips with the 
mysterious, alien atmosphere Tret’iakov came later to reject as dangerous exotica. Invoking 
tropes of abjection and horror that Spurr identifies with colonial discourse, Tret’iakov 
recounts how “the corpulent odour of gangrenous food laid siege from the sores of eating 
houses,” while “lanterns like oranges watch monstrously from doorways.”325 Tret’iakov 
returned in 1924 for a more extended stay as a teacher of Russian at Beijing University, 
arriving soon after the Sino-Soviet Agreement and staying through 1925. This time he chose 
to inaugurate a very different kind of writing practice, using China as the testing ground for 
the nascent theories of the literature of fact.  
The articles that Tret’iakov produced on the basis of his experiences in China were 
published extremely widely in the Soviet Union, making Tret’iakov the most high-profile 
reporter of China in the 1920s. In 1924–5 his articles on China appeared in Prozhektor, 	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Pravda, Krasnaia gazeta, Krasnaia nov’, Krasnaia molodezh’, Krasnaia panorama, Shkval, 
Zhurnalist, the cinema periodicals Ekran and Kino, and the Harbin newspaper Tribuna.326 
The articles in Prozhektor were accompanied by extensive photographic illustrations; 
although these are unattributed, it seems likely from Tret’iakov’s own comments that he took 
at least some of these photos himself.327 These articles were later collected, reworked and 
republished in 1927 as a two-and-a-half month sequence of sketches that ran in the 
newspaper Rabochaia Moskva.328 That same year, a shorter sequence of the same articles also 
appeared in the Georgian newspaper Zaria Vostoka, to coincide with Tret’iakov’s arrival in 
that country for his next writing project.329 A single volume of these China sketches was 
published under the title Chzhungo in 1927 (republished and expanded 1930).  
The context for the reception of Tret’iakov’s reports on China changed greatly between 
these first and second waves of publication. In 1924–5 Soviet optimism about China was at 
its height. The Sino-Soviet agreement had been signed, and the Tsarist embassy in Beijing 
turned over to the Soviet government. The Comintern’s agents were cementing their authority 
within the GMD-CCP alliance in the south, and anti-imperialist sentiment was flaring up into 
protests and strikes in Shanghai and Guangzhou. By the time this material returned to print in 
May 1927, the Guomindang had overthrown Soviet influence, massacring their Communist 
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allies in Shanghai in April and forcing Borodin and his comrades to flee through the Gobi by 
car. Given that the Soviet press was jubilant at the success of the Northern Expedition and the 
workers’ movement in Shanghai right up until the April massacre, it seems likely that 
Tret’iakov’s republished articles were intended to complement the triumph, not the defeat, of 
Soviet policy in China. 
Despite this distribution over time, we can sense a unity of approach to Tret’iakov’s 
China sketches. Tret’iakov introduced the complete series in Rabochaia Moskva as united by 
the theme of old Chinese culture slowly cracking under the assault of the new: “Chinese 
culture, formed over the centuries, like a million-pound ally of reaction and counter-
revolution, slowly, too slowly crumbling under the blows of the new China—that, essentially, 
is the theme of my sketches.”330 This fundamental temporal structure of slow yet forceful 
cultural transformation shapes Tret’iakov’s sketches on various aspects of Chinese life: the 
family, marriage, the status of women, education, religion, theatre, and politics. As Papazian 
notes, these sketches are united by “a sort of (non-fictional) plot—in this case, a 
“modernizing” ethnography conveying a snapshot of the Marxist historical narrative.”331 
Tret’iakov also offers eyewitness accounts of major political events: Feng Yuxiang’s capture 
of Beijing, the death of Sun Yat-sen, the student protests of 1925. The authenticity of this 
material is purportedly guaranteed by their author’s embedded presence in the world he 
describes: the introduction to Chzhungo establishes that Tret’iakov was teaching in Beijing 
for 18 months, giving him the opportunity to witness these major historical events while also 
observing everyday Chinese life.332 Disparagingly comparing the superficial insights of the 
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tourist, “flinging himself from place to place,” Tret’iakov bases the authority of his texts on 
the validity and duration of his point of observation.333  
Writing of the complex process by which ethnographic texts claim the authority to 
represent social reality, the anthropologist James Clifford notes that a combination of 
participant observation and authoritative theoretical framework was being established in the 
1920s as the dominant mode of professional ethnography in the West.334 Presence, often 
given indexical proof through the inclusion of photographs, became a guarantee of valid 
knowledge, a promise of truth that Clifford neatly summarizes: “You are there, because I was 
there.”335 However, despite this rhetorical validation of presence, in reality these new 
fieldworker-theorists often stayed in a location for shorter periods and acquired less linguistic 
mastery than their predecessors. This was compensated by “an increased emphasis on the 
power of observation. Culture was construed as an ensemble of characteristic behaviors, 
ceremonies and gestures, susceptible to recording and explanation by a trained onlooker. […] 
Of course, successful fieldwork mobilized the fullest possible range of interactions, but a 
distinct primacy was accorded to the visual: interpretation was tied to description.”336 These 
interpretations were authorized by “certain powerful theoretical abstractions” which 
“promised to help academic ethnographers ‘get to the heart’ of a culture more rapidly than 
someone undertaking, for example, a thorough inventory of customs and beliefs.”337  
This description of ethnographic authority fits Tret’iakov’s assertions of his images of 
China in several respects. Tret’iakov’s articles constantly assert the fact of presence and the 
power of observation. As mentioned above, many of the original articles and both editions of 	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Chzhungo supplemented textual description with photographs, many of them probably taken 
by Tret’iakov himself: indexical signs of his presence and involvement in Chinese reality. 
Tret’iakov is also armed with a powerful theoretical abstraction: the Marxist-Leninist theory 
of revolutionary developmentalism, which confers authoritative meaning on his limited 
sample of observations. This theoretical background, however, gives Tret’iakov’s 
ethnographic texts a very different temporal structure to the ethnographies Clifford describes. 
Ethnographers like Malinowski, Clifford notes, tended from their short stays to produce 
synchronic depictions of an “ethnographic present,” and to confer on this present something 
of the character of eternal, unchanging social truth.338 Tret’iakov’s Marxist ethnography, by 
contrast, is necessarily diachronic: he records Chinese social life only in order to assert its 
transformation.  
Tret’iakov had even less linguistic skill than the post-Malinowskian ethnographer: 
though he peppers his texts with the odd Chinese phrase, his need for interpreters recurs 
constantly in his sketches.339 Instead, the introduction to Chzhungo is filled with visual 
terminology. Tret’iakov announces that he was a “witness” (свидетель) to major political 
events, but also had the chance “to observe Beijing at length” (длительно наблюдать на 
Пекин): an essential element to his authority, since “it is impossible to grasp China without 
scrutinizing everyday Chinese life” (без приглядки к китайскому повседневностью нельзя 
взять Китай наощупь).340 As Clifford noted the  primacy of visual observation in post-war 
ethnography, so Tret’iakov describes his reporting methods in Rabochaia Moskva as 
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339 For example, the final sketch in Chzhungo recounts Tret’iakov’s meeting, on his way home, with 
General Feng Yuxiang. Tret’iakov’s translator for this interview becomes a significant character in his 
own right: a graduate of the Communist University for the Workers of the East (KUTV), he engages 
Tret’iakov in a discussion about the contemporary literary scene in Moscow. Tret’iakov, Chzhungo 
(1927), 246–49. 
 
340 Ibid., 5–6. (My emphasis.) 
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beginning from observation, validated by presence, and proceeding only later to verbal 
sources: 
These sketches contain what I saw with my own eyes on the streets of Tianjin, 
Beijing, Harbin, through the windows of train carriages, what I read in the 
newspapers, and, finally, what came to me in conversation with people who have 
been burned by the heat of the Chinese sun and the furnace of the Chinese 
Revolution.341 
 
The need for sources other than his own eyes is sometimes emphasised by Tret’iakov, 
sometimes concealed. Balancing claims for the power of observation with admissions of the 
need for translators and intermediaries, these sketches can be read as a progressive search for 
a correct ethnographic method; or, to use Tret’iakov’s own terms, a search, through the 
medium of China, for a method for the new literature of fact. 
As we saw in the Introduction's discussion of “To Love China,” the first article 
included in Chzhungo in 1927, Tret'iakov's China reports align with and in effect initiate the 
movement that was later to receive the name “factography” or the “literature of fact.” Indeed, 
Tret'iakov's choice of title for his collection offers a neat expression of his factographic 
intentions and their roots in avant-garde techniques of disruption and estrangement. 
Chzhungo (Чжунго) is a cyrillicization of zhōngguó 中國, or “middle country,” one of the 
Chinese names for China. (Tret'iakov proposed the same title, spelt Dzhungo/Джунго, for the 
trilogy of film scripts he wrote for an unrealised collaboration with Sergei Eisenstein—see 
Chapter Three.) On Aleksandr Rodchenko's striking cover design, Чжунго appears between 
the characters 中 and 國, within a design balanced out by two identical red spheres and 
unified by a red, white and black colour scheme. Thus the equation of these two terms, both 
potentially inpenetrable to the reader, is vividly asserted. The disorienting jolt experienced on 
encountering this title, in place of the standard Russian Kitai, expresses immediately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Tret’iakov, “Zhelt’ i sin’.” “В эти очерки вошло то, что я видел своими глазами на улицах 
Тян-цзина, Пекина, Харбина, сквозь окна вагонов, что вычитывалось мною из газет и, наконец, 
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Tret'iakov's confrontational challenge to the reader: you know so little about the real China, 
this title implies, that you do not even know its real name.  
The moment of linguistic estrangement experienced on first glimpsing this title shakes 
the reader from complacency and points the way towards a more authentic, factual 
knowledge of zhongguo, freed from the automatized stereotypes of pre-existing images of 
China. As the example of this title shows, Tret'iakov's entire China project was conceived as 
a tool to reshape the Soviet public’s conception of China, scraping away the accumulated 
layers of false exotica that he ascribed to the works of writers such as Pierre Loti and Gustave 
Mirbeau.342 As Nikolai Chuzhak critiqued the Turgenevian realist novel for producing a false 
view of the world that existed only in an ideal realm, so Tret'iakov insists that the bourgeois-
imperial system has produced a powerful fantasy about China through its cultural products 
that conceals the realities of European domination.  
For a contemporary reader in the Western academy, such an argument cannot but recall 
post-colonial critiques of the relationship between cultural production and imperial power, 
beginning with the hugely influential work of Edward Said in Orientalism and Culture and 
Imperialism. Less well known, perhaps, is the degree to which the contours of these critiques 
were already being shaped in the anti-imperial rhetoric of Soviet publicist-scholars in the 
1920s. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye offers this summary, citing anonymously the 
pioneer of Soviet Oriental studies, Mikhail Pavlovich:  
Said's notion of Orientalism as the instrument of Western imperialism would have 
sounded very familiar to Soviet ears. In 1922 the editor of a Moscow-based 
journal, Novyi Vostok (The New East), argued that, for British, French, and German 
orientological societies, “scholarly study of the East is merely secondary,” adding 
that, “their primary goal is to do whatever they can in to help their respective 
governments conquer … Asian lands.”343 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 199.  
 
343 Schimmelpenninck, Russian Orientalism, 6. 
	  	   133	  
Schimmelpenninck cites Vera Tolz’s observation that Said's own intellectual legacy can be 
traced back, via Arab intellectuals who studied in the USSR in the 1960s, to the 
internationalist intelligentsia of the Soviet 1920s.344 This unmasking of Western images of 
the East is pioneered in the Soveit 1920s, and its chief exponent in the Chinese context is 
Tret’iakov. 
Tret’iakov guides his reader through this process of unmasking by employing a travel 
chronotope that structures an epistemological journey from darkness to light: a broadly 
chronological movement from arrival and ignorance towards greater proximity and 
understanding. Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope encourages us to see the 
ideological implications behind every particular arrangement of space and time in a literary 
text. One of his key examples is the “chronotope of the road,” a temporal movement through 
space that enables social distances to collapse, so that “people who are normally kept separate 
by social and spatial distance can accidentally meet[.]”345 Bakhtin delineates two forms of 
space that the textual road can pass through: “familiar territory” and an “exotic, alien 
world.”346 Most accounts of travel writing identify a chronotope that moves through exotic 
space while attempting at times to translate this exotic terrain into familiar, domestic space.347 
Tret’iakov’s travel sketches, I argue, move through exotic space in order to uncover 
commensurabilities that stop short of full domestication. Bakhtin also reminds us of the “rich 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Ibid. Tolz traces this genealogy back still further, to the “Rozen school” of Russian Orientologists 
in the late imperial period, whose “conclusions about the relationship between power and knowledge 
at times sound so topical that I propose that contemporary post-colonial scholarship should be viewed 
as a ‘descendant’ of the early twentieth-century Russian Orientology.” Vera Tolz, Russia's Own 
Orient: the Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods 
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345 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination, ed. 
Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1981), 243. 
 
346 Ibid., 245.  
 
347 See for example Thea Pitman, Mexican Travel Writing (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), 47–8. 
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metaphorical expansion of the image of the road as a course,” embracing as one variant the 
“course of history.”348 Tret’iakov’s journey towards commensurability can credibly be read 
as the movement of history that is driving such disparate societies as Russia and China 
towards a modern convergence. 
In his first Rabochaia Moskva sketch, Tret’iakov admits that his initial encounter with 
China was one of incomprehension and alienation: “In those first days I felt especially 
distinctly the difference—purely external, of course—between Chinese life and our own 
European customs.”349 Everything seems, at the level of surface appearance, to be backwards. 
Men dress in skirts, women in trousers. Old women are bald, old men wear ponytails. 
Windows face into the courtyard, not out onto the street. But the longer Tret’iakov’s eye 
examines the streets and peruses the newspapers, “the more everything inexplicable, strange, 
and exotic became comprehensible, troubling, and sometimes even a little frightening, since 
through these peculiarities there peered out the 4000-year slavery of the Chinese people.”350 
The epistemological method of de-exoticizing China is presented as a chronotope of travel: 
time passed in alien space will replace initial alienation with a growing awareness of the 
universality of structures of oppression. 
Tret’iakov’s arrival in China is recounted in a sketch that is also an openly self-
referential experiment in method: “Moscow—Beijing: A Journey-Film” (“Moskva—Pekin: 
put’fil’ma”), published in LEF, the journal of the Left Front of the Arts, in 1925. This 
journey from Moscow to Beijing stands in a line of symbolic spatial acts that can be traced 
back beyond the building of the trans-Siberian railway to Dostoevsky and Vasil’ev’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 244. 
 
349 Tret’iakov, “Zhelt’ i sin’.” (My emphasis.) “в эти первые дни особенно выпукло чувствовалась 
разница, чисто внешняя, конечно, между китайским бытом и нашим привычным 
европейским.”  
 
350 Ibid. “тем больше все это необъяснимое, странное, экзотическое, становилось понятным, 
надоедливым, а иногда и страшноватым, поскольку сквозь эти странности проглядывало 
четырехтысячелетнее рабство китайского народа.” 
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fantasies of Russian domination of Eurasian space through railway technology.351 In the mid-
1920s, this journey’s linking of two national spaces by railway—the epitome of modern 
mechanized technology—was a ready symbol for Soviet internationalist solidarity and the 
extension of revolutionary progress to the East. Indeed, this same symbolic journey was 
enacted by plane in the Great Flight, which took place in the same year that Tret’iakov’s 
travelogue was published (see Chapter Three). That journey produced a cinematic document, 
the film The Great Flight, as well as a series of reporters’ textual accounts. Likewise, 
Tret’iakov calls his “Moscow—Beijing” a “journey-film” (путьфильма), emphasising the 
indexical, documentary nature of his intentions.  
The text begins with a discourse on method, as the voice of “Osya” (presumably 
Tret’iakov’s LEF colleague Osip Brik) gives Tret'iakov his instructions for the composition 
of this journey-film. Brik's orders reflect the influence among the LEF group of Aleksei 
Gastev's "scientific organization of labour" (nauchnaia organizatsiia truda—NOT), a Soviet 
interpretation of Taylorism that sought to achieve optimal efficiency in social activities. 
Tret'iakov's initiation of the literature of fact represents an attempt to apply the scientific 
organization principles of NOT to the production of literature, as Osya explains: 
You are going to Beijing. You must write travel notes. But they must not be notes 
just for yourself. No, they must have social significance. Proceed in accordance 
with NOT and fix what you see with a sharp, thrifty eye.  Be observant. Do not let 
a single detail slip away. You are in the train carriage: Kodak every line, every 
conversation. You are at a station: make a note of everything, right down to the 
posters washed away by the rain.352 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Susanna Lim, China and Japan, 102–3. 
 
352 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Moskva—Pekin (Put’fil’ma),” Lef 3 (1925): 33. “Ты едешь в Пекин. Ты 
должен написать путевые заметки. Но чтоб они не были заметками для себя. Нет, они должны 
иметь общественное значение. Сделай установку по НОТ и зорким хозяйским глазом 
фиксируй, что увидишь. Прояви наблюдательность. Пусть ни одна мелочь не ускользнет. Ты в 
вагоне—кодачь каждый штрих и разговор. Ты на станции—все отметь вплоть до афиш смытых 
дождем.” For a detailed discussion of Gastev’s theories of NOT and their influence on LEF, see Fore, 
“‘All the Graphs’,” 135–169. 
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As in the title of the sketch, the writer is equated here to a camera, an instrument that 
produces a “journey-film,” capable of “Kodaking” (the neologistic verb kodachit’) both sight 
and sound. Such a commitment to objective documentary writing, according to Osya, will 
give Tret'iakov's travel notes genuine social significance, in contrast to a sentimental focus on 
the self. It also demands that travel writing focus entirely on the (temporal and spatial) 
present, with no digressions into history or social context. 
As Fore notes, Tret'iakov's practical experiment in applying NOT's functional 
techniques of industrial rationalization to literature is subject to a certain degree of parody in 
“Moskva—Pekin.” The strictures of NOT interrupt the stock scene of emotional farewell at 
the train station, to specify precisely how many kisses can be achieved in the time 
available.353 Once on the train, Tret'iakov dutifully reports on the state of the bathrooms, the 
cost of bed linen, and the various ways to pass the time, producing “catalogs of banal detail 
so limitless that they border on the absurd.”354 When the train enters China, however, a 
different imperative to interpret and explain creeps into the report, and the comic element 
subsides. Observing a Chinese family on the train, Tret'iakov moves from observed image to 
an ethnographic conclusion about family structure: “A Chinese man sits down, and sits his 
son down (his wife stands, a wife is an inferior creature, below a son — to ask a Chinese man 
about his wife is to insult him cruelly).”355 Later Tret'iakov sees the landscape dotted with 
graves, and draws from this sight a conclusion about the hierarchy of power in Chinese 
society, which he considers dominated by Confucian notions of filial piety and the cult of 
ancestors: “China is pimpled with a syphilitic rash of graves, this country in which the dead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Tret’iakov, “Moskva—Pekin,” 33. 
 
354 Fore, “‘All the Graphs’,” 171. 
 
355 Tret’iakov, “Moskva—Pekin,” 52. “Сядет китаец, сына посадит (жена стоит, жена существо 
низшего сорта, ниже сына—о здоровье жены спросить китайца, значит жестоко его 
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hold the living by the throat like nowhere else.”356 There follows a discourse on the hindrance 
these graves offer to agriculture, and the financial burden placed on the young by the old 
through the cultural importance of funerals.  
This is not information produced simply from the interface of recording device and 
external reality; these conclusions require extra, secondary knowledge obtained from 
supplementary sources. Entering China, Tret’iakov also enters into the established terms of 
foreign-authored discourse about China, which frequently focused on such issues as gender 
relations and the rule of the old over the young.357 In the course of his journey Tret’iakov 
thus travels between the two poles of objectivity and instrumentality that Papazian identifies 
as the tension within documentary forms: the writer begins as a recording machine, and ends 
as an interpreter and polemicist.358 In so doing, he also introduces the key outlines of his own 
interpretative perspective: from the speeding modernity of the Moscow—Beijing train, what 
Tret’iakov focuses upon is the destructive hold of tradition on Chinese society.  
However, Tret'iakov's observing gaze from the camera-like frame of his train window 
is not enough to produce useful knowledge on China. As with Clifford’s ethnographers, local 
knowledge may also be required. The sketch “A Coup in Beijing” (“Perevorot v Pekine”) 
describes Feng Yuxiang's 1924 coup against Wu Peifu as a confused mixture of multiple 
rumours and ineffective eyewitnessing.359 While various rumours as to which general has the 
upper hand “crawl” around the city and the Russian embassy, Tret'iakov's observations see 	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357 Douglas Kerr and Julia Kuehn, in their Introduction to A Century of Travels in China, remark that 
gender is “something almost all our travellers remark on.” Douglas Kerr and Julia Kuehn, eds, A 
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only empty streets and then soldiers. Only when Tret'iakov turns to a fruit-seller he knows 
who speaks a little English can he confirm that the troops are “‘Tong-tong Feng Yuxiang.’ 
(Tong-tong means all.)”360 Here Tret'iakov makes a show of his reporterly credentials: local 
acquaintances and (albeit limited) multi-linguistic capabilities enable him to get the 
information the embassy lacked and eyewitnessing alone could not provide. 
This combination of eyewitness detail and informant explanation shapes Tret'iakov’s 
report on Sun Yatsen's arrival at Beijing train station. Presence at the scene is established by 
an almost cinematic abundance of precise visual detail. Like an extended tracking shot, 
Tret'iakov's narration, devoid here of any authorial “I,” takes us down the road to the station, 
noting the paper flowers adorning its façade, then pans along the densely-packed crowds of 
young people waiting in the square. This disembodied gaze picks out the red flags in the 
crowd, then zooms in on the hieroglyphs written on them, and finally a close-up on the 
Guomindang sun, white on blue, in the corner. Tret’iakov describes the cloth hoods worn by 
the crowd on this frosty, snowy day, the long scarves of the students, and the hats and 
decorations of arriving dignitaries. Only after two pages of such disembodied description 
does the authorial “I” appear in the narrative, and in doing so reveals Tret'iakov's position 
within this huge and crowded scene: embedded with his Chinese students from Beijing 
University. “I quickly find acquaintances. Students appear from all sides.”361  
His students act as information sources that supplement his observations: where 
Tret’iakov sees only solders in furry hats, his students can identify the student volunteers 
from Hu Jingyi’s 2nd National Army.362  They also serve as his translators. After Sun’s death, 
Tret'iakov recounts a series of “overheard” political disputes among different social groups: 	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361 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 170. “Быстро нахожу знакомых. Студенты подходят с разных 
сторон.” 
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he admits that the last, between a nationalist supporter of the GMD and a monarchist, was 
translated for him by one of his students.363 The students are presented as authentic 
inhabitants of Chinese reality, and by extension, Tret’iakov’s close relationship with them 
becomes a guarantee of his account’s authority.  
Tret’iakov’s use of informants is not just about ethnographic method: there is a political 
dimension to the fact that he, a Soviet Russian, can allegedly gain access to Chinese reality in 
a manner that is denied to other Europeans. During Beijing's “Day of Rage,” after the 
shooting of Shanghai protestors by British troops in May 1925, he is with his students as they 
join the demonstrations at the diplomatic quarter. In this scene we see both the ambiguity of 
Tret’iakov's position, and the fundamental difference between Soviet Russian and western 
imperialist that he is so keen to assert: 
I walk through the seething crowd with the students. Distrustful looks from the 
crowd. Who is this foreigner? Perhaps the accursed “yingguoren” (Englishman)? 
My student companion keeps projecting on all sides “eguoren” (Russian), 
“sunguoren”[sic] (Soviet person), and the hateful eyes are extinguished, and the 
ranks part amicably, allowing the camera to enter their dense core.364 
 
Here we find a condensed assertion of the privileged position and perspective of the Soviet 
observer in China. Aided by his student friends, Tret’iakov's status as a Soviet Russian allows 
his politically and aesthetically modern documentary project (metonymized here in his 
camera) to penetrate right into the heart of contemporary Chinese reality. The very words 
“Russian” and “Soviet” obtain a kind of mystical power, and grant their referent immunity to 
the violent heat of Chinese popular anger: “Foreigners do not risk entering the cauldron of the 
demonstration. Only we, the Soviets, walk through the flame of Chinese rage without getting 	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364 Ibid., 225. “Сквозь кипение толпы прохожу со студентами. Недоверчивы взгляды толпы. Что 
за иностранец? Может быть, проклятый «ингожень» (англичанин)? Студент спутник все время 
бросает направо и налево «огожень» (русский), «сунгожень» (советский человек), и гаснут 
ненавидящие глаза, и дружественно расступаются ряды, пропуская в самую гущу 
фотографический аппарат.”  “Сунгожень” seems to be a typo for “Suguoren” (苏国人), the 
standard Chinese translation for “советский человек”—perhaps a revealing one, in that it overlays 
Sun Yatsen’s surname onto the name of the USSR. 
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burned, and the thickest, most scowling-faced columns open fraternally before us once they 
hear the word “eguoren” — Russian.”365 Tret’iakov acknowledges here that he does belong 
to the category of "foreigners," but only in order to insist that his position, as a Soviet 
Russian, is fundamentally different from that of the other foreigners in China, be they 
administrators, bankers, missionaries, soldiers or writers. He is inside, he insists, in a way 
they cannot be, in a way that is ruled out by imperialist policy as by imperialist culture.  
During a student-led lantern procession to Sun Yat-sen's hotel on New Year's Eve, 
Tret’iakov positions himself in a triangulated position that allows him to observe both the 
protesting Chinese in the street and the Westerners gathered to celebrate in a hotel ballroom. 
The Westerners break from their foxtrot, the quintessential symbol of capitalist decadence in 
1920s Soviet art, to observe the Chinese through the windows, as Tret’iakov earlier observed 
rural scenes from his train seat. These other Europeans remain in their enclosed, separated 
space, whereas Tret’iakov, over the course of the sketch series, gradually enters the Chinese 
crowd. During Sun's funeral procession, “a Guomindangist in the chain extends a hand to me, 
and I am included in the chain.”366 Elsewhere Tret’iakov and his comrades break into rousing 
song at a Chinese “Communist wedding,” pushing the marriage into a metaphor for Sino-
Soviet alliance: “And finally Russian and Chinese voices were knitted together in the single 
tight knot of the Internationale.”367 Tret’iakov has got out from behind his window, and rides 
various waves of revolutionary enthusiasm to cross the line of exclusion that separates 
foreign and local. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Ibid., 228. “Иностранцы не рискуют в котел демонстрации. Только мы, советские, проходим 
в пламени китайского гнева, не обжигаясь, и перед нами братски расступаются самые плотные, 
самые насупленные колонны, заслышав слово «огожень» — русский.” 
 
366 Ibid., 188. “Гоминдановец в цепи протягивает мне руку, и я включаюсь в цепь.” 
 
367 Ibid., 121. “А под конец и русские и китайские голоса связались в одном тугом узле 
Интернатионала.” 
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III. Soviet Russia in the Middle: Beijing under Soviet Eyes 
This movement from ignorance to involvement is replayed as a single journey in 
Tret’iakov’s longest China sketch, “Beijing” (“Pekin”), which uses multiple vantage points to 
provide a highly detailed eyewitness report on everyday life in the Chinese capital. Although 
Tret’iakov indicates at points that the chapter is in fact the result of several months of 
residency and observation, the text itself is structured around the chronotope of arrival in and 
exploration of an unknown city.368  
Our first sight of Beijing is veiled in the language of exotic fantasy: compared to 
Tianjin, where traditional Chinese buildings rub shoulders with cranes and factory chimneys, 
“Beijing is a city from another world entirely.”369 In fact the city itself is literally invisibile 
from the outside, contained within the “stone collar” of its walls: “only some fantastic multi-
coloured towers, reminiscent of boats or the tiaras of Chinese actors, break the monotonous 
toothed line of these mountainous walls.”370 These metaphors should give us pause; it seems 
Tret’iakov is employing the very aesthetic devices that he elsewhere denounces as illusory 
and deceptive. For example, in an essay on aerial perspective entitled “Through Unwiped 
Glasses” (“Skvoz’ neprotertye ochki,” 1928), Tret’iakov suggests that there are two types of 
metaphorical imagery: there are metaphors that help to elucidate the objective nature of 
things and processes, and there are metaphors that obscure this objective reality through an 
aesthetic appeal to the subject as consumer. The distance produced by aerial perspective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 The chapter in Chzhungo reworks and greatly expands the first of Tret’iakov’s China reports to be 
published in Prozhektor: “Pekin,” Prozhektor 11 (33), 20 June 1924, 12–14. The Prozhektor version 
begins at the centre of the city and works its way outwards, an order that is inverted in the version 
published in Chzhungo. The sketch was expanded still further for the revised edition of Chzhungo, 
published in 1930. 
 
369 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 19. “Пекин — это город из совершенно иного мира.” 
 
370 Ibid., 27. “только фантастические разноцветные надворотные башни, похожие то ли на 
корабли, то ли на тиары китайских актеров, разнообразят зубчастую линию стенного хребта.” 
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heightens the tendency towards such aestheticized metaphor as “the strip farms look like a 
patchwork quilt,” which tell us nothing, Tret’iakov points out, about the practical functioning 
of strip farms.371 A more acceptable form of figural language is suggested by Tret’iakov’s 
comparison of humans and termites: here, at least, the fact that both transform the landscape 
through their productive activity elucidates their function rather than fixating entirely on 
aesthetic appearance.372 
Returning to “Beijing,” it seems that Tret'iakov’s use of metaphorical similarities on 
the approach to the city accentuates the mythical and distances the practical. Under 
Tret'iakov's metaphorical gaze, a tower is not a structure intended for defence, but a boat, or 
then again a tiara. From the outside, at a distance, a sense of the fantastic and exotic are 
retained. Next Tret'iakov switches his (and our) vantage point from the train to the walls 
themselves, a popular promenade for tourists and thus a common perspective in China 
travelogues. From this elevated vantage point he sees, “as far as the eye can see, like a 
petrified dead wave, the dull, grey undulation of the tiled roofs of Beijing’s one-storey 
houses.”373 Earlier the towers along the walls were like boats, and now the roofs of the 
houses become waves. If we follow Tret'iakov's own theory of metaphor from “Through 
Unwiped Glasses,” these metaphorical descriptions distance what Beijing seems to be from 
what it is, form from function, appearance from reality.  
These preliminary, distanced vantage points perform an aestheticization of the city, a 
transformation of a complex social reality into a poetic metaphor. In Imperial Eyes, Mary 
Louise Pratt describes a recurrent trope in travel writing that she calls the “monarch-of-all-I-
survey” scene. In such a scene, a white male imperialist traveler stands in an elevated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Skvoz’ neprotetrye ochki,” Novyi Lef 9 (1928): 20–24.  
 
372 Tret’iakov, “Skvoz’ neprotertye ochki,” 23. For a further development of this argument see 
Tret’iakov, “Obrazoborchestvo,” Novyi Lef 12 (1928): 43. 
 
373 Ibid., 29. “каменной мертвою зыбью, насколько хватит глаз, тусклое, серое волнение 
черепичных крыш одноэтажных пекинских домов.” 
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position (a promontary over a lake, the balcony of a hotel) and expresses mastery over the 
place he views by describing it. One major aspect of this expression of mastery, for Pratt, is 
the aestheticization of landscape. A descriptive focus on the beauty of the scene and the 
pleasure it gives the viewer serves to mask political and economic motivations by suggesting 
that “the esthetic [sic] qualities of the landscape constitute the social and material value of 
the discovery to the explorers’ home culture.”374 Aestheticization equates the view to a 
painting, which places the viewer in the double position of painter (in words) and judge: the 
landscape exists for his own pleasure, not for the propagation of actual economic lives. 
Tret'iakov's initial aestheticization of Beijing seems to mimic the “monarch-of-all-I-survey” 
scene, transforming a large and complex city into an elegant (if clichéd) poetic image. But 
Tret'iakov aestheticizes here as the first step towards de-aestheticization, or more accurately a 
replacement of aesthetic distance with socio-political proximity; he will have to take us 
further into the life of the city before we can start to reconcile appearance and reality. 
Tret’iakov’s next vantage point gives access to actual Chinese social life, though still 
from a spatial and temporal distance. The “law of profit and trade competition” on the city's 
major arteries, Tret’iakov notes, is “turning one-storey China into two-storey.”375 Our 
Marxist ethnographer uses the elevated position of this commercialized modernity to observe 
the older forms of life in the one-storey hutongs below: “Living on the second floor of a flat-
roofed building, on several occasions I observed at length these courtyards, in which 
Bejingers pass three quarters of their life.”376 Looking down from elevated modernity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




376 Ibid., 30. “Живя на втором этаже плоскокрышего дома, я не раз подолгу глядел в эти 
дворики, на которых протекает три четверти жизни пекинцев.” The Prozhektor version of the 
sketch shows a photograph of a Beijing courtyard from an elevated position, captioned “The inside of 
a Beijing house (taken from the neighbouring roof” (Нутро пекинского дома [снято с соседней 
крыши])—possibly the photographic record of the view described in Chzhungo. Tret’iakov, “Pekin,” 
14. 
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Tret’iakov’s camera-eye sees everything. Despite his admission that these observations took 
place over a period of extended residence, in the descriptions that follow they are condensed 
into a single, simultaneous act of viewing, united in the present tense and heightened in their 
immediacy by parataxis and indexical injunctions.  
Tret’iakov’s gaze now picks out not fantastic imagery but concrete economic processes 
of socially necessary labour. “Here is the house of a collier”: a detailed technical description 
follows (in accordance with Gastev’s NOT) of the labour process through which the collier 
and his assistants convert discarded fragments of charcoal into cheap fuel, mixing them with 
coal dust and clay into little pellets that dry in the sun.377 Next Tret'iakov's gaze pans round to 
another courtyard, where the products of this labour are being consumed: “And here, in 
another courtyard, I see the pellets being poured into a portable white clay stove, reminiscent 
of a toilet bowl.”378 The pan is followed here by the close-up, as Tret'iakov's vision zooms in 
on the blue flame that heats a long-nosed copper kettle. The inhabitants of the courtyard use 
the boiled water to wash off the city’s “poisonous dust” and prevent scabs: Tret’iakov’s gaze 
seems to learn the meaning of this cultural practice simply from observation.  
In a third courtyard, a meal is being prepared. Chinese cuisine has often functioned in 
European travel accounts as a symbolic expression of Chinese culture’s difference and 
distance. For Victorian British travellers, Ross Forman notes, “Chinese food continued to 
enthral and repulse with its alterity,” while chopsticks represented “the basic contradiction of 
an ancient culture that staunchly resisted incorporation into Western systems of 
behaviour.”379 But Tret'iakov's description of the meal lacks any strangeness, and chopsticks 
are explained by Tret'iakov in practical, “organizational” terms: “The Chinese do not use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Ibid.  
 
378 Ibid. “И вот я вижу, как на другом дворике в белую глиняную переносную печь, 
напоминающую клозетный унитаз, засыпают катышки.” 
 
379 Ross G. Forman, “Eating Out East,” in Kerr and Kuehn, A Century of Travels in China, 65. 
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knives during a meal. The knife is an instrument for the kitchen. Food should be brought to 
the table in such a form that it can be put straight in the mouth and chewed.”380 As with the 
two preceding scenes, eating here is a technical, goal-oriented form of social labour, a 
universal activity that takes different concrete forms in different societies. 
As his gaze moves down from his vantage point and through the streets, Tret'iakov's 
Beijing continues to gain complexity, subdividing into distinctions and subcategories. The 
typical homes of the rich, middle-class, and poor are described in turn. The various types of 
transport on the main roads are differentiated, from automobiles to camel caravans. 
Differentiation even enters the portrait of the rickshaw driver, that typical image of Chinese 
oppression: Tret'iakov's rickshaw drivers are subdivided into hierarchies, the young above the 
old and the privately employed above those that hunt for every fare.381 Entering the 
commerical district of the city, Tret'iakov describes an exhaustive gallery of Chinese trades, 
crafts and occupations. The homogeneous grey sea observed from the walls breaks up into a 
complex, differentiated social system.  
The abstract framework through which Tret'iakov processes these observations of 
economic life is the contradiction between tradition and modernity, expressed in the 
confrontation between traditional labour and the introduction of machines. The machine, he 
notes, breaks the guild system's connection between master and apprentice: the former 
becomes an entrepreneur, the latter a worker.382 Rickshaw drivers, desperate to preserve their 
livelihood, lie down in protest on the newly constructed tram lines that spread through the 
city.383 The contemporary American travel writer Harry Franck lamented Beijing's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo, 31. “Ножа китаец не знает за обедом. Нож — орудие кухни. Пища 
должна быть подана на стол в таком виде, чтобы ее можно было прямо класть в рот и жевать.”  
 
381 Ibid., 38. 
 
382 Ibid., 47. 
 
	  	   146	  
determination to “desecrate her streets with the ugliness and clamour of electric tramways,” 
declaring himself “glad to have known the inimitable Chinese capital before they came.”384 
For Franck, mechanized transport destroys the authenticity of Beijing; for Tret'iakov, this is 
precisely the kind of authenticity he is looking for, signs of the social tensions and ruptures 
caused by the incursion of industrial capitalism. Hence his joy at finding in the market, 
among the traditional images carved into paper embroidery patterns, the shapes of 
aeroplanes, automobiles and bicycles. The aeroplane image is reproduced in the text, forming 
a striking contrast to two “traditional” patterns: the sole of a Chinese shoe and a flowering 
bamboo plant. All these details combine to present a dynamic image of Chinese social life in 
the process of transformation under the impact of capitalist modernity. 
Although we have seen in other sketches how Tret'iakov highlights the asisstance he 
received from his students and other intermediaries, the complex processes by which our 
reporter came to know what he knows are concealed in "Beijing." The experience of eighteen 
months' residence is condensed into a single movement from the outside to the inside, in the 
course of which nothing in Beijing, it seems, is closed to Tret'iakov's roving eye. He moves 
through the impassable crowds of the New Year celebrations.385 A sight of some passing 
courtesans leads into a typical scene of courtesan-client relations.386 Moving beyond the 
commerical district into a residential area, Tret'iakov's gaze passes into “humble” private 
homes and observes the gastronomic customs enacted there. Again, it is with great attention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Ibid., 36. David Strand, who uses the rickshaw puller as a representative figure through which to 
explore the social history of 1920s Beijing, mentions this opposition to trams, which culminated in 
destructive riots in 1929. David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), xv. 
 
384 Harry Franck, Wandering in Northern China (New York, London: The Century Co., 1923), 200. 
 
385 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 49. 
 
386 Ibid. “Ухажер с прителями приезжает к ней днем как в клуб, они играют в «май-чжан», 
сплетничают и обдумивают интриги. Она поет им стихи китайских поэтов, аккомпанируя себе 
на скрипке или на тамбурине.” 
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to procedural detail that Tret'iakov convinces us of the authority and authenticity of his 
images: he knows, for example, that the bamboo shoots have been boiled for three days until 
soft and slippery.387 This all-access vision contrasts strongly with the experience of the 
western tourists from whom Tret'iakov differentiates himself. They flock instead to see the 
temples; indeed, “these days the temples are only kept alive by tourists.”388 As social spaces 
they are dead for the real, contemporary Chinese culture that Tret'iakov presents. The 
tourists’ vision is drawn to the exotic and titillating, but requires assistance: they must pay the 
monks at the Lama Temple to lift the covers and reveal the notorious statues of Buddha 
copulating.389 Tret'iakov's gaze, drawn to the real and the current, seemingly needs no such 
local assistance to see everything he sees. 
 After giving us a detailed, typological view of the lives of Beijing's people, Tret'iakov 
concludes his tour of Beijing with a glimpse of the city's centres of power. The old centre, the 
Forbidden City, is now empty, its pleasure gardens turned into public parks in which the 
city's small but active intelligentsia gather. The new centre, and the end-point of Tret'iakov's 
journey, is the Diplomatic Quarter, which is metaphorized in a way fully fitting its function: 
“a stone loudspeaker, through which imperial capital dictates its orders to China.”390 The 
Diplomatic Quarter is heavily fortified and eerily quiet, both qualities that set it apart from 
the rest of the city. The quarter's main street is quiet and deserted; the atmosphere is the 
inverse of the bustle of the market, defined instead by “silence, emptiness, apprehension” 
(тишина, безлюдье, настороженность—the word for emptiness, безлюдье, is the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Ibid., 50. 
 




390 Ibid., 61. “каменный рупор, через который империалистический капитал диктует свои 
приказания Китаю.” 
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term Pil'niak used to describe Kitai-gorod, but attached now to the non-China at the centre of 
Beijing).391 This quiet suggests not tranquility but control, a place under permanent guard.  
Against this ominous silence, as night closes in, flashes out the bright assertiveness of 
the chapter's concluding image: “It is getting dark. Chattering gangs drive past, returning 
from the cinema, and—silence. Guards pace outside embassy gates. But there are no guards 
at the gates of that embassy from whose bastion a red banner with our hammer and sickle 
flutters at Beijing.”392 By ending at the Soviet embassy, Tret'iakov retains for his tour of 
Beijing, with all the intricate knowledge it displays, the narrative shape of a single arriving 
journey. But it also places that embassy and the power it represents at the spatial centre and 
temporal climax of this journey, which condenses all of Tret'iakov's knowledge of Beijing 
into a single travelling movement. Arriving in ignorance, his vision clouded by fantasy, 
Tret'iakov learns as he moves and observes to understand Beijing as a society with a rich and 
complex culture, while at the same time recognizing that this culture is being transformed by 
the contradictory forces of development. The conclusion of this journey from outside to 
inside locates the centre of the city at the Soviet embassy, and suggests that it is here that a 
future resolution to the conflict of tradition and modernity may be found.  
The affirmation of observational authority that we find in “Beijing” calls to mind 
Spurr’s evocation of Foucault’s panopticism to describe the visual balance of power that 
dominates most travel accounts, wherein the traveller observes and understands all but cannot 
himself be observed. For Spurr, the panopticon describes a dissymmetry of vision that “has 
bearing on any occasion where the superior and invulnerable position of the observer 
coincides with the role of affirming the political order that makes that position possible.”393 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Ibid., 62. 
 
392 Ibid. “Стемнеет. Проедут еще болтливые оравы, возвращающиеся из кино, и — тихо. Около 
посольских ворот шагают часовые. Но нет часовых около ворот того посольства, с бастиона 
которого веет Пекину красное полотнище с нашим серпом и молотом.” 
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Tret’iakov’s sketch indeed plays such an affirmative role, and ends at the guardless Soviet 
embassy because this is the symbolic source of Tret’iakov’s superior, de-exoticized vision. 
Most studies of travel accounts emphasise the ethnocentrism that characterizes the genre. For 
example, according to Patrick Holland and Graham Huggan: “travel writing frequently 
provides an effective alibi for the perpetuation or reinstallment of ethnocentrically superior 
attitudes to ‘other’ cultures, peoples, and places.”394 Tret’iakov, we might say, replaces 
ethnocentrism with politico-centrism. His global map is defined not by cultural difference, 
but by socio-economic commonalities. Superiority in the metaphorical chronotope of 
“Beijing” is a matter simply of revolutionary seniority: the future radiates out from the Soviet 
centre that Tret’iakov’s all-seeing narrator moves towards. 
A similar unmasking of Beijing is performed in a short sketch by A. A. Ivin (Aleksei 
Alekseevich Ivanov), who taught with Tret’iakov on the faculty at Beijing University. Ivin, as 
mentioned in the Introduction, was one of the few Soviet writers involved in the 1920s drive 
to reimagine China who actually spoke and read Chinese. Attracted to anarchism as a young 
man, Ivin had gone to study in Paris in 1904, but returned to Russia to participate in the 1905 
revolution. Sentenced to four years of convict brigade labour for fighting in the streets, he 
returned to Paris in 1909, where he studied Chinese with Édouard Chavannes and Silvain 
Lévi. By 1917 Ivin was in Beijing, working at the Russian Orthodox Mission, when the 
revolution broke out. His support for the new Soviet government lost him his position at the 
Mission, but he eventually managed to get a job with the Journal de Pekin, where the editor's 
laziness allowed him to turn the paper into a pro-Soviet voice in Beijing. Around 1919 Ivin 
began teaching French at Beijing National University—exactly the time that this university 
was taking its place, in the wake of the May Fourth Movement, at the centre of radical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Spurr, Rhetoric of Empire, 16. 
 
394 Patrick Holland and Graham Huggan, Tourists with Typewriters: Critical Reflections on 
Contemporary Travel Writing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), viii. 
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thought on transforming China. While Li Dazhao was organizing the first Chinese study 
groups on Marx in his Beijing University office, Ivin was setting up the university’s first 
Russian section, which provided teaching posts for other Soviet intellectuals such as 
Tret’iakov and the Sinologist Boris Vasil’ev (the first translator of Lu Xun into Russian).395  
Tret’iakov encountered Ivin on his first visit to China in 1921, and later credited him 
with transforming his own vision of China: “A. Ivin, a veteran resident of Beijing, taught me 
to see China, laying it out before my maddened eyes carefully and tastefully, like a jeweller 
laying out precious stones.”396 Tret’iakov’s own writing on China is thus framed as an 
extension to his readership of an educational service that Ivin first rendered to him. Ivin 
published a large number of articles on China, including in Pravda, Prozhektor and Krasnaia 
nov’. Most of his output was in the objective-discursive vein, analyzing the current situation 
through a Marxist lens that focused in particular on the class complexities of semi-colonial 
China and the issues of the peasantry and land reform.397  
One rare excursion into travel narrative is the short sketch “Revolutionary Beijing” 
(“Revoliutsionnyi Pekin”), which first appeared in Prozhektor’s special issue on the Chinese 
revolution in March 1927. This publication date marks the high point of Soviet involvement 
in 1920s China, right before the fall of Shanghai to the GMD and subsequent purge of the 
Communists.398 Ivin, like Tret’iakov, opens with arrival, and presents Beijing from an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Nikoforov, Sovetskie istoriki, 144–6. 
 
396 Sergei Tret’iakov, Chzhungo, 2nd expanded edition (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1930), 339. “А. Ивин, 
старожилец-пекинец, темпераментнейший журналист, учил меня видеть Китай, раскладывая 
его перед моими ошалалыми глазами бережно и вкусно, как ювелир раскладывает каменья.” 
 
397 Many of these articles were collected into books released by the state publishing house: Kitai i 
Sovetskii Soiuz (1924), Pis’ma iz Kitaia (1927), Ot Khankou k Shankhaiu (1927), Ocherki 
partizanskogo dvizheniia, 1927–30 (1930); Bor’ba za vlast’ sovetov: ocherki sovetskogo dvizheniia v 
Kitae (1933). 
 
398 A. Ivin, “Revoluitsionnyi Pekin,” Prozhektor 5, 15 Маrch 1927, 18–19. Reprinted, as “Pekin,” in 
A. Ivin, Pis’ma iz Kitaia: ot Versal’skogo dogovora do sovetsko-kitaiskogo soglasheniia (Moskva: 
Moskovskii rabochii, 1927), 68. 
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external perspective as exotically distanced in time and space. “Before us is Beijing: those 
same cyclopic walls that surrounded the city many centuries ago surround it still,” he begins, 
comparing for elucidation the walls of Babylon in D. W. Griffith's 1916 film Intolerance.399 
Next Ivin moves, like Tret'iakov, to the vantage point of those walls. From here vision again 
tends towards distancing metaphors: Beijing now resembles a “garden in full bloom,” now a 
“sea of buildings” decorated with “fantastically curved roofs.”400 By the end of this first 
paragraph, these perspectives from outside and from above have drawn Ivin's observing 
subject out of contemporary reality into a realm of generalized Oriental fantasy: “it begins to 
seem that you have flown over the mountains and across the seas to be deposited by magic 
carpet in a fantastical land of fairy-tale.”401 Beijing is inscribed, on first encounter, into a 
generic vision of an ancient, quasi-mythical East, which the Russian traveller reaches after 
travelling some impossible distance from his home. 
 However, as the reader is ushered down from this external vantage point and into the 
city proper, the distanced image of a mythical eastern city is disrupted by a host of temporal 
contradictions that Ivin describes as a “hotchpotch of the centuries” (винегрет столетий). 
The ancient and the modern are revealed to exist here side by side: the automobiles of the 
rich speed past a caravan of camels on the sidewalk, aeroplanes fly overhead, and bicycles 
and rickshaws share the road with two-wheeled carts that survive from the time of Genghis 
Khan. In a mammoth third paragraph that stretches a single sentence across thirty-nine lines, 
Ivin portrays Beijing as the epitome of Trotsky’s uneven development, an explosively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Ibid., 18. “Перед нами Пекин: те же циклопические стены, что охраняли его много столетий 
назад, охраняют его и теперь, и если вам пришлось видеть в кинематографе «Intolérance» с 
импозантной инценировкой штурма стен вавилонских, то вы имеете некоторое представление 
о величественности пекинских стен, их колоссальных башнях-бойницах, их многочисленных 
гигантских воротах[.]” 
 
400 Ibid. “сплошным цветущим садом… море построек… причудливо-изогнутых крыш[.]” 
 
401 Ibid. “начинает казаться, что пролетели вы тридевять земель и тридевять морей, и опустил 
вас ковер-самолет в небывалую скaзочную страну.” 
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contradictory combination of ancient Asia and Europeanized modernity.402 The one-step and 
the foxtrot are danced in foreign hotels while hordes of chancrous beggars roam the streets; 
the complex traditional artform of Chinese theatre competes for attention with the brash new 
import of foreign cinema. Beijing now appears as “some kind of fantastical, monstrous blend 
of Europe and Asia”: the fantastic element endures, but  transposed now to a scarcely 
credible present.403 
 These are not unique observations: as S. A. Smith notes, Ivin's contemporary and 
Beijing University colleague Li Dazhao described Qianmen in 1918 as a similar space of 
temporal contradictions, where “all the things of the twentieth century alongside those from 
the before the fifteenth are brought together in one place.”404 Ivin’s innovation lies in the 
authority he ascribes to the Soviet Russian observer to decipher the “riddle” posed by the 
city’s inhabitants, briefly typified through a string of standard figures—monk-like students, 
philosopher-infants, fragile girl-children.405 This riddle, it transpires, turns not on strangeness 
but on similarity: 
This whole human anthill with its strange customs, understandings, beliefs and 
legends produces the impression of an unknown world that is at the same time 
mysteriously close to us, close to us Russians as to none of the Europeans. For 
despite all the dissimilitude, there is in this China something of Tatar, pre-Petrine 
Rus', of boyars' gowns, painted mansions and lubok garishness.406 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 “The development of historically backward nations leads necessarily to a peculiar combination of 
different stages in the historic process. Their development as a whole acquires a planless, complex, 
combined character.” Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, ch. 1, “Peculiarities of 
Russia’s Development.” http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/ch01.htm accessed 11.6.13. 
 
403 Ivin, “Revoliutsionnyi Pekin,” 18. “какая-то фантстически-уродливая смесь Европы и Азии[.]” 
 
404 Li Dazhao, Li Dazhao wenji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), vol. 1, 539. Quoted in S. A. 
Smith, Revolution and the People in Russia and China: A Comparative History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 18. 
 
405 Ivin, “Revoliutsionnyi Pekin,” 19. 
 
406 Ibid. My emphases. “весь этот человеческий муравейник с его странными обычаями, 
понятиями, верованиями и легендами производит впечатление неведомого и в то же время 
загадочно-близко нам мира, близкого нам, русским, как никому из европейцев. Ибо, несмотря 
на всю непохожесть, есть в этом Китае что-то от татарской, допетровской Руси, боярских 
охабней, расписных теремов и лубочной пестроты.” 
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This atmosphere of fantasy and fairy-tale recalls in Russian observers their own exoticized, 
“Oriental” past, as epitomized for Ivin by Ivan Iakovlevich Bilibin's famous fairytale 
illustrations. This aesthetic echo is replicated on the level of ideology with “Confucian 
conservatism itself, which so smacks of the firmness in faith of our doctrinarians.”407 It 
seems that Ivin here retools the ethnocentrism of colonial discourse for a revolutionary age, 
domesticating strange China as Russia's own past. China can be understood by Russians 
instinctively, on the basis of their own historical experience. 
What’s more, Ivin insists that “[t]his vague sense of proximity, kinship and similarity 
is mutual,” pointing to Chinese students’ enthusiasm for the works of historian Vasilii 
Osipovich Kliuchevskii (1841–1911) and his descriptions of old Russian life: “Listen to their 
commentaries,” he exhorts, “and you will be convinced that, despite all the differences, we 
have much in common, and not only in terms of historical experience, but also in our 
thoughts, our feelings, our worldview…”408 With Chinese students immersed in Kliuchevskii, 
the stage is set for the final phase of Ivin's transformation of China, as embodied in Beijing, 
from exotic other to mysterious twin. Further acquaintance with the younger Chinese 
generation, he suggests as he leads his reader into their university auditoriums, will reveal 
such traits as veneration of science, rejection of all authorities and traditions, and disputes in 
various “circles” (Marxist, anarchist, feminist) over the role of the intelligentsia and its 
relationship to politics. “[I]n a word, before your eyes spring back to life our eighteen forties, 
sixties, seventies, and nineties, the period of student demonstrations and the first protests by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Ibid. “даже самый конфуцианский консерватизм, так отдающий твердостью в вере наших 
начетчиков.” 
 
408 Ibid. “Послушайте их комментарии, и вы убедитесь, как, несмотря на все различия, много у 
нас общего, и не только в исторических переживаниях, но и в наших мыслях, наших чувствах, 
нашем миросозерцании…” Tret’iakov also reports a student interest in Kliuchevskii: Tret’iakov, 
Chzhungo (1927), 147. 
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the Russian workers.”409 If the traditional, archaic, Asiatic elements in China recall Russia's 
distant past, Ivin's reasoning runs, then the modern elements must recall the recent Russian 
past, the radical intelligentsia and the birth of the workers' movement. Harnessing the two 
countries together through a kind of aesthetic intuition, on the level of distant history, Ivin 
now extrapolates forward to a present moment when China, reacting against the same 
conservatism as did Russia, is growing towards the same revolution. China will overcome its 
exotic, Oriental-despotic past, as Russia has its own. 
 We are not there yet, however. All this is as yet in miniature (в миниатуре), indeed 
childish (по-детски): young China is still “on the school-benches” (на школьных скамьях), 
still at the stage of student demonstrations  and manifestos. But a description of one such 
demonstration suggests ancient Chinese decrepitude transformed by Soviet example into 
youthful, martial valour: “The impression is inescapable,” Ivin assures us, “that decrepit, 
captive China has sent forth its first brigade, sent its youth in search of the Promised Land, 
news of which sounds forth incessantly from the great Russian plain.”410 
This notion of Sino-Russian similarity is not unique to Ivin. As we saw in the 
Introduction and in Chapter One, many writers and thinkers suggested likenesses between 
these Eurasian agricultural autocracies. Earlier Russian travellers had also seen a past Russia 
in present China: Ivan Goncharov, stumbling upon a market on the outskirts of Shanghai in 
the 1850s, felt “that I had suddenly stumbled onto some bustling marketplace in our Moscow 
or a fair in some provincial capital far from Petersburg, where wide streets and shops have 
yet to be introduced…”411 Nor is Ivin unique in projecting a similar past into a similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 Ivin, “Revoliutsionnyi Pekin,” 19. 
 
410 Ibid, 20. “невольно кажется, что это дряхлый, плененный Китай выслал свой первый отряд, 
свою молодежь на поиски земли обетованной, весть о которой неумолчно звучит с великой 
русской равнины.” 
 
411 Ivan Goncharov, Fregat Pallada: Ocherki puteshestviia, 3rd edition (St Petersburg: Izd. Ivana 
Il’icha Glazunova, 1879), 2:144. “Мне показалось, что я вдруг очутился на каком-нибудь нашем 
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revolutionary future: the Russian radical Sinologist would surely have been aware that such 
comparisons of Russian and Chinese historical destiny were popular among his Chinese 
intellectual contemporaries in Beijing, including his university colleague and fellow Marxist 
revolutionary Li Dazhao.412 Ivin’s text, however, concentrates these notions of Sino-Russian 
similarity into a narrative shape that affirms the superiority of the Soviet gaze, and replaces 
exoticism with an affirmation of historical progress and messianic Russian seniority. The 
chronotope of arrival here takes on the metaphorical form of a temporal movement from 
difference to historical similarity, before accelerating in its conclusion towards revolutionary 
convergence. 
IV. Translation: The Sounds of China Through Soviet Ears 
We might say that Ivin’s sketch performs a kind of translation: beginning from 
difference, the penetrative movement into the city reveals commonalities that enable 
understanding through equivalence. China equals Russia of the recent past. Ivin was unusual 
among Soviet reporters of China in that he actually could perform the linguistic translations 
that we would assume to be necessary for understanding a foreign cultural world. For most 
Soviet reporters in China, linguistic and cultural difference represented a serious obstacle to 
understanding. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
московском толкучем рынке или на ярмарке губернского города, вдалеке от Петербурга, где 
еще не завелись ни широкие улицы, ни магазины[.]” 
 
412 Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 47–61. Meisner notes that Li was close to the Soviet ambassador Lev 
Mikhailovich Karakhan, and indeed lived in hiding at the Soviet embassy for several months in 1926 
before being captured in a raid on the embassy by Zhang Zuolin’s troops, and subsequently executed 
(ibid., 236, 247). When the journalist Aleksandr Lebedenko arrived in Beijing with the Great Flight in 
1925, he found Ivin working at the Soviet embassy. See A. Lebedenko, Kak ia letal v Kitai (Moskva: 
Gos. izd., 1928), 144. It seems likely that Li and Ivin would have known one another: indeed, Ah 
Xiang lists Ivin as one of the go-betweens that first introduced the Comintern agent Grigorii 
Voitinskii to Li in 1920. (Ah Xiang, “USSR / Comintern Alliance with the KMT & the CCP,” 
http://www.republicanchina.org/USSR-Comintern-KMT-CCP.pdf, accesssed 11.7.13.) 
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The Chinese language posed a formidable barrier; but auditory impenetrability 
extended beyond the verbal sphere. In particular, Soviet ear-witnesses inherited the long-
standing European attitude towards Chinese music as inaccessible and incomprehensible. 
Many Soviet accounts of the period include a mandatory visit to a Chinese theatre, which 
typically becomes the occasion to reflect on the strange and alienating sounds of the music 
accompanying theatrical performances. Galina Serebriakova, in her Sketches of China 
(Zarisovki Kitaia, 1927), describes “several instruments issuing sounds unusual to the ear of a 
foreigner: a gong, a wooden flapper, flutes and a one-stringed violin. At first Chinese music 
deafens with its unaccustomed idiosyncracy.”413 Zinaida Rikhter, arriving in the China with 
the Great Flight aviation expedition of 1925, states plainly: “The most powerful hurricane 
could not compare with the frenzied noise made by a Chinese orchestra.” 414 Leonid 
Ierokhonov, who wrote the screenplay for the 1929 film The Blue Express (Goluboi 
ekspress—a revolutionary melodrama, based on an earlier script by Tret’iakov, that depicted 
an uprising on a Chinese train), was so affected by the “nightmarish, wild music” emitted by 
the Chinese theatrical orchestra that, walking home after a performance, even the cool 
southern night air could not relieve “the headache induced by the ‘musicality’ of Chinese 
theatre.”415  
Tret’iakov agreed that the music of the Chinese theatrical orchestra “shocks and 
deafens a European to the point of headache,” but tied his aesthetic conclusions to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 “Несколько издающих непривычные для уха иностранца звуки инструментов: гонг, 
деревянная колотушка, флейты и однострунная скрипка. В первый момент китaйская музыка 
оглушает непривычным своеобразием.” Galina Serebriakova, Zarisovki Kitaia (Moscow: Ogonek, 
1927), 19.  
 
414 “Сaмый сильный ураган не может сравниться с бешеным шумом, который производит 
китайский оркестр.” Zinaida Rikhter, 7000 kilometrov po vozdukhu: Moskva—Mongoliia—Kitai 
(Moscow: Avioizdatel’stvo, 1926), 126.  
 
415 “кошмарная дикая музыка... Прохладный воздух, мягкая южная ночь не избавили меня от 
головной боли, вызванной ‘музыкальностью’ китайского театра.” Leonid Ierokhonov, “Oshibka” 
pekinskoi tiurmy (Moscow: Doloi negramatnosti, 1927), 107, 111.  
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ideological critique.416 Chinese theatre, for Tret’iakov, occupied the socially central position 
held in the West by religious cult: an aesthetic narcotic that prevented its pacified spectators 
from perceiving the true nature of their social relations.417 As the mouthpiece of medieval 
morality, promoting the ideology of the patriarchal family and the guild, traditional Chinese 
theatre was for Tret’iakov a major obstacle to progressive social change.418  
 In place, then, of this alienating musical form, with its suspicious class connections, 
Soviet ear-witnesses focused on sounds from the economic sphere of daily life. Serebriakova, 
alienated by the music in the theatre, finds an “incomparable symphony” in the “so-called 
sound signs” used by traders and craftsmen on the streets of Beijing. Here the “tender 
melodic strain” of the fruit-seller interrupts the “hiss” (“shipenie”) of the water-seller, and the 
extended groans of a toy merchant are drowned out by the barber's click-clacking 
(“treshchotka”).419 Tret'iakov was also drawn to these “sound-signs” when he first visited 
China in 1921, passing through Tianjin, Beijing and Harbin on his flight from White-held 
Vladivostok to Red Chita. Summarizing that trip retrospectively, Tret’iakov describes his 
first impressions as “overwhelming, but processed above all from an exotic perspective.”420 
First on the list of these preliminary, exotic impressions is a sonic motif: the “mournful, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Sergei Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1927), 86. “Европейца этот оркестр 
потрясает и оглушает до головной боли[.]” 
 
417 Ibid. 77. 
 
418 Ibid. 82. Tret’iakov’s expressed views on Chinese theatre were to change considerably by the time 
of Mei Lanfang’s visit to Moscow in 1935. See Epilogue. 
 
419 “Нежный мелодический напев фруктовщика прорезывает шипение водовоза, продавец 
игрушек, несущий свой товар в ведрах, на коромысле, протяжно стонет, заглушаемый 
трещеткой парикмахера.” Serebriakova, Zarisovki Kitaia, 5. 
 
420 “Первые впечатления были потрясающие, но воспринимались главным образом своей 
экзотической стороной.” Sergei Tret’iakov, “Rychi, Kitai!,” in Chzhungo, 2nd expanded edition 
(Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1930), 339. 
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completely incomprehensible cries of the peddlers[.]”421 Tret’iakov’s attention in the Chinese 
context seems to have been drawn to sound from the beginning; indeed, in their analysis of 
the poem “Night. Beijing” (Ночь. Пекин), written by Tret’iakov after this first visit, Aleksei 
Kosykh and Pavel Arsen’ev detect a distinct primacy of acoustic over visual images.422 
When Tret’iakov returned to Beijing in 1924, to spend 18 months teaching Russian at 
Beijing University, he determined to replace these exotic impressions with a more authentic, 
documentary perspective on China. This longer stay allowed him more time, he notes, to 
observe and overhear the mundane details of everyday life. What he discovered was the 
ubiquitous and invulnerable abuse of the Chinese by foreigners, which began in turn to inflect 
the same soundscape with new meanings: “These stories and observations brought me to such 
a point of rage that the voice of an elemental, vengeful, righteous, inevitable rebellion, in the 
manner of the Boxer Uprising, began to whisper to me in every sound of the street, in every 
street vendor's melody.”423 This transformation of Beijing’s street sounds from the objects of 
ethnographic or simply exotic curiosity into the sounds of a fervently desired uprising is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 “Тогда в первую очередь воспринимались заунывные, совершенно непонятные запевки 
разносчиков[.]” Tret’iakov, Chzhungo, 339. 
 
422 Kosykh, Aleksei, and Pavel Arsen’ev. “Kitaiskoe puteshestvie S. Tret’iakova: poeticheskii zakhvat 
deistvitel’nosti na puti k literature fakta,” Translit, 10–11 (2012): 17–19. Kosykh and Arsen’ev also 
note that Tret’iakov was, according to his own daughter, musically talented, with perfect pitch and a 
piano-playing ability that was admired by Scriabin. They further add that other early twentieth-
century researchers were similarly attracted to the sound-scapes of foreign street life, citing in 
particular the linguist Evgenii Polivanov in Japan and the ethnologist Petr Bogatyrev in central 
Europe. (Ibid., 18.) Such audial street signs belonged also to the domestic exotic of a Russian past 
being lost to modernization: as Richard Taruskin notes, the orchestral introduction to Igor 
Stravinsky’s Petrushka (1911) is based in part on traditional Russian street-hawkers’ cries. Richard 
Taruskin, “Stravinsky’s Petrushka,” in Petrushka: Sources and Contexts, ed. Andrew Wachtel 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 70–71. 
 
423 “Эти рассказы и наблюдения довели меня до такой степени возмущения, что голос 
стихийного мстительного, праведного, неизбежного бунта, подобного боксерскому восстанию, 
стал мне чудиться в каждом уличном шуме, в каждой мелодии уличного продавца.” Tret’iakov, 
Chzhungo, 345. 
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described and re-enacted in the poem “Roar China” (“Rychi Kitai”), precisely dated and 
located: “Beijing, 20 March 1924.”424  
“Roar China” stands on the border between Tret’iakov’s Futurist poetic phase and his 
later advocacy of the literature of fact. Presented as an almost gramophonic recording of 
authentic Chinese reality, it also expresses an interest in the poetic capture of trans-linguistic 
sound that connects to Futurist investigations into zaum:  “trans-sense” or “trans-rational” 
language. Velimir Khlebnikov theorized zaum as the foundation for a world language of the 
future, based on his purported rediscovery—largely from Russian examples—of the universal 
kinetic significations of phonemes.425 Aleksei Kruchenykh argued that the absence in this 
language of a defined meaning locked within a specific cultural system enabled zaum to 
entertain trans-national, global ambitions: “Zaum is the most universal art, even though its 
origins and originary character may be national. For example: Hurrah, Evan-evoe! etc. Zaum 
creations can provide a global poetic language that is born organically, not artificially like 
Esperanto.”426 Like the Georgian poet Aleksandr Chachikov, who experimented at this same 
time with the introduction of foreign words into Russian poetry, Tret’iakov explores the 
implications of Futurist zaum for political internationalism: can a trans-cultural poetic 
language be found to communicate within the new global community of the world 
proletariat?427  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Rychi Kitai,” Lef 1 (5), 1924, 23–32. 
 
425 For Khlebnikov’s programmatic theoretical statements, see “Khudozhniki mira” and “Nashа 
osnovа,” both written in 1919. Translated as “Artists of the World!” and “Our Fundamentals,” in 
Khlebnikov, Collected Works, 1:364–70, 376–392. 
 
426 “Заумь – самое всеобщее искусство, хотя происхождение и первоначальный характер его 
могут быть национальными, например: Ура, Эван–эвое! и др. Заумные творения могут дать 
всемирный поэтический язык, рожденный органически, а не искусственно, как эсперанто.” 
Aleksei Kruchenykh, “Deklaratsiia zaumnogo slova,” 1921, accessed online on March 31, 2014: 
http://hylaea.ru/kruch_publ_1.html.  
 
427 The comparison between Tret’iakov and Chachikov is made by Tat’iana Nikol’skaia, “Aleksandr 
Chachikov, Sergei Tret’iakov i Vostok,” in Avangard i ideologiia (Belgrade: Izd-vo filologicheskogo 
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Tret’iakov’s poem moves its ear away from the theatre and towards the street, 
investigating the division of labour in contemporary Beijing. Nine of the poem’s 14 sections 
describe a particular occupation: peasant, rickshaw driver, knife-grinder, load-carrier, 
manure-carrier, water-carrier, fruit-seller, barber, and student. In an afterword appended to 
the first publication of “Roar China,” Tret’iakov explains the aesthetic technique of the poem 
as an attempt to capture the “sound signs” that had attracted his own and Serebriakova’s 
attention: “The basic core of the poem is constructed around the “sound signs” of the 
wandering street craftsmen and traders of Beijing: these are either cries, or sounds emitted by 
various instruments.”428 Some of these sounds are reproduced phonetically: the water-
carrier’s cart goes “vzhi—zzi; vzhi—zzi” (вжи — ззи; вжи — ззи), while a device similar to 
a tuning fork announces the barber and his trade: “Dzzzzyi / I shave / Dzzzzyi / I trim” 
(Дззззый / Брею / Дззззый / Стригу).429 Elsewhere the sound is implied in the poem's verbal 
structure. The repetition of the verb “точу” (tochu, I grind, I sharpen) in the section devoted 
to the knife-grinder (точильщик) begins to sound like the militaristic trumpet blast with 
which, according to the post-script, he announces his presence.430 For the fruit-seller, the 
post-script provides the rhythmical notation that supposedly corresponds both to the rhythm 
he beats out on his stick-mounted drum, and to the rhythm that organizes his section of the 
poem.431  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fakul’teta v Belgrade, 2009), 315–321. See also Tat’iana Nikol’skaia and Tat’iana Vinogradova, 
“Kitaiskaia zaum’ Aleksandra Chachikova,” in Vestnik vostochnogo instituta, 2001, 1 (13), vol. 7, 
19–23. 
 
428 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Rychi Kitai,” Lef 1 (5), 1924, 33. “Основная гуща поэмы построена на 
«звуковых вывесках» уличных бродячих ремесленников и торговцев Пекина — это либо 
выкрики, либо звуки, издаваемые разными инструментами.” 
 
429 Ibid., 29, 30. 
 
430 Ibid., 27. 
 
431 Ibid., 33. 
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Whether or not we consider Tret'iakov's attempt to reproduce street sounds through 
poetry a success, we must note that the method itself, as explained to the reader in the 
appendix, claims to capture actual auditory experience. In the “Beijing” sketch, Tret’iakov 
describes how the sounds were recorded: On the first days after my arrival in Beijing, sitting 
on the second floor above the hutong, I would write down on notepaper the musical phrases 
arising beneath my window. Soon I could tell the time of day from the first notes of a tune, 
and then learned to recognize the product or trade that the tune proclaimed.”432 This emphasis 
on recording connects “Roar China” to the nascent documentary project of the literature of 
fact, claiming an indexical reference to objective events in external reality. Even the poem’s 
most conspicuously narrative moment—the violent expulsion of a Chinese student from a 
restaurant dining car by a French major—is confirmed in the post-script as a verifiable, 
factual occurrence for which Tret'iakov claims a reliable source.433 This documentary act of 
recording enables a greater understanding of the Chinese social world: Tret’iakov begins to 
understand the significations of these sounds, revealing their functional social meanings in 
the world of the Beijing streets.  
Once this social function is established, however, Tret’iakov performs a second 
interpretative move that claims to unearth the true meaning concealed behind this apparent, 
economic meaning. Each verse on a different tradesman begins with a description of their 
activity, vivified by their distinctive sound, but progresses in every case to conclude with the 
same political message: the hatred of the Chinese workers for the foreign imperialists who 
dominate and exploit their economic system will lead eventually to violent rebellion. What 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Tret'iakov, Chzhungo (1927), 40. “Первые дни по приезде в Пекин, сидя во втором этаже 
европейского дома над хутунгом, я записывал на лист нотной бумаги музыкаьные фразы, 
возникавшие под окном. Вскоре по раздавшейся запевке я смог определить, который час, а 
потом научиться узнавать товар или труд, о котором кричит запевка.” 
 
433 “Случай со студентом в вагон-ресторане—факт, рассказанный мне дипкурьером.” 
Tret’iakov, “Rychi Kitai,” 33. 
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Tret'iakov's post-script presents as an objective recording of experience in the present in fact 
builds in every case into a prophecy of uprising in the future. 
For example, the section on the water-carrier (Водовоз), opening with the 
aforementioned sound of the cart (“vzhi—zzi; vzhi—zzi”), moves next to a description of 
typical activity in which the sounds associated with the cart (v, zh, i and z) are echoed in such 
verbs as “vezu” and “vizzhit”: 
Воду, воду 
Вези, вези. 





[Water, water / Bring, bring. / Shoulders to the chain. — / Sing, cart! / I bring the water 
trough. / The water trough screeches.] 
 
As the poem progresses, the emphasis moves to the difficulty of the work, rather than simply 
its regularity or typicality: 
 Воду везу. Воду везу. 
 Плечи калечит цепь, цепь. 
 Визжит на мясе звеньями зуд. 
 Пилит пыль — морщь на лице. 
 
[I bring water. I bring water. / Shoulders maimed by the chain, the chain. / Scratch 
screeches its links in flesh. /  Dust saws a furrow in a face.] 
 
Here the screech of the cart (“viz-zhit”) becomes the screech of its chain digging into the 
water-carrier’s body. This mutilating physical labour is juxtaposed to the leisurely existence 
of Europeans: “У белых, у белых сквозные шляпки. / У белых, у белых — белые лапки” 
(The whites, the whites have ventilated hats. / The whites, the whites have white paws). 
These contradictions climax in a fantasy of violent vengeance: 
 В лоханьях пятнадцать пудов воды. 
 В ней тебя и твою утоплю. 
 Белым лицом рвану по грязи. 
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434 Ibid., 29. Subsequent quotations from this section of the poem are all from the same page. 
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 Вжи — ззи. 
 
[There are fifteen poods of water in these tubs. / I will drown you and your woman in 
it. / I will grind your white face in the dirt. / Scree—chee. / Scree—chee.] 
 
The screeching sound of the cart, “vzhi-zzi,” which once carried the neutral socioeconomic 
function of advertising water, migrates to signify first oppressive labour and then violent 
uprising, the sound of a hated face ground into the dirt.  
Every section on an individual trade follows a similar pattern: from typical activity, 
through a sense of hardship, to the turning of the tools of that trade against the European 
imperialists. The manure-carrier throws the European into his excrement-filled basket; the 
barber offers to slit the collective throats of the Diplomatic Quarter. The knife-grinder’s 
sharpened tools become potential weapons: “Кто злобой гружен — / Ставь красную точку 
/ Моим ножом” (Whoever is burdened with malice — / make a red dot / with my knife), he 
declares, turning his neutral trade into a weapon of violence. Next the verb “tochu,” equated 
through repetition with the knife-grinder’s trumpet blast, but now linked sonically to the 
blood-red tochka (dot) pierced by the sharpened knife, splits into two discrete sounds, “To — 
/ Chu!” (То — / — Чу!): closer to distinct notes, but also to the one-two thrust of a knife 
pushed into a body. The common denominator of all these typified Chinese labourers and 
craftsmen, despite the differences in occupation, is their readiness to overthrow foreign 
dominance with a graphically expressed violence.  
 Tret’iakov’s poem engages two different forms of translation, and its ideological 
message demands the subjugation of the first to the second. The first translation move is, to 
use Roman Jakobson’s terminology, “intersemiotic.” Tret’iakov learns, for example, to 
translate the non-linguistic audial sign of the water-seller’s cart (vzhi-zzi) as a linguistic 
message: “I bring drinking water” (Везу водопой).435 In this inter-semiotic act of translation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Roman Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation,” in The Translation Studies Reader, ed. 
Lawrence Venuti (London: Routledge, 2000), 114. Jakobson in fact defines intersemiotic translation 
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however, we remain entirely within the signifying terms of Beijing street culture: the sounds 
mean what they mean to inhabitants of that social milieu. Next, however, Tret’iakov 
performs an interpretative move that is closer to Jakobson’s interlingual translation: he 
asserts the true meaning of these signs by exporting them out of their native cultural 
environment and importing them into the theoretical discourse of world revolution that he has 
brought with him from Moscow.436 These streets sounds do not for Tret’iakov signify a static, 
functioning socio-economic system; they are revalorized to signify a society that is on the 
verge of erupting into violent revolution because of the contradictions produced by foreign 
colonial domination.  
Indeed, the poem-cycle as a whole follows this movement from economic description 
to revolutionary prescription. The first poem, “Walls” (Стены), presents the seemingly 
eternal processes of agriculture, observed we may assume from Tret'iakov's train as it enters 
China: “Жирный лесс / Родит рис. / Водоемных колес / Взмах вверх, / Взмах вниз. / И 
зеленый рисовый мех / Рaстет.” (Bloated loess / bears rice. Water wheels / Swing up, / 
Swing down. / And the green rice fur / Grows.)437 By contrast, the final poem, prophetically 
entitled “I Know” (Знаю), is fully invested in accelerating historical time, confidently 
predicting a future mass uprising:  
 Миллионы храбрых 
 Несущих штыки и гнев 
 Шагнут от текстильных фабрик 
 И сталелитейных огней. 
 И станет труду иная цена. 
 Не коппер, а Крaсный 
      Интернационал.438 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or “transmutation” in the reverse direction, as a verbal sign interpreted by a sign from a nonverbal 
sign system. In the Beijing streets, Tret’iakov finds an intersemiotic system operating effectively in 
the opposite direction, wherein nonverbal sound signs have become functionally attached to fixed 




437 Tret’iakov, “Rychi, Kitai,” 23. 
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[Millions of brave people / Bearing bayonets and rage / Will step forth from the 
textile factories / And the steel-forging fires. / And labour will gain a new value. / Not 
a copper coin, but the Red International.] 
 
Again, the chronotope of arrival is used to suggest Tret’iakov’s movement from ignorance to 
understanding, as well as a historical movement from unconscious to conscious labour. As 
the first-person nature of this concluding prophecy (“I know”) suggests, it is through the 
interpretative subjectivity of Tret'iakov the observer-narrator that this movement from 
experience to political prophecy is enabled. Tret’iakov’s presence and interpretative activity 
are necessary for this prophecy to be made, for the old value of labour to be converted into its 
future, revolutionary value.  
This transformation is demanded in sonic terms by the poem's imperative title: the 
everyday sounds of the accepted socioeconomic order are to be replaced by the conscious 
roar of revolution. But the verb rychat’ (“roar”) appears only in the title, never in the text. 
The closest we get is orat’ (“yell,” “bellow”), and its subject is Tret’iakov himself:  
Это я в квартальный уют  
От лица китайцев пою. 
Это я в арсеналью дыру 
От лица китайцев ору. 
В обмен на тысячи плюх 
Жадным зубом пера скриплю.439 
 
[It is I in the comfort of the Quarter / Singing on behalf of the Chinese. / It is I in this 
armoured hole / Yelling on behalf of the Chinese. In exchange for a thousand thwacks 
/ I scratch with the greedy tooth of my pen.]  
 
Here we find again the distinctive positionality of the Soviet eyewitness reporter, the 
privileged location from which he speaks. Tret’iakov’s poetic voice is located within the 
Diplomatic Quarter, the “arsenal” of dynamite at the heart of Beijing that, in the preceding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Ibid., 32.  
 
439 Tret’iakov, “Rychi Kitai,” 26. 
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section, snatches bread from China's mouth with its teeth-like walls.440 Embedded at the 
centre of foreign, imperial power in China, Tret’iakov claims the right to roar on behalf of the 
laborers oppressed by that power—literally “from the face of” (ot litsa), as if Tret’iakov has 
donned a Chinese mask. The poem’s imperative title demands that China roar, but thereby 
admits that China is not roaring yet: for now, Tret’iakov must roar on China’s behalf.441 
Tret'iakov claims this apparently contradictory position as the source of his authority: granted 
access to the European enclave, his sympathies and duties lie with the Chinese, and thus he 
sees both perspectives in a way that neither side can. Donning his Chinese mask, Tret’iakov 
sings Beijing’s street sounds in a new key, inspiring his Soviet readers to hear, not see, 
China, and embrace his ventriloquistic fantasy of violent uprising. 
 The methods of communication particular to Chinese culture are hereby transcended 
by a universal semiotics founded on revolutionary enthusiasm. Daniel Collins has interpreted 
this revolutionary enthusiasm (entuziazm) as an early Soviet reformulation of the Pentecostal 
concept of the Holy Spirit, a divine force that could reverse the separation of tongues enacted 
at the fall of the tower of Babel. “With the advent of the spirit of labor,” Collins writes, “the 
proletariat could fuse heaven and earth and build god-mankind without suffering the discord 
of a Confusion of Tongues. Enthusiasm would guarantee universal understanding regardless 
of language.”442 Scenes where linguistic and cultural difference are transcended by 
revolutionary enthusiasm are frequently encountered in Soviet culture of this period, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Ibid., 25. The image of a wall as having teeth originates at the beginning of the first section, where 
we might assume, if this section describes an arrival, that it refers to the Great Wall. 
 
441 As Xiaobing Tang has shown, Tret’iakov’s phrase did in fact cause reverberations within Chinese 
art and culture, most famously providing the title for Li Hua’s 1935 woodcut. Indeed, Tang argues 
that the phrase’s trajectory suggests that the “explosive potential of aurality” may debunk “the myth 
of seamless scopic regimes in modern life,” since “in comparison to a visual experience, an aural one 
may be even more immediate, more compelling, and more monumental.” Xiaobing Tang, “Echoes of 
Roar, China! On Vision and Voice in Modern Chinese Art,” positions: east asia cultures critique, 
Vol. 14, 2 (Fall 2006): 482–3. 
 
442 Collins, “Tower of Babel,” 428. 
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especially in locations on the eastern margins of the Soviet space. As noted in the previous 
chapter, Vsevolod Ivanov's Armoured Train 14-69 contains a scene in which a captured 
American soldier, lacking any knowledge of Rusian, responds to the word “Lenin” with the 
joyous exhortation “There's a chap!”443 A similar scene can be found in Vsevolod Pudovkin's 
film The Descendent of Genghis Khan (Potomok Chinghiz-Khana, 1928—released in the 
West as Storm over Asia), when a Mongolian trapper under interrogation by British officers 
smiles warmly in reaction to the world “Moscow.”444  
A replaying of this scene in revolutionary China can be found in the Chinese Diaries of 
Nikolai Kostarev, which went through five editions between 1929 and 1935. Kostarev, who 
had fought in the First World War and commanded Red Guard units during the Russian Civil 
War, spent nine months embedded with Guomindang troops in 1926–7 as a correspondent 
for Rabochaia gazeta.445 A chapter entitled “After John Reed” (Глава по Джону Риду) 
describes an experience in Shanghai that echoes a scene in the American journalist’s Ten 
Days that Shook the World. In the original version, Reed and his companions are wandering 
through the Winter Palace, shortly after the October Revolution, and are challenged by 
soldiers who suspect them of being looters. The documents they offer up are at first no use as 
proof of identity, because the soldier who takes them is illiterate. Just as the situation appears 
to be becoming dangerous, however, Reed and his friends are saved by the intervention of an 
officer with superior linguistic skills, who vouches for the “foreign comrades from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Ivanov, “Bronepoezd 14-69,” in Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh (Moscow: isd-vo 
“Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 1968), 2: 81. 
 
444 Julian Graffy, “The Foreigner’s Journey to Consciousness in Early Soviet 
Cinema: The Case of Protazanov’s Tommi,” in Insiders and Outsiders in Russian Cinema, ed. 
Stephen M. Norris and Zara M. Torlone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 6.  
 
445 Biographical information taken from Nikolai Kostarev, “Moia biografiia,” dated 10 December 
1931, RGALI f. 1624 op. 1 d. 102. One of Kostarev's Civil War comrades was Vasilii Bliukher, 
subsequently the Comintern military advisor at the GMD's Whampoa academy. Moi kitaiskie dnevniki 
is dedicted to Bliukher. 
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America.”446 Kostarev’s deliberate use of the parallel indicates that he, like Ivin, wants his 
readers to see China as replaying the recent revolutionary stages of Russia.  
 In Kostarev’s version, he ventures alone out of Shanghai’s foreign settlement during 
the tumult of March 1927, and is swiftly arrested by Guomindang troops. Kostarev’s 
attempts to explain his special correspondent status are to no effect, and he is soon plunged 
into gloomy reflections on “the secret laws of nature which have produced such a variety of 
races and skin colours, and such total sonic exclusivity in language: each people has its 
own.”447 Determined not to succumb to this lamentable natural curse, Kostarev compensates 
for his limited capacities at interlinguistic translation by resorting to intersemiotic translation, 
introducing a multiplicity of other signifying practices: 
I quickly drew a hammer and sickle in my notebook. Underneath them I wrote, in 
English, “Moscow.” I pointed with my finger to the emblem, and then to myself, 
saying: — I ge yang! [footnote: The same.] 
The Chinese smiled. He quickly doffed his cap to me in a friendly manner and 
moved on, increasing the pace.448  
 
In his determination to be understood, Kostarev identifies himself with two signs which are 
themselves presented as equivalent: the visual image of the hammer and sickle, a trans-
linguistic symbol of world revolution; and the sign “Moscow” written in English, which 
ironically identifies the Russian capital as the global centre of revolution in the language of 
its most prominent political adversaries. The semiotic identity of these different objects is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, accessed online on February 23, 2012: 
http://www.archive.org/stream/tendaysthatshook03076gut/10daz10.txt. 
 
447 Nikolai Kostarev, Moi kitaiskie dnevniki (Moscow: gos. izv-vo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1931), 
27–8. “Я грустно молчал и думал о трагедии немого среди говорящих людей; о таинственных 
законах природы, породивших такое разнообразие рас, цвета кожи и такое совершенно 
исключительное звучание языка: у каждого народа — свое.” 
 
448 Ibid., 28. “Я быстро в блок-ноте нарисовал серп и молот. Под ними я написал по-английски 
— Москва. Я показал пальцем на эмблему, а потом на себя и сказал: 
— Ига-ян! [footnote: Все равно.] 
Китаец улыбнулся. Быстро и дружелюбно закивал мне шляпой и двинулся дальше, ускоряя 
шаги.” 
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asserted by more signs: the indexical gesture of pointing, and a simple phrase in Chinese (yi 
ge yang, the same). Furthermore, the Chinese man’s signs in reply are invested by Kostarev 
with implied meaning. The smile, the “friendly” doffing of the cap: all these imply that 
Kostarev’s escort has understood the message and accepts that Kostarev can be identified 
with internationalist revolution. In transcending the Babelian separation of languages, 
Kostarev's inter-semiotic gesture places the hammer and sickle in a privileged position 
within this set of internationally valent signs.  
Once they reach the army headquarters, Kostarev's escort repeats the sign of the 
hammer and sickle as equivalent to Kostarev by drawing it onto the palm of his hand. 
Kostarev nods, confirming his equivalence with the sign.449 Not everyone is convinced, 
however: Kostarev overhears the word “imperialist” (in what language, it is unclear). 
Meanwhile Kostarev’s observations are continuing the domestication announced by his 
chapter title, as he senses himself transported backwards in time and space: “unexpectedly, 
by some wonderous jolt of history, I had been thrown back into our 1918. I was in a Red 
Guard base.”450 A threatening man decked out with grenades and a machine-gun ribbon 
becomes “our Krondstadt sailor… this was a Chinese Red Guard from Piter.”451 History is 
replaying itself, in a way only the Soviet reporter can see. While Kostarev drifts into the 
recent Russian past, someone is found who knows him from the international settlement, and 
the situation is defused. 
In the episode's final scene, the game of signs is played out once more. Kostarev says 
goodbye to his acquaintance, and asks him his name. But the pronounced name is no good to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 Kostarev, Kitaiskie dnevniki, 29. 
 
450 Ibid., 30. “неожиданно, каким-то изумительным толчком истории, я был переброшен в наш 
восемнадцатый год. Я находился в красногвардейском штабе.” 
 
451 Ibid., 30–31. “наш кронштадтский матрос […] это был китаец — питерский красногвардеец.” 
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Kostarev; he takes out his notebook, and insists that his friend write down the name, in 
Chinese.  
He wrote it down. 
By chance, he opened the notebook at the very place where I had drawn the hammer 
and sickle.  
Underneath then he “drew” his surname. 
That notebook is lying beside me now, and I gaze at those squiggles, so dear to me 
now. 
I said goodbye to him, a great, good friend.452 
 
These “squiggles” are still incomprehensible to Kostarev at the intralinguistic or 
interlinguistic levels, in terms of the etymological composition of the character or the 
phoneme to which it is connected; but they are no longer meaningless. This is the model of 
international communication and friendship that Kostarev offers us: mutual incomprehension 
is averted by anchoring the discourse around the fixed sign that is the hammer and sickle. We, 
the readers, never learn the friend's name, as we might traditionally understand it: we do not 
see its character or receive a written rendition of its phonetic composition. But its connection 
to the international sign is enough to ensure his identity.  
Indeed, if we refer back to the earlier passage in which Kostarev first draws the 
symbol, it appears that his friend has written over Moscow-in-English, or at least, written in 
the space where it used to be. This also means, according to the logic of Kostarev's semiotic 
equation (yi ge yang!), that his name means the same as Kostarev. In this sense, these “dear 
squiggles” now have a meaning that transcends their function within the Chinese language, 
even we might say within the Chinese cultural system as a whole. Attachment to the hammer 
and sickle has brought them into a whole new semiotic configuration where they mean the 
same thing as Moscow, and as Kostarev: they have entered a semiotic regime where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Ibid., 34. “Он написал. Он случайно открыл блок-нот в том месте, где я нарисовал серп и 
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everything is, at its most radical, either identical with the hammer and sickle or excluded 
entirely. 
Kostarev, then, identifies the problem of inter-cultural communication only to 
demonstrate, in its overcoming, the semiotic power of the symbols of the Russian revolution, 
which are hereby shown to have attained truly global significance. Revolutionary sentiment 
transcends linguistic and cultural barriers. In a similar vein, when Aleksandr Lebedenko 
arrives in Beijing with the Great Flight of 1925, the sheer enthusiasm of the crowds that 
greet the Soviet aviators overcomes the fact that they do not understand the actual words they 
are using:  “They shouted out something in unison in Chinese, and we understood that this 
was a greeting to us. From their eyes and flushed faces we saw that this entire meeting was 
truly genuine and not simply the traditional politeness.”453 Lebedenko and his companions 
can read the meanings these Chinese students intend from the appearance of their faces; 
language is superfluous. Lebedenko and Kostarev extend Collins' Soviet Pentecost into 
China, as the spirit and symbols of the revolution affirm their power to overcome linguistic 
difference. For a more ambiguous approach to Babel's overcoming, we must turn to our final 
China report, Boris Pil'niak's Chinese Story. 
V. Boris Pil'niak's Chinese Story: Communication, Solipsism, Nostalgia 
When we turn to Boris Pil'niak, we must first acknowledge that we are dealing with a 
relationship to Soviet political power of a very different order. Tret'iakov was a committed 
Communist who unambiguously identified himself as an emissary of the Soviet state in his 
sketches. Indeed, his entire artistic project within LEF can be read as an attempt to re-
orientate the functioning of artistic production in such a way that it might serve the same 
ends as revolutionary politics: the transformation of social life in an industrialized, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Lebedenko, Kak ia letal v Kitai, 128. (My emphases.) “Они что-то выкрикивали хором на 
китайском языке, и мы понимали, что это тоже приветствие нам. По глазам и раскрасневшимся 
лицам мы видели, что вся эта встреча действительно искреняя и не является простой обычной 
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mechanized age. The other reporters on China we have mentioned—Tarkhanov/Erdberg, 
Ivin, Kostarev—were all agents or close allies of the Comintern’s mission in China. 
Pil'niak, by contrast, was the first name on Trotsky's list of poputchiki, or “fellow-
travellers”: writers whose “transitional” works were “organically connected” to the 
revolution without grasping its true, proletarian character.454 Trotsky argued that the 
revolution as it appeared in Pil’niak’s novel The Naked Year, the work that made the writer’s 
reputation, was an elemental, rural, national phenomenon, incompatible with the urban, 
proletarian, industrial, and ultimately global vision endorsed by the Bolsheviks. Moreover, 
Pil’niak had an awkward tendency to assert that art need follow no political master.455 
During his trip to the Far East in 1926, a scandal erupted back in Moscow around his “Tale 
of the Unextinguished Moon,” which dramatized the death of Mikhail Vasil’evich Frunze 
and pointed to the complicity of a thinly disguised Stalin. This scandal began Pil'niak's fall 
from political grace, which ended with his arrest in 1937 and subsequent execution.456 
In early 1926, however, Pil'niak was President of the Moscow branch of the All-
Russian Writers’ Union, and one of the USSR’s most prominent and popular writers.457 
Pil’niak was also known as a writer who travelled: in recent years he had visited England, 
Germany, Palestine, and Spitsbergen, and spent a month in 1925 flying round central 
European Russia in an aeroplane. These experiences produced a series of publications that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution, ch. 2, “The Literary Fellow-Travellers of the 
Revolution,” http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/lit_revo/ch02.htm accessed 2.23.12. 
 
455 On Pil’niak’s apolitizm see Browning, Boris Pil’niak, 20, 38. 
 
456 For a detailed history of Pil’niak’s fatal relationship with the Soviet state, see Vera T. Reck, Boris 
Pil’niak: A Soviet Writer in Conflict with the State (Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 
1975). Tret’iakov’s ambitions to fuse his artistic activities with the political work of the Bolshevik 
Party was not enough to save him from the same fate: both he and Pil’niak were arrested and executed 
in the late 1930s on charges that included spying for the Japanese, an association enabled by their 
work in the Far East. 
 
457 Dany Savelli, “Shest’ neizdanykh pisem’ Borisa Pil’niaka o ego pervom prebyvanii na Dal’nem 
Vostoke (v Kitae i v Iaponii) v 1926 god,” Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2001), 
139.  
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explore and juxtapose a diverse range of global spaces, expanding outwards from provincial 
Russia to take in Europe, the Arctic and the Near East.458   
Thus it seems understandable, after the events of 1925 in China had precipitated mass 
anti-foreigner anger and set in motion the Guomindang’s Northern Expedition of 
reunification, that the Soviet authorities would want a writer of Pil’niak’s stature to travel to 
China and produce an image of that country moving towards revolution under the guidance 
of Soviet example. And indeed, Pil’niak travelled under the auspices of the All-Union 
Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo kul’turnoi 
sviazi s zagranitsei—VOKS), though it appears VOKS had limited control over or even 
knowledge of his actual actions there.459 But the trip must be seen as motivated by personal 
as well as official desire. Besides a clear enthusiasm for travel and adventure, Pil’niak had 
shown a particular interest in China as a symbol within his explorations of Eurasian history 
and identity. As we saw in the preceding chapter, Chinese themes and motifs feature 
prominently in The Naked Year and “Sankt-Piter-Burkh,” where they suggest a strange, 
sinister element from the East that has made its way into the heart of Russia. Pil’niak had his 
own reasons for wanting to see China: as early as July 1924, in fact, he had written to 
Vsevolod Ivanov suggesting they embark on a trip to China together.460 Indeed Dany Savelli, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 For example: “Tret’ia stolitsa,” written after a trip to Berlin in 1922; “Staryi syr,” inspired by a trip 
to London in 1923; “Zavoloch’e,” written after a 1924 journey to the Arctic Circle; “Rossiia v 
polete,” which describes the 1925 airplane journey; and “Rasskaz o kliuzhakh i gline,” which 
recreates a journey to Palestine later that same year. Before reaching China in 1926 Pil’niak also 
visited Japan, an experience recorded in Korni iaponskogo sol’ntsa. 
 
459 The official records of VOKS describing Pil’niak’s Far Eastern expedition note: “Pil'niak also 
visited China: in Beijing we rendered him the same assistance [as in Japan]. As to the results of his 
trip to China, we are unable to pass judgement, since we know about it only from his own words.” In 
December 1926 the director of VOKS, O. Kameneva, wrote to a Soviet diplomat in Beijing: “The 
writer Pil’niak, who recently visited China, informs us that in Shanghai he supposedly set up an 
initiative group directed towards the creation of a Chinese society for closer relations with the USSR. 
We have not yet managed to confirm this fact. Do you know anything about this?” Boris Pil’niak, 
Pis’ma, 2:270.  
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who has researched Pil’niak’s 1926 visit to Japan in great detail, argues that the decision to 
travel to China and Japan was taken independently by Pil’niak, and only subsequently 
approved and endorsed by the authorities.461 
Pil’niak arrived in China in May 1926, then, as both a Soviet emissary and a writer 
drawn to seek eastern Eurasian connections within Russia’s historical identity. This 
ambiguity shapes the text that the journey produced. Chinese Story (Kitaiskaia povest’, 
published in Novyi mir in June and August 1927) is a disjointed account of Pil’niak’s 
experiences travelling through China and staying in Shanghai, where he spent several weeks 
waiting for a voyage home. Much in this curious travelogue fits the general outline of the 
Soviet “China text” as we have so far encountered it. We see war-torn northern China from 
the window of a train; we see Pil’niak walking the streets, attending parties with left-wing 
Chinese intellectuals, and commenting on the brutish behaviour of western imperialists. 
Echoing the aspirations of Tret’iakov’s literature of fact, Pil’niak’s text is filled with 
“documents”: newspaper reports translated from English and Chinese, telegrams, diary 
entries, private letters.  
Besides such elements of documentary form, there are moments when the rhetoric of 
revolutionary solidarity is openly proclaimed. Pil’niak declares at one point that he and his 
companions are in Shanghai “because the Russian Revolution has sent us, because we, the 
Russians, are now against the entire world.”462 Elsewhere he insists that, in contrast to the 
rapacious intentions of the capitalist powers, “[t]he USSR intends to see the entire Earthly 
Globe free, endowed with equal rights, working and educated.”463 We see a rickshaw driver, 
standard symbol of oppressed Chinese labour, kicked in the back by an Englishman in a cork 	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462 Boris Pilnyak, Chinese Story and Other Tales, trans. Vera T. Reck and Michael Green (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 75. 
 
463 Ibid., 69. 
	  	   175	  
helmet; like other Soviet reporters, Pil’niak gives us nightsoil traders, executions, and police 
violence.464 However, this discourse of solidarity is undermined by the experience of reading 
the text as a whole, in a manner that challenges the authority of Soviet reporting on China.  
The first element in this challenge is the text’s fragmentary structure, which disrupts 
the travelogue as a coherent chronotope. As we have seen, Tret’iakov structured his 
travelogues through a chronotope of arrival that drew the reader from ignorance through 
exploration to understanding. Other China travelogues of the period, such as Sergei Dalin’s 
In the Ranks of the Chinese Revolution or Kostarev’s Chinese Diaries, are similarly 
structured as chronological journeys of enlightenment. Moving chronologically through a 
series of discrete and defined locations, the narrator and, by extension, the reader move from 
a state of relative ignorance to one of relative knowledge. For example, Dalin’s journey takes 
him from Harbin through Beijing and Shanghai towards a climactic meeting with Sun Yat-
sen in Guangzhou, positioning the GMD leader as China’s most authentic hope for 
revolution.465 Kostarev begins in the chaos and confusion of Shanghai in the spring of 1927, 
but a clearer picture of the social forces at war in China emerges as he moves to Wuhan and 
then into the Henan countryside with Guomindang troops. Kostarev’s prologue even rejects 
the old colonial adage that the longer one lives in China, the less one understands it. “You 
could say this about old China. But about today’s — no!” he insists. “Because today in China 
everything has come into movement — become differentiated in class terms, become 
defined.”466 The movement of history has made China comprehensible to Kostarev’s Marxist 
gaze. 
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Pil’niak’s narrative, by contrast, does not even observe a coherent progression in 
space and time. He begins with what seems to be a vivid assertion of location, announcing “I 
am standing on the bank of the Yangtze” (Я стою на берегу Ян-Цзы).467 But where exactly 
along the world’s third-longest river Pil’niak is standing neither he nor we can know, because 
all he tells us is that he is opposite a village “whose name I will never know” (имени 
которой я никогда не узнаю).468 Across an ellipsis marked by a double dash (— —), we are 
next told that Pil’niak is staying in an international concession in the largest city on the shore 
of the Pacific, which must be Shanghai, though again the name of the city is withheld. 
Several pages in, we finally get a geographical and temporal marker, further inland and 
upriver: “Hankou, June.”469 After a scene in Hankou, however, the narrative jumps again 
across space and time to recall a railway journey from Mukden through Beijing to Hankou, 
before the chapter eventually concludes with a boat journey from Hankou to Shanghai, which 
is now, finally, named. With external knowledge of China’s geography and Pil’niak’s 
biography, we can deduce that Pil’niak’s actual journey through China began in the north-
east and proceeded via Beijing and Hankou to Shanghai. The account in Chinese Story 
jumbles the different stages of Pil’niak’s journey, disrupting the chronotope of arrival and 
producing in the reader a sense of travel, and of China, as disorienting and confusing. 
Perhaps this initial confusion could, as in Tret’iakov and Ivin, represent the ignorance 
of arrival that is to be replaced by greater knowledge and understanding? Sure enough, in the 
second chapter Pil’niak announces that his true purpose is to tell the story of Liu Hua, a 
Shanghai trade union leader arrested by the British and executed by a local Chinese warlord. 
Here, Pil’niak finally seems to be getting round to his “mission”: the depiction of semi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




469 Ibid., 115. 
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colonized China moving inexorably towards revolution. A lengthy passage cataloguing 
Shanghai’s contradictions—the Chinese workers living on cramped boats beside huge 
Western hotels, the workers’ unions that co-exist with the remnants of the feudal economy, 
the luxurious restaurants and dingy brothels—builds up rhetorical steam towards prophecies 
of revolution: “Oh, when the Canton revolution smashes through all this—even though three 
Hindu policemen stand on every corner here —oh, with what chilly joy one looks upon the 
Chinese who must inevitably be moved—not by marshals, but by revolutions!”470 This 
crescendo culminates with the naming of Liu Hua, a “worker, librarian, student” recently 
killed by shooting or strangulation. It seems that Liu Hua is being positioned as some kind of 
protagonist, through whose life-story Pil’niak will synecdochically represent the Chinese 
Revolution—precisely the approach taken by Tret’iakov in his “bio-interview,” Den Shi-khua, 
which began publication at around the same time Chinese Story appeared.471  
Immediately after this proclamation, however, Pil’niak abandons this line of narration, 
pleading exhaustion and homesickness: “Essentially, though, all this is not about me. I don’t 
feel at all well. I am very tired. I would like to go home now, to Russia, onto the stove ledge, 
into thoughts, into books, into quiet—and far, far away from this unbearable heat, horrible 
and tormenting[.]”472 The subjective experience of the narrator intrudes, disrupting the 
fulfilment of his mission. The re-mapping of China as a commensurable revolutionary space 
is interrupted by the desire to abandon this uncomfortable foreign place altogether and return 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 38. “Ах, как деранет по всему этому кантонская революция, — 
несмотря на то, что на каждом углу здесь стоит по три полисмена-индуса, — ах, как 
холодновато-весело смотреть на китайцев, которые неминуемо должны задвигаться — не 
маршалами, а революциями!” Pil’niak, SS, 3:129. 
 
471 The first instalment of Den Shi-khua was published in the July 1927 issue of Novyi Lef — in other 
words, right in between the two instalments of Chinese Story, which appeared in Novyi mir in June 
and August of that same year. On Den Shi-khua, see Chapter Five. 
 
472 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 38. “Но, в сущности, все это — не обо мне. Я себя чувствую очень 
нехорошо. Я очень устал. Мне бы теперь домой, в Россию, на печку, в мысли, в книги, в 
тишину — и подальше от этой нестерпимой жары, ужасной, мучительной[.]” Pil’niak, SS, 3;129. 
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to the comfort of home, effectively reversing the drive of the Comintern project outward from 
its Russian core. Pil’niak’s turn away from internationalist sympathy here is not simply an 
affirmation of the self (“all this is not about me”); it is also an affirmation of the nation as the 
true home, a note of Russocentric homesickness that runs through Chinese Story and seems to 
put the possibility of global identity under a cloud. The fragmentary, confused narrative form 
endures, meanwhile, and prevents the discourse of solidarity from building any sustained 
momentum: the story of Liu Hua is only resumed after another thirty pages, almost a third of 
the text.   
Next there is the issue of veracity, which is also an issue of genre. If this is 
documentary reportage, why the generic label, “povest’” (tale), in the title? In fact, after 
opening as a confused travelogue and briefly threatening to become a revolutionary 
biography, in its third chapter Chinese Story begins openly to violate the border between 
reality and fantasy. “I am making this up” (…я выдумываю — —), Pil'niak announces, as he 
begins to concoct a romantic narrative between Liu Hua and a visiting American 
missionary.473 These digressions into fiction perhaps make the reader question the 
authenticity of what they had hitherto read, trusting the generic markers of documentary and 
travelogue, as fact.474  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 Pil’niak, SS, 3:147. 
 
474 Extra-textual evidence supports such suspicions. For example, Pil’niak includes in Chinese Story a 
series of letters and telegrams purportedly from one of his housemates in Shanghai, the translator 
“Krylov,” to his wife, who has returned to Russia. Here is the text of one such telegram:  
“Крылов послал сразу пять телеграмм — в разные адреса. [...] Крылов показал текст 
телеграммы: « — молчание считаю возмутительным требую объяснения».” (Krylov sent five 
telegrams at the same time, to various addresses. Krylov showed me the text of the telegram: 
“Consider silence outrageous demand explanation.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:125–26.) And here is a telegram 
sent by Pil’niak to his wife Olga Shcherbatskaia, who had returned to Russia rather than accompany 
him to China—the similarities are striking: “Передайте Шербиновской Последнее ее письмо от 
девятнадцатого Послал пять безответных телеграмм молчание считаю безобразием и требую 
объяснения[.]” (Pass on to Sherbinovskaia Her last letter from the nineteenth Have sent five 
telegrams without reply I consider this silence an outrage and demand explanation[.]) Pil'niak, Pis'ma, 
267. 
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There is also the diary element in the text: the second and fourth of the text’s four 
main chapters are arranged as a sequence of diary entries. The diary has been recognized as 
an ambiguous medium between the self and the world, “an uncertain genre uneasily balanced 
between literary and historical writing, between the spontaneity of reportage and 
reflectiveness of the crafted text, between selfhood and events, between subjectivity and 
objectivity, between the private and the public.”475 Philippe Lejeune suggests we view the 
diary as the confluence of the monological chronicle and the dialogical prayer, a record of 
external events rooted in book-keeping that becomes a dialogue with the self and an exercise 
in self-fashioning.476 Kostarev’s Chinese diaries maintain a complementary balance between 
external and internal: the events that Kostarev witnesses in China gradually transform and 
shape his inner self. In his post-scripted foreword, Kostarev begins with emotional 
experience: “Leaving China, I felt very sad.” But as the foreword progresses and Kostarev 
realizes he has come to understand what is happening in China, his mood is transformed: “I 
am no longer sad,” he declares, and “I wanted to go to China again!”477 Private experience is 
here publicized as an instructive example. 
Kostarev does not use the diary as a form, however; he simply borrows the generic 
title to describe his memoir of experiences in China. Pil’niak uses the diary form itself, albeit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
So perhaps these “documents” are fake? What then of “Krylov,” whose name suggests fables, or the 
second housemate, known only as Loks—do they exist? And what of the other documents introduced 
into the text: the humorous newspaper reports on Chinese generals and their concubines, the poem by 
a Russian poet imprisoned in Beijing, the Chinese fable “translated” by “Krylov”? Even without this 
extra-textual evidence, Pil’niak works to undermine, rather than reassure, the reader’s sense of his 
reliability.  
 
475 Rachel Langford and Russell West, “Introduction: Diaries and Margins,” in Marginal Voices, 
Marginal Forms: Diaries in European Literature and History, ed. Rachael Langford and Russell 
West (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 8. Quoted in Irina Paperno, “What Can Be Done with Diaries?” 
Russian Review 63, no. 4 (Oct. 2004): 561. 
 
476 Philippe Lejeune, On Diary, trans. Katherine Durnin, eds Jeremy D. Popkin and Julie Rak 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 93. 
 
477 Kostarev, Kitaiskie dnevniki, 5. 
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sporadically. His second and fourth chapters are mostly made up of entries with specific dates 
and times of day (a short fifth chapter has no date, only the time: “2am”).478 Even though the 
text as a whole ends with an indication of date and place of writing (Moscow, on Povarskaya, 
7 February 1927), still the use of the diary form produces what Irina Paperno, following 
Andrew Hassam, calls the “illusion of ‘authenticity’ and ‘immediacy’,” a sense of present 
access to the act of writing and the writer’s state of mind at that precise moment.479 This 
Chinese diary turns increasingly inward, away from China, to record Pil’niak’s discomfort, 
homesickness, and frustration over his delayed departure. By the end of chapter 4, this 
impatience is expressed in multiple entries per day, broken down by time, that communicate 
nothing new. A typical sample: “4 o’clock. Impossible to breathe!... Dreadful!... But in 
Moscow there is the coolness of nine o’clock in the morning.”480 Pil'niak's diary-keeping 
produces neither greater understanding nor greater love for China, only a greater longing for 
home, a growing retreat into the self. 
All this might seem unremarkable—why, after all, would we expect a romantic fellow 
traveller with Scythian tendencies, who spent a total of two months in the country, and most 
of that holed up in an apartment, to endorse either the Comintern’s mission in China or the 
LEF programme for a literature of fact? But in the course of subverting the travelogue, 
Pil’niak’s text calls into question the grounds of the entire Soviet project to reimagine China. 
A close reading of Chinese Story shows that it engages with but ultimately undermines all the 
tropes and devices on which other Soviet reporters of China based their authority. Pil’niak 
explores the reliability of observation and translation as methods for producing knowledge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Pil’niak, SS, 3:185. 
 
479 Irina Paperno, “What Can be Done with Diaries?,” 565.  
 
480 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 85. “4 часа. Дышать нечем!.. ужасно!.. — А в Москве прохлада девяти 
часов утра.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:172.  
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about China, and casts serious doubts on the privileged position of the Soviet eyewitness, his 
interpretative powers, and his capacity for trans-national solidarity. 
Not unlike Tret’iakov or indeed Kostarev, Pil’niak begins in a state of profound 
sensory confusion. The following examples all occur in the first five pages of Chapter One, 
which, as mentioned above, relate in non-chronological order the writer’s journey through 
China, via Beijing and Hankou, to Shanghai. First Pil’niak is troubled by the identity of this 
village on the Yangzi, whose name he cannot ever know; a rendition of this same scene in a 
private letter suggests that this is because the name is written in Chinese.481 A jump in 
location takes us to a museum, where a collection of local fauna affirms the strangeness of 
this world: “yes, I am in a strange country, utterly strange; […] A strange world! An 
incomprehensible world!”482 At night he hears the boat-dwellers on the Nanjing canal 
shouting, and reacts with fear: “it is then, in the midst of all this strangeness, in this dark 
night—darker than any Russian night—that terror comes.”483 Visiting some opium dens, he 
reaches his most complete expression of incomprehension and the impossibility of 
comprehension: 
And it is here, on the threshold of these dens, in the same way as in the temples 
and in the streets, that I realize I do not know, do not understand, and never will 
understand China and the Chinese. I ask questions right and left to find some keys 
to China, but I do not have these keys, and everything that I look at only adds to 
my lack of knowledge.484  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Pil’niak, Pis’ma, 2:266. “Пароход стоит около какого-то города, имени которого я не знаю, 
ибо написано по-китайски.” 
 
482 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 20–21. “Да, я в чужой стране, совсем чужой, […] — чужой мир! 
непонятный!” Pil’niak, SS, 3:113. (My emphasis.) 
 
483 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 18. “тогда становится страшно в этой непонятности, в этой темной 
ночи, такой темной, каких в России не бывает.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:111. (My emphasis.) 
 
484 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 22. “И вот, на порогах этих притонов, так же как в храмах и на улицах, 
— я познаю, что я не знаю, не понимаю и никогда не пойму китайцев и Китая. Я спрашиваю 
направо и налево всех, чтобы найти какие-либо ключи Китаю, — и этих ключей нет, все, что я 
вижу, я вижу для того, чтобы — не знать.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:114. (My emphasis.) 
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Observation appears unable to produce knowledge and understanding—indeed, the peculiar 
phrasing here suggests that sight causes ignorance.485 But how is the Soviet eyewitness to 
create sense and meaning from experience, if not on the basis of what he sees?  
The solution lies in the use of analogies to enable translatability. Pil’niak establishes a 
series of inter-cultural equivalences to overcome his crisis of incomprehension. The 
discovery of these “keys” is announced with a certain totalizing relief: “China,” Pil'niak 
confidently declares, “is built entirely on analogies.”486 Thus the Chinese relationship with 
opium, which seems in the passage above to lead Pil’niak to a cognitive dead end, can be 
explained by reference to a universal principle of national narcotic predilection: “Every 
people, every nation has its own particular opiate.”487 The Chinese relationship with opium is 
thus rendered comprehensible by analogy with the Russian relationship with vodka, both 
somehow expressing some kind of national-cultural essence. 
Another example is the Chinese expression “manmande” (Pinyin Romanization of 
Chinese 慢慢的，“slowly”). Two paragraphs after bemoaning the absence of the “keys” he 
needs to unlock China’s meaning, Pil'niak latches onto manmande, which he renders 
“mamandi,” as the basic expression of all that is fundamentally, quintessentially Chinese. At 
the same time, he providing a series of translations of the term that culminates in an idiomatic 
equivalent in Russian: “Mamandi means in Chinese ‘Wait a moment,’ ‘Don’t hurry,’ ‘Don’t 
rush,’ the same as the Russian seichas. This mamandi lies at the heart of Chinese distances, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485 In the rough draft of Kitaiskaia povest’ preserved in RGALI (Russian State Archive of Literature 
and the Arts), a deleted line stands in place of this final phrase that presents the experience of 
ignorance as the fundamental message of the text: “Эта повесть написана о том, чего я не знаю и о 
том, что я видел для того, чтобы не знать.” (RGALI, f. 1692, o. 1, ed. khr. 32, l. 1.) Perhaps the 
deletion of this line anticipates the growing sense as Kitaiskaia povest’ progresses that a kind of 
knowledge is produced, albeit one that is highly unstable and imbedded within subjective 
perspectives. 
 
486 Pil’niak, Chinese Story, 23. “Весь Китай строится аналогиями.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:115. 
 
487 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 21. “У каждого народа, у каждой нации — свой наркотик.” Pil’niak, 
SS, 3:114. 
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Chinese time, Chinese dealings, Chinese philosophy.”488 This act of translation enables 
mamandi to function for the remainder of the text as a convenient signifier for the 
metaphysical peculiarity of Chinese culture. Anything that Pil’niak does not understand—the 
apparent disappearance of the ship on which he was supposed to depart, the delays in setting 
up his projected Sino-Russian Society for Cultural Relations (“Kitrus”)—all this can now be 
ascribed to mamandi. In a private letter written after his return to Russia, Pil’niak refers to 
mamandi as “this inexplicable Chinese disease,” suggesting that the concept is enmeshed so 
firmly within Chinese culture that it cannot be explained.489 In Chinese Story, however, we 
are told that mamandi is commensurable to something idiomatic in the Russian language: the 
use of “seichas” to mean “in a moment,” “wait a minute,” with the implication that something 
will get done and there is no need to hurry or worry. The identification of commensurable 
idioms opens up the possibility that they may refer to commensurable cultural practices: thus 
translation enables Pil’niak’s China, while remaining distinctive and different, to move 
towards similarity.  
Directly after the translation of mamandi comes Pil’niak’s most emphatic assertion of 
similarity between Russia and China, a similarity that moves towards a kind of ecstatic 
identity. Awaking by the river in Hankou, Pil’niak is transported by auditory stimuli back to 
his childhood: “I awoke today with the most astonishing sensation of childhood, my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 22. “Маманди — значит по-китайски — погоди, не торопись, не 
спеши, значит русское — сейчас. Это маманди скрыто в китайских расстояниях, в китайском 
времени, в китайских делах и в китaйской философии.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:115. I have modified Reck 
and Green’s English translation here, to preserve Pil’niak’s slight mistake in not reproducing the first 
two syllables of the phrase: they correct him, and offer, under the Wade-Giles Romanization system, 
man-man-ti. The dashes are their own addition. 
The transition from ignorance to some basic spark of knowledge is made more explicit in two 
deleted lines from the earlier draft, that top and tail this paragraph: “Единственное, что я знаю о 
Китае – это великую горечь маманди. [...] Я знаю это маманди, и оно мне очень страшно, оно 
очень много крови испортило, это страшное маманди.” (The only thing I know about China is the 
great bitterness of mamandi. […] I know this mamandi, and it terrifies me, it has corrupted so much 
blood, this terrible mamandi.) RGALI, f. 1692, o. 1, ed. khr. 32, l. 2. 
489 Savelli, “Shest’ neizdanykh pisem’ Borisa Pil’niaka,” 154. “такая необъяснимая китайская 
болезнь.” 
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childhood in Saratov, in the house of my grandmother Katerina Ivanovna, among the noises 
of the embankment, the boom of the barge haulers’ song [dubinushka].”490 This song, dubbed 
in Russian a dubinushka, is not just similar but identical to the music he remembers from 
childhood. Pil’niak takes the Russian title of the traditional Volga barge-haulers’ song and 
transposes it wholesale to the music he hears by the river in Hankou. Doubts remain over the 
historical direction of this cross-cultural borrowing, but the newfound certainty of their 
identity, based on a memory provoked by sounds heard at the moment of waking, expands 
geographically to take in all of China as well as the whole length of the Volga: “I don’t know 
whether they borrowed this dubinushka from us or we from them, but I know that the tune 
and the rhythm of it here in Hankow, as everywhere else in China, are the same as in Saratov 
and everywhere on the Volga.”491  
As Pil’niak focuses his hearing on the music, the sense of identity expands from the 
song alone to embrace all the sounds heard along the river: “I listened hard: the Chinese “Ha-
hey-ho!” is exactly the same as at my grandmother’s—and the noises are exactly the same—
both the roars of the steamers and the shouts of the crowd.”492 Liberated from the nightmare 
of sleep as from the nightmare of alienation, Pil'niak walks down the embankment and back 
into his childhood: 
And in the morning, freed from the nightmare of sleep under a mosquito net, I 
went to the embankment to wander through my childhood, for the picture is 
exactly the same, amazingly so: the same barge haulers wearing a variety of 
national costumes, the same overseers, men carrying sacks and bales on their 
backs in the same way (how is it that their spines are not broken?). It is good to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 22. “…Я проснулся сегодня в удивительнейшем чувстве детства, 
моего детства в Саратове, в доме бабки Катерины Ивановны, в шуме набережной, в гуле 
дубинушки.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:115. 
 
491 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 22–3. (My emphasis.) “Не знаю, кто у кого взял дубинушку, эту 
портовую дубинушку, — но знаю, что мотив и ритм ее здесь в Ханькоу, как везде в Китае, 
таков же, как в Саратове, как везде на Волге.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:115.  
 
492 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 23. (My emphasis.) “Прислушивался, в китайской — «ха-xэ-хо!»: одно 
и то же, — как у бабушки! — и шумы одни и те же, и рявки пароходов, и крики толпы.” 
Pil’niak, SS, 3:115.  
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remember one’s childhood; I feel happy and sad at the same time, and it is 
certainly not too much to travel thousands of miles to stumble into one’s 
childhood.493  
 
The discomforts of travel are now justified, because they have brought Pil'niak back, quite by 
chance, to the home that is his own past. China, recently incomprehensible, is transformed by 
this act of aesthetic memory into home; in translation terms, fully domesticated. 
Autobiographical memory provides an origin on which to ground the shifting, confusing 
experience of China.  
Travellers who lack advanced linguistic or cultural knowledge of their destination 
always risk a certain infantilization: excluded to a large degree from the surrounding world of 
“adult” semiosis, orphaned from their mother tongue. Pil'niak's orphaned child responds to 
confusion and displacement by imaginatively discovering his lost home in the foreign place, 
transcending linguistic estrangement by latching onto a different semiotic expression—the 
coolie’s song—that he is able to translate as something familiar. This surprising 
transformation, initiated by sound, is here extended to the faculty of vision, which has now 
attained the semantic clarity of speech: “Strange that what I see here should speak to me of 
Russia, Grandmother’s Russia beyond the Volga.”494 If we compare the conclusion of just 
under a page before—“everything that I look at only adds to my lack of knowledge”—we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 23. (My emphasis.) “И утром, освободившись от кошмарного сна в 
москитнике, я пошел на набережную — б р о д и т ь   п о   м о е м у   д е т с т в у, ибо картина  о 
д н а   и   т а   ж е, разительно, — такие же разноплеменно одетые бурлаки, такие же 
надсмотрщики, так же на спинах (непонятно, почему не ломаются хребты) тащат люди мешки 
и тюки. Детство — хорошее память: мне грустно и хорошо, и совсем не зря колесить тысячи 
верст, чтобы угодить в детство.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:115.  
 
494 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 23. (My emphasis.) “Удивительно, но точно то, что я вижу, мне 
говорит о России, о заволжской, бабушкиной.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:115. Though it may seem less 
strange if we take into account the fact that, on the evidence of Pil’niak’s letters, he most likely wrote 
Chinese Story while staying with his relatives in Saratov. On 4 January 1927, he wrote to M. L. 
Slominskii: “I am going to visit my German relatives beyond the Volga—to write about China and 
about Russia.” On 30 May he wrote to his then wife, Ol’ga Shcherbinovskaia, from Saratov: “In 
Saratov I am reminded of Hankou, as in Hankou I was reminded of Saratov…” Chinese Story was 
published the following month. See Pil’niak, Pis’ma, 2:294, 2:311.  
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will appreciate how far Pil'niak's narrator has come in extracting meaning from, or imposing 
meaning on, his Chinese surroundings.  
In focusing on the coolie’s work-cry, Pil’niak stands at the intersection of two traditions, 
an intersection that in fact characterizes his travelogue as a whole. On the one hand, 
following the methodology outlined by Tret’iakov in his poem “Roar, China,” this song of 
the coolies drew the attention of Soviet reporters as a near-ubiquitous sound that could be 
interpreted as symbolizing the subjugation of cheap Chinese labour to the forces of 
international capital. Here was an element in Chinese reality that was appropriated to 
become, through repetition, a sign in Soviet discourse on China: the coolies’ work-cry comes 
to signify both oppression and revolutionary potential.495 In his Chinese Diaries, Kostarev 
dubs this repetitive sonic motif the “Productive Rhythms” of Shanghai, uttered by every one 
of the 300,000 coolies in the city: “under their dozen-pood swinging weight they exhale by 
turns, in a kind of call-and-response, their monotonous “a! — a!”: two tones (one higher, the 
other lower), like the groan of someone whose insides have been consumed by hunger.”496 In 
Sergei Alymov’s 1929 novel Nanking Road (Nankin-rod), the same sounds (“E-khe-io!”) 
greet the protagonist’s arrival in Shanghai by boat.497 They also appear in Tret’iakov’s stage 
directions for the opening to his play Roar, China! (Rychi, Kitai!), first staged in 1926 (see 
Chapter Four), which began with a long scene of Chinese coolies unloading a boat under the 
supervision of their American boss. Oskar Erdberg, whose anti-Orientalist sketch opened this 
chapter, includes the coolies’ cries in his story “Tai-an Symphony”: “And a monotonous song 
is carried above the road, alternating high and low cries, inhalations and exhalations, a hymn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 On the transformation of elements from reality into signs in a discourse through repetition, see 
Spurr, Rhetoric of Empire, 20, 25. 
 
496 Kostarev, Kitaiskie dnevniki, 39–40. “под это покачивание десятков пудов они попеременно, 
точно перекликаясь, выдыхают это свое однообразное: а! — а! — в два тона (один — выше, 
другой — ниже), похоже на стон человека, у которого внутренности съедены голодом.” 
 
497 Sergei Alymov, Nankin-rod (Kharkov: Proletarii, 1929), 70. 
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of unbearable animal labour: ‘O-okh-okh!’ ‘E-khe-khe!’ ‘A-kho-li!’ ‘I-khi-khi!’”498 The 
titular symphony is given a revolutionary resolution at the story’s end, when this hymn of 
oppression is offset by our worker-narrator singing the first few bars of the Internationale in 
Chinese.  
In short, this coolies’ work song became a convenient Soviet sign for “oppressed 
Chinese labour” in various accounts of the period. Pil’niak even intimates his awareness of 
this revolutionary interpretation by dubbing the coolies’ song a “dubinushka.” The folk song 
“Dubinushka,” with its insistent labour chants (“Ei, ukhnem!”), had been revalorized as a 
song about the awakening power of the Russian working masses since the 1860s: an audial 
equivalent to Repin’s famous painting of the Volga Barge Haulers. As Boris Gasparov 
explains: “in the context of Russian revolutions—first in 1905, then in and after 1917—this 
labour song, with its ominously pushing rhythm, was interpreted as an emblem of the 
awakening masses whose thrust is aimed at the edifice of the old order.”499 The wildly 
popular 1927 ballet, Krasnyi mak (The Red Poppy), opened with a scene that is almost 
identical to the opening of Roar China!: Chinese coolies unloading a foreign ship, to a slow, 
heavy musical accompaniment that ballet scholar S. Katonova describes as “a kind of 
Chinese dubinushka.”500 As the act progresses, this refrain returns in a triumphant mode, 
when the coolies revolt with Soviet assistance. (For a detailed discussion of The Red Poppy, 
see Chapter Four.) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Erdberg, Kitaiskie novelly, 48. “И однообразная песня, чередование высоких и низких воплей, 






499 Boris Gasparov, Five Operas and a Symphony: Word and Music in Russian Culture (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 190. 
 
500 S. V. Katonova, Balety R. M. Gliera (Moscow: Sovetskii kompozitor, 1960), 10. “Танец кули — 
это своего рода китайская «Дубинушка.»” 
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But Pil’niak does not extrapolate forward from these sonic connections to revolution, as 
do Tret’iakov, Erdberg and the creators of The Red Poppy. Instead he extrapolates backwards, 
into the historical past: the similarity of these songs does not imply similar structures of 
oppression of labour, but rather a genealogical, inter-ethnic link in the deep past between the 
Chinese and Russian folk traditions. The thesis of a common origin to Russian and Chinese 
folk music is not unique to Pil’niak. Exploring similarities between Puccini’s opera Turandot, 
which is set in Beijing, and Musorgsky’s Boris Godunov, Gasparov suggests that:  
For all the apparent difference in sound, East Asian and Russian music contained 
pertinent common features of harmony, voice leading, and musical form. […] It 
would be tempting to attribute these similarities to a genetic relationship, however 
remote, between Russia and the East Asian world, a perspective that would view the 
Russian folk song as the westernmost offspring of the Chinese musical stock whose 
influence is felt throughout East and Southeast Asia. 501  
 
Gasparov only suggests the temptation; Pil’niak, as we have seen, succumbs to it 
wholeheartedly. The song heard by the river provides a cognitive framework within which 
Pil’niak can make sense of China and his relation to it: the notion of a “genetic relationship” 
between Russia and China across the Eurasian space, a deep historical connection that can at 
times be glimpsed through surface cultural differences. Later, attending a film studio party in 
Shanghai, Pil’niak declares that China is more like Russia than any country he has visited, 
and links this similarity explicitly to shared history: “It is no accident,” he tells the reader, 
“that both China and Russia were conquered by the Mongols.”502 We have encountered 
already in Ivin this “Eurasian” approach to China, which sees that country as a kind of mirror 
for Russia’s own “Asiatic” element and pre-modern past. So what is so scandalous about 
Pil’niak’s Eurasian analogy?  
The scandal arises when Pil’niak, unlike Ivin, fails to project this similarity from the 
past forward into a revolutionary future. Echoing Kostarev’s invocation of John Reed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 Gasparov, Five Operas and a Symphony, 195–6. 
 
502 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 40. 
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Pil’niak clearly sees the recent Russian past in the chaos of China’s railways and the 
militarized state of Beijing, which he dubs “a city under arms of Russia’s 1918.”503 But, to 
recall Trotsky’s criticism of Pil'niak, describing the chaos of the revolutionary present is not 
the same as describing what will be born from it in the future. As Alexander Bukh observes, 
Pil’niak’s text fixes China at an unsurpassable temporal lag behind Russia, the same strategy 
of hierarchical differentiation through time that Johannes Fabian finds underpinning the 
modern discipline of anthropology.504 When Pil’niak is called upon to project an image of 
Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity into the future, his functioning as an emissary and an 
eyewitness breaks down completely, as we shall see in Chinese Story’s final scene. 
In Shanghai Pil’niak met the Communist writer Jiang Guangci (a graduate of 
Moscow’s Communist University for the Workers of the East), and the dramatist and film-
maker Tian Han. Chinese Story describes them meeting to discuss the foundation of “Kitrus,” 
or the Sino-Russian Society for Cultural Relations. Tian Han also convinced Pil’niak to make 
a cameo appearance in a film he was making at the time, entitled Go to the People (Dao 
renmin qu). The title alone signals the significance of Russian precedent for Chinese leftists: 
Tian Han explicitly traced the motivation for the film to the Russian Populist movement of 
the late nineteenth century, which had exerted a major influence on other early Chinese 
Marxists such as Li Dazhao.505  
The film was never completed due to financial difficulties, but a surviving synopsis 
suggests a revolutionary love triangle with a strong ideological message: indeed, Jay Leyda 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 24. “Пекин — военный город российского 18-го года.” Pil’niak, SS, 
3:116. 
 
504 Alexander Bukh, “National Identity and Race in Post-Revolutionary Russia: Pil’niak’s 
Travelogues from Japan and China,” in Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western and Eastern 
Constructions, edited by Rotem Kowner and Walter Demel (Leiden: Brill Modern East Asia in Global 
Historical Perspective Series, 2012), 188. 
 
505 See Tian Han, “Women de ziji pipan － ‘women de yishu yundong zhi lilun yu shiji,’” Tian Han 
quanji, 15:88. On Li Dazhao and Russian Populism, see Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins 
of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 80–89. 
	  	   190	  
calls it “the only [Chinese] film of the period that seems to welcome the revolution rather 
than resist or ignore it.”506 Two idealistic Shanghai students, the confident Zhang Qiubai and 
the indecisive Guo Qichang, both fall for Lu Meiyu, a waitress from the countryside who 
works in the café they frequent. Seeing a chance to put their talk of “going to the people” into 
action, they accompany Meiyu back to her village, where they meet “the people” for the first 
time. Zhang marries Meiyu, but gradually loses his idealism and becomes a capitalist and 
speculator. Meanwhile Guo, affected by his experiences in the countryside and later among 
the urban poor of Shanghai, goes to live in a new-style village commune, and eventually wins 
over Meiyu, who is disillusioned by her first husband’s moral decline. The story concludes 
with Zhang, his business bankrupted by foreign competition, arriving in the village, seeing 
the happiness of life there, and committing suicide.507  
Pil’niak’s role is not included in this synopsis, but a description of it survives from a 
later article written by Tian Han in 1930. According to that text, Pil’niak played a “Russian 
revolutionary poet” travelling through the Far East, who meets the students in the opening 
café scene and recounts his impressions from his journey. The students discuss the best way 
to transform China: one advocates construction of a socialist state through class war, the 
other suggests that communism can be directly achieved by “going to the people.” The 
Russian writer does not adjudicate between these options, but encourages them to pursue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506 Leyda also confirms that the film was not completed because the Southern Society ran out of 
money; Jay Leyda, Dianying: An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China (Boston, MA: 
MIT Press, 1972), 54–55. 
 
507 See Tian Han, “Dao renmin qu,” in Tian Han quanji, 10:10-17. Although the film was never 
completed, the encounter had other cinematic consequences. Through Pil’niak, Tian Han became 
acquainted with the Soviet consul in Shanghai, who arranged for a private screening to the Nanguo 
Society of Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin, released the previous year. See Tian Han, “Women de 
ziji pipan,” 103. Thus Pil’niak’s visit acted as catalyst for what Leyda claims was only the second 
screening of Potemkin in China, after a viewing in Guangzhou in December 1926. Leyda, Dianying, 
56. 
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their goals, and, taking the waitress by the hand, declares: “Whichever one of you truly 
manages to change China shall win this girl!”508  
Tian Han’s use of a Russian writer as a symbolic figure of authority within his film 
speaks to the growing importance and influence of Russian literature in China at this time. 
Mark Gamsa’s recent study suggests that, while Chinese readers looked to the classical 
Russian literature of the nineteenth century for “moral example,” left-wing intellectuals in the 
1920s and beyond read the new Soviet literature as a “manual of practice,” seeking guidance 
on how to conduct a revolution and establish a revolutionary culture.509 Both these elements 
are distilled into the symbolic character Pil’niak plays in the film, who embodies the hopeful 
precedent of the Russian revolution and bestows his spiritual blessing on the students’ search 
for social change. Indeed Lu Xun, the leading Chinese writer of the period and an avid reader 
and translator of Russian literature, greeted Pil’niak’s arrival in China not just as a writer, but 
as a figure whose bodily experience could educate the Chinese as to the true nature of 
revolution: “He witnessed and experienced revolution. He knew that in its midst could be 
found destruction, bloodshed, contradictions, but also construction. Thus he never despaired. 
This is the spirit of a living human being in a revolutionary era.”510 By contrast, the absence 
of such artists in China, Lu Xun goes on to argue, shows that 1911 in China, compared to 
1917 in Russia, was not a true revolution.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 Tian Han, Tian Han quanji, 15:92. “你们谁真达了改造中国的目的的，便得者位姑娘!” 
Pil’niak’s own description of his role in Chinese Story is slightly different, omitting the element of 
sexual competition: “The students recognize me and ask to be introduced. We exchange visiting 
cards. We talk. They, the students, say that they welcome me, a Russian revolutionary writer. We all 
get up to drink a toast together – the students and the maids and we, science and art. And I put the 
hands of the students in the hands of the maids – European fashion – as a symbol of the alliance of 
science and democracy, the alliance of labor and learning! So it was conceived by Tian Han.” 
Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 99. 
 
509 See Gamsa, The Reading of Russian Literature in China, passim. 
 
510 Lu Xun, “Mashang riji zhi’er” (Impromptu Diary No. 2), Lu Xun quanji, 3:361–2. I have used, and 
very slightly modified, the translation of this passage given by Lee Ou-Fan Lee in Voices from the 
Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 153. 
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Tian Han, then, sought to take advantage of Pil’niak’s symbolic capital to create a 
cinematic image of a Soviet Russian writer fraternally endorsing the revolutionary efforts of 
Chinese youth. Here we see a Chinese perspective on this special position that Tret’iakov and 
others claim for the Soviet eyewitness in China. His experience bestows moral authority, yet 
his intervention is not prescriptive: he endorses the search for China’s path to the future 
rather than laying down the correct path that must be followed. This image of revolutionary 
solidarity contrasts starkly, however, with Pil’niak’s on-set experience as presented in 
Chinese Story, a hellish torment of cacophony, blindness under lights and unbearable heat. 
Pil’niak describes the filming process as “the tower of Babelissimus!”; the easy inter-cultural 
communication of the film scene itself is replaced by Babel, the epitome of inter-linguistic 
communication breakdown.511  
Pil'niak's discomfort at this babble of foreign voices is carried through into his 
experience of the music played on set, which is the complete opposite of the nostalgic reverie 
down by the river:  
Although the film was silent, a musician played the violin, and a man sang; but 
Chinese music and singing—to a European ear—seem the ultimate degeneration 
of hearing; my teeth began to ache from the singing and the violin just as they 
ache when cork is rubbed against glass.512 
 
Pil’niak’s ear is not Russian or even Eurasian here but staunchly European, and this music, in 
its superfluity, seems to exist solely to cause him physical pain. At this point the reader may 
recall an earlier scene, where Pil’niak described his reaction to an evening concert in 
Shanghai’s Jestfield Park, a space from which the Chinese residents of Shanghai were 
notoriously excluded. Here incomprehension, earlier a source of anxiety, is experienced as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 98. “столпотворение творилось вавилонственнейшее!” Pil’niak, SS, 
3:183. 
 
512 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 98. “Хотя на киноленте и не слышно, — тем не менее, музыкант играл 
на скрипке и пел певец, — китайская же музыка и пение — на ухо европейца — кажутся 
окончательным вырождением слуха, от пения и скрипки у меня начинали ныть зубы, как они 
ноют, когда трут пробкою по стеклу.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:184. 
	  	   193	  
relief: “I don’t know and I don’t understand music – but tonight I felt very good listening. 
The music was European. […] I sat there and listened; it felt very good – to leave reality for 
the incomprehensible.”513 Marvelling at how the English manage to “cut out” of China this 
authentic slice of England, Pil’niak divorces this aesthetic experience from politics 
completely, declaring: “The music and the beautiful night in Jestfield Park – are not a bit 
responsible for being beautiful.”514  
In the film studio, by contrast, a political motivation—making the film as a show of 
solidarity—cannot ameliorate the aesthetic displeasure of the experience. The distinction 
between the Soviet and Western observer, on which so much of the Soviet eyewitness's 
privileged authority seems to rest, collapses over the issue of music. Whereas the vocal song 
of the coolies could be interpreted through the prism of Eurasian commonality, an encounter 
with instrumentalizd Chinese music has a very different effect. That “European ear,” whose 
sufferings in the Chinese theatre were acknowledged by Tret’iakov and Serebriakova, 
alienates Pil'niak at the very moment of Sino-Soviet collaboration. Hearing and sight, the 
tools of the eyewitness, are now equally dysfunctional: the painful music and the 
incomprehensible babble mingle repetitively with the artificial light to revive in Pil’niak the 
incomprehension and sensory alienation with which his travelogue began: 
The director yells at Chiang. Chiang yells at me. Everyone yells. Can’t understand 
anything. And I stand there weeping, tears flow from the light and the pain in my 
eyes. Music howls. […] Music plays, the singer sings, the sun incinerates, sweat 
pours, everyone yells in Chinese; there’s no understanding anything. The director 
yells at Chiang. Chiang yells at me. I am blind and deaf.515  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 65. “Я не знаю и не понимаю музыку, — но сегодня мне было очень 
хорошо слушать. Мусыка была европейской. […] Сидел, слушал, мне было очень хорошо — 
уйти из реальностей в непонятное.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:154. 
 
514 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 65. “Музыка же и прекрасная ночь Джестфильд-парка — никак не 
виноваты в том, что они прекрасны.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:154.  
 
515 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 98–9. (My emphasis.) “Режиссер орет на Дзяна. Дзян орет на меня. Все 
орут. Ничего не понятно. И я стою, плачу, текут слезы от света иболи в глазах. Музыка воет. 
[…] Музыка играет, певец поет, солнце сжигает, пот течет, все орут по-китайски, ничего не 
понятно. Режиссер орет на Дзяна. Дзян орет на меня. Я слеп и глух.” Pil’niak, SS, 3:184. 
	  	   194	  
 
This audio-visual experience produces no fond, homely connections with childhood 
memories. Instead, fleeing to his hotel and the sanctuary of the bathtub, Pil’niak remembers 
his experience of military enlistment, when his myopia was tested by pouring atropine into 
his eyes. A short final chapter shows Pil’niak in his hotel room, playing endless games of 
patience. His experiences of China are condensed into nightmares that haunt his waking state, 
with music woven among them: “dreams become confused in your waking hours: a 
nightmare of floodlights that blind you, steamships, Chinese music and hubbub, shrines, 
alleys.”516 The travelogue ends with immobile homesickness, Pil’niak still stranded in his 
hotel room, dreaming of Russia and cool rain on an August night—a final desire for escape 
from this foreign place.  
By representing his climactic collaboration with leftist Chinese artists as a Babelian 
hell that leaves him with nothing but nightmares, Pil’niak conclusively undermines the 
narrative of revolutionary solidarity that he appears elsewhere to endorse. The historical 
similarities between Russia and China unearthed by Pil’niak’s translation practices fail to be 
projected into a revolutionary identity in the future. Instead, the position of Pil’niak’s 
observer is unstable and fluctuating, immersed in the elements of China he can domesticate to 
a common “Eurasian” paradigm, but alienated by those elements that, in their strangeness, 
reveal him as a product of “European” culture. Gary Browning dismisses Chinese Story as a 
coerced and unsuccessful piece of publitsistika, “the flawed effort of an unwilling servant 
who completed his task grudgingly.”517 Read within the contemporary drive to represent 
China anew, Chinese Story seems more like a deliberate undermining of the entire 
internationalist project, sunk between the opposing poles of domestication and alienation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 Pilnyak, Chinese Story, 100. “И наяву тогда путаются сны: кошмарствуют прожекторы, от 
которых слепнешь, пароходы, китайская музыка и галдеж, кумирни, переулки.” Pil’niak, SS, 
3:185. 
 
517 Gary Browning, Boris Pilniak, 35. 
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It may be objected that Pil’niak simply sees China through the superficial, tourist gaze 
that the embedded ethnographer Tret’iakov condemned. Writing in the journal Novyi vostok, 
S. L. Vel’tman elaborated this critique of Chinese Story as subjective and superficial: 
“Everything in it is juxtaposed to the author’s own “I,” and Eastern reality is depicted from 
this perspective. […] B. Pil’niak, like a whole host of west-European writers, tries to grasp 
the East while approaching it as something external, seeking to capture the ‘scent’ of the 
East.”518 Such a critique links Pil’niak to fellow modernists from Gérard de Nerval to André 
Gide, who narrate travel in non-Europe as an exploration of a collapsing self.519 By contrast, 
Vel’tman praised Tret’iakov’s Chzhungo for its objective clarity, a “discrete and artistically 
crystallized reflection of the various aspects of Chinese life, which elucidates and accentuates 
the transition from old to new.”520  
What this critique overlooks, I think, is the degree to which Pil’niak’s text engages 
with the same representational and political concerns as Chzhungo, including the 
developmentalist narrative of international revolution. What Tret’iakov and Pil’niak offer us 
are two contrasting visions of space and time in the new age of the 1920s, elaborated around 
the figure of China: one Marxist and revolutionary, the other romantic-nationalist and 
nostalgic. Both experience China as a space of contradictions, but these contradictions tell 
them very different things. Tret’iakov sees time moving confidently forward, through the 
energy of social contradictions, towards a global revolution that emanates spatially into China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 S. Vel’tman, “‘Literaturnye otkliki’ (Vostok v izobrazhenii B. Pil’niaka, S. Tret’iakova i dr.),” 
Novyi vostok 19 (1927): 215, 219. “В ней все противопоставляется своему «я», и в этом разрезе 
рисуется восточная действительность. […] Б. Пильняк, как и целый ряд западно–европейских 
писателей, старается охватить Восток, подходя к нему, как к чему–то внешнему, стремясь 
уловить 'запах' Востока.” 
 
519 Spurr, Rhetoric of Empire, 142–147. 
 
520 Vel’tman, “ ‘Literaturnye otkliki,’” 221.  
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from its Moscow centre. When he expresses a desire to return to Moscow, it is a desire for 
the future: he wants to keep up with the newest developments in art and political debate.521  
Pil’niak, by contrast, finds in China a host of similarities with Russia and at the same 
time a contradictory strangeness that he cannot ultimately overcome. China for Pil’niak is 
uncanny, both unsettlingly familiar and insurmountably foreign. In a letter written after his 
return home, he declares that “I know that there is no better country than Russia, there could 
not be, even though Russia is similar—catastrophically!—to China[.]”522 This similarity is 
catastrophic, it upsets the order of things. Pil’niak does not project this similarity into a 
common revolutionary future; instead, his attempts to engage with contemporary Chinese 
reality only drive him to retreat into fantasies of a stable, deep Russian past, an imagined and 
secure childhood. This modernist nostalgia has been described by Svetlana Boym as a 
longing for the accelerated time of modernity to cease its relentless forward movement.523 
Like the early Lukacs, Pil’niak voices the fear that this globalizing modernity will be defined 
by homelessness: the relentless nature of historical change produces confused orphans cut 
loose from the stable meanings of the past (a theme developed in later works such as 
Mahogany). China can only be accepted if transformed into Russia, fully identical with the 
true home of childhood; but this identity will inevitably collapse, catastrophically, and 
Pil’niak can find no identity of interests with which it might be replaced. Hence, perhaps, the 
collapse of the travelogue into the inherently private form of the diary. Pil’niak fails to fulfil 
the public role of his onscreen double: he cannot endorse the Chinese revolution because it 
does not belong to him.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 See for example the beginning of the final chapter of Chzhungo, “Domoi,” Tret’iakov, Chzhungo 
(1927), 227; “Tret’iakov uekhal v Pekin. Otvet na zapros redaktsii,” Zrelishcha 74 (1924): 8. 
  
522 Dany Savelli, “Shest’ neizdanykh pisem’,” 154. Savelli dates this letter to 17 September 1926. “я 
знаю, что лучшей страны, лучшей России, — нет, не может быть, хотя Россия похожа — 
катастрофически! — на Китай[.]” 
 
523 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), xv, 10–13. 
	  	   197	  
Chapter Three 
The Internationalist Gaze: China in Early Soviet Cinema 
 
 Soviet reportage’s claim to represent a real, contemporary China was shared by the 
newly prominent medium of film, whose form and function was the subject of such heated 
debate in the 1920s. Although many films on Chinese themes were planned during the China 
boom of the mid-to-late 1920s, including a projected trilogy scripted by Sergei Tret’iakov 
and directed by Sergei Eisenstein, the two most prominent films to bring China to Soviet 
audiences were both documentaries: The Great Flight (Velikii perelet, 1925) and Shanghai 
Document (Shankhaiskii dokument, 1928). These documentaries shared reportage’s desire to 
transmit contemporary China to its audience as an eyewitness experience, but with the added 
authenticity of the camera’s indexical recording capacities. By collapsing the space between 
the point of recording and the point of exhibition, and by juxtaposing multiple spaces within 
one film through the use of montage, film could bring this distant socio-spatial entity called 
“China” before the eyes of a larger Soviet audience than any other medium. These films also 
operated with the combination of analytical authority and emotional sympathy that 
characterized internationalist aesthetics: asserting the power of the Soviet perspective to order 
and explain Chinese reality, while presenting vivid images of exploitation, suffering and 
uprising that would deliver affective charges to their audience.  
This chapter will focus on the ways in which these two filmic representations of 
China assert the power of Soviet culture’s perceptual apparatus to conceive and indeed 
reorder global space. In The Great Flight, the expedition film is enabled by a heroic act of 
aviation, a conquest of space that brings China within reach of the Soviet internationalist 
gaze. In Shanghai Document, the juxtaposition of multiple spaces within the city of Shanghai 
expresses the global class struggle in microcosm. Although the expedition element is almost 
effaced from this later film by comparison with its predecessor, the use of parallel montage 
enables the Soviet cinematic gaze to become the only agent that can penetrate and perceive 
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all the contradictory spaces of this social totality. The heroic travelling capacity of the camera 
in the first film becomes a purely cognitive capacity in the second: as with Tret’iakov’s travel 
sketches, the Soviet observer’s privileged perspective enables an understanding of the social 
totality in China that is not available to either Europeans or Chinese. 
I. 
 “Under-shooting, over-shooting, and hitting the target”: the Great Flight Moscow—
Mongolia—China as a transformation of spatial perception 
 
China should rightfully become as well-known and dear to us as America. China 
must be carefully and comprehensively squeezed into the consciousness of the 
masses through their pupils. 
(Sergei Tret’iakov, in a review of the film The Great Flight, 15 December 1925.)524 
 
At the turn of the century, cinema and aviation seemed to form a single moment. By 
1914, aviation was ceasing to be strictly a means of flying and breaking 
records[…]; it was becoming one way, or perhaps even the ultimate way, of seeing. 
(Paul Virilio, War and Cinema.)525 
 
On June 10 1925, six aeroplanes took off from the L. D. Trotsky aerodrome in 
Moscow, bound for China. Organized by the Society for Friends of Aviation and Chemical 
Defence and Industry (Aviakhim), this “Great Flight” aimed to reach Beijing by way of 
Baikal, Mongolia and the Gobi desert—the latter never before crossed by air.526 In an 
interview published in Pravda on the day the planes departed, Aviakhim Chair A. I. Rykov 
described the Great Flight as performing two fundamental tasks. The expedition would serve 
as “a sign of the strengthening of the fraternal link between the workers of the Soviet Union 
and the peoples of Mongolia and China,” while also providing “excellent training for our 
flight personnel and an observable test [наглядная проверка] of the achievements of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Nedolet-perelet-popadanie,” Kino 39 (1925): 4. “Китай в праве стать нам 
столь же знакомым и родным, как та же Америка. Через зрачки в сознание масс надо втиснуть 
Китай бережно и обстоятельно.” 
 
525 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: the Logistics of Perception (London, New York: Verso, 1989), 22. 
 
526 Obshchestvo druzei aviatsionnoi i khimicheskoi oborony i promyshlennosti SSSR (AVIAKHIM), 
founded in May 1925 as a merger of two pre-existing societies, the Society for Friends of the Air 
Fleet (Obshchestvo druzei vozdushnogo flota—ODVF) and the Society for Friends of Chemical 
Defence and Industry (Obshchestvo druzei khimicheskoi oborony i promyshlennosti—
DOBROKHIM).  
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aviation industry.” In conclusion, Rykov asserts that “the entire Soviet country should follow 
the progress of this flight.”527  
Rykov’s language of observation and signification alerts us to the fact that aviation 
feats such as this were intended first and foremost as representations, laden with symbolic 
meaning. Emma Widdis reads the spatial aesthetics of 1920s Soviet cinema as celebrating a 
drive towards exploration (разведка) of the periphery, enabled by technical inventiveness 
(изобретение): “The heroism of the inventor was celebrated alongside the heroism of the 
traveller.”528 In the aviation feat, invention and eploration, technology and daring, combine in 
the conquest of space. In his study of Russian aviation culture, Scott W. Palmer argues that 
the airplane emerged in the twentieth century as perhaps the quintessential symbol of 
progress. Moreover, for Palmer, its signifying powers were national in reference. 
Achievements in aviation reflected onto the prestige of individual nation-states: 
As the quintessential marker of twentieth-century progress, the airplane, more so 
than any other technology, clarified the link between nationalist aspirations and the 
advent of the modern age. In promising military and economic advantage, and in 
demonstrating mastery over nature, the airplane emerged as the clearest measure of 
nations, distinguishing not only European civilization from those of Africa and 
Asia, but also the truly great powers among the Continent’s leading states.529 
 
The Great Flight, however, sought to represent national achievements through an act of 
internationalist solidarity: this, from a Soviet perspective, was the meaning of Palmer’s 
“modern age.” In fact, as Anindita Banerjee has argued, the symbolic functions of 
mechanical flight in modern Russian culture oscillated from the mid-nineteenth century 
between appraisals of a future borderless humanity and affirmations of the power of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 “Perelet Moskva—Mongoliia—Kitai,” Pravda, June 10, 1925. 
 
528 Widdis, Visions, 104. 
 
529 Scott W. Palmer, Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6. 
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nation state.530 The Great Flight inherits this ambiguity as its defining symbolic feature: a 
declaration of national, military power, it also served as a statement of internationalist 
solidarity with neighbouring China. This symbol was directed to three audiences: the peoples 
of Mongolia and China, the USSR’s rivals in the West, and the Soviet audience itself. To 
achieve this symbolic status, the Flight had to pass into representation through the mass 
media technologies of print and film. With cinema in particular, aviation found a close 
partner for its complex aspirations of technological prowess, national assertion, and 
internationalist sentiment. 
The Great Flight squadron consisted of six planes: four of Soviet construction, and 
two foreign-made “Junkers.” These larger passenger planes were needed to transport the 
sizeable media crew that accompanied the expedition, making up around a third of the total 
number of participants.531 Four correspondents from various press organs—Grigorii 
Rozenblat for Pravda, Zinaida Rikhter for Izvestiia, Aleksandr Lebedenko for Leninskaia 
Pravda, and V. A. Mikhel’s for the Russian Telegrah Agency (Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe 
agenstvo—ROSTA)—filed daily telegrams updating readers on the Flight’s progress along its 
route. In addition, a two-man film crew from Proletkino, cameraman Georgii Blium and 
director Vladimir Shneiderov, travelled with the planes and captured the expedition on film. 
This was the first time anywhere in the world, the newspapers declared, that a film crew had 
participated in a long-distance aviation expedition of this kind.532 The Great Flight was thus 
produced as a media event that happened multiple times: reported near-simultaneously in 
newspapers through the summer of 1925, it was replayed in the film The Great Flight (Velikii 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 Anindita Banerjee, We Modern People: Science Fiction and the Making of Russian Modernity 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2012), 42–51. 
 
531 There were six pilots, six engineers, the expedition’s leader, I. P. Shmidt, and six representatives of 
the newspaper and cinema industries. 
 
532 “S kino-apparatom v Kitai,” Kino 12 June 16, 1925): 1. Western film-makers, this article claimed, 
had hitherto filmed only the beginning and end of such expeditions, rather than accompany the entire 
flight. 
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perelet), which ran in the capitals’ cinemas from December 1925 to January 1926. The 
experience could also be relived by reading one of the books that the aforementioned 
newspaper correspondents spun out of their aerial adventure in subsequent years.533  
By the end of the Civil War, aviation had practically ceased to exist in Russia.534 
Beginning in 1923, the Bolshevik government launched a concerted newspaper campaign to 
generate public interest in the renaissance of the aviation industry. Organizations such as 
ODVF, Dobrolet and Aviakhim were created to channel public support for aviation.535 This 
campaign soon sought to harness the symbolic power of arduous flights over impressive 
distances, in conscious rivalry with Western competitors. In 1925, a newly-established 
“Committee on Big Flights” proposed a flight to China as their first major project.536  
The timing of a symbolic flight of solidarity to China could not have been more 
auspicious. Although Comintern agents had been working to direct China’s political 
development since 1920, forming alliances with the Nationalist Party (Guomindang—GMD) 
and helping to found the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), press coverage on the Chinese 
situation increased considerably following the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 
1924.537 But it was the shooting of demonstrators by British police in Shanghai on May 30, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Of the four correspondents, Rikhter, Lebedenko and Mikhel’s all published book-length accounts 
of their experiences. See Zinaida Rikhter, 7,000 kilometrov po vozdukhu. Moskva–Mongoliia–Kitai 
(Moscow: Avtoizdatel-stvo, 1926); A. Lebedenko, Kak ia letal v Kitai (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1928); 
V. Mikhel’s, Ot kremlevskoi do kitaiskoi steny — perelet Moskva–Pekin (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 
1927). It is possible that Rozenblat would have followed suit, had he not been killed in a plane crash 
at Kharkov in 1926, aboard a flight from Tiflis to Moscow. See “Gibel’ samoleta ‘Dorn’e-kometa’: 
ubit sotrudnik ‘Pravdy’ tov. G. Ia. Rozenblat,” Pravda, May 20, 1926. 
 
534 Palmer, Dictatorship, 81. 
 
535 Ibid., 85–98. On ODVF, see note 526. Dobrolet (Dobrovol’nyi vozdushnyi flot, the “Voluntary Air 
Fleet”) was founded in 1923 to act as “a self-financing commercial enterprise that would assist 
industry, trade, and business interests regarding the construction of a national air fleet.” Ibid., 91. 
 
536 Ibid., 161. Mikhel’s reports that the Flight’s route was planned by the veteran pilot and engineer 
Kh. N. Slavorosov. Mikhel’s, Ot kremlevskoi do kitaiskoi steny, 10. 
 
537 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), 309, 
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1925 that really catapulted China to the top of the Soviet news agenda. That day, a large 
crowd gathered at a police station in Shanghai’s International Settlement to demand the 
release of six students, who had been arrested en route to the funeral of a worker shot by 
Japanese factory guards in a dispute over a strike. When the crowd refused to disperse, the 
British police opened fire, killing at least eleven people and wounding twenty more. Social 
outrage at the May 30 massacre led to major strikes in Shanghai and Hong Kong, and yet 
more retaliation from the Western powers. Another 50 or so protestors were killed on June 23 
when British and French troops fired on a demonstration in Canton.538  
In the Soviet Union, the May 30 massacre and subsequent strikes made China the 
undisputed story of the day in the run-up to and throughout the Great Flight. China was on 
the front page of every issue of Pravda for the first week of June 1925. Inside the newspaper, 
Sergei’s Tret’iakov’s “letters from Peking” described the development of Beijing’s student 
movement in recent months, while articles by Leon Trotsky and Grigorii Zinov’ev 
proclaimed that events in Shanghai were the first stage in global capitalism’s collapse.539 On 
June 5, Karl Radek’s front-page article compared China’s 1925 to Russia’s 1905, not least 
because of the surprise it caused among Western observers, who had not expected these 
immobile, frozen Eastern lands to spring suddenly into revolutionary life.540 On the following 
page, a cartoon showed a Chinese man in traditional dress and Qing-dynasty hairstyle break 
his chains while a capitalist on his knees shouted “Help! Sound the alarm!!” (караул!! 
Помогите!”): 
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539 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Na perelome (Pis’mo iz Pekina),” Pravda, June 3, 1925; “Den’ unizheniia 
(Pis’mo iz Pekina),” Pravda, June 4, 1925; Lev Trotskii, “Moskovskii dukh,” Pravda, June 6, 1925; 
Grigorii Zinoviev, “Vsemirnoe-istoricheskoe znachenie shankhaiskikh sobytii,” Pravda, June 7, 1925. 
 
540 Karl Radek, “Shankhaiskie sobytiia,” Pravda, June 5, 1925. 
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Figure 2: "Help!! Sound the Alarm!" Pravda, June 5, 1925. 
The queue that this male Chinese figure wears was, by 1925, an anachronism: the traditional 
hairstyle of the Manchu Qing dynasty, mandated for all their male subjects, was outlawed 
following the foundation of the Chinese Republic in 1912. Its retention in the pages of 
Pravda shows the gap between popular images of China and contemporary Chinese reality; 
but it also places the Chinese man firmly in the past of pre-modern tradition, rendering his 
sudden overthrow of the capitalist, and perhaps his own backwardness, all the more dramatic. 
Capital is on its knees, says Pravda, and China is rising. 
The stage could not have been better set for a symbolic journey such as the Great 
Flight. The expedition asserted that Soviet, socialist modernity possessed the technology, the 
political empathy, and the daring to forge a new connection between Russia and China, thus 
overcoming the legendary “distance” that shaped one dimension of China’s pre-revolutionary 
image. That distance, traditionally metonymized in the impassable barrier of the Great Wall, 
was represented in accounts of the Flight by the Gobi desert. “Remember,” advised Rykov in 
his departure speech at the aerodrome, summoning the flight’s distant, mysterious 
destination, “there, beyond the Gobi desert, lives a people fighting for its independence.”541 
This mighty natural obstacle had never before been crossed by plane. The absolute novelty of 
this geospatial feat was to parallel the proclaimed novelty of the political gesture: Europeans 
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живет народ, который борется за свою самостоятельность.”  
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arriving in China with a display of technological prowess intended to assert solidarity, not 
dominance.  
Though the idea of crossing the Gobi by plane was new, the idea of a technologically 
enabled connection to China across Eurasian space had considerable pedigree in the Russian 
imperial imagination. Susanna Lim notes that nineteenth century writers from Fyodor 
Dostoevsky to the Sinologist Boris Vasil’ev and the science-fiction writer Vladimir 
Odoevskii hailed the new technology of the railway as enabling the expansion of Russian 
power across the Eurasian landmass.542 Most notably, the Trans-Siberian Railroad became, in 
Steven Marks’ phrase, a “road to power” enabling the colonization of Asian Russia.543  
The Soviet project inherited the technology and the ambition for connection, but 
sought to reverse their signification. As Emma Widdis notes, contemporary films such as 
Turksib and Salt for Svanetiia presented the expansion of Soviet infrastructure as a heroic 
overcoming of backwardness.544 Connection to the new Soviet grid was represented as a 
liberation and reconfiguration of global space: “The destruction of social and spatial 
boundaries meant the creation of alternative connections, between peasant and worker, and 
between proletariats across the world.”545 One of Tret’iakov’s first travel sketches, 
“Moscow—Beijing,” invokes precisely this motif of technological connection across 
Eurasian space as it describes the author’s journey across Soviet space and into China along 
the Trans-Siberian Railroad.546 In the process, Marks’ “road to power” is refigured as a road 
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Russia, 1850–1917 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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see Chapter Two. 
	  	   205	  
to enhanced knowledge and internationalist solidarity.547 Revealingly, Tret’iakov described 
his travelogue as a “journey-film” (путьфильма), indicating that it shares the ambitions of 
the film The Great Flight: by documenting his journey to Beijing in as much detail as 
possible, Tret’iakov attempts to transfer to the reader the bodily experience of travelling by 
train to China.  
The “journey-film” was becoming a significant Soviet genre precisely at this moment 
in the mid-1920s. Indeed, the director Shneiderov was something of a pioneer in this regard, 
producing, Widdis notes, “two of the first examples of the emergent genre of the travel film”: 
Around Uzbekistan (Po Uzbekistanu) and The Great Flight.548 The fact that Shneiderov could 
follow an expedition film on Uzbekistan with one on China suggests, for Widdis, that at this 
time adventure space was “unbounded,” that “the national border represented not a protective 
divide, but rather a point of transition or contact, Russia’s immanent link with the 
international proletariat.”549 But is a journey to China really the same thing as a journey 
around Uzbekistan? In this section I will argue that the model of connective journey to the 
backwards periphery works well when we are looking at the backwardness of Mongolia, and 
(to a degree) the exotica of old Beijing. Shanghai, however, offers the potentially alarming 
prospect of a rival Eurasian centre, a modernity equally if not more mechanized; a front line 
in the revolutionary war over which the Moscow centre can exert only a weak grip. In the 
narrative of The Great Flight, this tension is resolved when we reach Guangzhou, and find 
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there a revolutionary political force, the Guomindang (GMD), organized on Soviet lines and 
equipped for military violence. 
The Chinese, it is asserted, are being linked to this new network of technologized 
connectivity for their own benefit, not for reasons of control or dominance. Mikhail 
Pavlovich, editor of Novyi Vostok (The New East) and a prominent Soviet authority on the 
East, made this point in the introduction to Mikhel’s’ book: 
When the expedition’s aeroplanes appeared under comrade Shmidt’s command 
above China, they were the first aeroplanes to speak to the Chinese people not of 
the threatening power of their enemies—who have at their disposal all the resources 
of modern technology, including mighty aerial squadrons equipped with machine-
guns and bombs for battle with rising China—but of the friendship of a great 
neighbouring country that adjoins their own for several thousand kilometres, and an 
unwritten union with the great workers’ and peasants’ republic.550 
 
The message that the planes pronounce to the Chinese people is perhaps more complex than 
Mikhail Pavlovich’s “not A… but B” construction allows for here, however. In truth, it is 
more along the lines of “A but not A, because B.” The arrival of the planes announces that 
the Soviet state does in fact possess all the “resources of modern technology” and their 
implied military capacities, but at the same time insists that these resources pose no threat to 
China, whose safety is guaranteed by neighbourly feeling and a somewhat ambiguous 
“unwritten union.”  
In fact, the military significance of the Flight was in no way concealed: Mikhail 
Pavlovich begins this same introduction with an extensive discussion of aviation’s primary 
importance in “the coming war” (будущая война).551 The inevitability of war with the 
Western powers was a constant theme in Soviet official discourse at this time, and was 	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inextricably linked with the growing prominence of the aviation industry.552 The mapping of 
an unprecedented air route to China through Mongolia, where the Soviets were at that time 
cementing their political influence, sent a clear global signal about the reach of Soviet aerial 
capabilities. Accordingly, military language saturates contemporary accounts of the Flight. 
Mikhel’s, reporting on the efforts to organize landing points for the flight across the USSR, 
invokes the atmosphere of a military operation: “Communications from the VTsIK, from 
Dobrolet, and from the ODVF were regarded and carried out as combat orders.”553 Rykov, in 
his speech at the aerodrome before the flight departed, described the expedition as “a battle 
with the aerial space separating the peoples of the USSR from the peoples of Mongolia and 
China,” concluding that “the conquest of distance [победа над расстоянием] will play an 
important role in linking us with the peoples of the East [для смычки с народами 
востока].”554 The term smychka, suggesting the interlocking of links in a chain, was 
commonly used at this time to refer to the overcoming of the separation of town and village 
within the USSR. Widdis finds in the term a sense of equalization, a drive to reduce spatial 
hierarchy.555 In Rykov’s speech, this stated ambition to connect with the East on equal terms 
coincides with the metaphorical language of conquest. The military significance of such a 
connection cannot be allowed to slip entirely from view. 
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Aviation and war are inextricably linked; but we only begin to appreciate the 
complexity of the Great Flight’s international work of signification once we introduce cinema 
into the mix. Paul Virilio, whose book War and Cinema draws multiple threads and parallels 
across what he calls “the osmosis between industrialized warfare and cinema,” notes that the 
relationship between perception and modern warfare is double.556 On the one hand, 
perception became, in the twentieth century, the fundamental element that enabled military 
forces to assert dominance over the enemy. War, increasingly distanced from actual contact 
in combat, becomes for Virilio a game of hide-and-seek within ever more advanced fields of 
technologically mediated perception, in which “what is perceived is already lost.”557 The 
conjunction of aviation and photographic technologies played a crucial role in this 
development from World War I, when reconnaissance planes proved capable of not just 
perceiving but recording, through serial photography, the movements of enemy lines in a 
manner that was simply inaccessible from the sightless position of the trenches.558  
On the other hand, Virilio insists that war is always a spectacle, a display of power 
with “psychotropic origins in sympathetic magic,” whose deep roots stretch back to “the 
world of ancient religions and tribal gatherings.”559 War, as perception, is not just logistics 
but also aesthetics, and this aesthetic experience serves to bond and forge communal 
identities: “war is a symptom of delirium operating in the half-light of trance, drugs, blood 
and unison.”560 War works psychologically on its audience, including combatants, victims, 
and spectators, to change their mode of perception itself: 
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There is no war, then, without representation, no sophisticated weaponry without 
psychological mystification. Weapons are tools not just of destruction but also of 
perception—that is to say, stimulants that make themselves felt through chemical, 
neurological processes in the sense organs and the central nervous system, affecting 
human reactions and even the perceptual identification and differentiation of 
objects.561  
 
Virilio’s claim is that cinema, by turning the son et lumière effects of modern warfare onto 
the civilian audience, extends the state of entrancement produced by war to the general 
population. “Once cinema was able to create surprise, (technological, psychological, etc),” 
Virilio claims, “it effectively came under the category of weapons.”562 Cinema is war for 
Virilio in a double sense: the advanced visual precision of film enhances the military 
perspective, while its aesthetic powers, its capacity to shock and move, extend the delirious 
“magic” of war to the film spectator. In this way, for Virilio, cinema trains its audience to 
populate permanently militarized industrial societies.  
This double movement of logistics and aesthetics that Virilio outlines in War and 
Cinema tallies closely with the combination of analytical power and affective sympathy 
expressed, I argue, through the Soviet internationalist perspective on China. In the film of 
The Great Flight, the Soviet audience was encouraged to share the military perspective 
enabled by aviation, and granted visual access to the Chinese Civil War, which they were 
encouraged to view as the front line in a global war with capitalist imperialism. At the same 
time, the film’s visual excitement, adventurous narrative, and extensive portrait images of the 
residents of Mongolia and China sought to produce an emotional reaction that would bring 
the spectator to embrace the internationalist project and its militarized implications.  
The militarized atmosphere of early Soviet culture certainly fits Virilio’s sense of 
cinema as a war of and through images. Indeed, it could be said that Soviet culture was 
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simply more explicit than its western counterparts about its status as militarized propaganda. 
Endlessly repeating Lenin’s alleged mantra that “cinema for us is the most important of the 
arts,” publications such as Kino (Cinema), Sovetskii ekran (Soviet Screen) and Sovetskoe kino 
(Soviet Cinema) were filled in the 1920s with articles on cinema’s educative function and the 
need to “cinefy” the countryside. In this discourse, cinema was frequently described as an 
“orudie”—a word meaning “instrument” that can equally signify “gun” or “weapon”—with 
which the consciousness of the newly Soviet population could be reshaped. Thus Eisenstein, 
writing of his planned but unmade film about China, argued that: “Perhaps for the first time, 
film was to become as fearsome a weapon as the machine gun.”563  
The enemy forces in this psycho-formational war were foreign films, particularly 
Hollywood productions—what Virilio calls the “American perceptual arsenal.”564 As Denise 
Youngblood has shown, in the 1920s foreign-made films remained, on the whole, much more 
popular with cinema audiences than domestic Soviet produce.565 In 1925, The Great Flight 
was one of 62 Soviet films released in the USSR, as against 53 films imported from France, 
another 53 from Germany, and 241 from the USA.566 The sense of the cinematic field as a 
war for (and on) audiences is suggested, in part, by the Russian term used for “smash hit” or 
“blockbuster”: “boevik,” which carries also the meaning of “fighter” or “militant.” The Great 
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Flight was promoted in the press precisely as a “sovetskii boevik”: a Soviet, documentary 
film that could compete at the box office with its foreign adversaries.567  
The link between aviation and film as perceptual experiences, meanwhile, was 
identified in V. Pertsov’s review of The Great Flight for Sovetskii ekran. Pertsov argued that 
cinema and aviation were both modern technologies that expanded the radius of human 
consciousness through their transformations of perceptive experience: “Cinema is the 
prototype for the brazen daring of the modern innovator. The radius of ordinary human 
perception is expanding beyond measure. Cinema's only competitor in this regard is another 
great force of modernity that is pushing outwards the radius of our possibilities: aviation.”568 
The combination of these quintessential modern technologies of perception in a project like 
the Great Flight enabled the entire population to experience the transformative aerial (and 
implicitly military) perspective: “the multi-million masses of the population now participate 
in the aerial expedition Moscow—Beijing.”569 Pertsov even suggests cinema can be used as 
training for actual flight by reproducing the experience of a passenger in a plane—complete 
with shaking floor—just as artificial wooden horses are used to train cavalry in military 
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academies.570 Pertsov here anticipates the invention of flight simulators, which, Virilio notes, 
were to become a crucial element in military pilot training from the mid-1970s.571 But 
Pertsov wants to use cinema’s affective power to jolt the entire population into new ways of 
thinking about and seeing the world: taking all of peasant Russia up for a ride in a plane, he 
suggests, might help to “uproot their patriarchal thought structure.”572  
Pertsov here voices the cultural aspirations of the Soviet aviation project, aspirations 
that linked aviation technology to the mass transformation of perception. Palmer reports that 
agit-flights in the mid-1920s would indeed take local peasants up for a ride in their planes. 
Ostensibly this was done to remove from them any superstitious belief in a spirit-ordered 
cosmos.573 But it also introduced them to the aerial perspective that played so crucial a role in 
recent advances in military perception. The general population is thus encouraged, through 
the medium of cinema, to share this new military perspective. A film like The Great Flight, 
Virilio’s study suggests, simply placed before a general audience the breakthroughs in 
technological perception that had been achieved by the development of reconnaissance 
aviation in World War One: “While war footage or aerial chronophotography remained under 
lock and key or was simply shrugged aside (as it mainly was in the United States), film-
makers served up the technological effects to the public as a novel spectacle, a continuation 
of the war’s destruction of form.”574 In expedition films such as The Great Flight this 
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“destruction of form” enables the construction of a new spatial experience, based around the 
chronotope of travel but with dazzling new dimensions opened up by aerial shots of the 
landscape. Likewise, new temporal dimensions are revealed in the sheer speed with which 
Moscow gives way to Mongolia and then to China, as film editing mimics the aeroplane’s 
capacity to overcome distance and extend the reach of the technologically enabled Soviet 
gaze. As Pertsov argues, The Great Flight simulates the Great Flight cinematically: montage 
combines with the aerial perspective to reproduce the flight’s accelerated collapsing of 
Eurasian space, offering a psychological tool able to transform the perceptual experiences of 
the population. 
The language of war and cinema overlap explicitly in Sergei Tret’iakov’s review of 
The Great Flight, entitled “Undershooting—Overshooting—Hitting the Target” (“Nedolet—
Perelet—Popadanie”). Tret’iakov’s use of the language of military bombardment here stems 
from a pun on the word “perelet,” which in the title of the expedition and film implies a flight 
that crosses a significant quantity of territory, but also carries the potential meaning of 
“overshoot” in the context of artillery. Thus Tret’iakov openly equates filming and artillery 
fire, declaring at the start of his article: “China is taken under our cine-bombardment” (Китай 
взят под наш кинообстрел).575 The first phase of this bombardment, the “undershoot” 
(nedolet), was the writing of bad film scripts by people who either knew nothing about China, 
or nothing about writing film scripts. The second phase, the “overshoot,” is The Great Flight 
itself, which presents a “vivid, real contemporary China,” but does so in a way that is 
“thrown together hurriedly, feverishly and unsystematically.”576 What will “hit the target” 
(popadanie), for Tret’iakov, is a synthesis of these two tendencies: a combination of the 
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China itself. This was indeed to be the formula pursued by Tret’iakov and Sergei Eisenstein 
on their uncompleted project, considered below, to make a trilogy of China films. 
If Soviet cinema sought to train its audience to perceive the world as war, then China, 
in the mid-1920s, was presented as that war’s turbulent centre, its violent front line. China in 
this formulation staged the sequel to the Russian Civil War, in the ongoing apocalyptic war 
of capitalism’s downfall predicted by Lenin’s Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism. 
The newspaper advertising campaign for The Great Flight gave the film the subtitle “Civil 
War in China,” and promised the following sights: “Military action. The army of Feng 
Yuxiang. The army of the Guomindang. Bloody battles for Canton”:  
 
Figure 3: The Great Flight. Newspaper advertisement, November 1925.577 
The film’s advertisement promised to realize visually the complex details of the Chinese 
situation that filled the papers’ pages every day. But the advertisement also offered a different 
kind of visualization: a map of the route, uniting Moscow, Mongolia, China and even Japan 
within the same, traversed space.578  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 Vecherniaia Moskva, November 19, 1925. This or similar advertisements for Velikii perelet 
appeared on the back of every issue of Vecherniaia Moskva from November 13 to November 30, 
excluding November 16 and 17.  
 
578 A branch of the Great Flight flew on by invitation to Japan, while the rest of the expedition made 
its way to Shanghai. The Japanese leg of the expedition, despite appearing on the posters, was not 
accompanied by a camera and did not appear in the film. 
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Even in this period of “cinematification,” the map, an older technology of military 
perception, remained an important means of imagining global space as the space of global 
war. The importance of maps in the young Soviet state’s process of self-representation has 
been widely remarked.579 But the map is also crucial to the formation of the early Soviet 
sense of global, international space. Towards the end of Ostrovskii’s How the Steel was 
Tempered, a description of Pavel Korchagin’s room notes its simple furniture, piles of books 
and newspapers, several filled notebooks, and a “huge map of China studded with black and 
red flags.”580 Following the war in China by map is a sign of Pavel’s progress towards correct 
revolutionary behavior. In the various techniques used to visualize the Great Flight, however, 
we encounter the intersection of maps and cinema as visual technologies, focused upon China 
as the centre of global war.  
This is a constellation that is also encountered in the animated film China on Fire 
(Kitai v ogne), released in the summer of 1925: another testament to the centrality of China in 
the Soviet internationalist imagination of the 1920s.581 This film contains a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Noting that Walter Benjamin observed the prominence of maps during his sojourn in Moscow in 
1926, Emma Widdis argues for mapping the new national territory as one of the fundamental tasks of 
inter-war Soviet film. See Widdis, Visions, 2–4. Francine Hirsch identifies the map, alongside the 
census and the museum, as one of the key technologies that enabled the production of the USSR as an 
ethnologically differentiated multi-national state. See Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: 
Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2005).  
 
580 Ostrovskii, Kak zakalialas’ stal’, 303. “В комнате Корчагина, на столе у окна, груды 
принесенных из партийной библиотеки книг, стопа газет; несколько исписанных блокнотов. 
Хозяйская кровать, два стула, а на двери, ведущей в комнату Таи, огромная карта Китая, 
утыканная черными и красными флажками.”  
 
581 Kitai v ogne was produced by the Experimental Workshop of the State Technicum of 
Cinematography (Gosudarstvennyi tekhnikum kinematografii—GTK), an artistic collective consisting 
of Z. Komissarenko, N. Maksimov, Iu. Merkulov and N. Khodataev. The scenario was written by 
“Vinogradov and the collective,” and the photography done by Shulman. For this study I have used 
the copy available via youtube.com, accessed online on April 18, 2014: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tO4MfMIosRw. Komissarenko, Merkulov and Khodataev had 
also worked together on GTK's 1924 animated film Mezhplanetnaia revoliutsiia (Interplanetary 
Revolution), a fantastical expansion of proletarian internationalism into the cosmic realm of science 
fiction. (See opening credits for both films.) The animation technique of using cardboard cut-out dolls 
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sequences figuring China as a map that constitutes the focal point of global struggle, attacked 
by grotesque, ghoulish monsters that stand for imperialist capitalism. Consistent with the 
demands of internationalist aesthetics, China on Fire does not allow these maps to remains 
abstract, detached symbols; instead, they become concrete, even embodied sites of suffering, 
invested with emotional value.  
In the film’s opening sequence, the “Ruler of the World” (Владыка мира), a 
disembodied head with enormous cheeks, fanged jaws and a star-spangled hat, lurks by the 
spinning globe. As the globe rotates, this grotesque figuration of global capital darts out its 
obscene tongue and gobbles up India, Australia, Java, and the decapitated German Kaiser. 
Search beams shooting from the ruler’s eyes herald the appearance of China, linking it 
immediately to war (and, Virilio would argue, to cinema): 
 
Figure 4: China on Fire. The Ruler of the World catches sight of China 
These same eyes then pop out on stalks and begin to strafe lightning bolts across China’s 
territory, now marked with the written signs of its resources—coal, gold, silver: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was carried over from this previous production, in which the all-consuming, fat-cheeked “Ruler of the 
World” also made an appearance.  
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Figure 5: China on Fire. Seeing China's resources 
In this sequence, perception and illumination are presented as essential elements in capital’s 
consumption of the globe. The eyes stick out before the tongue, their reach enhanced by 
electricity. The film itself becomes a reciprocal act of world-seeing: if the collective can 
show China to their Soviet audience, perhaps they can help China escape the eyes and jaws of 
capitalist power.  
In this short but visually inventive film, maps are used to figure China as a passive, 
prone body, helpless in the face of imperialist violence. In one particularly horrifying 
sequence, a monstrous black spider with bulging eyes, a markedly Semitic nose, and the top 
hat of capital crawls across the map of China, which is centred on a soft-featured human face, 
its eyes closed in sleep or fear. Pulling in bags of raw material from all across the map, the 
spider sits on top of this face, wrapping its long legs around it. Capital sees, China is blind:  
 
Figure 6: China on Fire. The spider of Capital wrapped around China 
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At the beginning of Part Three, letters spinning out of a hat inform us that we are in Beijing’s 
Diplomatic Compound. Five figures sit around a table, representing the four Great Powers—
the USA, Britain, Japan and France—and the puppet Chinese President. On the table is 
spread a map of China. The grotesque diplomats, their fangs bared, set about measuring out 
spheres of influence with compasses under the passive gaze of the nominally presiding 
President: 
   
Figure 7: China on Fire. Carving up the map of China 
In a later sequence we return to this map, now corporealized as a prone Chinese man with a 
Mandarin hat and, again, the anachronistic queue. The map, which had earlier embodied the 
raw materials that attract this foreign aggression, here becomes the body of the nation, an 
ethnically marked representative of the population that is greedily dismembered from four 
directions: 
   
Figure 8: China on Fire. Dismembering China  
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As his limbs fly offscreen, the outlines of the map fade on the page: the nation’s physical 
survival is threatened.  
This sequence is immediately contrasted, however, with another that is structurally 
similar but opposite in outcome, as announced by dramatic titles: “BUT… they forgot one 
little thing” (НО… о малом забыли). In perhaps the most visually striking sequence of the 
film, we see another map being drawn, from scratch. Gradually it takes the shape of Russia, 
centred on Moscow, whose name is given (inaccurately) in Chinese characters. The drawing 
continues to develop, tracing the outlines of three torsos in imperialist military attire. On 
completion, these are topped with monstrous animal heads. Simultaneously, a star swells out 
from the point on the map that is Moscow, transforming into a hammer and sickle. The 
encircling monsters shoot lightning bolts from their eyes at the symbol—to see, again, is to 
destroy—and reach out their hands to grasp it: 
  
Figure 9: China on Fire. Imperialist encirclement of the USSR 
But the hammer and sickle changes back into a star and thence into a cannon, which shoots 
back at the heads, turning them into white skulls as blackness engulfs their bodies and fills 
the space around the map. In this moment, we see the map transformed from a system of 
imperialist dominance into a site of resistance to imperial power. The star swells to fill the 
screen, adorned again with the hammer and sickle, then cuts to ambassador Lev Karakhan 
arriving in China on the Moscow—Beijing train. Thus cartographic parallelism, which 
	  	   220	  
establishes the Russian Civil War as the positive predecessor to the Chinese situation, is 
immediately followed by a connective spatial act demonstrating the solidarity of the Soviet 
political space with the Chinese.  
The Great Flight likewise sought to connect symbolically and spectacularly these two 
dynamic map-spaces: the threatened map-space of China, and the victoriously resistant map-
space of the Soviet Union. The spatial and graphic parallelism of China on Fire concurs with 
Karl Radek’s analysis at a meeting of the group “Hands of China” the previous year: the 
Chinese Civil War must be seen as a continuation of the Russian, itself an extension of the 
global struggle begun by World War I.582 The connective act of the Great Flight, in explicitly 
linking these two spaces, is an act of alliance in this global war. This meaning was endorsed 
from both sides: approving messages from the Guomindang were printed in the Soviet press, 
affirming the “veracity and authenticity” of Proletkino’s footage as against the “false 
information spread by the imperialist press.”583 But the Soviet audience was also encouraged 
to visualize the Flight in terms of cartographic connectivity, even before the film itself 
appeared.  
The coverage of the Flight in Vecherniaia Moskva, for example, included a series of 
front-page map images showing the current progress of the Flight on its path from Moscow to 
Beijing, each bearing the instruction, “follow this map” (следите за этой картой). Altering 
with each day’s progress, this newspaper map became a slow-moving form of animation. One 
redaction of the map introduces the stock characters in this global war, neatly delineating the 
two opposing sides: the smiling proletarians of Moscow at the point of origin, against the 
panicking Western and Chinese bourgeoisie at the final destination:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Radek, Ruki proch’ ot Kitaia!, 1.  
 
583 “Kitaiskoe natsional’noe pravitel’stvo o s”emkakh Proletkino,” Vecherniaia Moskva, November 
17, 1925. The statement from the Chinese National Government is attributed to Wang Jingwei. 
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Figure 10: “They are watching…” Vecherniaia Moskva, June 15, 1925. 
The assertion that everyone is watching the flight (Наблюдают…) affirms the sense that this 
aviation expedition constitutes a crucial move on the focal battlefield of the day. But the 
spatial arrangement of the map, which ignores north-south orientation and frames the 
Moscow—Beijing route almost as a straight line within these rectangular contours, also 
replaces notions of Chinese distance with a stark assertion of Eurasian proximity. Landscape 
and borders pose no obstacles to this trajectory’s homogenous progress; indeed, the border 
separating Mongolia and China from the USSR is scarcely distinguishable from the Siberian 
rivers that punctuate the route. 
If this map asserts proximity and accessibility, older tropes of distant China also 
persist in the various representations of the Flight. “To the distant, unknown, dangerous / 
Great Flight,” announce the film’s titles at the moment of departure from Moscow, 
accompanying shots of the pilots readying themselves and the planes starting to move.584 
Zinaida Rikhter’s account, meanwhile, frames the expedition very much within the tradition 
of adventures to distant, peripheral spaces. Rikhter positions herself from the start as the 
correspondent with a thirst for adventures: her previous winter, she tells us, “flashed by in the 
swift running of deer, in the rays of the polar sun, in the icy tundras of midnight Lapland.” 
Considering options for her next escapade, she is seduced by the lure of “golden” Aldan, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Velikii perelet, RGAKFD N. Uchetnyi 2721, pt. 1. “В далекий, неведомый, опасный /  Великий 
перелет.”  
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“Soviet Klondike,” with its “wild nature.”585 Rikhter is evoking here the language and 
geography of the American writer Jack London, who set such novels as The Call of the Wild 
and White Fang in the extreme environment of the Klondike gold rush. But with the 
announcement of the Great Flight, all her plans change: “7,000 kilometres by air… yes, that 
is a journey out of Mayne Reid! A lust for distant journeys and dangerous adventures 
immediately spoke forth within me.”586 This journey evokes the tales of Thomas Mayne 
Reid, another American writer of exotic adventure novels. Rikhter was not the only one 
positioning the Flight within the adventure canon: the inside cover for Mikhel’s’ book 
advertises such expeditionary titles as “Abode of the Snows (A Journey to the Himalayan 
Glaciers)” and “The Dead City of Khara-Khoto, discovered by the Russian Explorer P. K. 
Kozlov,” alongside “A Basic Summary of the Fundamentals of Aviation.” This placement of 
Mikhels’ volume within its media environment clearly seeks to link the technological feat of 
long-distance aviation with an earlier tradition of heroic imperial exploration.587  
Indeed, the exotic travel narrative, reformulated as a mission in internationalist 
solidarity, remained a popular form in the 1920s. Widdis notes the enduring success of the 
pre-revolutionary journal Vokrug sveta (Around the World), which repackaged its tales of 
exotic adventure to express the newly Soviet attitude of “discovery, not conquest—of 
exploration, not exploitation.”588 Indeed, several adventure novels written for young Soviet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Rikhter, 7,000 kilometrov, 9. “Зима 1925 года промелькнула для меня в быстром беге оленей, 
в лучах полярного сияния, в ледяных тундрах полуночной Лапландии. Передохнув в Москве, в 
мае я уже снова готовилась к поездке. Манил меня своей дикой природой золотой Алдан, — 
советский Клондайк.”  
 
586 Ibid. “7,000 километров по воздуху... да, ведь, это майнридовское путешествие! Страсть к 
далеким путешествиям, опасным приключениям сразу заговорила во мне.” 
 
587 Mikhel’s, inside front cover. Original titles: “БЕК, К.— Обитель снегов (Путешествие на 
гималайские ледники). Сокращенн. перевод с немецк. Э. Пименовой. Изд. 2-е. ФЕДЯЕВСКАЯ, 
В. —Мертвый город Хара-Хото, открытый русским путешественником П. К. Козловым. 
РИХАРД МИЗЕС. — Основы авиации в элементарном изложении. Перевод с немецкого инж. 
В. А. Лыкошина, под редакц. Н. А. Рынина.” 
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readers sent their heroes on adventures of solidarity to revolutionary China. Nikolai 
Karintsev’s Around the World in an Aeroplane (Vokrug sveta na aeroplane, 1926), like the 
Great Flight, celebrated aviation as a liberatory technology that could bring the global 
oppressed under the Soviet gaze. A round-the-world aviation expedition led by a Russian 
exile desperate to return to the USSR, flying in close techno-competition against devious 
capitalist rivals, culminates in China, where our hero is imprisoned for siding with the 
Chinese in Shanghai and later meets Sun Yatsen in Guangzhou.589 Aleksandr Lebedenko also 
drew on his trans-Eurasian experiences in the Great Flight to publish Four Winds, a rollicking 
adventure tale in which two Soviet students sneak across the Gobi and charge around China 
by car, plane and hot air balloon, foiling imperialist plots and tutoring their Chinese comrades 
in correct revolutionary organization.590 
The Great Flight belongs also to this strain of solidarity adventures, combining 
objective knowledge about distant places with the heroic excitement and danger of exotic 
travel. The heroes of this adventure are the six pilots, six mechanics, and their leader, Shmidt. 
These are the men who were to fly into the unknown, single-minded, self-sacrificing: a 
reporter for Sovetskii ekran recalls meeting one of the pilots on a Moscow tram en route to 
the aerodrome, and reports with awe that he had no suitcase, just a few shirts wrapped up in 
brown paper.591 The newspaper coverage of the flight contained interviews with the crew 
members along the route, which emphasized such heroic, superhuman qualities as 
inexhaustibility and fearlessness. “You feel no tiredness at all while actually flying,” declares 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Widdis, Visions, 98. 
 
589 Nikolai Karintsev, Vokrug sveta na aeroplane (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1926). 
 
590 Aleksandr Lebedenko, Chetyre vetra (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1929). 
 
591 E. Vilenskii, “Na Vostok,” Sovetskii ekran 14 (1925): 3. 
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pilot M. M. Gromov, admitting only to a slight sleepiness a few hours after landing.592 
Weather is constantly emphasized as a major potential obstacle, yet fails to be a source of 
fear: “We are not accustomed to fear bad weather and storms,” says I. I. Polianov, pilot of 
Pravda.593 Likewise their ignorance of the territory they are crossing does not worry our 
heroes. “In a few hours we are flying off into the taiga, which none of us has ever seen 
before, and about which we have only heard terrifying stories,” explains pilot V. F. 
Naidenov, before adding nonchalantly: “But there’s no need to be afraid. We shall 
prevail.”594  
The film The Great Flight opens with a series of portrait shots of these heroic 
individuals as they prepare to depart for the unknown; Mikhel’s’ book devotes an entire 
chapter to profiles and photographs of these men, “the best of the best, the bravest of the 
brave, most daring of the daring.”595 We can sense here the origins of the heroic aviator’s 
symbolic role in Stalinist culture, “a cult of heroism in which the pilot was increasingly 
pictured as conqueror, mastering the skies.”596 This elevation of the aviator above the masses 
is only embryonic in 1925, however. As the anecdote about the shirts in brown paper 
suggests, the pilots of the Great Flight are presented as simple men closely attached to the 
masses. The near-equal importance of the mechanics is constantly emphasized in the reports 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592 “Perelet Moskva—Mongoliia—Kitai: Letchiki o perelete,” Pravda, June 21, 1925. “Усталости во 
время самого полета абсолютно не чувствуется.” 
 
593 Ibid. “Мы не привыкли бояться непогоды и бури.” 
 
594 Ibid. “Через несколько часов мы вылетаем в тайгу, которую никто из нас до сих пор не 
видел и о которой слышали только страшные рассказы. Но ничего—не страшно. Одолеем.”  
 
595 Mikhel’s, Ot kremlevskoi do kitaiskoi steny, 26.  
 
596 Widdis, Visions, 130. See also Scott W. Palmer, “Aviation Cinema in Stalin's Russia: Conformity, 
Collectivity, and the Conflict with Fascism,” in Russian and Soviet History: From the Time of 
Troubles to the Collapse of the Soviet Union, ed. Steven A. Usitalo and William Benton Whisenhunt 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 200–214.  
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and books, as is the key role of factory workers in supplying the planes and parts for the 
expedition.  
Under the set significations of the heroic flight narrative, the conquest of space 
through technology meant also the conquest of backwardness. This was already the 
aeroplane’s symbolic function within the borders of the USSR, where exhibition flights were 
used to display the power and progress of industrial civilization to the inhabitants of 
traditional, rural society. As Palmer notes, the summer of 1925 saw “agit-flights” (agit-
polety) cover more than 16,000 miles across northern and southern Russia, displaying the 
planes to secluded rural settlements, distributing literature, and taking peasants up into the 
sky. The Great Flight’s progress east through Soviet territory thus followed an established 
scenario for such agit-flights, and the accompanying newspaper reports present an almost 
indistinguishable series of triumphant receptions, crowds gathered from miles around, 
celebratory meetings, and “flaming greetings” sent to the people of China. Rosenblat’s prose 
in Pravda becomes almost self-conscious about repeating these formulae, as when he admits: 
“In Krasnoyarsk the air expedition was met by just as triumphant, just as joyous a reception 
as in other Siberian towns.”597 This repetition enables the Flight, the envoy of central power, 
to symbolically impose a technologized homogeneity on this vast traversed territory: as one 
pilot comments, while the landscape below is constantly changing, the sound of the plane’s 
motor remains exactly the same.598 The Flight’s connective act thus performs something of 
the function ascribed by Widdis, in her discussion of spatial conceptions in the 1920s, to the 
grid. According to Widdis, perceptions of Soviet space as a grid system at this time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 “Perelet Moskva—Mongoliia—Kitai,” Pravda, June 24, 1925. “В Красноярске воздушную 
эскадрилью ждала такая же торжественная, такая же радушная встреча, как и в другиx городах 
Сибери.” 
 
598 Gromov, “Perelet Moskva—Mongoliia—Kitai: Letchiki o perelete,” Pravda, June 21, 1925. 
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envisioned a development of the nation’s territory wherein “[t]he integration of the periphery 
would suppress local difference and establish a single, unified Soviet space.”599 
Crossing the border into Mongolia represents to some extent an extension of this 
project of unifying Soviet space through the reach of the aeroplane and camera, visible and 
all-seeing signs of Soviet power and technological progress. And indeed, at this time Soviet 
political influence was strong in the People’s Republic of Mongolia, which had been 
established under Soviet sponsorship (and in defiance of China’s claims to a sphere of 
influence in Mongolia) the previous year.600 Nonetheless, once the expedition enters the non-
Soviet East, the degree of backwardness highlighted in accounts of the Flight sharply 
increases. The film establishes this change with a pair of contrasting shots of “the Soviet and 
Mongolian border posts”: the Soviet post is regimented and ordered, with soldiers marching 
in straight lines, while the Mongolian post has one man standing undynamically beside a 
small building, while another man wearing a hat sits on a carpet in the shade nearby.  
We have reached the indolent Orient, and henceforth the ethnographic search for 
curious exotica is greatly expanded. “Mongolia perhaps made an even greater impression on 
us than China,” muses Rikhter. “More primordial exoticism.”601 Lebedenko describes 
Mongolia as “a curious, semi-savage country.”602 While Blium’s camera did gather a few 
ethnographic shots of rural Russian families earlier in the film, the section on Mongolia is 
almost exclusively ethnographic, capturing men on horseback, Buddhist lamas, temples, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Widdis, Visions, 52. 
 
600 On the struggle between Soviet Russia and China for influence in Mongolia, see Baabar, Twentieth 
Century Mongolia, translated by D. Sühjargalmaa, S. Burenbayar, H. Hulan and N. Tuya, edited by C. 
Kaplonski (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1999), esp. 248–271. This Soviet influence is a visible 
presence in The Great Flight: signs in Russian constantly appear in the background, and the Soviet 
envoy Aleksei Vasil’ev is shown in close interaction with the Mongolian government. Velikii perelet, 
reel 3. 
 
601 Rikhter, 7,000 kilometrov, 69. “Монголия поразила нас, пожалуй, более, чем Китай. Больше 
первобытной экзотики.” 
 
602 Lebedenko, Kak ia letal v Kitai, 99. “Любопытная, полудикая страна[.]” 
	  	   227	  
corpses being eaten by dogs. Unlike the heroic portraits of individual aviators that began the 
film, individuals are now transformed by the intertitles into types: “Street horse traders, 
people without specific occupations and travelling monks and their clothing.”603 A similar 
swerve towards ethnography can be observed in the photographs that accompany Mikhel’s’ 
text. For most of the journey across Soviet space, these photographs document specific 
people and specific events. Once the planes cross Lake Baikal, however, they take on the 
typifying function of ethnographic portraiture, enforced by such explanatory captions as 
“Types of Mongolian women.”604  
Mongolia is presented, in sum, as the epitome of backwardness, still partially 
enslaved by religious tradition, and entirely in need of Soviet salvation. This was the default 
mode for presenting the Soviet East and the Bolshevik’s salvational mission there. Matthew 
Payne finds it in Viktor Turin’s 1929 documentary Turksib, which depicts the building of the 
Turksib railway through the Kazakh steppe as an act of “conquering time and history through 
technology,” in which “technologically advanced representatives of the new civilization quite 
literally shake the backward Kazakhs out of their somnolence.”605 Michael Smith identifies a 
style he calls “national realism” in early films about the Muslim Soviet republics, which 
reduce national identity to a tradition-mired backwardness that socialist modernity has come 
to redeem. “Moscow,” writes Smith, “could not look upon the borderlands of the east except 
from its own European center, its own forward position in the moving drama and progress of 
Marxist history.”606 In Mongolia, the very presence of the airplane and the camera, those twin 
technological symbols of modernity, testifies to the great developmental gulf that these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 Velikii perelet, pt 3. 'Уличные торговцы лошадьми — лица без определенных занятий и 
стрaнствующие монахи и их одеяния.” 
 
604 Mikhel’s, Ot kremlevskoi do kitaiskoi steny, 133. 
 
605 Matthew J. Payne, “Viktor Turin’s Turksib (1929) and Soviet Orientalism,” Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2001: 40–41. 
 
606 Michael G. Smith, “Cinema for the ‘Soviet East’,” 677. 
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Soviet adventure-liberators seek to resolve. “We visited a famous temple, in which the leg of 
a tripod had never before set foot,” muses cameraman Blium in his account of the Mongolia 
stage of the journey.607 The arrival of the camera and the plane promises liberation from the 
temple.  
But this spatial map of technologized modernity spreading out from Moscow to 
capture and redeem increasingly backward hinterlands breaks down once the planes reach 
China. Not because of the antiquity of Chinese civilization—this can be safely dismissed as 
feudalism, covered by a few touristy shots of Beijing’s pagodas, temples and stone lions. But 
as the expedition moves south from the capital, it becomes clear that semi-colonial China 
opposes the Soviet centre as the site of a rival techno-modernity. Lim finds some precedent 
for this dynamic in nineteenth century Russian culture’s binary attitude towards east Asia, 
whereby China and Japan “alternated, paradoxically, between signifying backwardness and a 
stagnant past on the one hand and a threatening, uncertain modernity on the other.”608 In The 
Great Flight, this alternation is played out across Eurasian space: the plane and camera travel 
through the desert of backwardness to arrive at the front line in the global war, the enemy’s 
lair, in Shanghai.  
Rikhter can barely conceal her wonder at first encountering this rival modernity in 
Shanghai, before eventually rediscovering her sense of moral outrage: 
I was astonished by the European luxury of this Chinese city: the magnificent 
embankment and banks like palaces, the imposing Hindu policemen in their red 
turbans, the bustle on Nanjing Road, the fashionable hotels, the skyscrapers 
glistening above the city at night… the pruned trees and lawns of the French and 
English parks, which Chinese and dogs are forbidden to enter.609  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 “Посетили знаменитый храм, в который еще не ступала ножка штатива.” Vladimir 
Shneiderov, Georgii Blum, “Kak snimalsia ‘Velikii perelet’,” Kinozhurnal ARK 1 (1926): 29. 
 
608 Lim, “Between Spiritual Self and Other,” 322–3. 
 
609 Rikhter, 7,000 kilometrov, 117. “Меня удивила европейская роскошь этого китайского города: 
превосходная набережная и банки–дворцы, величественные полицейские–индусы в красных 
чалмах, оживление на Нанкин-род, фешенебельные отели, сияющие по вечерам над городом 
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Here there is order, energy, and illumination: everything the plane and camera promise to the 
past-bound lands they cross. Mikhel’s reports with a kind of awe that Shanghai contains more 
cars—some 14,000—than the entire USSR.610 Blium’s camera, echoing the attraction to 
moving, mechanized vehicles found in 1920s city symphonies like Berlin and Man with a 
Movie Camera, sets off by tram through the busy city streets.  
The Shanghai section of The Great Flight, anticipating the fuller treatment of the 
theme in Shanghai Document, seeks to present a city defined by contradictions. Cars and 
trams are contrasted to coolies, “human horses,” pulling huge loads along the same streets, or 
collapsing old and exhausted in the sun.611 On the river, great hulking foreign cargo ships are 
juxtaposed to Chinese junks and skiffs, old and battered but legion. The camera fixes the 
worn materiality of massed masts and decks, tracking along one boat to reveal a string of 
human heads between sail and wood, trapped in an older age of technology. These two sides 
are effectively at war: the titles announce to us that the cargo ships are sitting unloaded, 
because the Chinese labour force, old-fashioned but multitudinous like these boats, has gone 
on strike. But there is also a war in the realm of experience, which is being transformed in 
this semi-colonial city. The shots in Shanghai’s Chinese quarter have the ethnographic 
quality of the footage from Beijing, all dusty back streets, half-naked children, and 
agricultural labour. But the most striking shots from Shanghai dramatize the encounter 
between China and western technology, expressing the violent juxtaposition of historical 
epochs that, according to Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development, could 
produce a revolutionary dynamic in less developed countries. Perhaps the most arresting shot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
небоскребы... подстриженные деревья и газоны французских и ангийских парков, куда 
запрещается вход китайцам и собакам.” 
 
610 Mikhel’s, Ot kremlevskoi do kitaiskoi steny, 226. 
 
611 A wide shot of some young coolies chatting is followed by a medium shot of an older man asleep 
on his hat, and a close-up on his face, with a fly on his sleeve. Velikii perelet, Pt 5. 
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in the film beautifully illustrates the notion of uneven development: two coolies, naked to the 
waist, stand beneath a clock on a traffic island in the middle of the road, as trams and 
automobiles pass by on either side. Other pedestrians cross with determination, but these two 
men stand still, as if stunned by the passage of time.  
The Soviet symbols, the plane and the camera, introduce themselves into this binary 
of Chinese backwardness versus Western technology as a destabilizing third term, materially 
related to the latter but politically attached to the former. The Western imperialists come by 
sea from the east, with gunships; the Soviet liberators come by air from the north, with an on-
board camera. The presence of the camera is a kind of salvational promise, at least to the 
audience back home: with our technological achievements, our cameras and planes, we can 
help these people throw off the foreign technology that at present oppresses them.  
This liberational potential is promised by the sequences in the film that show the 
workers of Shanghai and the Guomindang in its base at Canton. The Great Flight arrived in 
Shanghai in the summer after the May 30 Incident, amidst intensified anti-foreigner protests 
and organization. Shneiderov makes much of the fact that their filming in Shanghai was 
assisted by Chinese workers. While Western spies followed them everywhere, workers and 
union members helped them film strikes, pickets, and demonstrations.612 The Shanghai 
sequence of the film ends with this footage, a series of shots showing workers organizing 
strikes and holding demonstrations. These sequences are bathed with light and filled with 
energetic, ordered activity—a strong visual contrast to the slow, lazy pace of life and work 
shown earlier in the Chinese quarter. Proletarian organization offers a resolution of the 
opposition between foreign technology and native ignorance. Further south, in Canton, we 
find the Guomindang portrayed as a native revolutionary force, in charge of its own destiny, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612 Shneiderov, Blium, “Kak snimalsia ‘Velikii perelet’,” 28–9; Cheng Jihua, Li Shaobai, Xing 
Zuwen, eds, Zhongguo dian ying fa zhan shi, (Beijing : Zhongguo dian ying chu ban she, 1963), 143–
4. 
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unafraid of taking action. We see a court trying some strike breakers, energetic young strike 
leaders, a village committee. And finally, the traveling plane-camera finds actual war, the 
front line, and Blium’s apparatus can collect adoring shots of its spiritual cousin, the machine 
gun. These final sequences, which give us a machine-gun crew, artillery explosions, and the 
detailed operations of a field hospital, promise that the Guomindang are mastering modern 
military technology and techniques. The imbalance found in Shanghai is here offered a 
potential resolution. 
The implication throughout these later sequences is that the progressive elements in 
Chinese society have welcomed the Soviet envoys and their camera. The film does not 
mention that these Guomindang soldiers were probably being trained by Soviet advisors—the 
work of Borodin and Bliukher is nowhere mentioned in coverage of the Flight. But a large 
number of the shots from the China segment of the film show Chinese subjects staring 
directly into the camera. As Widdis notes, the presence of the camera was frequently an 
internal feature of these early expedition films: “The ethnographic documentary films of the 
late 1920s often focused on the experience of travel and exploration, positioning the camera 
explicitly as part of an adventure.”613 Blium and Shneiderov do not seek Vertov’s ideal of life 
caught “unawares”: instead, a stock component of their film language is the staged portrait 
shot, the subject or subjects standing still and looking into the camera, as if posing for a 
photograph. These shots are deliberately and openly staged; their subjects agree to be filmed, 
to be captured as a sample, to submit to observation. They stare straight at the Soviet 
audience through their prosthetic eye, the travelling camera. But this visual relation is one-
sided: the Chinese see only the camera, not the society that stands behind it and sees through 
it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Widdis, Visions, 115. 
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The Great Flight seeks to convince us that the Chinese also conflate camera, plane 
and Soviet society as a single message of solidarity and progress. At the beginning of Part 
Four, as titles announce “Miaotian. First landing in China,” we see people on the ground 
watching the skies through binoculars, expectantly. A woman holding the binoculars to her 
eyes turns, trains them on the camera, and then smiles: an equation of camera with plane, and 
a welcome to both. Next we cut to a shot of a plane landing, running in from a distance 
towards the camera and past it to the right. From here Shneiderov cuts to a series of group 
shots, old and young people, all looking directly and attentively into the camera. The 
sequence suggests that they, too, are looking at the plane in welcome and expectation as it 
lands.  
But there are less positive reactions to the camera’s presence in China. In one street 
sequence, in Shanghai’s “Chinese Commercial District,” an old man amidst the bustle stands 
still and faces the camera, but covers his face with something flat and white. The film cuts to 
a shot of a man in uniform raising a stick up and backwards, seemingly in threat. Then 
another cut returns us to the old man standing still in this busy street shot, still holding the flat 
object in front of his face, but now also pointing directly at the camera.  
What are we supposed to make of this sequence? The interjection of the violent figure 
of authority encourages us to think that the man in the street is hiding from and pointing at 
this uniformed oppressor and the illegitimate power he represents. But the film and its 
accompanying newspaper coverage all work constantly to remind us that this expedition is 
about the presence of Blium’s camera in China, the adventures it has undergone to get there, 
the risks it takes to gather its material. Its subjects standing in awkward stillness before it 
testify constantly to its presence. So it is hard not to think that this man is reacting to the 
camera, hiding from it, refusing to be seen, which for Virilio is to be destroyed. In this brief 
moment, the Soviet camera and the uniformed figure of imperial rule are fused. The Chinese 
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man in the street, meanwhile, declines to become a part of the Soviet world picture. To use 
the terms employed by Xinyu Dong in her study of early Chinese film comedy, this 
anonymous figure rejects the Soviet project to produce “China on display” by realizing the 
rights of “China at play.” Playfully hiding behind his small white screen, he asserts his 
agency, his capacity to be more than simply passive exhibition material for the Soviet 
cinematic gaze.614  
II:  
Filming China, Films to China: From The Great Flight to Shanghai Document 
 
We are drawn to this China, even though we still do not know China. But we must 
get to know China, we must get to know it well, and we must get to know it 
quickly, because the tempo of history has quickened to an unusual degree. 
And so the screen must come promptly, quickly, urgently to the help of the 
newspaper and the book, so that the USSR can not only hear about its revolutionary 
brother, but also see him face to face. 
(Sergei Tret'iakov, “Cinema and China,” 1925.)615  
 
The Great Flight was hailed in the press as an unprecedented opportunity to see and 
thus know China, a step forward in global perception. “We must admit,” Kino’s front-page 
review began, “that not every citizen of our republic, even the most educated, knows what is 
going on there, behind the Gobi desert.” Dry telegraph dispatches about revolutionary China 
were not always easy to understand. But the visual element rendered China comprehensible: 
“The expedition has dispersed the newspaper fog. We have seen with our own eyes Feng 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 Xinyu Dong, “China at Play: Republican Film Comedies and Chinese Cinematic Modernity,” 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2009. Dong uses the opposition of “China on display” and 
“China at play” in her discussion of Shanghai Document and Shanghai 24 Hours (Dong, “China at 
Play,” 168–179). I shall return to her analysis of Shanghai Document later in this chapter. 
 
615 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Kino i Kitai,” Kino 28 (1925): 3. “Мы тянемся к этому Китаю, хотя еще и 
не знаем его. Но мы должны его узнать и узнать крепко, и в то же время срочно, ибо темп 
истории необычайно учащен. 
И в помощь газете и книге, говорящей о Китае, срочно, спешно, неотложно должен притти 
экран, чтобы СССР могла не только услыхать о своем революционном брате, но и увидать его 
лицом к лицу.” 
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Yuxiang and the Canton revolutionaries. Shanghai on strike has gazed out at us from the 
screen[.]”616  
Viktor Shklovskii agreed that The Great Flight had great epistemological value, 
dubbing the film an “avalanche of China” for the huge quantity of information about China to 
the viewer in a sudden, even violent manner: 
This is simply an avalanche of China. 
You will understand a lot about the world when you see this film. Its shots are filled 
with their own Chinese life. All directors will learn from this film. 
And the spectator who sees it will understand who Zhang Zuolin is, and who the 
Chinese workers are. He will learn that there is more than one China. And that 
China is angry. With a new kind of rage. A rage directed against the foreign 
merchant.617 
 
But Shklovskii had serious formal criticisms of the film. Above all, he saw a contradiction 
between the images in the film, which communicated the specificity of China as described 
above, and the film’s titles, which constantly insisted on the similarity between the Russian 
and Chinese revolutions. “We have no need for naive parallelism,” Shklovskii declared. 
“Science and art think in differences, not similarities. We know and should know about the 
specific character of the Chinese revolution.618 Shklovskii’s solution was that the film should 
be recut and re-edited, and the titles redone by “an Orientalist and a good writer.”619  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616 S. Gekht, “Velikii perelet,” Kino 36 (1925): 1. “Надо признаться, что не каждый, даже 
культурный, гражданин нашей республики знает, что делается там, за пустыней Гоби. […] 
Экспедиция рассеяла газетный туман. Мы увидели воочию Фын-Юй-Сяна и кантонских 
революционеров. С экрана глядел на нас бастующий Шанхай[.]”  
 
617 Viktor Shklovskii, “‘Velikii perelet’ i kinematografiia,” Kino 38 (1925): 3. “Это прямо обвал 
Китая. 
Вы много поймете в мире, когда увидите эту картину. Ее кадры полны своей китайской жизни. 
Все режиссеры будут учиться у этой картины. 
А зритель поймет после нее, кто такой Чжан-Цзо-Лин и кто такие китайские рабочие. Узнает о 
том, что Китай разный. Что Китай сердит. Новой злобой. Злобой против иностранного купца.” 
 
618 Ibid. “Нам не нужен наивный параллелизм. Наука и искусство мыслят различиями, а не 
сходствами. Мы знаем и должны знать о специфическом характере китайской революции.” 
 
619 Ibid. “Подрежьте, подмонтируйте ее, дайте сделать надписи востоковеду и хорошему 
писателю.” 
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As 1925 gave way to 1926, Sergei Tret’iakov was seeking to assert himself in a 
combination of these two roles: a writer with specialist knowledge of the contemporary 
Chinese situation, gleaned from his time teaching at Beijing University, and a firm 
understanding of the necessary way to represent China to a Soviet audience. His assessment 
of The Great Flight, as already noted, greeted the film as a step on the right road, but also 
voiced several criticisms. Although the film as a whole presented “living, authentic, 
contemporary China,” some elements of the footage struck him as retaining the dreaded tint 
of exoticism, such as the lions’ heads at temple gates that occur in the touristic shots of old 
Beijing, or the landscape shots with bananas and lotuses that are interspersed with episodes 
from the civil war during the Guangzhou sequences towards the film’s end.  
Tret’iakov’s main criticism, however, was formal and structural. The imagined Soviet 
audience in whose name he spoke wanted, Tret’iakov claimed, to see China “from all 
angles—spatial, temporal, causal” (во всех разрезах—пространственном, временном, 
причинном). Instead, the film’s image of China appeared rushed and unsystematic, an 
impression Tret’iakov memorably, and perhaps revealingly, compares to a bunch of flowers 
stolen from someone else’s garden: “But they see a film in which China is “cobbled together” 
hurriedly, feverishly and unsystematically. As if climbing over a fence and tearing up 
bouquets from forbidden flower-beds.”620 We will encounter the idea of documentary film as 
theft again in the discussion of Shanghai Document below. But for now, what are we to make 
of Tret’iakov’s categories: space, time, and causality? It is fairly clear that The Great Flight 
arranges China’s spatio-temporal aspect through the exploratory chronotope of the expedition 
film. Shneiderov edits together Blium’s footage as a series of images linked by succession in 
space over time, a parade of landscape and portrait shots that record primarily the fact of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 Tret’iakov, “Nedolet-perelet-popadanie.” “Но видят они фильму, в которую «надергано» 
Китая, надергано поспешно, лихорадочно и бессистемно. Так перелезши через забор, рвут 
букеты на запретных клумбах.” 
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Blium’s camera moving across Eurasian territory. But what about causality? The only 
causality in the film is spatial, not social: its organizing principle, its siuzhet, is provided by 
the movement of the Flight itself. And even this drops away: as S. V. Drobashenko notes, 
once the film enters the non-Soviet East, “the flight as such moves into the background and is 
henceforth turned into a functional outline that binds together disparate travel film-
sketches.”621  
This lack of system can be sensed in particular in the film’s final sequence, shot in 
and around Guangzhou (Canton). Here ethnographic and newsreel footage succeed one 
another without any sense of necessity or intention. Street scenes are followed by shots of the 
Shamin foreign concession and a title describing a boycott; but then the film reverts to 
displaying the life of people living on river boats. The film drifts out into the countryside, 
showing us fishermen, rice fields, buffalo, only to interrupt these tranquil rural scenes with a 
workers’ demonstration marching through the streets of the city. When war footage finally 
arrives, at the very end of the film, it is entirely unclear how the fighting between 
Guomindang troops and the army of Chen-Tziu-Lin is related to or caused by anything that 
has gone before. Civil war is just another thing, like fishermen or protests, that Blium's 
camera has encountered on its travels through China.  
These sequences come closer to the notion of cinema put forward in Siegfried 
Kracauer’s later, realist film theory: cinema as a form of photography that captures material 
reality beyond any human intention.622 Such a perspective is inimical to Tret'iakov's demand 
that everything in film's rendition of reality has a defined social and political meaning. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 S. V. Drobashenko, Istoriia sovetskogo documental’nogo kino (Moscow: Izdanie Moskovskogo 
universiteta, 1980), 21. “полет, как таковой, отходит на второй план и в далнейшем 
превращается в служебную канву, скрепляющую разрозненные путевые кинозарисовки.” 
 
622 In his notes towards a book on film aesthetics from 1940, Kracauer asserts that film “does not aim 
upward, toward intention, but pushes toward the bottom, to gather and carry along even the dregs. It is 
interested in the refuse, in what is just there—both in and outside the human being.” Quoted by 
Miriam Bratu Hansen in her “Introduction” to Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: the Redemption of 
Physical Reality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), vii. 
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Tret'iakov wants film to assert a causality that explains why things in China are they way 
they are. To adopt the terms Widdis uses in her study of early Soviet film, we might say he 
wants the expedition film’s “exploration” (разведка) to be replaced with “domination” 
(освоение), in the form of China's coherent incorporation into the Soviet discourse of class 
struggle and world revolution.623 The Great Flight fails as internationalist aesthetics, 
according to Tret’iakov’s critique, because it does not express the superiority of the Marxist 
analytical perspective: it enables its audience to see China, but not necessarily to understand 
China. 
Tret’iakov’s proposed solution, the way to hit the cinematic target of China (a 
metaphor for human intention if ever there was one), is to shoot a combination of culture 
films (kul’turfil’my) and a plot-based film shot on location in China, thereby combining the 
organizing power of the script with the authenticity of the Chinese location. Narrative, 
according to Tret’iakov’s argument here, is needed to fully express causality. This was in fact 
precisely the program of the film expedition to China that Tret’iakov, then deputy President 
of the Artistic Council of Goskino’s 1st Film Factory, was already proposing to Goskino in 
late 1925.624 The expedition was necessary, Tret’iakov argued, not just because of the 
importance of current events in China for the world revolution, but also because popular 
notions about China were dependent on Western art, which represented China as exotic and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 Widdis, Visions, 7–12. 
 
624 RGALI f. 1923, op. 1, ed. khr. 133: “Dokladnaia zapiska zamestitelia predsedatelia 
khudozhestvennogo soveta 1-oi Goskinofabriki v Goskino ob organizatsii ekspeditsii v Kitai dlia 
s’’emok fil’ma ‘Dzhungo’. Mash. 1925–1926.” Tret'iakov's report is not dated; however, he suggests 
therein that the expedition could depart in January 1926 in order to begin work by late March 1926, 
and offers a range of preparatory activities that could be carried out between the time of the report and 
January 1926. These details suggest that the report was delivered in late 1925. (Имея ввиду общую 
неустойчивость политической карты Китая надлежало бы экспедицию форсировать: 
обследовательская группа могла бы выехать примерно в Январе 1926 года, с тем, чтобы в 
конце Марта уже можно было приступить к работе. Время же остающееся до Января уйдет на 
подготовительную по экспедиции работу, на обеспечение по линии НКИД наиболее выгодных 
условий работы экспедиции в Китае, на установление связей с Китайскими Кино-
предприятиями, окончательную разработку сценариев. RGALI f. 1923, op. 1, ed. khr. 133, l. 4.)  
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incommensurable. China in film, Tret’iakov argued, had hitherto served only as “an exotic 
spice” added to a film to enhance its flavor. He called upon Soviet film to right this wrong by 
focusing on social life to reveal the “stormy processes of [China’s] transformation from 
medieval autocracy towards industrialism and socialism.” This was a task, the writer 
declared, that could not be accomplished by literature alone. 
Tret’iakov’s proposed project was immense. An expedition of nine to ten months was 
to produce: three long feature films (boeviki) under the general title Dzhungo (i.e. zhōngguó, 
China); a short feature in the style of a Chinese slapstick comedy (buffoonada); a continuous 
film chronicle (kino-khronika) shot throughout the duration of the expedition; and up to ten 
lecture films on such topics as the Chinese countryside, the Chinese factory, crafts, trade, 
China at war, family life, theatre, foreigners in China, the revolutionary movement, religion 
and superstition, science, etc. This list of topics suggests these short films were envisioned as 
filmic companions to Tret’iakov’s printed China sketches. The lecture films were not to be 
shot separately, but would be assembled from the footage shot for the feature films and the 
chronicle. Tret'iakov insisted that the expedition must produce multiple films, because a 
single film would not justify the expense, and furthermore “could not even get close to 
exhausting the fundamental aspects of contemporary Chinese life that require disclosure.”625 
A team of no more than 15-16 people, including two directors and two cameramen, was to be 
dispatched from the Soviet Union; actors and additional crew were to be recruited within 
China itself. Tret'iakov estimated that the expedition would cost some 500,000 roubles, 
perhaps less in view of the cheapness of Chinese labour and the willingness of worker and 
youth groups to help.626  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 Ibid., l. 2. 
 
626 Ibid., l. 3. 
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Tret’iakov’s proposal was initially accepted, and Dzhungo was on course to become 
one of the film events of the 1920s. Sergei Eisenstein and Eduard Tisse, fresh from their 
work on Battleship Potemkin (the intertitles for which were written by Tret’iakov), were 
recruited as director and cameraman. Tret’iakov drew up librettos for the three films, entitled 
The Yellow Peril (Zheltaia opasnost’), The Blue Express (Goluboi ekspress), and The Pearl 
River (Zhemchuzhnaia reka—also titled China Roars [Kitai rychit] in an earlier version). A 
set of documents from a later stage in planning sometime in early 1926 suggest that the 
number of feature films was subsequently cut from three to two: The Blue Express, which 
was supposed to be filmed in rural China, was dropped, limiting the sites for filming to 
Beijing and Guangzhou. The film-chronicle and lecture films were still to be made, though 
the buffoonade seems to have been discarded. Thus the size and cost of the expedition were 
somewhat reduced: Eisenstein, Tisse and Tret’iakov were to head up a ten-man team, with 
funding of 250,000 roubles to be provided jointly by Goskino and Sovkino.627 In March 
1926, anticipatory announcements about the project began to appear in the press.628  
This expedition and the resulting films were to be the grandest achievement of the 
accelerating drive to represent contemporary China as the front line in the final global war. 
On his return from Beijing to Moscow in the autumn of 1925, Tret’iakov noted that the film 
studios had already commissioned numerous film scripts dealing with China.629 The Great 
Flight was released in January 1926, and reviewed extensively in the press; that same month, 
Tret’iakov’s play Roar, China! premiered at the Meyerhold Theatre in Moscow, triggering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 Ibid., l. 5, “Dopolnitel’nye spravki k soobrazheniiu po voprosu ob otpravke kino-ekspeditsii v 
KITAI.” Projected budgets for Zheltaia opasnost’ and Zhemchuzhnaia reka are attached to this report, 
totalling around 250,000 roubles. The report is anonymous and also undated, though a reference to the 
premiere of Tret’iakov’s play Rychi, Kitai! tells us it was composed after 23 January 1926, and the 
acknowledgement of the Guominjun’s defeat may date the report to as late as April (see below).  
 
628 See for example Kino 11 (March 16, 1926), 1. This article also mentions Karakhan’s supportive 
telegram in the wake of Rychi, Kitai! 
 
629 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Kitai na ekran,” 16. 
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even more extensive press reaction. The following month, the directorate of the Bolshoi 
Theatre scrapped their plans for a ballet set in revolutionary France and switched locations to 
China, setting in motion the production of The Red Poppy (see Chapter Four). On 20 
February, Boris Pil’niak, then President of the Moscow branch of the Union of All-Russia 
Writers, left Moscow in a train bound for Japan, a trip which would also take him to China 
for three months and result in Chinese Story.630  
With film, however, we see an extra dimension added to this project: the desire to 
represent China to the new Soviet audience is compounded by the desire to represent China 
to China. Film, communicating chiefly in images, held out the possibility of overcoming the 
complexities of translation and inter-cultural understanding that attended both the 
dissemination of knowledge about internationalism and the dissemination of knowledge 
internationally. Cinema is a spatial system of both representation and distribution: in the 
words of Mark Shiel, we must consider both “space in films” and “films in space.”631 Besides 
educating the Soviet populace about contemporary reality, film could extend the reach of 
Soviet internationalist images to other areas of the globe.  
The mid-1920s saw a particularly active campaign to promote the making of films 
about, and distribution of films to, “the East”: understood as both the southern and eastern 
republics of the USSR, and the colonized and semi-colonized populations of Asia beyond the 
Soviet borders. The front page of Kino on 1 September 1925, for example, was occupied 
entirely by articles exploring this theme, under such titles as “Film for the East,” “About the 
East and for the East,” “What is in the East?” and “What to Give to the East?”632 In the latter, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Dany Savelli, “Shest’ neizdannykh pisem Borisa Pil’niaka,” 139. 
 
631 Mark Shiel, “Cinema and the City in History and Theory,” in Mark Shiel and Tony Fitzmaurice, 
eds, Cinema and the City: Film and Urban Societies in a Global Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 
5. 
 
632 “Filmu na Vostok,” “O Vostoke i dlia Vostoka,” “Chto na Vostoke?,” “Chto dat’ Vostoku?,” Kino, 
24 (September 1, 1925): 1. For other instances of the press campaign, see e.g. An. Skachko, 
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Mikhail Pavlovich argued that, given widespread illiteracy, film was the optimal medium for 
penetrating the East with Soviet culture, dispelling religious illusions, and combating 
American influence.633 The simple translation of intertitles could, moreover, render these 
films suitable for international consumption.634 Mikhail Pavlovich was apparently involved in 
the foundation of a joint-stock company, “Vostochnoe kino” (Eastern Cinema) or 
“Vostkino,” mandated to produce suitable films both about and for the East.635 Vostkino’s 
first major production, Turksib, is read by Payne as a paradigmatic expression of the Soviet 
centre’s mission to civilize the backwards periphery.636 Likewise, Smith summarizes the 
Soviet “Orientalist” films of the 1920s as primarily concerned to express the benighted 
backwardness of the Eastern spaces that the socialist future was to save: “Cinematic socialist 
realism would show these peoples the way to the future, but not without first revealing to 
them the horrors of their own past and present.”637 Both scholars focus on cinematic images 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Organizatsiia vostochnogo kino,” Sovetskoe kino 2–3 (1925): 16–18 (Skachko here quotes Nariman 
Narimanov’s argument that film is the only way to reach the peoples of the East, since they have 
learnt to think in images, rather than logically); An. Skachko, “Vostochnaia kino-fil’ma,” Sovetskoe 
kino 6 (1925): 24–27; Armen Gasparian, “Put’ na Vostok,” Kino 11 (1925): 7; “Prodvizhenie kino na 
Vostok (Beseda s t. Pavlovich-Vel’tman), Kino 13 (June 16, 1925): 1; An. Skachko, “Kino dlia 
Vostoka,” Kinozhurnal ARK 10 (1925): 3. 
 
633 “Chto dat’ Vostoku?,” Kino 24 (September 1, 1925): 1. 
 
634 G. Levkoev, “Kino-ekspeditsiia na Vostok,” Kinozhurnal ARK 6–7 (1925): 28. 
 
635 Mikhail Pavlovich’s involvement is mentioned by An. Skachko, “Kino dlia Vostoka,” Kinozhurnal 
ARK, 1925, 10, 3. The journal Sovetskoe kino described Vostkino's missions as follows: “Vostkino is 
established with the aim, on the one hand, of serving the cultural needs of the workers and peasants of 
the East through cinema, taking into account the particular nature of Eastern psychology and daily 
life, and, on the other, of familiarizing the western nationalities of the USSR with the cultural values 
and achievements of the East. Simultaneously one of the tasks will be the release of special films 
designated for export to foreign eastern countries.” (Восткино учреждено с целью обслуживания 
культурных запросов рабочих и крестьян Востока через кино, учитывая своеобразие быта и 
психологии Востока, с одной стороны, и, с другой стороны—для ознакомления западных 
народностей СССР с культурными ценностями и достижениями Востока. Одновременно одной 
из задач будет выпуск специальных фильм, предназначенных для вывоза в зарубежные 
восточные страны.) Sovetskoe kino 1 (1926): 24. 
 
636 Payne, “Viktor Turin’s Turksib,” passim. 
 
637 Smith, “Cinema for the ‘Soviet East’,” 646. 
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of the internal East; but a glance at the contemporary articles quoted above will show that the 
East was taken to signify an amorphous swathe of oppressed and backward space from 
Turkey through Persia to Mongolia and China, with the internal East ambiguously included 
within this broader East.  
China became a focal point in this struggle for a broadly defined East, despite lying 
outside Soviet borders and, as we saw in The Great Flight, offering a more complex temporal 
relation to the Soviet center than the progress-backwardness axis that Smith identifies in 
images of the internal East. Thus in 1925, calls for more films about China were joined by 
calls for more films to be sold to China. Soviet films were reportedly on display at the Sino-
Soviet Exhibition in Harbin in the summer of 1925.638 A host of articles appeared about film 
production and consumption in China, generally lamenting the dominance of the American 
model in both spheres.639 Shneiderov shared his own experiences of cinema-going in 
Shanghai, where he watched an American film set during the Russian Civil War that saw 
Rudolf Valentino as the American hero saving a princess from both the Whites and the Reds. 
The availability of such quasi-historical “trash” clearly showed the need for Soviet films to 
enter the Chinese market and replace fiction with truth; Shneiderov ends his article with the 
collective voice of some important members of the Chinese film industry that he met, asking: 
“Why don’t you send your films to China? They would play here with great success.”640  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 “Kino na vystavke v Kharbine,” Kino 12 (March 17, 1925): 1; G. B., “Kino na Vostoke,” Kino 11 
(1925): 7. 
 
639 L. P., “Kino v Kitae,” Kino 10 (March 3, 1925), 2; Sovetskii, “Kino v Kitae,” Sovetskoe kino 6 
(1925): 52–55; A. Grinfel’d, “Kinematografiia Kitaia (Issledovatel’skii ocherk),” Kino-Front 9–10 
(1926): 37–8. G. Boltianskii, in “Kitai o sebe samom,” Sovetskoe kino 8 (1926): 26, notes that the 
growth of the national liberation movement has moved some film production towards more 
revolutionary themes. One such film, Doch' terrora, had reached the Leningrad division of Sovkino. 
Boltianskii approvingly describes a revenge plot in which the daughter of an executed revolutionary 
avenges herself on the general that caused his death, by becoming his concubine and then murdering 
him. Boltianskii found in the film a “range of adventures and escapades that illustrate the 
particularities of Chinese life.”  
 
640 Shneiderov, “Kitaiskii kinematograf,” Sovetskii ekran 5 (1926): 14–15. 
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Contributing to this theme in Kino, Tret’iakov concurred that “the Chinese largely 
swallow American produce,” and that Chinese film production likewise followed the 
example of Hollywood. But there were pressing reasons why this need not be the case. The 
use of China in American film as exotic decoration or racialized negative had led to some 
scenes, such as the end of Thief of Baghdad, being edited out for Chinese audiences. Film 
production, meanwhile, was in the hands of people largely sympathetic to the 
Guomindang.641 The Chinese masses were assumed to be in need of cinematic awakening: 
they needed to be shown themselves through the mediation of film in order to achieve self-
recognition and self-consciousness. This process was neatly described in a story, “A film 
screening in Guanghu” (“Kino-seans v Guan’-Khu”). published in Vokrug sveta in February 
1927. Two Westerners running a travelling cinema in the Chinese provinces accidentally 
interrupt their standard fare of European romances to show newsreel footage of “Events in 
Shanghai.” The audience are awoken from lethargy to rage:  identifying themselves with the 
onscreen oppressed and the cinema owners with the oppressors, they bounce these cine-
entrepreneurs up and down on the sheet that served as a screen and then throw them into the 
river. Cinema that reflects reality awakens the masses to action; the cinema screen becomes a 
weapon of revenge.642  
The assumed existence of such a Chinese audience implied that Soviet productions, if 
they could only reach Chinese screens, would enjoy considerable success. This orientation of 
production towards a Chinese audience can be sensed in China on Fire, which contains text 
in both Russian and Chinese, suggesting it was made with one eye towards playing in China. 
A report from April 1926, revealingly entitled “Cinema-Diplomacy-Power,” claims that The 
Great Flight was in the possession of the Soviet trade mission to China, alongside such films 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641 Treti’akov, “Kino i Kitai.” 
 
642 Mikhail Zuev-Ordynets, “Kino-seans v Guan’-Khu,” Vokrug sveta 2 (1927): 3–5. Also published 
in Mikhail Zuev-Ordynets, Zheltyi taifun (1928). 
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as Battleship Potemkin. 643 As we saw in Chapter One, the playwright Tian Han recalls 
watching Battleship Potemkin through the assistance of the Soviet chargé d’affaires in 
Shanghai in 1926, an opportunity he claims was facilitated by Boris Pil’niak. But Tian Han 
makes no mention of The Great Flight. Likewise, Chinese film historian Cheng Jihua lists 
Battleship Potemkin as the second Soviet film to be screened in China, after a small-scale 
screening by the CCP of the short newsreel film The Funeral of Lenin (Pokhorony Lenina) in 
1924 (Cheng excludes here Soviet films that reached Harbin via railway workers on the 
Chinese Eastern Railway). But Cheng, who describes The Great Flight and its production 
background in detail, finds no evidence that the film ever reached Chinese audiences in 
1926.644  
Given this heightened interest in China as both material and market, it is perhaps no 
surprise that Tret’iakov was invited to join Goskino’s First Factory, as deputy President of 
the Artistic Council, on his return from Beijing in the summer of 1925.645 Tret’iakov’s 
knowledge of China was hot property: in fact, Goskino had contacted him while he was still 
in Beijing, asking him to investigate shooting possibilities for a film about Kublai Khan. 
Such a historical topic jarred, of course, with Tret’iakov’s own aesthetic intentions: he spent 
his time in Beijing snapping with his Kodak and longing for a film camera, while catching up 
on events in Guangzhou by watching newsreels made by Pathé-Orient and Shanghai tobacco 
companies. Back in Moscow and working at Goskino, Tret’iakov found himself reading 
scripts that showed a clear ignorance of Chinese politics, culture and geography. Bamboo 
growing in Manchuria, kidnappers nipping on horseback from Hankou to Tibet via Mongolia, 
British emissaries issuing threatening speeches at Guomindang conferences: such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 “Kino-diplomatiia-vlast’,” Kino 15 (April 13, 1926).  
 
644  Cheng et al, Zhongguo dianying fazhanshi, 144.  
 
645 “Khronika,” Kino 20 (August 4, 1925): 2. 
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inaccuracies, Tret’iakov insisted, would make these films useless as knowledge for a Soviet 
audience, but also laughable as images of China to be exported back to the Chinese 
themselves.646 The need for such films was clear to Tret’iakov from a double perspective: 
The task to inform, acquaint and forge a friendship between the average Soviet 
activist and this young, fraternal revolutionary country was not within the power of 
journalists and belletrists alone. Only film footage, with its all-encompassing 
method of fixation, was capable of showing China as it truly is. And, finally, arising 
China itself needed a form of film production capable of satisfying the demands of 
revolutionary agitation. At this moment cinema is already penetrating into the 
remote corners of China, the Chinese love to watch films, and our job is to end the 
further influence of American apoliticism, sentimentalism and the propagation of 
“Efficiency” (individual initiative leading to enrichment). For at present Americans 
appear to be the only teachers of the Chinese in the realm of cinema.647  
 
Soviet films about China that could reach China would teach the Chinese both about 
themselves, and about cinema; they would learn to understand themselves and to represent 
the world through a Soviet lens. 
The Dzhungo expedition was oriented towards a reworking of raw Chinese material 
into a product that could be consumed domestically and also sold back to China—an 
economic relationship with markedly imperialist overtones. (Indeed, Rey Chow argues in her 
book Primitive Passions that post-colonial national identity in China and elsewhere was born 
out of a reaction to the visual power of such images and the cumulative imperialist world 
picture that they formed, though a moment of alienated self-seeing, such as that experienced 
by the writer Lu Xun in a lecture hall in Japan.)648 Such overtones were deflected by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 Tret’iakov, “Kitai na ekran,” 16–17. 
 
647 Ibid., 16–18. “Задача информировать, ознакомить, подружить широкого советского 
активиста с молодой революционной братской страной была не под силу одним только 
газетчикам и беллетристам. Только кино-съемка, с ее всеохватывающим методом фиксации, 
была способна показать Китай таким, как он есть. И, наконец, поднимающийся Китай сам 
нуждался в кино-производстве, способном удовлетворить требованиям революционной 
агитации. Уже и сейчас кино проникает в захолустные уголки Китая, китайцы любят смотреть 
фильмы, и наше дело—прекратить дальнейшее влияние американского аполитизма, 
сентиментализма и проповеди ''Эффишенси'' (личной инициативы, ведущей к обогащению). А 
ведь американцы пока что являются единственными учителями китайцев в области кино.” 
 
648 Chow, Primitive Passions, 7–8.  
	  	   246	  
revolutionary rhetoric of film as liberatory weapon. As Eisenstein described the project, the 
need to enlighten Soviet audiences as to the true situation in China was even a secondary 
motivation: “What was needed, first of all, was concrete agitational material as a real weapon 
of war for China itself. For the first time, perhaps, cinema must become just as fearsome a 
weapon [orudie] as a flamethrower.”649 Film is a weapon in this erupting war, and 
Eisenstein’s sentences reduce to bullet points as he describes his targets: “For us. About 
China. In parallel. For China.”650 This doubly directed logic of production sought to make 
Soviet film into truly internationalist cinema, representing the world to the world through the 
mediation of Soviet film technique and ideological perspective. 
And yet the expedition did not happen. According to Eisenstein, budgets, screenplays, 
and directorial sketches were all prepared, but Goskino’s indecisiveness scuppered the 
project: “The myopia and spinelessness of Goskino with its indecisiveness overturned all the 
deadlines. The advantageous political situation in the Far East passed. We entered into a 
phase of restrictions on the export of currency.”651 The change in political circumstance to 
which Eisenstein refers was the Anti-Fengtian War, which ended in defeat for the Soviet-
backed National Army (Guominjun) of Feng Yuxiang at the hands of the combined forces of 
Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin. By mid-April 1926, Beijing and the northern government were 
under the control of Zhang Zuolin, a significant enemy to the USSR over the issues of the 
China Eastern Railway and Japan’s influence in Manchuria. Under this new political situation 
in the capital, “relations between Peking and Moscow became highly strained and were in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 “General'naia liniia (Beseda s S. M. Eizenshteinom),” Kino 32 (August 10, 1926), 1. “Был в 
первую очередь необходим конкретный агитационный материал, как реальное боевое оружие 
для самого Китая. Впервые, быть может, кино должно стать столь же страшным орудием, как 
огнеметы.” 
 
650 Ibid. “Для нас. О Китае. Параллельно. Для Китая.” 
 
651 Ibid. “Близорукость и бесхребетность Госкино своей нерешительностью перетянули все 
сроки. Прошла благоприятная политическая конъюнктура на дальнем Востоке. Мы вступили в 
полосу ограничений вывоза валюты.” 
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process of rapid deteriorization”; Zhang even asked that ambassador Karakhan be withdrawn, 
though this demand was later retracted.652 Tret’iakov’s original report had argued that the 
present moment was auspicious precisely because the Soviet-friendly National Armies of 
Feng and the GMD controlled both Beijing and Guangzhou.653 Subsequently, the anonymous 
Goskino report from 1926 acknowledges that the Guominjun’s defeat might seem to suggest 
that the expedition should be postponed or abandoned. This argument is rejected, however, in 
favour of even greater urgency. The only thing the expedition is waiting for, in this second 
report, is the opening of a line of credit at the Beijing branch of Dal’bank. As Eisenstein 
suggests, it seems that the failure to acquire a working credit line, linked very probably to the 
worsening in diplomatic relations, sank the China film expedition.  
Despite the failure of the expedition to materialize, Tret’iakov’s extant scenarios for 
Dzhungo remain an interesting document in the ongoing evolution of strategies to represent 
China.654 For all that his written sketches based their validity on real, eyewitnessed 
experience, and the docu-drama Roar, China! claimed to reproduce an actual historical event 
on the stage, Tret’iakov has not quite abandoned literary invention. Instead, Dzhungo 
interweaves invented typical heroes with actual historical figures to re-imagine the major 
events of 1923–5, many of which Tret’iakov witnessed while in Beijing. This is recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652 Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956), 60. 
 
653 RGALI f. 1923, op. 1, ed. khr. 133, l. 3. 
 
654 Librettos for all three parts of Dzhungo are preserved in Tret’iakov’s archive (RGALI f. 2886, op. 
2, ed. khr. 8) as well as Eisenstein's (RGALI f. 1923 op. 1. ed. khr. 131). The Eisenstein copies, which 
include librettos for Zheltaia opasnost', Golubaia ekspress and Kitai rychit, plus an alternative, longer 
libretto for Zheltaia opasnost', have recently been published in Sergei Mikhailovich Tret'iakov, 
Kinematograficheskoe nasledie: stat'i, ocherki, stenogrammy vystuplenii, doklady, ed. I. I. Ratiani 
(Sankt-Peterburg: Nestor-Istoriia, 2010), 212–220. The copies in Tret'iakov's archive, however, 
contain a second, additional version of the third film, here renamed Zhemchuzhnaia reka, which is not 
included in the 2010 publication. Since Zheltaia opasnost' and Zhemchuzhnaia reka (with that title) 
are the two films which are budgeted into the later Goskino report on the expedition, it is possible that 
these additional versions are second drafts, perhaps closer to what might actually have been shot. 
Eisenstein also refers to the third film as Zhemchuzhnaia reka in his discussion of the expedition. See 
Kino 32 (1926). 
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Chinese history through the Soviet lens: the soldier beaten for walking on Beijing’s city wall; 
the deposed Emperor Pu Yi evicted from his palace by Feng Yuxiang; the kidnapping of 
European train passengers by bandits at Lincheng; and the anti-foreigner strikes that erupted 
in Guangzhou after the May 30 Massacre. The approach to history is, in fact, not far from 
that displayed in the last Tret’iakov-Eisenstein-Tisse collaboration, Battleship Potemkin. At 
this point Tret’iakov, determined to demonstrate causality above all, and to provide a 
comprehensive panorama of the forces at work in China that are driving social change, 
cannot do without the fictional siuzhet. But the need to claim authenticity requires that these 
fictional, typical characters be embedded in real historical events, and that filming take place 
in actual China with real Chinese actors.655 Indeed, this claim to present the real China, as 
never seen before, is reflected in the choice of title, Dzhungo. Using the same device as he 
would for the publication of his collected sketches in 1927, but opting for a different spelling, 
Tret’iakov Cyrillicizes the Chinese name for China, zhōngguó, a word largely unknown to his 
potential audience. The choice of title expresses the message of the film in microcosm: you 
think you know about China, but you do not even know its real name. 
Neatly illustrating this pull from factual material towards fictional siuzhet and 
fictional heroes, the first film, The Yellow Peril (Zheltaia opasnost’), serves as a kind of 
fictional sequel to the supposedly factual events of Roar, China! The film opens after the 
events of the play, and continues the story of Chi, renamed Li, the boatman whose passive 
resistance led to the death of the American businessman Hawley (already a departure from 
the reported facts of the incident — see Chapter Four). In the play, Chi/Li was forced by 
poverty to sell his daughter; the film follows their narrative arcs through separation to tragic, 
belated reunification. Li becomes a bandit, then is conscripted into a general’s army, where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 A section from the plan on the composition of the expedition insists: “The emphasis must be on 
local resources, in terms of both acting and directing.” (упор должен быть на местные силы, как 
актерские, так и режиссерские.) Muzei kino, f. 57, op. 2, ed. khr. 13, l. 3. 
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he leads a riot over pay. Moving back from the typical to the historical, Li next 
metamorphoses into a Chinese soldier who was reportedly arrested and beaten for walking on 
the Beijing city walls, and sought to avenge himself by beating a foreigner for every blow he 
had himself received.656 His stints in prison before and after this act of elemental anger 
introduce Li to a student, who begins his political enlightenment.  
Parallel to this typical narrative of developing proletarianization and self-
consciousness, Li’s daughter, Tsaian’ Tsan Lin’, is sold into prostitution and embarks on a 
humiliating but successful career as a courtesan. In a convoluted and unlikely climax to the 
film, the Western powers and their Chinese government stooges seek to disrupt the recently 
concluded Sino-Soviet Treaty by gifting Tsaian’ to the President as a concubine. The 
President, plotting to restore the monarchy, passes Tsaian’ on to the deposed Emperor, Pu Yi, 
to join his palace harem. The plan to restore the Emperor to his throne is interrupted by the 
National Army of Feng Yuxiang (characterized here as a “fat general” resembling a “Chinese 
Taras Bulba”), which marches into Beijing with Li in its ranks. Li enters the palace, but the 
Emperor has fled, leaving behind orders to slaughter his harem. His dying daughter tells Li 
where to find the emperor. At the film’s close, Li foils a Japanese plot to undermine Feng.657  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 This event was reported in April 1924, and subsequently became the centrepiece in Trotsky’s May 
Day speech on internationalist solidarity: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/04/mayday.htm, accessed 01.23.14. John Fitzgerald 
reports that the Chinese soldier was named Li, which may explain Tret’iakov decision to change his 
hero’s name. John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist 
Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 143–4. 
 
657 I follow here chiefly the second, longer summary of Zheltaia opasnost’, which I take to be later 
and thus closer to the final vision of the unmade film (see note 73, above). The earlier version 
contains some interesting variations: notably, the captain of the Cockchafer, a historical personage 
carried over from Rychi, Kitai!, is found hiding in the Emperor’s palace at the end, a foreign agent in 
league with the President. Once more, fact is stretched into melodrama in the interests of displaying a 
full picture of the forces at work in China. The film also ends with the image of the hammer and 
sickle flying in the dawn gloom above the Soviet embassy. In its combination of the biographical road 
to consciousness with the inevitability of violent sacrifice, Zheltaia opasnost’ fits perfectly with the 
Chinese-themed fiction for younger readers, constructed on the socialist-realist master plot as 
described by Katerina Clark, that was published on a large scale in the late 1920s. By that time, 
Tret’iakov was promoting Den Shi-khua as a factual account superior to these fictionalized semi-
historical sacrifice narratives. (See Chapter Five.) 
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Already we can sense in this synopsis the urge to overload, to cram in every aspect of 
contemporary China that Tret’iakov considers essential for understanding. The next film 
script is, if anything, even more convoluted in its admixture of historical fact and 
revolutionary message. The Blue Express (Goluboi ekspress) takes its name from a luxury 
train running on the Tianjin—Pukou railway, which was held up in the most famous Chinese 
bandit attack of the 1920s. On May 6, 1923, this train was attacked and derailed by some 
1,000 bandits at Lincheng, in Shandong. Around 300 passengers, including thirty or so 
Westerners, were captured and taken into the mountains. Two months of negotiations secured 
the release of the captives for a considerable sum of money and other concessions to the 
bandits.658  
Tret’iakov’s libretto seeks to show banditry, a rampant phenomenon in Republican 
China, as a socio-economic problem with a potentially revolutionary resolution. The libretto 
begins with the Blue Express travelling through provinces devastated by flooding. This 
destruction of the rural economy forces peasants into the town, where we see them begging 
on the streets and exploited by foreign capital. This set of circumstances drives many into 
bandit gangs. The hero of the piece is Sun’-Mei-Yao (Sun Meiyao in pinyin), the historical 
leader of the Lincheng bandits. Continuing the overlaying of the historical and the typical, 
however, in Tret’iakov’s version he is partnered by a clearly invented character called simply 
Tu-Fei (tufei 土匪 means “bandit” in Chinese). While Sun’s path to banditry is directed by 
economic necessity—he is one of seven brothers, but the family only owns enough land to 
support one—Tu-Fei is more of a professional villain, with agents in town and bank 
accounts. Thus banditry as a social phenomenon is split between genuine social protest and 
self-interested pursuit of profit, to be neatly aligned with socialism and capitalism 
respectively. A more explicitly proletarian element is introduced in the fictional figure of U 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658 Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 13. 
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(Wu), the leader of a group of workers driven from American-owned mines by a violent 
response to protests. Wu supplants and eventually liquidates Tu-Fei.  
Simultaneously, the niece of the mines’ billionaire American owner—surely a stand-
in for John D. Rockefeller’s sister-in-law, Lucy Aldrich, who was captured in the historical 
Lincheng Incident—arrives in Shanghai and boards the Blue Express.659 A representative of 
false American philanthropy, a shot at the station has her throwing coins for amusement to 
Chinese children, who can only reach them by crawling through barbed wire. The train is 
captured; among the passengers, Wu recognizes his former commander from the Soviet Red 
Guard. This prompts a speech from Wu about his time fighting in the “great state of the poor 
in the north,” and the Russian becomes a kind of political advisor. Various other stock 
characters flit through the libretto, including a treacherous fortune-teller, a giant Annamite 
bodyguard, and a tough old female bandit leader. In the finale, Sun is double-crossed and 
killed. Wu seeks instant revenge, but the Russian advises him to direct his energies towards 
organization and the revolution. 
Tret’iakov had discussed writing a play based on the Lincheng Incident with 
Eisenstein as early as 1923, and took the idea with him to Beijing. The play was superseded 
by subsequent historical events, which inspired instead the composition of Roar, China!660 
The idea was revived for the Eisenstein-Tret’iakov film trilogy, yet abandoned, it seems, 
even before the project as a whole was cancelled. However, the broad concept was later taken 
up again and filmed in 1929 under the direction of Ili’a Trauberg, Eisenstein’s assistant 
during the filming of October (Oktiabr’, 1927), with a screenplay by Leonid Ierokhonov.661 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Fitzgerald, Awakening China, 141. 
 
660 Sergei Tret’iakov, Chzhungo, 2nd ed. (1930), 342–347. 
 
661 Jay Leyda, Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), 272. The Blue Express was made by Sovkino’s Leningrad factory. It seems feasible that 
Trauberg came to the story through his work with Eisenstein, whom he seems to have regarded as a 
mentor. In a letter to Eisenstein from 1929, Trauberg declares: “When I recall all these past days and 
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Trauberg and Ierokhonov’s film departs even further from the historical base on which 
Tret’iakov built his agit-plot, making no explicit reference to historical figures or place 
names: a subtitle simply dubs the film “an episode from the revolutionary movement in the 
East.” Instead, the characters are entirely typical, representatives of a basic class antagonism 
between Europeans and Chinese: a set of such antagonisms is played out and reduced to “just 
a bourgeois” (просто буржуа) and “just beggars and peasants” (просто нищие и рабочие). 
The Chinese heroes, played as Tret’iakov intended by Chinese actors (except it seems for the 
“coolie,” who is played by one Vardul’), lament the failure of their crops and the sale of a 
sister to the textile factory. The train, a well-worn dynamic allegory for dramatic social 
change on the path into modernity, here provides a space in which the social contradictions of 
China are brought to the point of explosion. Class is reduced to train class. The element of 
sexual violence is reversed: in Tret’iakov’s libretto, the American billionaire’s niece fears she 
is to be raped, but is not, while in Trauberg’s film the uprising is provoked by the attempted 
rape of a Chinese woman by drunk European soldiers. Trauberg effectively builds tension 
and excitement towards a heady climax, as the speeding train narrowly avoids a crash and 
zooms off in an unknown direction, covered in cheering, armed men. But the specificity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
events, and take stock, I understand impartially that I am indebted to you alone for practically 
everything I currently have.” (Когда я вспоминаю о всех прошлых днях и событиях подвожу итог 
— я беспристрастно понимаю, что почти всем, что я сейчас имею я обязан только Вам.) Later 
in the same letter, Trauberg teasingly berates Eisenstein for not answering his messages, referencing 
the subject of The Blue Express: “I’m personally thinking about taking a risk, and if you forget me for 
good, I’ll throw myself under the ‘Nanjing-Suzhou Express.’”  (Я лично думаю рисковать и если 
Вы меня окончательно забудете, броситься под 'Экспресс Нанкин-Сужоу'.) RGALI f. 1923, op. 
1, ed. khr. 2151, l. 10–11. 
Screenwriter Leonid Ierokhonov, for his part, seems to have had some first-hand experience 
of China. In 1927 he had published a volume of stories and sketches, A Mistake in a Beijing Prison 
(Oshibka pekinskoi tiurmy), cataloguing such typical moments from contemporary China as the rape 
of a female activist in prison, the beheading of an illiterate rickshaw driver for examining political 
literature, and a miserable visit in authorial first person to a Chinese theatre. Ierokhonov’s book ends 
with a truth claim based on presence and eye-witnessing: “In publishing the present collection, I have 
tried to give only a truthful representation of what I myself saw and lived through.” (Выпуская 
настоящий сборник, я старался дать только правдивое изображение того, что видел и пережил 
сам.) Leonid Ierokhonov, Oshibka pekinskoi tiurmy, 127. 
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the Chinese situation and its socio-economic motive forces is lost in this generic, elemental 
image of uprising and energy.  
Indeed, Lev Shatov’s review in Kino complained that the film-makers had gotten 
carried away with the “abstract cinematographic possibilities” of movement. Instead of 
functioning in the service of social allegory, movement had become the film’s “self-sufficient 
goal”: “Movement—in shots, in tempo, in montage—movement of the express train, of the 
people in the express train, and so on, supplants the political essence and conceptual 
foundation of the picture: the revolutionary struggle, which alone could give meaning to this 
symbol.”662 Speaking in what Katerina Clark has identified as the essential binary of socialist 
realism’s chronological model of education, Shatov here accuses The Blue Express of 
remaining at the level of stikhiinost’, elemental anger, but lacking the sober assessment of 
underlying socio-political forces necessary to progress towards soznatel’nost’ 
(consciousness). By comparison with Tret’iakov’s stated ambitions for Dzhungo, the 
specificity of China and the complexity of the historical situation are here reduced to a fast-
paced yet abstractly symbolic tale about revolutionary energy. 
Tret’iakov’s third film libretto, by contrast, is over-loaded with specificity. The Pearl 
River (Zhemchuzhnaia reka, entitled China Roars [Kitai rychit] in a different, possibly earlier 
version) sets out to capture the dramatic political events of 1925 in Guangzhou, which was 
gripped by strikes in the wake of the May 30 shootings in Shanghai. The strikes began in 
June 1925 in the British colony of Hong Kong, at the mouth of the Pearl River, before 
spreading to the foreign concession on the island of Shamian. On June 23 British and French 
soldiers opened fire on a demonstration heading from Guangzhou towards the island, killing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662 Lev Shatov, “Odna oshibka dvukh fil’m: ‘Flag natsii’ i ‘Goluboi ekspress’,” Kino 52 (December 
31, 1929): 2. “Движение—в кадрах, в темпах, в монтаже,—движение экспресса, людей в 
экспрессе и пр. подменяет политическую суть, смысловую основу картины — революционную 
борьбу, которая единственно могла этот символ осмыслить.” 
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fifty-two people. This massacre led to a complete embargo on trade with Hong Kong and a 
boycott of British firms across south China.663 These events, which seemed to represent a 
serious and sustained protest against foreign power in China (the strikes went on for some 
sixteen months), appeared fleetingly and without clear explanation in the final part of The 
Great Flight. Tret’iakov set out to explain them by exploring the class dynamic within 
Chinese society, in particular the ambiguous role of the Chinese bourgeoisie. It is, of course, 
unreasonable to judge Tret’iakov’s rough sketch as if it were a finished artistic whole; 
nonetheless, the jumbled, overloaded quality of the libretto can tell us something about his 
ambitions, his drive to include all of “China” in these three films.  
The plot was to be organized around two juxtaposed families: the family of a Canton 
comprador, and a poor boat-dwelling family on the Pearl River, the daughter of which works 
in the comprador’s textile (silk-spinning) factory. A strike at the factory is led by the 
comprador’s radicalized student son. The striking women are estranged for their actions from 
the rural community that increasingly depends on them, the comprador conspiring with the 
village elder to punish his disobedient workers by excluding them from a temple festival. 
Compounding his evils, the elder attempts to buy the boat family’s daughter as a wife: she is 
rescued by a band of women formed to fight enforced marriages. Meanwhile, a complex 
series of negotiations occur between the comprador, his foreign investors, and the 
Guomindang. The strike is lifted, the owners concede.  
Events accelerate. The poor family’s father, driven from the land, is recruited into the 
“paper tigers,” Canton’s Merchant Corps, based in the western district of Xiguan (Sai-guan in 
Cantonese). Their instructors are White Russian soldiers. The Tigers seize a boatload of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663 Fitzgerald, Awakening China, 247–9. Perhaps oddly, this paradigmatic moment of imperialist 
violence, with its echoes of the famous Odessa Steps massacre from Eisenstein and Tret’iakov’s last 
collaboration, does not feature in the libretto. 
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weapons and attack a peaceful demonstration.664 Tempers rise. Workers find themselves 
locked out of factories. The Chinese servants in the European compound of Shamin stage a 
mass walkout, offended by new terms of registration. At a demonstration, a student cuts off a 
finger and writes in blood.  
A showdown between the Tigers and the GMD seems imminent. British and Soviet 
cruisers arrive in the delta. Anticipating the opening act of The Red Poppy, Tret’iakov stages 
a scene in a bar where Soviet and British sailors are fraternizing peacefully, until a fight 
flares up between a British sailor and the comprador’s son. The Soviet sailors intervene, 
victoriously, on the side of the Chinese. This confrontation seems to be about to be played 
out on the city scale: the comprador’s daughter hears that the British are on the point of 
opening fire on the GMD. At the last minute, a telegram arrives from the British Prime 
Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, ordering that neutrality be maintained. Meanwhile, the student 
blows up the gates of Saiguan, killing the White Russian instructor. The Tigers are defeated, 
the workers’ and servants’ demands are met. The daughter rejects her comprador father, 
telling him his son is no longer his son. The film ends with a shot of the hammer and sickle 
alongside the five-pointed star of the Guomindang.665  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664 This seems to refer to a sequence of events in mid-1924, when Guangzhou’s merchants went on 
strike in response to the GMD government’s confiscation of a shipment of arms intended for their 
militia (the “paper tigers”). The militia attempted to seize the confiscated shipment, and later opened 
fire on a demonstration. The resolution of the incident demonstrated the rising efficacy of the first 
graduates of the GMD’s Whampoa academy, trained by Comintern advisers, who routed the merchant 
militia and razed their section of the city. (Spence, Search for Modern China, 321; Fitzgerald, 
Awakening China, 287.) Tret’iakov’s libretto does not mention Whampoa, while the presence of 
Comintern advisers in Guangzhou is merely hinted at (in China Roars) through a conversation 
between the “President” of the GMD and his “Russian friend”: “The President at his Russian friend’s 
house. ‘The gun barrels are directed at us. Is it worth risking the city” How would you proceed?’ “The 
gun barrels of the whole world were directed at us, but we risked it and won.’”  (Председатель у 
своего русского друга. — «Дула наведены на нас, стоит ли рисковать городом. Как бы 
поступили вы?» — «Дула всего мира были наведены на нас, но мы рискнули и победили.») 
Tret’iakov, Kinematograficheskoe nasledie, 217. 
 
665 This is the final image in China Roars, the more detailed of the two surviving librettos. Tret’iakov, 
Kinematograficheskoe nasledie, 218. 
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How did Tret'iakov expect his audience to understand all this? Surely they could only 
have done so if they really were following the newspaper reports on China with as much 
enthusiasm as people like Tret'iakov constantly claimed they were. And yet at the same time, 
the compelling argument for making these films about China was that said newspaper 
articles, with their strange names and distant details, made no sense without cinematic 
illumination. Tret'iakov's project thus ran into a circular problem. He wanted to show China 
“as it really is,” in its specificity. Yet without some degree of simplification, how could 
audiences understand, on the basis of what was widely acknowledged to be their limited 
knowledge of China? How can lack of knowledge be converted into knowledge when 
historical knowledge is required to make sense of a quasi-historical storyline? How would 
these films have avoided being simply confusing? We cannot know. But the complex netting 
of these librettos allows us to see the extent of Tret'iakov's grandiose desire to represent all of 
contemporary China, to conclusively present zhōngguó on screen in its true guise. Perhaps 
these grandiose ambitions, as much as diplomatic-financial entanglements, contributed to the 
project’s downfall? 
A year after the Tret’iakov-Eisenstein expedition foundered, however, another Soviet 
film crew did make it into China. Their film, Shanghai Document (Shankhaiskii dokument), 
captured Shanghai in the pivotal year of 1927. Returning to documentary, Shanghai 
Document jettisons the invented script and the totalizing, typifying ambitions of Dzhungo. At 
the same time, the spatial contiguity of The Great Flight is replaced with a spatial 
concentration that allows rhetorical argument to emerge. Instead of representing “China,” 
Iakov Bliokh and V. L. Stepanov’s film seeks to present Shanghai as both a single 
geographical space and as a point wherein the class contradictions of a global struggle are 
concentrated and exemplified. The chronological complexity of actual historical events and 
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the spatial multiplicity of a journey through Eurasian space are hereby reduced to a clear and 
comprehensible argument about social structure.  
III: Shanghai Document: China as microcosm 
After the failure of the Dzhungo project, Tret'iakov notes that widespread interest in 
filming China flared up once more in the winter of 1926, in reaction to the early successes of 
the GMD's Northern Expedition.666 Sensing the appetite for films about China, but aware of 
the complexities of sending expeditions there, some companies began to consider filming 
Chinese-themed projects using “internal resources”: domestic locations and studios. This 
approach produced such films as The Blue Express (see above) and 400 Million (Dzhou-de-
shen), a 1928 joint production between Vostok-kino and the Leningrad company Belgoskino 
set during the Canton uprising of December 1927.667 Exteriors were shot on the banks of the 
Moika canal and in Leningrad’s parks, with Chinese members of the Institute of Oriental 
Languages reportedly playing the Chinese roles.668  
Even after the catastrophe of 1927, China remained a convenient shorthand for 
internationalism and the obligations of global revolution. Five Minutes (Piat’ minut, 1928) 
presents the workers of the world ceasing their labor for five minutes on January 21, 1924, 
after hearing of Lenin’s death. The film cuts between mourning Moscow and China, where a 
Chinese chauffeur’s five minutes of tributary inactivity make his passenger, an English 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Kitai na ekran,” 18.  
 
667 400 millionov (Dzhou-de-shen), written and directed by V. R. Gardin, cinematography by D. 
Shliugleit and K. Naumov-Strazh. Premiered April 16, 1929. A.V. Macheret, ed., Sovetskie 
khudozhestvennye filʹmy: annotirovannyi katalog, vol. 1, Nemye fil’my, 1918–1935 (Moscow: 
Iskusstvo, 1961), 303.  
 
668 Kino 26 (June 26, 1928): 1. Тhe film told the story of Communist leader Dzhou De-shen and his 
Russian wife Elena Nikolaevna, who is captured during the suppression of the Canton uprising. 
Recognizing in one of her captors the White Russian officer who fathered her son through rape, Elena 
refuses to betray the revolutionaries, and her son is killed. The film does not survive, but 
contemporary reviews were not kind. One reviewer lambasted the film for moulding such historically 
significant material into “a shining example of the most low-grade trash.” (Rabochii, Minsk, 8 June 
1929. “яркий образ самой низкопробной халтуры[.]”) 
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banker, late for a crucial meeting with some villainous Chinese generals. The global network 
of worker solidarity emanating from Moscow disrupts the oppressive plans of imperialist 
capital, and China remains the most recognizable metonymic location for this universal 
struggle, even if that location is simulated.669  
The idea of the film expedition was not abandoned, however: Tret’iakov reports that a 
whole range of film expeditions, both documentary and staged, were slated for dispatch to 
China in 1926–7.670 Only one, however, seems to have been successfully carried out. In July 
1927 a two-man Sovkino team consisting of director Yakov Bliokh, who had worked as a 
producer on Battleship Potemkin, and cameraman V. L. Stepanov, set off for China. Like 
Tret’iakov and Eisenstein, they had planned a trilogy of films that would portray the Chinese 
revolution within three contexts: the city (originally to be Beijing), the countryside, and the 
army. The political turmoil of China in 1927, however, restricted their activity to Shanghai. 
Even there, Bliokh and Stepanov could only get permission to film with the assistance of 
Western film companies, and only if they concealed the true intentions of their work.671 
Surviving the loss of five suitcases of negatives at the border, the film they produced was 
released on May 1, 1928 as Shanghai Document.672 Film on China had reverted to the 
documentary, but in a style very different from The Great Flight.  
As detailed analyses of the film by Nicholas Cull and Arthur Waldron and, more 
recently, Xinyu Dong demonstrate, Shanghai Document is a remarkable exercise in visual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 Piat’ minut, produced by Goskinprom of Georgia, 1928, written and directed by A. Balagin and G. 
Zelondzhev-Shipov, cinematography by N. Anoshchenko and G. Kabalov. (Macheret, ed., Sovetskie 
khudozhestvennye filʹmy, 1:289.) The titles from the film were printed in Kino 2 (1929): 2.  
 
670 Tret’iakov, “Kitai na ekran,” 18. 
 
671 L. Vaks, “‘Shankhaiskii dokument’ (prosmotr v ODSK),” Kino 17 (April 24, 1928): 5. See also G. 
Prozhiko, D. Firsova, eds., Letopistsy nashego vremeni: rezhissery documental’nogo kino (Moscow: 
Iskusstvo, 1987), 103–4. 
 
672 Ibid., 104–5. 
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parallelism and juxtaposition.673 The life of this city is presented as the contradictory yet 
inter-related experiences of two classes: the exploiting bourgeoisie (both foreign and 
Chinese), and the exploited Chinese workers. An opening sequence in the docks establishes 
the juxtapositional structure that dominates the film. A dizzying array of shots shows us, 
from every angle, Chinese workers loading and unloading cargo ships. These constantly 
shifting, multiple lines of movement recall such contemporary celebrations of vigorous 
Soviet labor as Vertov’s The Eleventh (Odinnadtsatyi)—except here our attention is drawn to 
the workers’ poverty, their ragged clothes, their meager wages.674 Bliokh and Shneiderov 
build this impression of frenetic Chinese labor, until a shot of a Chinese man intently pulling 
crane levers is intercut with a shot of two steering wheels standing idle, and a European 
officer in gleaming white uniform walks towards the camera and calmly smokes his pipe as 
he surveys the port. “Not everyone in the port passes the time in the same manner,” the titles 
announce, and the busy world of work lines, cranes and cargo gives way to scenes of gentle 
leisure on European yachts.675 An old woman and her family row a junk through the port; on 
a different vessel, a portly European man reclines in a wicker chair on deck, with a cigarette 
in his mouth.  
This sequence initiates a juxtaposition of Chinese labor and European leisure that runs 
through the film. As the Chinese pull cables and ropes for work, the Europeans manipulate 
the same shapes for relaxation, on their yachts. The same point is repeated in several striking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673 Nicholas Cull and Arthur Waldron, “Shanghai Document — Shankhaiskii dokument (1928): Soviet 
Film Propaganda and the Shanghai Uprising of 1927,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television 3 (1996): 309–331; Xinyu Dong, “From Shanghai Document to Shanghai 24 Hours: the 
City, the ‘Sovkino Expedition,’ and Montage Complex,” in The Collegium Papers VI, edited by Luca 
Giuliani and David Robinson (Sacile: Le Gironate Del Cinema Muto, 2005), 80–90. See also Xinyu 
Dong, “China at Play: Republican Film Comedies and Chinese Cinematic Modernity,” Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 168–179. 
 
674 On the representation of energy in Vertov’s Odinnadtsatyi, see John MacKay, “Film Energy: 
Process and Metanarrative in Dziga Vertov’s ‘The Eleventh Year’ (1928),” October 121 (Summer 
2007): 41–78. 
 
675 “Не все в порту проводят время одинаково.” 
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later sequences. The rushing feet of a rickshaw driver, the “human horse,” are intercut with 
shots of horses racing in the hippodrome for the pleasure of the assembled European and 
Chinese bourgeoisie. In perhaps the film’s most famous sequence, a group of boys pull a cart 
along the street, sweating in the sun. When they pause to drink water from a trough, one boy 
peeks through a fence, and the film cuts to a scene of Europeans drinking cocktails beside a 
private pool. Cross-cutting back and forth between the two groups, the film’s montage 
juxtaposes dancing European legs to the toiling limbs of the boys as they drag their load; the 
cart’s spinning wheel is intercut with the spinning record of the poolside gramophone.  
The cumulative effect of this repetitive parallelism is to suggest a causality that never 
needs to be expressed in words: the labor of the Chinese workers, the surplus value they 
produce, enables the leisure of the Europeans and the Chinese bourgeoisie. Staking a claim 
for film as the superior medium for international aesthetics, with its desired combination of 
analytical understanding and sympathetic connection, Shanghai Document deploys parallel 
montage and cross-cutting to express visually, as a “documentary” reality, the Marxist 
understanding of labor exploitation under capitalism and the human suffering it causes. 
(Praising the film on its release in 1928, Emil’ian Iaroslavskii reportedly called it “Volume 
One of Marx’s Capital on film.”)676 This constant juxtaposition of labor and leisure allows 
the film cumulatively to imply a second causality: the inevitability that these conditions of 
production will lead to revolution. 
Soviet and Western film historians largely concur that Shanghai Document was an 
improvement over The Great Flight precisely because it used images to make a consistent 
rhetorical argument about social conditions. Responding to Tret’iakov’s demands in his 
review of The Great Flight, Shanghai Document replaced the purely spatial sequentiality of 
the expedition film with an analytical accumulation of contrasts that produced a sense of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676 Quoted by the director Donskoi in “‘Shankhaiskii dokument’ (prosmotr v ODSK),” Kino 17 
(1928): 5. 
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causality. Drobashenko acclaims Bliokh’s film for replacing “the primitive registration of 
real-life facts, which characterized many chronicle films from the mid-20s,” with “associative 
thinking in images […] If in V. Shneiderov’s film the revolutionary situation was, essentially, 
merely proclaimed, in Shanghai Document not only is the nature of the social conflict 
analyzed, but the direction of its development is also traced.”677 Cull and Waldron describe in 
detail how Shanghai Document applies the dialectical theory of montage to depict “a 
dialectical clash of classes: the Shanghai proletariat and the European and Chinese 
bourgeoisie. […] They clash in the juxtaposition of shots; in the juxtaposition of sequences; 
in the rapid montage sequence and even within a single frame, all preparing the way for the 
consummation of that clash in Bliokh's account of the rising and the promise of the 
revolution yet to come.”678 Writing in the Pordenone Silent Film Festival catalogue from 
2004, Thomas Tode likewise finds the film’s significance in its “‘discovery’ of parallel 
montage as a political tool” and a successful “break with the postcard idyll previously 
conventional in travelogues.”679  
Building on these analyses of the film’s rhetorical structure, I want to focus on the 
comparison with The Great Flight in order to illustrate the claims for the analytical power of 
the Soviet perspective on China that Shanghai Document puts forward. What does the 
transformation in film structure outlined above mean for the positioning of China within the 
Soviet geospatial imagination—the “cognitive map” of global totality postulated by Jameson 
as necessary to any socio-political project, and invoked by Widdis as a primarily cinematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Drobashenko, Istoriia, 24. “На смену примитивной регистрации жизненного факта, 
характерной для многих хроникальных лент середины 20-х гг., пришло ассоциативное 
образное мышление […] Если в фильме В. Шнейдерова революционная ситуация была, по 
существу, только декларирована, то в картине 'Шанхайский документ' анализируется не только 
природа социального конфликта, но и прослеживается направление его развития.” 
 
678 Cull and Waldron, “Shanghai Document,” 313. 
 
679 Thomas Tode, “Shankhaiskii dokument,” Le Giornate del Cinema Muto 23 (2004): 65. 
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product?680 Shanghai Document responds to the imperative to imagine revolutionary China 
through a conception, and perception, of space that is fundamentally different to the notions 
of heroic trans-continental connectivity found in The Great Flight. While The Great Flight 
links Russia and China across a natural space conceived as an obstacle to be crossed by a 
combination of technology and daring, Shanghai Document focuses on Shanghai as an urban 
space, a complex totality that contains multiple social spaces inhabited by conflicting groups.  
As such, it bears consideration within the 1920s film genre of the city symphony, alongside 
such exemplary city films as Walter Ruttmann’s Berlin: Symphony of a City (Berlin: Die 
Sinfonie der Großstadt, 1927), Mikhail Kaufman’s Moscow (Moskva, 1927), and Dziga 
Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera (Chelovek s kinoapparatom, 1929).  
The specific dynamics of city representation in Shanghai Document, however, 
distinguish it from these other city symphonies as a specifically internationalist film about 
class struggle and the unique power of the Soviet perspective on the global situation. Moving 
between these social groups and their spaces with the aid of montage, the Sovkino camera 
becomes the only actor in the film that can traverse the entire space of the city, that sees 
every facet of the revolutionary situation contained therein. The specific revolutionary 
energies the film discovers in this city come to encompass “China” as a whole, and, as the 
film’s ending tends necessarily towards abstraction, to sketch the contours of a global 
situation. In truth, The Great Flight and Shanghai Document both celebrate the unique 
perceptual power of the Soviet point of view, but in different ways. The Great Flight enables 
privileged vision through a heroic act of spatial connectivity; Shanghai Document uncovers 
the City as a microcosm of global forces through the cognitive power of Marxist-Leninist 
class analysis, enacted through the tool of montage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680 Widdis, Visions, 2, 197n1. 
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To understand this difference, let us begin by considering how the two films establish 
their claims to represent an objectively true reality.681 The Soviet film press in the 1920s was 
filled with debates over the correct way to represent contemporary reality, often centred 
around the relative merits of “played” (игровая) or fiction film versus “unplayed” 
(неигровая) or documentary film.682 For example, in 1927 Novyi Lef printed the record of a 
roundtable debate on cinema, at which Tret’iakov appeared once more as a prominent voice 
on the issue of representing contemporary reality in film. Tret’iakov sought to replace the 
binary opposition of “played” and “unplayed” with a tripartite system based on increasing 
degrees of “falsification” (фальсификация), produced through various forms of “subjective 
distortion” (произвольное искажение).683 Such subjective or voluntary distortions could 
include choice of material, choice of vantage point and lighting, and choices made during the 
editing process. These subjective distortions, in other words, were available to documentary 
film as well as fiction, even if the former claimed to base itself upon “authentic” material.  
Tret’iakov’s first category is material captured “in flagrante” (флагрантный 
материал), seized “at the scene of the crime.”684 This is Vertov’s “life caught unawares” 
(жизнь врасплох). Even within “in flagrante” material, however, there are degrees of 
distortion. For example, if the presence and action of the camera is noticed, a human subject 
may respond in a distorted manner: “he presents himself as if to an icon, and not how you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 Much has been written on how documentary films construct their rhetorical claims to objectivity. I 
have found particularly helpful the work of Bill Nichols: see Bill Nichols, Introduction to 
Documentary, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); idem, Representing Reality: 
Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
 
682 I use игровая and неигровая here to reflect the fact that, in the 1920s, the noun “film,” фильма, 
was feminine in Russian. 
 
683 “LEF I KINO: Stenogramma soveshchaniia,” Novyi Lef 11–12 (1927): 52. 
 
684 Ibid. “Флагрантный - схваченный на месте преступления.” 
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would wish to see him.”685 We have already seen this in The Great Flight, where the film’s 
subjects stare at, point at, and freeze before the camera.  
The second category of material Tret’iakov defines as “staged” (инсценированный), 
but not yet fully “played” (игровой). This consists of staging an event, but having the event 
performed by the type of person who would have performed it in real life. Tret’iakov’s 
example is asking a wood-cutter to chop wood for the camera. This produces a much lower 
level of distortion, for Tret’iakov, than getting an actor to perform the same task, since the 
camera captures habits and automatized movements that are identical when enacted in real 
life. This approach is exemplified for Tret’iakov in Eisenstein’s use of non-actors performing 
staged versions of historical events. This practice was called “typage” (типаж): defended by 
Eisenstein as capable of delivering a greater emotional impact than “in flagrante” material, it 
was aggressively criticized by Vertov, who considered it a devious falsification of historical 
reality.686 Typage, presumably, was the form of authenticity that would have been used in 
Dzhungo, which was to be shot on location in China, with Chinese actors recreating historical 
events for the camera.687  
Where does Shanghai Document fit in Tret’iakov’s taxonomy of authenticity? The 
film gives the appearance of showing material captured “in flagrante”: in contrast to The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Ibid., 53. “Он искажается, он преподносит себя как икону, а не так, как вы хотели бы его 
видеть.” 
 
686 Youngblood, Soviet Cinema in the Silent Era, 1918–1935 (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 
1985), 25, 81. The border between documentary and fiction film was notably permeable in the late 
1920s and early 1930s. Graham Roberts cites as a prominent example Salt for Svanetia (Sol’ 
Svanetii), scripted by Tret’iakov and directed by Mikhail Kalatozov: a highly stylized depiction of 
Svan life in the Caucasus mountains compiled largely from staged material. See Graham Roberts, 
Forward Soviet! History and Non-fiction Film in the USSR (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 114–115. 
Indeed, Tret’iakov mentions filming the Svan during the Novyi Lef discussion, suggesting that it is 
precisely this film that he has in mind. (“LEF I KINO,” 53.) Not everyone accepted the film’s free 
mixing of staged and unstaged material: according to Jay Leyda, a group of “twenty-five leading 
citizens of Svanetia” reportedly protested against the film for its unrealistic representations of their 
lives. (Leyda, Kino, 293.)  
 
687 Tret’iakov’s position was critiqued by V. Pertsov, who wrote the intertitles for Shanghai 
Document. Pertsov insisted that an actor could be trained to do the same job as an actual worker, thus 
muddying the question of authenticity. “LEF i kino,” 60. 
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Great Flight, the camera and the act of filming appear largely to be invisible, unnoticed by 
their documentary subjects. There are moments when subjects do seem to notice or 
acknowledge that they are being filmed: a coolie in the early docks sequence looks into the 
camera as he passes, and representatives of the Chinese bourgeoisie glance at the recording 
apparatus as they somewhat awkwardly perform their “scenes of leisure” before it. 
Nonetheless, the camera’s presence is not openly proclaimed as it was in The Great Flight, 
which goes so far as to include shots of the shooting process: at the Soviet Embassy in 
Beijing, we see a group portrait shot of Karakhan and the embassy staff, and then cut to a 
wider shot which includes a cameraman (apparently Blium, to judge by his pipe) capturing 
the group image.   
At an early screening of Shanghai Document, Bliokh echoed Tret’iakov’s use of the 
language of crime, describing how he and Stepanov were obliged to “steal” footage of 
factories and foreigners by claiming that their filmic intentions were other than they really 
were.688 Bliokh also acknowledged, however, that the foreigners knew they were being 
filmed, introducing an extra level of distortion on Tret’iakov’s scale: “If we had to film 
foreigners, then we would promise them that they would be able to see themselves in the next 
newsreel at the cinema in a few days.”689 Furthermore, Bliokh described his filming approach 
in terms which strongly suggest that many sequences were staged: “speaking of his approach 
(orientation) to filming the picture, comrade Bliokh indicates that all his material was 
organized in advance, and that the film contains no ‘life caught unawares.’”690 It seems 
unlikely, indeed, that several of the film’s more striking images could have been captured off 
the cuff, without some degree of staging: the boys pulling the cart along the street in slow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Vaks, “‘Shankhaiskii dokument’,” 4–5. 
 
689 Ibid. “Если приходилось снимать иностранцев, то обещали им, что они увидят себя на-днях 
в кинотеатре в ближайшей хронике[.]” 
 
690 Ibid. “говоря о своем подходе (установке) к съемке картины, т. Блиох указывает, что весь 
материал у него заранее был организован, и «жизни врасплох» в картине нет.” 
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symmetry, heads bowed, as the camera moves simultaneously away, or the cross-cut shot 
from above of bathers merrily lining up to slide down into the swimming pool. 
Both The Great Flight and Shanghai Document, then, employ staging to some degree, 
but the staging is only acknowledged openly in the first film. In a similar vein, The Great 
Flight is much more open than Shanghai Document about its status as an expedition film. 
The expedition-film genre is acknowledged at the start of Shanghai Document: “This film 
was shot by a Sovkino expedition in Shanghai in 1927,” announces the film’s first title, and 
the first image we see is an arrival shot moving down the Huangpu River by boat towards the 
city. However, once we arrive at the Shanghai docks, the journey of the camera and its two-
man crew is no longer part of the film’s internal narrative as it was for The Great Flight. 
Stepanov’s camera, relative to Blium’s, is invisible from the audience’s perspective. Nor was 
the Sovkino expedition reported simultaneously in the newspapers as its Proletkino 
predecessor had been—no doubt in part because the triumphant narrative of China moving 
towards the Soviet embrace was in pieces by the summer of 1927.  
This means that the form of connection between Soviet and Chinese spaces asserted 
by the two films is completely different. The Great Flight connects China to Soviet Russia by 
means of what we might call an expedition chronotope, with echoes of the narrative of 
adventure: setting off from the domestic centre, the planes and the camera battle to cross the 
wilderness before arriving at the goal of their ambitions, and reaping the treasure of lavish 
footage of contemporary China. This chronotope creates a very specific form of spatial 
connection, one that is altered by the expedition itself, through the introduction of a new 
temporal dimension shaped by the speed of the aeroplane. The Great Flight is in this sense 
akin to Tret’iakov’s “Moscow—Beijing”: an account of a technologically enabled traversal 
of space that brings the Soviet Russian as an envoy to China, ending with some scattered 
ethnographic snapshots of the Chinese world through the frame of the train window.  
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These “journey films” echo Mikhail Bakhtin’s novelistic chronotope of the road, 
which cuts through everyday space in such a way that “[p]eople who are normally kept 
separate by social and spatial distance can accidentally meet[.]”691 The expedition’s 
collapsing of space enables such a series of random encounters, memorialized in The Great 
Flight by the accumulated portrait shots of locals along the route. But it was this apparent 
randomness that the film’s critics disliked, arguing that it expressed simple spatial succession 
rather than a more complex causality. “When we say that one should film a reflection of 
reality,” opined Osip Brik at the 1927 Novyi Lef roundtable on fiction and documentary film, 
“that doesn’t mean leaving a camera on the street and walking away, it means reflecting 
reality under a specific angle of vision.”692 The camera’s physical access to a perspective on 
Chinese reality is not enough, on Brik’s terms; the images it records must be organized in 
accordance with a clear ideological perspective, an interpretation of reality. 
Shanghai Document seeks to offer this perspective, the “specific angle of vision” that 
Brik demands. For much of Shanghai Document, there is no “narrative” in the sense of a 
causal sequence of temporal events—until the late interruption of “History” in the form of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s suppression of the Communists, which significantly disrupts the film’s 
style and structure. This means that the connection between China and the USSR is not 
asserted spatially by the represented fact of the journey, as it is in The Great Flight. And yet 
that connection remains explicitly the message and motive of the film. “475 million people 
live in China,” announce Pertsov’s opening titles, beginning with this most crucial fact about 
China. “These millions, dwelling in age-old slavery, have been soldered to our Soviet land by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and Chronotope,” 243. 
 
692 “LEF I KINO,” 67. “когда мы говорим, что надо снимать отображение действительности, это 
не значит поставить аппарат на улице и уйти, а отображать действительность под 
определенным углом зрения.” 
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the Chinese Revolution.”693 This intense, industrialized connection, this soldering, is 
presented here as an accomplished fact. In practice, its creation, as a mental experience 
produced by imagistic argument, is the purpose of the film. Beneath the super-structure of 
cultural difference, Shanghai Document encourages its audience to discern the underlying 
shape of class struggle, a shape that is repeated structurally across the world. Cull and 
Waldron summarize the film’s rhetorical argument thus: “As revolution had swept Russia, so 
it was building in China. Evidence establishing this as a product of a universal historical 
process both affirmed the Bolsheviks’ wider claim to ideological authority and provided 
psychological boost for the citizens of the pariah state.”694 It is not culture or technological 
power that “solders” Russia and China together, according to this iteration of internationalist 
aesthetics. Rather, it is the social logic of capitalist modernity that produces this form of class 
conflict. Shanghai Document was intended as a global statement: the Soviet press reported 
gleefully that the film had caused quite a stir when screened in Germany, provoking whistles, 
shouts of condemnation, and outbursts of the Internationale.695 
Shanghai’s significance is ultimately global; but it is also offered to us here as a 
microcosm of the nation. The film’s opening titles effectively collapse China into Shanghai. 
Аfter the opening statement about the soldered connection between the Chinese population 
and the Soviet audience, China is reduced to the cities most closely connected with the 
national revolution: “Canton, Shanghai, Hankou: the names of these Chinese cities will live 
in our memory.”696 From here we zoom in on Shanghai itself, with the film’s opening shot of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 “В Китае живёт 475 миллионов людей / Миллионы, находившиеся в вековом рабстве, 
спаяла с советской страной Китайская революция.” (My emphases.) 
 
694 Cull and Waldron, “Shanghai Document,” 312. 
 
695 Kh., “Revoliutsionnyi dokument na zapade,” Kino 2 (Jan 8, 1929): 4. 
 
696 “Кантон, Шанхай, Ханькоу – имена китайских городов, памятных каждому из нас…” 
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“Ocean steamers travelling up the Huangpu River towards Shanghai.”697 In terms of 
chronotope, Shanghai Document is closer to Tret’iakov’s “Beijing” sketch than his 
“Moscow—Beijing”: an extended period of urban observation is condensed into the structure 
of a single, stereotypical day, as the Soviet eyewitness arrives in and explores the social 
complexity of the Chinese city. The observations he accumulates in the city—on the conflict 
between tradition and modernity, on the presence of foreign power at the heart of the social 
order—acquire implied resonance for the Soviet analysis of “China” as a whole. Both 
“Beijing” and Shanghai Document found their authority on the notion of the city as 
metonymic microcosm.  
In replacing the chronotope of the road with the metonymic city, Shanghai Document 
announces its relation to the significant genre of city films in the 1920s, a group that might be 
said to include Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand’s Manhatta (1921), Alberto Cavalcanti’s 
Nothing but the Hours (Rien que les heures, 1926), Ruttmann’s Berlin: Symphony of a City 
(1927), and such prominent Soviet examples as Kaufman’s Moscow (1927) and Vertov’s 
Man with a Movie Camera (1929). In these films, a common concern with capturing and 
meditating on contemporary urban life coincides with the exploration of cinema’s technical 
capacities, through cross-cutting and parallel montage, to represent a complex socio-spatial 
totality as an accumulation of discrete spatial elements in simultaneous movement. This 
urban chronotope replaces the road’s series of extraordinary encounters along a single 
movement throught space with a multiplicity of typical events, all happening simultaneously 
at coexisting sites within a greater spatial totality—usually explored within the temporal 
structure of a single typical day. Filmic montage allows this complex socio-spatial totality to 
be witnessed as a single temporal sequence, offering a perspective on the city that could not 
be achieved through direct experience by any individual inhabitant.  
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   270	  
For most of its duration, Shanghai Document roughly adheres to this temporal 
structure of the “day in the life of a city.” In fact, Shanghai Document gives us two days: 
opening with labor and leisure at the docks, the film moves on to juxtapose the lives of the 
Chinese and European districts, and takes this comparison into the evening, when the 
bourgeoisie visit the theatre and dance the foxtrot while workers trudge home to the outskirts 
of town. Next a new day dawns, opening with shots of the foreign banks and trade houses on 
the Bund, before cutting to the factories they control and the workers who work there. Thus 
the two days actually represent a sort of temporal progression. While the first day is full of 
ethnographic footage of what might loosely be termed traditional life in the Chinese 
quarter—street craftsmen, sword jugglers, funeral processions, puppet theater—the second 
introduces us to the lives and working conditions of the Chinese proletariat, the class 
proclaimed by the film as leader of the revolution. This paves the way for the confrontation 
of the final ten minutes of the film, when the workers’ uprisings of March 1927 and their 
suppression in April interrupt the narrative of typicality. In this manner Shanghai Document 
seeks to address Tret’iakov’s third category, causality, alongside space and time: the 
juxtaposition of the film’s various spaces and actions builds a sociological argument that 
attempts to explain how the events of spring 1927 occurred.  
This rupture of typical time by historical events distinguishes Shanghai Document 
from the other city-symphony films of the period. In terms of spatial representation, Shanghai 
Document echoes its peers in representing the city as a multiplicity of juxtaposed social 
spaces inhabited by opposing classes. In Ruttmann’s Berlin film, for Wolfgang Natter, 
“Berlin as a place proves in fact to be many places and as such is a permutatious vessel 
differentiated by all the divisions characteristic of Weimar Germany more generally, 
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particularly divisions of class.”698 Vlada Petric finds Man with a Movie Camera to be filled 
with Vertov’s visual critiques of abiding class antagonisms in NEP-era Soviet society: 
representative in this regard is a shot in which elegant ladies arriving home in a carriage are 
juxtaposed to their shabbily-dressed maid waiting in the street to carry their bags. The film 
affirms its allegiance with the maid by paralleling her movements with those of the camera-
man, Kaufman, as he hauls his apparatus along the street.699 
Both these films, however, draw their spectator away from a sense of the city as a 
specific historical place, and towards a more abstract experience of urban space as movement 
and circulation.700 Berlin, for Rutter, emphasises speed and fragmentation, stripping the city 
of the historical associations of place and produce instead an abstract (but still social) space 
of productivity and exchange: “speed effects and incarnates the spatialization of place.”701 
Man with a Movie Camera, famously, does not even locate itself in a specific city, combining 
footage of Moscow, Odessa and Kiev to explore the speed and complexity of modern urban 
life and to celebrate film’s privileged capacity to capture and represent that life. Social 
comment and situated reality ultimately takes a back seat to an exposition of the process of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 Wolfgang Natter, “The City as Cinematic Space: Modernism and Place in Berlin, Symphony of a 
City,” in Place, Power, Situation, and Spectacle: A Geography of Film ed. Stuart C. Aitken and Leo 
E. Zonn (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 218. 
 
699 Vlada Petric, “Cinematic Abstraction as a Means of Conveying Ideological Messages in The Man 
with the Movie Camera,” in Anna Lawson, ed., The Red Screen: Politics, Society, Art in Soviet 
Cinema (London: Routledge, 1992), 91–2. 
 
700 I follow broadly here the distinction between space and place outlined by Yi-Fu Tuan, who sees 
space as characterized by movement and freedom, while place suggests pause, dwelling and security, 
and thus tends towards a sense of historical continuity. Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective 
of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 3. 
 
701 Natter, “City as Cinematic Space,” 219. 
	  	   272	  
film-making itself: as Yuri Tsivian pithily concludes, “Man with a Movie Camera puts the 
making above the made.”702 
Shanghai Document certainly conveys a stronger sense of place than either of these 
films. The expedition’s presence in Shanghai is announced at the start, and the titles give 
extensive facts and figures about this particular city. There are more than 2 million people in 
Shanghai; in 1926 more than 200 million poods of freight passed through the port; Chinese 
children from the age of 6 work 12 hours for 8 kopecks.703 The events of spring 1927 are 
historically situated in this specific location. At the same time, Shanghai is positioned as a 
place of national and global significance: “Shanghai,” an early title tells us, “is a global port 
and China’s largest labor center.”704 Shanghai is thus presented in the film as a specific place 
where a specific set of social relations lead to a specific historical event; but the spectator is 
constantly encouraged to make the metonymic move from the specific to the microcosmic. 
This tendency is encouraged most forcefully at the film’s end, which pushes towards 
mythical symbolism as historical reality disappoints. 
A closer comparison, a city film with a stronger sense of place that also asserts a 
metonymic significance, might be Mikhail Kaufman’s Moscow (1927). This film, like 
Shanghai Document, follows a two-day structure. The first presents a typical working day, 
from the journey to work through various productive activities to afternoon leisure and 
evening entertainments. The second shows the political life of the Soviet capital, its 
government offices and its embassies. The city in Moscow is presented as a multiplicity of 
sites and processes that interlock to form a complex yet smoothly functioning machine. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702 Yuri Tsivian, “Man with a Movie Camera—Lines of Resistance: Dziga Vertov and the Twenties,” 
in Masterpieces of Modernist Cinema, ed. Ted Perry (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2006), 93. 
 
703 Cull and Waldron reproduce all the titles from the film, translated by Arch Tate: Cull and Waldron, 
“Shanghai Document,” 329–331. A pood is roughly equivalent to 16 kilograms or 36 pounds. 
 
704 “Шанхай – мировой порт и крупнейший рабочий центр Китая.” 
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Constant shots of human and vehicular traffic in motion give the impression of a flowing, 
efficient circuit of productive activity. Yet place endures in Moscow as it did not in Berlin 
and would not in Man with a Movie Camera. The camera moves freely around the city, 
offering travelling shots of named, specific places: Myasnitskaya Street, Tverskaya Street, 
Lubyanka Square, the Moscow River. What’s more, a humanized and comfortable image of 
authority anchors the second half of the film, which shows, and names, government figures 
and diplomats as they meet, work, and administrate. The fragmented multiplicity of the city is 
thus anchored round a sense of stable, personified order.   
Moscow also acknowledges the simultaneous existence of different developmental 
stages in the Soviet capital, the presence of the countryside within the town that struck Walter 
Benjamin on his visit in 1926.705 An elevated shot early on shows a tram moving along tram 
tracks, and then a horse-and-cart crossing those same tracks in the opposite direction: this 
alternation is repeated several times. Such temporal contradictions were, in other words, an 
observed part of contemporary urban life. But in Moscow they point to an ongoing process of 
development: images of bast shoes and singing gypsies at the marketplace give way to the 
regimented, productive movements of the telephone exchange and the cigarette factory. 
Contradictions persist, as in the evening sequence that juxtaposes carousing bourgeois 
remnants to homeless children on the streets. But these drunken bourgeois are harmless and 
comic, not a threat: there follows an energetic display of recreational evening activities in a 
workers’ club. Likewise, labor and leisure are juxtaposed with visual rhymes, but performed 
by the same people: the same workers that rode the trams to work ride bicycles to relax in the 
countryside, or take a break from the horse-drawn carriages in the streets to watch horse-and-
buggy races at the hippodrome.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 “There is one curious thing about the streets: the Russian village plays hide-and-seek in them.” 
Walter Benjamin, “Moscow Diary,” October 35 (Winter 1985): 67. 
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In Shanghai Document, these same contradictions announce the imminence of a 
crisis. The hippodrome recurs in Shanghai Document, but here the running of the horses 
under the cheerful eye of well-dressed bourgeois spectators is juxtaposed to the speeding feet 
of a rickshaw puller, the “human horse.” Likewise, the image of the carousel appears in both 
films: but whereas in Moscow it serves as a simple sign of children’s recreation, in Shanghai 
Document we note that a single Chinese man is pushing this ride full of smiling European 
children, and cannot help but recall the recent shots of Chinese children of the same age 
working in the factories.706 Shanghai Document, like Moscow, offers a composite impression 
of multiple processes taking place within the same social space. These processes are 
complementary, in the sense that they amount to the functioning of a single social system. 
However, in Shanghai Document they are also contradictory, in that they are performed by 
opposed classes whose interests do not coincide and whose activities are often concealed 
from one another. This difference between the films concisely expresses the distinction 
drawn by Soviet anti-imperial rhetoric between social life under socialism and under 
capitalism. 
In its exploration of the contradictions of real social space, Shanghai Document 
exploits what Michael Chanan calls the “heterotopic” character of Soviet montage theory, 
which conceives film space as “a space capable of juxtaposing several different spaces 
belonging to different orders which are in themselves incommensurate or incompatible.”707 
This coexistence of the incompatible, which corresponds so neatly to the Marxist model of 
class society, characterizes for Chanan the “documentary chronotope,” which differs from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706 Cull and Waldron note that the Chinese man pushing the European children round on their 
roundabout constitutes a rare example of what Eisenstein called “intra-shot montage’: “Here, the two 
sides of life in Shanghai—the exploiting European and the exploited Chinese—clash in a single 
frame.” Cull and Waldron, “Shanghai Document,” 318. 
 
707 Michael Chanan, “The Documentary Chronotope,” Jump Cut 43 (July 2000): 56–61. Accessed 
online July 24, 2013 at 
http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/onlinessays/JC43folder/DocyChronotope.html. 
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fictional chronotope in its emphasis on discontinuities, not continuities: “Where the space of 
the fictional narrative produces continuity, documentary space is composed of 
discontinuities, both spatial and temporal, produced by dialectical (and dialogical) 
associations across time and space.”708 Instead of narrating continuous movement through 
space over time, in the manner of fictional film or indeed the expedition film, Shanghai 
Document uses the juxtaposition between discontinuities to produce meaning. Narrative is 
replaced by rhetoric; the illusion of spatial continuity is replaced by an argument about causal 
or structural relationship. As Yuri Tsivian has commented of Vertov’s work, the Soviet 
documentary film is “driven by the urge to transform the physical space-time of the film into 
the open space of thought.”709 
 Shanghai Document, we might say, seeks to enact this movement from actual place, 
“physical space-time,” towards the disembodied realm of thought. Although clearly located 
in a specific place at a precise historical moment, Shanghai Document is socially more 
abstract than Moscow. As Cull and Waldron note, Bliokh’s film (unlike The Great Flight) 
contains no specific historical actors, besides the villainous Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese 
Communist Party is not mentioned, and no Soviet advisors or specific Chinese workers 
appear. Cull and Waldron trace this evasion of specificity to the delicacy of the China issue in 
1928, following its role in the power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky: “Recriminations 
might be flying in Moscow over who ‘lost China,’ but there are no policies or individuals in 
Bliokh's version of the Chinese Revolution: only clashing social classes: workers, 
imperialists and militarists. Furthermore, their actions and fates are determined not by their 
own actions or wills, but by History.”710 A specific place inhabited by generalized social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
708 Ibid. 
 
709 Yuri Tsivian, ed., Lines of Resistance: Dziga Vertov and the Twenties (Sacile, Italy: Giornate del 
Cinema Muto, 2004), 11. 
 
710 Cull and Waldron, “Shanghai Document,” 324.  
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forces in opposition: this is how Shanghai Document enacts its movement towards 
metonymy. In this sense, the self-censorship of historical circumstance that Cull and Waldron 
identify in fact intersects with the demand for greater analytical rigour that we find in critics 
such as Tret’iakov and Brik. Shanghai Document replaces the power of Soviet technology to 
reach and record distant places with the power of Soviet conceptual thought to penetrate and 
understand all facets of the global situation. The absence of the camera as an embodied actor 
in the film means that it is Soviet analytical subjectivity itself that appears to move freely 
around the city, crossing the borders between conflicting social spaces. The camera as 
representative traveler-adventurer becomes the disembodied “internationalist gaze” of the 
Soviet spectator, empowered by the film to observe all facets of this Chinese reality and to 
draw their own connection to this distant place through conceptual thought. 
This internationalist connection is not to be achieved by simply denying the existence 
of cultural difference. After an opening reel that introduces the port of Shanghai as a place of 
frenetic Chinese load-bearing labor in contrast to European leisure, the film’s second reel 
presents life in the city’s Chinese quarter as a wealth of ethnographic material. We see 
images of street theatre, craftsmen, funerals, and other instances of cultural exotica. But as 
with Tret’iakov’s “Beijing” sketch, this exotica is not simply presented for the sake of 
curiosity, or to satisfy a thirst for pre-modern authenticity (though this is not to say that the 
film may not have catered to those desires in audience members). Instead, the ethnographic 
interest in Shanghai Document is Marxist in its focus on productive activity and class 
contradiction. The exotic sight of a funeral procession is subjected to class critique: this is a 
rich man’s funeral, and beggars are recruited as attendants to bolster its splendour. The 
camera picks out productive labor processes of the traditional, pre-capitalist economy. We 
see blacksmiths making knives, cobblers, wood-carving, and a visually rich transition from 
two men weaving chairs to young boys on scaffolding plaiting the covering for a roof. Even 
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in the exotic scenes of dancers, costumed monkeys, and other street performers, the camera 
lingers on the crowd of gawping spectators, casting them in the role of a passive mass, 
seeking relief from work, awaiting an awakening. (The cramped poverty of these scenes will 
be offset by the light and space of the later scenes of European leisure, at the race course or 
by the swimming pool.) In one neat sequence, a Chinese crowd surrounds a sword-spinner 
who whirls his blades in a rhythm that is matched by cuts from mid-shot to close-up and 
back, three times: this hypnotic display is broken, however, by the sight of a tram moving 
past behind the crowd in the background. As Tret’iakov rejoiced to find stencils of motor-
cars and aeroplanes among the traditional craftworks of Beijing, here Stepanov and Bliokh 
suggest that a mechanized modernity is interrupting the traditional world they portray in this 
“ethnographic” sequence. 
Next, however, the film leaves this Chinese world that it has explored so freely, 
extracting the exotic pleasures of traditional life, and journeys past some barbed wire into the 
international settlement. The Chinese, we are told, cannot gain access here; but the Soviet 
cinematic gaze can cross the spatial divide that separates the city’s residents. We go up on a 
roof, where, as Dong notes, the Soviet camera assumes the vantage point of the detached, 
elevated Chinese bourgeoisie that it seems to want to condemn.711 We might add that this 
elevated position was also taken up by Tret’iakov in Beijing, standing on the second floor of 
his modern hotel to look with sympathy into the city’s old one-story hutong dwellings. Like 
Tret’iakov, the Sovkino camera goes everywhere: it leaves these rich Chinese in their rooftop 
isolation to descend into the factories and slums where the workers labour and live. It 
penetrates the old Chinese city, where no European faces are to be seen. However, unlike 
Tret’iakov, The Great Flight, or for that matter Man with a Movie Camera, Shanghai 
Document conceals the embodied travellers who crossed the city to create the film that we 
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see. The free access of the Soviet camera thus comes to express the free access of Soviet 
analytical subjectivity itself. 
To illustrate this idea in detail, let us return to that most iconic scene in the film, 
where the cart-pulling boy peeks through the fence to see the Europeans at play. This 
sequence, Dong notes, employs a device more commonly found in fiction film, the point-
glance: a shot of the boy peeking through the fence is followed by a shot of what lies beyond 
the fence, such that we are encouraged to view the second shot as the boy’s perspective. 
Dong argues that the insertion of this device into the documentary disrupts the structure of 
arbitrary, conceptual spatial oppositions that has defined Shanghai Document. At this 
moment, for Dong, the boy achieves an agency otherwise denied to the passive, observed 
Chinese subjects in the film: “the Chinese boy peeping through the fence clearly stands for a 
moment for not only the rising class and colonial consciousness, but also where a Chinese 
viewing subject claims his sight.”712 The boy, for Dong, anticipates a future Chinese 
cinematic practice that will be able to represent China for itself, without the mediation of 
foreign film-makers.  
This shift in the film’s spatial order is undeniably striking, but I cannot entirely agree 
with Dong’s conclusion. The boy is granted a partial fulfillment of his scopic desire, but the 
fence remains between him and European bourgeois space, a barrier that affords him only 
one, partial perspective on this opposing world. By contrast, the Sovkino camera invisibly 
enters the European world on the other side of the fence, and films it from every angle: 
portrait shots of laughing girls, close-ups of cocktails, gramophones, and dancing legs. This 
mobile internationalist perspective even climbs onto a slide to capture a group of happy 
swimmers cascading down into the water. The static position of the boy by the fence, by 
contrast, ultimately serves to re-accentuate his limited agency within the crucial realm of 
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visual access, relative to the all-seeing Soviet internationalist gaze. It is this Soviet gaze, not 
the boy’s static viewpoint, that makes the parallel connections between the stirred cocktail 
and the water the labourers drink from a trough, or between the spinning wheel of their cart 
and the spinning record on the poolside gramophone. At work here is not Chinese voyeurism, 
but the critical activity of Soviet analytical subjectivity. 
The internationalist gaze enabled by the invisible Sovkino camera essentially 
occupies the same positionality that Tret’iakov claimed in his reportage: that third term 
between European and Chinese, technologically aligned with the former but politically with 
the latter. As Tret’iakov could be within Beijing’s Diplomatic Quarter one moment and at the 
center of a student protest at its gates the next, so Shanghai, a filmed city of divided spaces, is 
traversed freely only by the Soviet gaze. This freedom to traverse social space is only 
matched in the film’s final sequence, when first protestors and then troops march violently 
across the spatial divides that have defined the city, rupturing its precarious, unsustainable 
order.  
For most of its running, as noted, Shanghai Document juxtaposes contradictory social 
spaces within the same urban totality, in the course of abstract or typical time. In the last 
eight minutes of the film, however, the clash of these contradictions causes historical time 
violently to interrupt the typical time of the city symphony, and disrupt the ordered separation 
of spaces we have so far seen. Over some vague shots of people milling down a street, the 
titles tell us that strikes have been more and more common in recent years. Then suddenly we 
are given our first specific date: “in MARCH 1927” the city finally falls into the hands of the 
proletariat. Shortly afterwards, the proletariat is betrayed by General Chiang Kai-shek, the 
first historical individual to appear in the film. The parallelism of labor and leisure is replaced 
by a new parallelism of marching groups, as swarming, banner-waving protestors are intercut 
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with mechanically marching soldiers carrying ominous rifles: this increase in directional 
motion builds the spectators’ expectation of a violent collision between these groups.  
This growing sense of dynamic tension culminates in a sequence that combines 
montage and titles to assert a direct causality between Chiang Kai-shek and the mass 
slaughter of workers. We see Chiang, the “betrayer of the Chinese revolution,” shouting at a 
podium. Next we see a machine gun, which the titles tell us is being prepared “against the 
uprisen workers.”  Next, searches in workers’ districts, and pedestrians patted down by 
soldiers: a growing sense of repression after the internationalist optimism of the earlier 
protest scenes. We cut back to Chiang, still shouting at his podium: the titles tell us that he 
has demanded “immediate reprisals” (немедленой расправы). The next shots are more 
walking crowd scenes, of the type we have seen earlier in this history-on-the-move section: 
but now the titles insist that what we are seeing is “Unarmed workers led to execution” 
(Обезоруженых рабочих ведут / На казнь). Multiple moving crowd sequences now 
culminate in sudden, shocking violence, as figures on their knees in a field are shot by 
soldiers before our eyes. These execution shots are intercut with more shots of crowds 
moving down streets: the impression is given that people are being led to these execution 
sites in their hundreds. One last cut back to Chiang shouting, followed by a cut back again to 
yet more executions, cements the chain of causality: Chiang has massacred the working class 
of Shanghai.  
This climactic disruption of the city’s spatial order by massed, mobile crowds does 
not lead to the institution of a new, revolutionary socio-spatial practice; rather, it culminates 
in repressive violence in an eccentric space on the edge of the city. The rupturing of the 
film’s established order, however, disorients the viewer, who has become acquainted to the 
steady narrative of typicality and parallelism. This sense of shock peaks at the scenes of 
execution. In newsreel footage of markedly different quality, we watch from a mid-range 
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wide angle as prisoners kneeling in a line are shot in the back of the head. The roughness of 
these shots, which make no attempt at compositional complexity or ingenious montage, gives 
them a frightening blankness in the context of this highly stylized film. At these moments, the 
assertion of cognitive authority cedes priority to the other essential element of internationalist 
aesthetics: the generation of emotional sympathy as a concrete, affective experience. The 
shocks and jolts generated by this sequence of the film are directed at the body of the 
spectator. 
Next we cut to the foreign concession, where all is calm and order, marked by 
military parades: once again, the procession, a determined movement of a mass of people in a 
certain direction, has become the dominant visual motif of this last part of the film. By now, 
however, the rigid, mechanical military march has entirely overwhelmed the more disorderly, 
rambling march of protest (as in an earlier sequence where a protest walks towards the 
camera and folds around it). Bodily states, however, are still juxtaposed: a parade of foreign 
tanks driving past calm spectators is intercut with two shots of bodies lying on the ground, 
the first raising his arms over his head as if to protect himself from the onrushing tanks, the 
second a corpse. The montage sequence encourages the spectator to see here a single Chinese 
body crushed by the tanks, and perhaps even to insert their own body by identification in its 
place. A title after this corpse shot confirms we have moved locations again: back “In the 
workers’ quarters…” we see nothing but corpses littering the ground.  
In the film’s final sequence, we see foreign warships gathering in the harbor, and 
foreign soldiers bolstering their defences; and lastly we return to the industrial images of the 
Shanghai proletariat in its factories. The separation of the rival classes into exclusive spaces 
has been reinstated. But now the images of labour are revalorized, infused what Cull and 
Waldron call “industrial vigour.”713 The energy of these workers’ movements, the spinning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Cull and Waldron, “Shanghai Document,” 323. 
	  	   282	  
wheels of their machines, and the pace of the montage between these shots, which constantly 
changes the direction of movement: all this suggests industrial work is not simply oppression 
but also generates the potential for resistance. Dynamism and movement in these final 
sequences are on the side of the workers and their spaces, not the imperialists, who remain 
immobile beside their sandbags in anxious expectation of further uprisings.  
In a final series of shots, a worker draws a piece of glowing iron from a furnace, and 
three men beat the white-hot metal rhythmically with hammers, allowing an apt title to insist 
that the “heroic” Shanghai proletariat has retained its “iron will for victory” (сохранившего 
железную волю к победе). With this conclusion, Shanghai Document moves away from 
situated specificity in recourse to a more abstract symbolism. The image of workers beating 
hot metal with hammers is in fact foreshadowed in the knife-making scene in the second reel, 
when the camera is exploring the traditional productive processes of the Chinese part of the 
city (see above). But its repetition at the end, performed now not in broad daylight but in an 
enveloping darkness that brings out the bright glow of the beaten steel, offers a generalized 
motif of socialist revolution that recalls the soldering metaphor of the opening titles.  
Of course, there is an important historical context here. As Cull and Waldron point 
out, the irony of Shanghai Document is that it sets out to produce this connection between 
Soviet Russia and China at the very moment that Soviet policy in China was experiencing 
comprehensive defeat. Indeed, even when the Communist victory did eventually come in 
China, it came through the peasant-based revolutionary model that Mao Zedong was 
beginning to develop around the time Bliokh and Stepanov were filming, rather than the 
Soviet emphasis on the industrial proletariat that their film clearly endorses.714 The film’s 
tension between Shanghai as specific place and as metonymic microcosm collapses at the end 
in favour of the latter. In the face of the historically real victory of Chiang and defeat of 	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Soviet policy, the filmmakers resort to mythopoetic imagery. The final image of workers 
hammering away presents a rousing symbolic figure of proletarian revolution, divorced from 
the concrete social surroundings in which it was recorded. Thus a defeat for Soviet policy 
was transformed into a victory for Soviet internationalist aesthetics. Shanghai, the focal point 
of Chinese politics, becomes an emotionally charged microcosm of the global class struggle, 
while the power of montage to connect heterogeneous social spaces expresses the power of 
Soviet analytical subjectivity to perceive and interpret social reality across the world. 
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Chapter Four 
Authenticity and Sacrifice: China Onstage 
 
 While the young medium of film was asserting its right to know and show China in 
the mid-1920s, China could also be found at the centre of debates over the post-revolutionary 
development of an older spectacular medium, stage theatre. Since “China” had become the 
symbolic testing ground for an internationalist aesthetics that sought to bring distant places 
into the immediate cognitive and emotional experience of its audience, theatrical images of 
China were connected with the vital question of how to represent authentic social reality on 
the Soviet stage. The documentary aesthetic we have encountered in the two preceding 
chapters based its legitimacy on an indexical relation to observed, experienced China. The 
images of China thus produced, claimed the advocates of this aesthetic, presented a more 
authentically real China than the false chinoiserie of the imperialist exotic.  
But how can such “authentic reality” be produced in the theatre, where the artificial, 
staged nature of the performance is so much in evidence? This chapter addresses two 
productions that sought to address this question of producing an authentic China onstage, but 
in very different ways. The staging of Sergei Tret’iakov’s play Roar, China! (Rychi, Kitai!) at 
the Meyerhold Theatre in 1926 used Chinese costumes, objects and music to assert the 
presence of an ethnographically “authentic” China on its stage. This aesthetic of ethnographic 
authenticity endorsed the play’s political message about the awakening of national 
revolutionary consciousness, the necessary first step on the road to an internationalist future. 
A year later, the decision to set the first successful “revolutionary” ballet, The Red Poppy 
(Krasnyi mak), in China, was motivated by the desire to introduce a theme from 
contemporary reality into the repertoire of an art form suspected of obsolescence. Here the 
question of authenticity rests less on ethnographic naturalism, and more on the conflict 
between two aesthetic modes for representing China. The contemporary setting and collective 
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male dances of the first act suggested a new ballet form inspired by working class struggle 
and informed by the physicality of biomechanics. The ornamental, fantastic visual motifs of 
the second act, however, re-centred the delicate femininity of the lead ballerina, and 
suggested a return to both a Chinese aesthetic and a ballet aesthetic rooted in the past. 
Beneath these very different conflicts over theatricality and authenticity, however, we find 
both productions shaped by a strikingly similar mythical narrative, one that demands 
individual self-sacrifice as a necessary precursor to collective awakening. 
I. China on the Soviet Stage 
In November 1927, as the Soviet Union celebrated the 10th anniversary of the October 
Revolution, the stages of the capitals were packed with images of China. The Red Poppy, 
which had debuted at the end of the previous season in June, returned to the Bolshoi Theatre 
on 9 November, two days after the anniversary itself and one day after the Bolshoi’s 
“Triumphant Spectacle” to mark the event. Vsevolod Ivanov’s stage adaptation of his 
Armored Train 14-69 opened on 7 November in both Moscow and Leningrad, its pared-down 
action centred around the heroic sacrifice of the Chinese partisan Sin-Bin-U. Sergei 
Tret’iakov’s Roar, China! (Rychi, Kitai!), which had premiered in 1926, was still on the 
repertoire of the Meyerhold Theatre, playing there at the end of the month. Likewise, 
Princess Turandot (Printsessa Turandot), the flagship production of the Vakhtangov Theatre 
since its premiere in 1922, was also still playing in late November. Chinese themes could also 
be enjoyed by attending a performance of Georgii Pavlov’s melodrama The Bronze Idol 
(Bronzovyi idol) on November 12, or by catching a production of Franz Lehar's 1923 operetta 
The Yellow Jacket (Zheltaia Kofta—Die gelbe Jacke) the following evening.715 
At this crucial juncture in the symbolic life of the Soviet state, China was highly 
visible on the stage. This trend had been going for a while: during the theatrical season of 	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1925–26, at least five plays set in China premiered in Moscow, with some of them playing 
also in Leningrad. Their diversity provides an insight into the conflicts over correct post-
revolutionary repertoire that consumed theatrical life in this period. Rustem Galiat's A Cheap 
Amusement for the Crowd (Deshevaia zabava dlia liudei), a production of the Semperante 
theatre, shared many common elements with Roar, China! A summary written for Gosizdat 
by the theatre critic V. Blium describes “a typical agitka on the theme of English violence in 
China, not lacking in melodramatic elements.” Focusing on the lives of Chinese street actors, 
the play also featured opium smugglers and incidents of excessive, unjust punishment, such 
as the arrest of a Chinese character for “breaking an Englishman’s walking-stick with his 
back.”716 Another agit-play set in China, Locusts (Sarancha), played at MGSPS (Teatr imeni 
Moskovskogo gubernskogo soveta professional’nykh soiuzov) from late March 1926. Blium 
reviewed this one too, stating that “the action unfolds in some synthetic, abstract Eastern 
country,” where the dominance of an imperialist “clique of violators” (the titular locusts) 
drives the people to revolution.717  
These agit-prop productions, pushing the basic formula of global revolution spreading 
through the colonized East on Soviet example, shared stage and column space with a series of 
translations and adaptations from German-language originals. We have already mentioned 
Franz Lehar’s The Yellow Jacket, an operetta centred around a marriage between a Viennese 
Countess and a Chinese Prince that is undermined by homesickness and difficulties in trans-
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717 V. Blium, “‘Sarancha’ v teatre imeni MGSPS,” Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh 
teatrov, 1926, 27 (23–30 March), 6. According to this review, the play was written by Evsei 
Osipovich Liubimov-Lanskoi, the artistic director of the MGSPS theatre. See 
http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enc3p/184198, accessed March 12, 2013. Elizabeth Souritz, however, 
suggests that this was actually a play by French writer Émile Fabre, Les Sauterelles, from 1911. 
Elizabeth Souritz, Soviet Choreographers in the 1920s (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 238. 
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cultural communication.718 There was also Chang-Gai-Tang, a translation of the German poet 
Klabund’s version of Li Qianfu’s Yuan-dynasty play The Chalk Circle (Hui lan ji), which 
debuted at Leningrad’s Komediia theatre in January and opened at Moscow’s Dramaticheskii 
teatr in March.719 This production featured music by Reinhold Glière, the future composer of 
The Red Poppy.720 The basic plot, through its various redactions, tells of a poor girl, Chang 
Gaitang, who becomes a rich man’s second wife, and bears him a son; the jealous first wife 
poisons her husband, frames Chang for the murder, and claims the child as her own. Justice is 
served when the child is placed in the centre of a chalk circle and the two claimants instructed 
to pull the child out of the circle; his true mother, Chang, does not want to hurt him and so 
refuses to pull. Also playing in both Leningrad and Moscow, Chu-Iun-Vai was a translation 
of Julius Berstl's The Lascivious Mr Chu (Der lasterhafte Herr Tschu), a “Chinese fairy-tale 
in 3 acts” in which the Court of Hell re-incarnates an imperial judge in the body of Chu, a 
poor and morally dubious tailor.721  
What can be said about this proliferation of theatrical images of China? First of all, 
quite simply, China was news. After the Sino-Soviet agreement and the opening of the Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 Die gelbe Jacke premiered in Vienna, 9 February 1923, with a libretto by Victor Léon. It was 
significantly revised as Das Land des Lächelns (libretto by Ludwig Herzer and Fritz Löhner, premiere 
in Berlin, 10 October 1929). 
 
719 Klabund (pen name of Alfred Henschke) liberally adapted Stanislas Julien’s French translation of 
Hui lan ji from 1832, adding such characters as the Emperor and Tong the eunuch, and introducing a 
love plot absent from the original. See James Laver’s foreword to The Circle of Chalk: A Play in Five 
Acts, adapted from the Chinese by Klabund (a.k.a A. Henschke), English version by James Laver 
(London: W. Heinemann, 1929). The same story later served as the basis for Bertold Brecht’s story 
Der Augsburger Kreidekreis (The Augsburg Chalk Circle, 1940) and play Der Kaukasische 
Kreidekreis (The Caucasian Chalk Circle, 1944). See Renata Berg-Pan, “Mixing Old and New 
Wisdom: The ‘Chinese’ Sources of Brecht’s Kaukasischer Kreidekries and Other Work,” The 
German Quarterly, 1975, Vol. 48, no. 2. 
 
720 According to K. Sezhenskii, Glière wrote the music to this melodrama in 1924 [sic]. K. 
Sezhenskii, R. M. Glier (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe muzykal’noe izdatel’stvo, 1940), 30. 
 
721 Chu-Iun-Vai was produced by the 4th Studio of the Moscow State Theater, premiering during their 
summer tour to Leningrad. Berstl’s text was translated by P. A. Markov, and the production was 
directed by N. K. Markov. See “Teatr i zrelishcha,” Zhizn' iskusstva 16 (April 20, 1926): 17–18. Plot 
summary taken from review by “A.”, Zhizn’ iskusstva 21 (1926): 14. 
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embassy in Beijing, and then the protests and growing unrest that succeeded the May 30 
Massacre of 1925, China was probably the front-page story in the Soviet press in this period, 
as a glance at issues of Soviet newspapers from mid-1925 through 1927 quickly shows. The 
sustained media campaign around the Great Flight in the summer of 1925 sought to heighten 
this sense of connection to China and events unfolding there, as did frequent articles in the 
newspaper from experts and observers, foremost among them Tret'iakov. When Tret'iakov 
returned to Moscow in autumn 1925, he continued to press for greater attention towards 
China in Soviet culture, penning the play Roar, China!, and advocating in his role as 
Chairman of Goskino's first factory that a film expedition be sent to China to make a series of 
films about current events there. As of January 1926, while the glut of China-themed stage 
plays was building, The Great Flight was playing in cinemas in the capital, and Eisenstein, 
feted in the press for the achievement of Battleship Potemkin, was publicly announcing his 
intention to collaborate with Tret'iakov on a triptych of China films. China was at the centre 
of attention, in terms of media coverage at least: how much this attention translated into 
genuine public interest must remain speculation. 
Given this topicality, we might not be surprised to find a series of contemporary 
theatrical productions presenting images of China onstage. When we look at the evidence, 
however, we notice that not all these China images are the same. The simplest division would 
seem to be between productions set in the past and adapted from foreign-language originals 
(Princess Turandot, Chang-Gai-Tang, Chu-Iun-Vai) and productions set in the immediate, 
revolutionary present, mostly penned by Soviet authors (Roar, China!, The Red Poppy, A 
Cheap Amusement for the Crowd, Locusts). The promotion of the latter implied a critique of 
the former as exotic, imperialist and outdated. As the documentary aesthetic of Soviet 
reportage claimed to sweep away the false impression of China fostered by the colonial 
novel, so the question of representing China onstage became a question about the nature of 
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theatrical authenticity. Tret'iakov and the group that staged The Red Poppy both proclaimed 
that they were presenting an authentic and contemporary China quite different from the 
irresponsible chinoiserie of their competitors. Criticism of these Soviet productions, in turn, 
often focused on their failure to overcome such exoticist tendencies.722  
There was a third option, however: instead of being presented as mysterious and 
exotic or revolutionary and contemporary, China could be presented onstage as openly 
theatrical, in a manner that revealed the artifice of pretending that the space of the stage was 
somehow transformed through performance into a place called “China.” This approach was 
deployed to great acclaim in Princess Turandot (Printsessa Turandot), which debuted in 
1922 as the final production of the director Evgenii Vakhtangov. The China presented on the 
stage of the Vakhtangov Theatre was entirely and openly artificial: the production bared the 
device of its own artistic construction, and made no attempt at producing a convincing 
mimetic illusion of a supposedly historical reality. In Vakhtangov's theatre, Carlo Gozzi's 
fable about the cruel Chinese princess who eliminates her suitors by asking them impossible 
riddles was staged as a spectacle of theatre coming into being. Its authenticity was theatrical, 
a self-aware embrace of the artificiality of theatrical conventions.  
This conflict over the correct, “authentic” way to represent China thus taps into the 
antagonism between mimetic naturalism and self-aware theatricality that, metonymized in the 
names of Konstantin Stanislavsky and Vsevolod Meyerhold, shapes the standard narrative on 
Russian theatrical culture in the early twentieth century. Vakhtangov, a student of 
Stanislavsky, moved away from the naturalist aesthetic of the Moscow Art Theatre in search 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722 The most obvious example of this is the critical reaction to The Red Poppy, which will be 
discussed below. Another example would be the melodrama The Bronze Idol, written by Georgii 
Pavlov, and staged by the Studiia Malogo teatra from 1926 (director N. F. Kostromskii, music S. L. 
Germanov). A less than ecstatic contemporary review describes a love triangle, served in a “spicy, 
exotic sauce,” between Lieutenant Ravenshtein, a Chinese woman named Oa-shen, and a sadistic 
novelist called Zoia Rants. Ingredients in this exotic sauce included an opium den, a gang of pirates, 
the skulls of executees being cleft by an elephant leg, and “the mysterious bronze idol, which begins 
to speak at the moment of the foreign intruder’s death.” Viktor Ermans, “Bronzovyi idol v Studii 
Malogo teatra,” Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 64 (1926): 14. 
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of a specifically “theatrical realism,” wherein the spectator could admire the actor’s skill as 
emotionally convincing whilst never forgetting that they are watching a theatrical 
performance.723 The actors in Princess Turandot did not even try to convincingly inhabit a 
fantastic, fairy-tale Beijing; instead, they were instructed to portray Italian actors attempting 
to improvise their way through Gozzi's text.724 Naturalist empathy was forestalled: “Who 
cares,” Vakhtangov remarked, “whether Turandot will fall in love with Calaf or not?”725 The 
actors emerged from the audience to don their costumes onstage, used seemingly random 
objects for props, and signified “China” as their location by simply holding up a sign that 
read “Peking.”726 The attitudes of the Soviet audience towards China or the Chinese as 
historical or contemporary realities were simply irrelevant to such ironic, playful 
investigations of theatricality. 
By the mid-1920s, however, the topicality of China could no longer be ignored. Both 
Roar, China! and The Red Poppy proclaim their purpose to be the representation of China as 
a contemporary, commensurable revolutionary space. In this they oppose Vakhtangov’s 
openly artificial China, still playing through the decade, whose verisimilitude was not at 
issue.727 Tret’iakov described writing Roar, China! as a conscious response to the falseness 
of the other theatrical images of China circulating at mid-decade, an abundance perhaps 
caused by the great success of Vakhtangov’s production as well as the topicality of events in 
China: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 Boris Zakhava, Vakhtangov i ego studiia, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Teakinopechat’, 1930), 130–132. 
 
724 Ibid., 143–4. 
 
725 Ibid., 142. “Кому интересно, полюбит Турандот Калафа или нет?” 
 
726 Nikolai A. Gorchakov, The Theater in Soviet Russia, trans. Edgar Lehrman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1957), 254. 
 
727 Zakhava estimates that Printsessa Turandot played over 600 times between 1922 and 1929. 
Zakhava, Vakhtangov, 155. 
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“Reality is more grey than fantastic exoticism,” cry the devotees of a particular 
China, the one that has now crawled out onto the stages of our theatres in all these 
plays with princesses, courtesans, and kings’ sons (The Bronze Idol, Chu-Iun-Vai, 
The Chalk Circle, The Yellow Jacket), which I tried to counter with Roar, China!, 
the only play-article on our stage.728 
 
This quite disparate selection of China-themed productions is grouped together as the 
“fantastic exoticism” that Tret’iakov sought to oppose. Their respective foci on elite marital 
relations (The Yellow Jacket), melodramatic love triangles (The Bronze Idol), super-natural 
intervention (Chu-Iun-Vai), and tales from the past (The Chalk Circle/Chang Gaitang) run 
contrary to Tret’iakov’s insistence on representing contemporary, popular China.  
It seems, however, that these productions were often conscious of the need to prove 
their contemporary relevance. A contemporary plot summary of The Yellow Jacket suggests 
that the Soviet production made the Chinese prince into a revolutionary, which he is not in 
the original.729 Likewise, a review of Chang Gaitang notes that an “ideological rationale” 
was “sewn onto” the play with the appearance of a member of a secret brotherhood.730 Critics 
were not convinced, however. The Yellow Jacket’s reviewer notes that Soviet “tailors” have 
attempted to update the piece, but adds that you would only know this from reading the 
poster, not from watching the play.731 Likewise, a review of Chang Gaitang dismisses the 
play as “melodramatic chinoiserie” that is “weak and unnecessary for our days” and “adds 
nothing to the renewal of the repertoire.”732 A review of the State Academic Theatre’s 1927 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
728 Tret’iakov, Chzhungo (1930), 8. “— Действительность серее фантастической экзотики, — 
кричат поклонники особенного Китая, того самого, который ныне вылез на сцены театров во 
всех этих пьесах с царевнами, куртизанками, царскими сынками («Бронзовый идол», «Чу-Юн-
Вай», «Меловой круг», «Желтая кофта»), которому я попытался противопоставить одинокую 
на наших подмостках пьесу-статью «Рычи, Китай!»” 
 
729 Zhizn’ iskusstva 45 (1927), “Teatry i zrelishcha” supplement: 9. 
 
730 Viktor Ermans, “‘Chan-Gai-Tang’ v Moskovskom Dramaticheskom teatre,” Programmy 
gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 28 (March 30–April 6, 1926): 9. 
 
731 Zhizn’ iskusstva 2 (1926): 9. 
 
732 Gaik Adonts, “Chang Gai-tang,” Zhizn’ iskusstva 4 (1927): 17. 
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production of a Japanese play, Oda Nobunago, lauds this attempt to introduce “real Eastern 
theatre” to Soviet audiences, after the “absurd Eastern masquerade recently seen in Chang 
Gaitang and Chu-Iun-Vai.”733  
 Nevertheless, the existence of these productions, and Tret’iakov’s sense of them as 
rivals, do suggest a certain appetite among theatrical audiences for Oriental, exotic 
entertainments. Nor should this be limited to China. The biggest film hit in the 1920s USSR 
was Douglass Fairbanks’ The Thief of Baghdad, which earned enthusiastic reviews, full-page 
advertisements and even a laudatory poem in Zhizn’ iskusstva (The Life of Art), a Leningrad 
journal considered one of the cultural barometers of the time.734 This taste for the exotica of 
early Hollywood, alongside the stage-chinoiserie imports mentioned above, remind us that 
1920s Soviet culture was connected to a wider international circuit of cultural products. 
Soviet cultural producers of the time were challenged to counter this dominance of the 
bourgeois exotic. It is essentially foreign competition that Tret’iakov is writing against with 
Roar, China!, just as his sketch collection Chzhungo was written to counter the false picture 
of China found in French exoticists like Pierre Loti and Claude Mirbeau.  
 China became the obvious site to confront the bourgeois exotic in the mid-1920s, 
because China was a prominent source of exotic images that was also newly visible as front-
page news. We see this pattern emerging even before Tret’iakov’s play. In 1925, the Moscow 
Theatre of Satire unveiled the second Soviet attempt at a political operetta, or “politoperetta,” 
entitled Forty Canes or Love in China (Sorok palok ili liubov’ v Kitae).735 This production, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733 Zhizn’ iskusstva 11–12 (1927): 11. 
 
734 On the popularity of The Thief of Baghdad, see Kepley and Kepley, “Foreign Films on Soviet 
Screens,” 437. 
For advertisements, see Zhizn’ iskusstva 10 (1925): 1–2. For the poem, see Zhizn’ iskusstva 11 (1925): 
1. For a very positive review of The Thief of Baghdad, which even credits the film as a historically 
accurate representation of Baghdad, see Zhizn’ iskusstva 12 (1925): 17. 
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with a libretto by Glob and music by Matvei Blanter, told the story of a Chinese coolie who 
administered a beating to the representatives of the great powers.736 Though dubbed 
“ludicrous” by the Zhizn’ iskusstva reviewer, this plot was apparently based on the same 
historical event that Tret’iakov drew on for the first film of his Dzhungo trilogy. In April 
1924, it was reported that a Chinese soldier in Beijing had received forty blows from a 
bamboo cane for walking on a section of wall designated for foreigners only. The soldier 
reportedly determined to take revenge by beating up forty foreigners; he managed only three, 
however, before he was again arrested. This “newspaper fact” came to the attention of 
Trotsky, who highlighted it as an example of imperialist injustice in his 1924 May Day 
speech, “May Day in the West and the East.”737 The vengeful Chinese soldier also made an 
appearance in the illustrated journal Prozhektor that month.738 Forty Canes does not seem to 
have made much of an impression on the theatre-going public. Nonetheless, its use of a 
reported fact from contemporary China as the basis for a theatrical enactment of oppressed 
Chinese throwing off foreign power anticipates both Roar, China! and The Red Poppy, both 
of which achieved much greater success.739 
Tret’iakov called Roar, China! a “play-article”: a “documentary” reproduction of a 
real historical event in the theatre, for the sake of communicating a political message about 
the contemporary world. Tret'iakov based this play-article on a “newspaper fact”: in June 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 V. Fedorov, “‘Sorok palok’ (Moskovskii teatr satiry),” Zhizn’ iskusstva 11 (1925): 15. According 
to Fedorov, the first “politoperetta” was Atlantida, an attack on White Guardists staged by the 
Moskovskii teatr operetty. 
736 Ibid. 
 
737 Trotsky, “May Day in the West and the East,” 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/04/mayday.htm accessed January 20, 2013. 
 
738 “Proletariat Moskvy s toboi!” Prozhektor 10 (1925): 25. 
 
739 Indeed, Roar, China! also seems to contain a reference to the incident, when the French merchant, 
Monsieur de Bruxelles, mentions that “in Beijing a soldier beats a European in the face” because 
“they wouldn’t let these yellow swine into a European park.” Sergei Tret’iakov, “Rychi, Kitai! 
Sobytie v 9 zven’iakh,” in Slyshish’, Moskva?! Protivogazy. Rychi, Kitai! (Moscow: Izd-vo Iskusstvo, 
1966), 111. 
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1924, in Wanxiang, Sichuan, an American businessman, Edwin C. Hawley, was killed during 
a dispute with Chinese boatmen.740 In response, the captain of the Cockchafer, a British 
battleship moored at Wanxiang, demanded that the city’s officials follow Hawley’s funeral 
procession, and that the leaders of the boatmen be executed. Failure to comply was to result 
in the bombardment of the city.741  
The Red Poppy also, it seems, owed its germination to a “newspaper fact.” According 
to ballet historian Elizabeth Souritz, Glière was working in early 1926 on music for a libretto 
by Mikhail Gal’perin, The Daughter of the Port (Doch’ Porta), set in revolutionary France 
and due to be staged at the Bolshoi. At a meeting of the Bolshoi’s directorate in February 
1926, however, The Daughter of the Port was rejected for its tedious content and insufficient 
dynamism.742 Here Mikhail Ivanovich Kurilko, theatre artist and future librettist for The Red 
Poppy, stepped into the fray, as he was to recall years later: 
I also spoke heatedly against it. And in answer to the question of where to look for 
a theme, I picked up the latest copy of Pravda and read out a report on the detention 
of the Soviet steamer Lenin in a Chinese port. There and then, in the midst of an 
intense debate, I sketched the contours of the plot for the future ballet. It was 
recorded by the stenographer. The next day I recounted this plot to E. V. Gel’tser. 
She liked it, and at her request I worked out the script in greater detail. Thus work 
began on the creation of the ballet The Red Poppy, for which I acted as librettist.743 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740 For newspaper reports of the incident, see New York Times, July 1, 1924; The Times, July 7, 1924. 
 
741 See for example New York Times, July 6, 1924; New York Times, August 16, 1924. An excellent 
summary of the event as reported in Western media is provided in Walter J. Meserve and Ruth I. 
Meserve, “The Stage History of Roar China!: Documentary Drama as Propaganda,” Theatre Survey 
21 (1980): 1–2. 
 
742 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 231–2. Gal’perin later had his chance to write a China-in-revolt 
piece, penning the libretto for the 1929 opera Syn solntsa, with music by S. N. Vasilenko. Here too a 
trans-national romance, between a Chinese monk and an American general’s daughter, plays out 
against the background of a Chinese uprising, in this case the Boxer rebellion of 1900. Syn solntsa set 
out to be the first properly Soviet opera in much the same way that The Red Poppy had been 
acclaimed as the first properly Soviet ballet, and was subjected to very similar criticisms for failing to 
overcome the aesthetic hangovers of the form, particularly the centrality of the love plot. See for 
example the review by M. Grinberg, “Syn solntsa,” Vecherniaia Moskva, May 28, 1929. Grinberg 
concludes that the opera's greatest flaw lies in the fact that “in essence it is not the whites and the 
Chinese that are opposed to one another, but the pair of lovers and the rest of the world.” He also 
objected that the Chinese were reduced to a “savage horde,” by contrast with the more sympathetic 
American characters. 
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Out of this single scene-setting detail—a Soviet ship causing tension in a Chinese port—
Kurilko spun the story of Tao Hua, a Chinese dancer forced to choose between loyalty to her 
corrupt Chinese fiancé and her newfound attraction to the Captain of the Soviet ship. Glière 
agreed to transfer his arrangements from the aborted ballet to The Red Poppy. Ekaterina 
Gel’tser, who had danced in the Imperial Ballet of Maurice Petipa and remained one of 
Russian ballet’s major stars in the 1920s, was to dance the central role of Tao Hua. The Red 
Poppy debuted shortly after Gel’tser’s 50th birthday.744 
 Though we may question the precise historical accuracy of these accounts—Glière, 
for example, claimed that the plot and setting were suggested by “the directorate of the 
theater”—it can be seen that both Roar, China! and The Red Poppy were presented by their 
creators as responding to a crisis in repertoire, and responding to it by introducing 
contemporary, reported reality onto the stage.745 Tret’iakov set out to sweep away the false 
Chinese exotica that was crowding the Soviet stage; Kurilko sought to introduce a theme of 
contemporary relevance and interest into the ballet repertoire, to reverse a perceived lack of 
interest in ballet among workers.746 The Great Flight had played to sizeable media coverage 
in the capitals in January 1926, and by March announcements were appearing of Eisenstein, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 M. I. Kurilko, “Rozhdenie baleta,” in Glière, stat’i, vospominaniia, materialy, 1:106.  
744 Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy, “Dance as Metaphor: The Russian Ballerina and the Imperial 
Imagination,” in Mapping the Feminine: Russian Women and Cultural Difference, ed. Hilde 
Hoogenboom, Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy and Irina Reyfman (Bloomington, IN: Slavica 
Publishers, 2008), 203. 
 
745 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 233. 
 
746 Though the class composition of ballet audiences was a matter of concern, performances remained 
well attended in the 1920s: the critic A. A. Gvozdev notes in an article in January 1925 that a third 
day of ballet has been added to the existing two per week in both Leningrad and Moscow. A. 
Gvozdev, “Balet i sovremennost’,” Zhizn’ iskusstva 2 (1925): 8. L. S. Leontev, ballet master at the 
Ballet Academy, argued in 1925 that ballet’s popularity was clear from packed auditoriums, but that 
theatrical administrators were failing to accommodate this popular demand by renewing the 
repertoire. See “Chto delat’ s baletom?” Zhizn’ iskusstva 7 (1925): 30. 
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Tret’iakov, and Tissé’s planned kino-expedition.747 The drive to re-imagine China was 
gathering pace, and it seems rational that the Bolshoi’s Artistic Council, seeking to assert the 
relevance of their institution, would latch onto a theme of such topicality. 
The idea of a crisis in repertoire was a constant theme in the Soviet theatre world of 
the 1920s. Ballet in particular was viewed as an anachronistic hangover of the Imperial past, 
tainted by the trappings of court culture, mired in fantasy and exotica. Ballet’s narrative focus 
on private love intrigue and choreographical hierarchy in favour of individual dances were 
anathema to the collectivist principles advocated for the new art. At mid-decade, the 
Leningrad journal Zhizn’ iskusstva was filled with articles bearing such titles as “Ballet and 
Contemporaneity” and “What is to be Done with Ballet?” This statement from the latter 
could summarize the sense of crisis: “We need a decisive shift out of the deadlock of the 
repertoire, otherwise our ballet theatre, being nothing but a depository for various fossils, will 
lose any right to existence and will be closed down.”748 
 Roar, China! and The Red Poppy both sought to improve on their competition by 
making a claim to greater realism: they ask their audience to believe that the China performed 
onstage corresponds somehow to an objective social reality out in the world beyond the 
theatre’s walls. In this sense both reject Vakhtangov’s purely theatrical, artificial China, 
whose verisimilitude was an absurd idea. China was to be shown to the Soviet audience “as it 
really was,” in a manner concordant with the Soviet internationalist image of the world. The 
Vakhtangov Theatre’s acknowledgement of the falsity and constructedness of theatrical 
representation could not achieve the desired effect of internationalist aesthetics, an emotional 
connection with China as a commensurable revolutionary reality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
747 Kino 11 (March 16, 1926): 1. 
 
748 E. M. Liukom, ballerina at the Academic Ballet, in “Chto delat’ s baletom?” Zhizn’ iskusstva 7 
(1925): 31. 
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These aspirations towards realism, however, encountered a range of complex 
problems. In each case, these problems can be seen to relate to the question of authenticity, 
though the word means rather different things in the context of each production. Roar, China! 
used Chinese props, costumes and music to assert an atmosphere of ethnographic 
authenticity, thereby seeking to evoke sympathy for the plight of the Chinese characters as 
representatives of their nation. Contemporary critics, however, reacted uncomfortably to 
these attempts at ethnographic authenticity, which they saw a naively naturalist and in 
contradiction with theatre’s necessary artificiality. The creative team that staged The Red 
Poppy, meanwhile, was riven by different ideas over what an aesthetically authentic ballet 
experience of China might be. While the first act offered a collectivist vision for ballet set in 
a struggling contemporary China recognizably close to Tret’iakov’s text, the second reverted 
to an aesthetic based on pre-modern Chinese art and the heritage of pre-revolutionary ballet, 
which foregrounded the individual dances of the ballerina. The Red Poppy ultimately retained 
many of to the established conventions of the ballet form, most prominently its exoticism and 
its emphasis on the love intrigue, just as it sought through its narrative to transcend and reject 
the values embedded in those forms. 
I shall proceed with a detailed comparative reading of these two high-profile China 
spectacles as realized in their initial productions: the Moscow production of Roar, China! at 
the Meyerhold Theatre in 1926, and the productions of The Red Poppy in Moscow and 
Leningrad in 1927 and 1929. Both struggled to overcome the perceived inadequacies of their 
repertoire by projecting themselves as authentic representations of contemporary reality. In 
this sense, they aligned themselves with the wider Soviet project of de-exoticizing the image 
of China. An important question remains in both cases, though it may remain unanswerable: 
to what extent were these presentist, de-exotifying intentions on the part of their creators 
replicated in their reception by audiences? Did the spectators of Roar, China! not experience, 
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in the production’s deliberately ethnographic, “Chinese” atmosphere, something of the 
“sensation of exoticism” that Victor Segalen discovered in the “notion of difference, the 
perception of Diversity” itself?749 Did the audiences that flocked to The Red Poppy see class 
struggle transcending the chinoiserie that filled Tao Hua’s opiated dream dance, or did they 
just enjoy watching dancing poppies and acrobats with swords?  
Beneath this ambiguous drive to replace the exotic with the authentic, moreover, both 
productions show striking similarities at the basic level of plot structure, what we might call 
their mythical form. A comparison of the two will show that both employ a familiar ritual 
narrative whereby individual self-sacrifice is required for the sake of the social, in order to 
bring the Chinese masses to consciousness. Thus the project to provide a more authentic, 
contemporary vision of China finds itself imposing a new Soviet master plot onto that 
Chinese reality.750 In both spectacles, moreover, the element of ritual sacrifice is organized 
around the category of gender, testifying in both cases to the “masculine” nature of revolution 
as imagined in early Soviet culture.751 Roar, China! presents a male, homosocial act of 
mutual self-sacrifice as the necessary rite that bonds the Chinese mass together as a self-
aware community. The Red Poppy, by contrast, revalorizes the romantic ballet figure of the 
exotic sacrificial heroine in order to show female self-sacrifice facilitating the reproduction of 
the patriarchal Soviet message of revolution.   
II. Roar, China! and the Ethnographic Mask 
Tret’iakov, with an ambiguity that we will find also in Den Shi-khua (see Chapter 
Five), both asserted the documentary validity of his play and acknowledged he had changed a 
few things. “These are the facts,” he declares in his introduction to the text of Roar, China! “I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 Victor Segalen, Essay on Exoticism: An Aesthetics of Diversity, ed. and trans. Yaël Rachel Schlick 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 19. 
 
750 The notion of the Soviet master plot is developed in Clark, Soviet Novel, passim.  
 
751 On the masculine character of early Soviet culture, see Eliot Borenstein, Men Without Women: 
Masculinity & Revolution in Russian Fiction, 1917–1929 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).  
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barely had to change them at all.”752 He does admit to shortening the action of the play, 
reducing the Captain’s two-day ultimatum to a single day.753 He also, by his own admission, 
altered the scene of Hawley’s death. Hawley, Tret’iakov explains, was an agent for the 
American company Robert Dollar, engaged in exporting various goods such as wood oil 
down the Yangzi from Sichuan.754 “Hundreds, possibly thousands of coolies, porters and 
boatmen” depended on his export business for their livelihood.755 This situation led to a 
confrontation: “The fact is that a conflict occurred between Hawley and the boatmen, the 
conflict escalated into a fight, and consequently the corpse of the Robert Dollar & Co. agent 
was fished out of the Yangzi.”756 This phrasing strongly suggests that Hawley was drowned 
in a fight with multiple boatmen. In Roar, China!, however, Hawley drowns after a fight with 
a single boatman, Chi, who is ferrying him across the river. 
 Western newspaper sources corroborate Tret’iakov’s original account to an extent. 
The Times of London reported that “Mr. Hawley was murdered as the result of a dispute with 
junk men, who declared that steamers were taking away their living.”757 A later article on the 
same incident states that Hawley was killed “by the junkmen of Wanhsien” because he 
violated the junks’ agreed monopoly on wood oil transportation. According to The Times’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
752 Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva?, 67. Original text: “Таков факт. Мне почти не пришлось 
изменять его.” 
 
753 Ibid., 68. 
 
754 Mark Gamsa notes that Tret’iakov deliberately altered the name of the company Hawley worked 
for. According to Walter and Ruth Meserve, Hawley was employed by a British firm, Messrs Arnold 
and Co. of Shanghai. (See Meserve and Meserve, “Stage History of Roar China!,” 1.) “By identifying 
his protagonist’s employer as Robert Dollar & Co.,” Gamsa writes, “Tret’iakov (who in another play, 
Moscow, Do You Copy?! in 1923, called an agent of an American bank “Mr Pound”) appropriated the 
suggestive name of a US shipping company, which had extensive dealings with China but no 
connection to Wanxian, while changing Hawley’s line of trade allowed him some play with the idea 
of “skinning” the Chinese.” Mark Gamsa, “Sergei Tret’iakov's Roar, China! between Moscow and 
China,” Itinerario 36, no. 2 (August 2012): 93. 
 
755 Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva?, 65. 
 
756 Ibid. 66. 
 
757 The Times, July 7, 1924. 
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Shanghai correspondent, “[a]s he was beginning to move the wood oil, Mr Hawley was set 
upon by rowdies, hit over the head, and knocked into the river.”758 The Times account, in 
other words, grants greater independent agency to the boatmen, who kill Hawley because he 
is encroaching on their business. The New York Times agreed that the junk men had 
“threatened death to any one attempting to load the wood oil on a steamer,” and describes 
Hawley kicking one of the junk men before the others turned on him. “The American ran 
towards the river, expecting to swim to safety, but was clubbed over the head and fell into the 
water. His own boatmen rescued him and took him aboard the gunboat, where he died.”759  
In Tret’iakov’s version, by contrast, the Chinese junk men have no independent 
business, and are entirely dependent on Hawley. In fact, they are transformed at the start of 
the play into load-bearing coolies, the standard Soviet symbol of exploited Chinese labour. 
The 1926 production opened with a sequence, reportedly ten to fifteen minutes long, in which 
the boatmen dragged chests of tea off the stage, “to the sounds of a Chinese work song and 
the rhythmic shouts of the overseer.”760 (The opening of The Red Poppy, seventeen months 
later, was to be strikingly similar.) When Hawley lowers the pay he is giving his porters, they 
protest, but when he throws the money into the crowd, they fight one another to get their 
hands on it. A riot breaks out, quelled by police, and Chi, one of the most vocal protestors, is 
fired. Later Hawley visits the Cockchafer and is ferried back across the river by Chi, now 
reverting to his other job as a boatman. (In their role as boatmen the Chinese characters also 
have no steady work; they are reduced to sitting on the quay, hoping to snare foreigners as 
fares.) Hawley’s death, in the play’s version of events, occurs when he will not pay the fare 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 The Times, Aug. 15, 1924. 
 
759 New York Times, July 1, 1924. 
 
760 A. Gvozdev, “Tragediia massy (‘Roar, China!’ v teatre im. Vs. Meierkhol’da),” Krasnaia gazeta, 
January 29, 1926. Reprinted in T. V. Lanina, ed., Meierkhol’d v russkoi teatral’noi kritiki (Moscow: 
Artist. Rezhisser. Teatr, 2000), 197. The figure of ten to fifteen minutes comes from Zagorskii, who 
thought the opening failed to move the action along with the pace necessary for agitational theatre. 
Mikhail Zagorskii, “Rychi Kitai v teatre imeni Meierkhol’da,” Zhizn’ iskusstva 6 (1926): 11. 
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Chi asks. Chi refuses to row any further; Hawley punches him in the face, but misses with the 
second swing and falls into the river. It has been established in an earlier scene that Hawley 
cannot swim.  
Tret’iakov’s reworking of the facts forces him to invent and repeat this convenient 
detail. Nonetheless, it allowed for a dramatic staging: the single boat floating in the stream of 
water that ran across the Meyerhold Theatre’s stage, the dramatic confrontation between 
Western power and Chinese suffering occurring in this mediating zone between the two 
enemy camps. But such a reformulation also maximizes Western aggression and Chinese 
passivity, the dynamic already established in their economic relationship. It is Hawley who 
strikes, rather than being struck. Chi only tries to avoid the blows aimed at him, and is barely 
responsible for the death. It seems Tret’iakov found it necessary to alter the facts to suit the 
purposes of dramatic exposition; in order to sharpen his appeal for Chinese uprising, the 
imperative to “roar,” he has to present his representative Chinese in an even greater state of 
debasement and passive servitude than is suggested by other reports.  
It may be countered, of course, that Western news sources might serve their own bias 
by reporting the event in a manner that highlighted Chinese aggression and deviousness.761 
But Tret’iakov’s most significant innovation comes in the manner in which the victims for 
execution are to be chosen. According to the New York Times, the captain demanded that the 
leaders of the junkmen be executed if the actual responsible parties could not be found.762 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761 An article by the Shanghai correspondent for the London Times, for example, describes Hawley as 
being “set upon by rowdies, hit over the head, and knocked into the river,” while “[t]he better-class 
junkmen kept out of the row.” This correspondent also argues that the death must have occurred with 
“officials’ connivance,” since a junk monopoly on wood oil would mean more revenue as junks could 
be taxed more easily than foreign ships. The article concludes with a ringing endorsement of the 
Captain’s actions: “Lawlessness, insecurity of foreign life and property away from the treaty ports, 
and official disregard of responsibility have come to such a pass in China that a few sharp lessons are 
indispensable if foreign trade is to survive. One such lesson H.M.S. Cockchafer has given, and it has 
had good effect.” (The Times, August 15, 1924.) Tret’iakov’s play, of course, argues that the lesson 
had precisely the opposite effect. 
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Tret’iakov’s version, the captain simply proposes that “two members of the boatmen’s union” 
be executed if Chi cannot be located.763 The boatmen do not at first accept this notion of 
collective responsibility. One shouts that the Daoin’ (the head of the city) should die; another 
that Chi is the guilty one, and if he can’t be found, his family should be punished in his place. 
The Second Boatmen, in particular, is inconsolable, repeatedly insisting “We’re not guilty” 
and “I didn’t kill anyone.”764 By contrast, the only proletarian in the group, the Stoker, tells 
tales of the Russian Civil War, presenting the Russian sacrifice for the first revolution as the 
model on which these Chinese boatmen should base their future action. His principle is 
simple, and class-based: coolie must die for coolie.765   
The notion of collective responsibility, in other words, is actually introduced into the 
play by the Captain’s excessive reparatory demands. It is gradually taken on and revalorized 
by the coolies as the basis for their own, newly conscious class solidarity, an ideological 
victory that makes their apparent defeat in the play acceptable. This new notion of solidarity 
requires that hierarchical concepts of leadership and responsibility be annulled. After an old 
boatman who believes in resurrection offers to be the first victim, Fei proposes himself as the 
second. But both are struck down by the First Boatman, who insists “we are all equal” and 
proposes instead that they draw lots.766 The lots fall to the old boatman and the Second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 See for example New York Times, July 6, 1924; New York Times, August 16, 1924. When the play 
came to New York City, the New York Herald Tribune repeated the assertion that the British captain 
called for the execution of identifiable leaders: “Failing the apprehension of the guilty ones, he 
demanded, the leaders of the agitation which had resulted in the crime, two known heads of the 
junkmen’s guild, were to be executed in their stead.” New York Herald Tribune, November 9, 1930. 
An excellent summary of the event as reported in Western media is provided by Meserve and 
Meserve, “Stage History of Roar China!,” 1–2. 
 
763 Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva?, 118.  
 
764 Ibid., 128. 
 
765 “poor coolies, just like us, drove out their masters. [...] They starved and died for you, Wanxiang 
coolie. Learn from them. Learn to die for all the boatmen who are beaten by the English in towns 
everywhere.” Ibid., 129–30. 
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Boatman, who most protested his innocence. Thus the pivotal element of sacrifice is 
revalorized by Tret’iakov’s reworking of the “facts”: instead of the leader being responsible 
for the led, here all are responsible for all.  
Roar, China! exemplifies the confluence, outlined in the Introduction, of the 
documentary and mythopoetic impulses in Soviet internationalist aesthetics. Tret’iakov 
reworks the “newspaper facts” to provide an exemplary tale of the individual sacrificing 
himself for the masses. (And it is male self-sacrifice we are dealing with here, though the 
gender complexities of the “Boy’s” suicide will be discussed below.) The documentary 
skeleton of raw material is fleshed out as a carefully structured narrative based around three 
instances of death: the death of Hawley, the suicide of the Boy, and the execution of the two 
representatives of the boatmen.767 The first is the spark that drives the action, as well as 
satisfying the audience’s sense of justice; the second and third are essentially self-sacrifices, 
individual deaths embraced for the benefit of the community. 
The “Boy” is the Chinese servant on the English ship, who commits suicide in protest 
at the injustice of the Captain’s demands: a traditional gesture, the play notes, made by 
subordinates against illegitimate officials. This Boy is not a “documentary” figure; he 
functions as a symbolic crosser of the border between the play’s two hostile groups. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the role was widely attributed to Maria Babanova’s 
transvestite performance; according to one reviewer, she “created an exceptionally expressive 
and tender artistic miniature out of the lyrical role of the Chinese boy-servant.”768 Feminized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Ibid., 143. 
 
767 Tret’iakov throws in a fifth death for good measure right at the end: the Hoshen, or Buddhist 
priest, is shot dead while chanting his superstitious lies about cloth that can stop bullets. Thus the 
representative of mendacious tradition is cleared out of the awakened mass’s way just in time for the 
future. 
 
768 K. Famarin, “Rychi, Kitai (Teatr imeni Meierkhol’da),” Vecherniaia Moskva, January 28, 1926. 
This was Babanova’s first role en travesti, according to Konstantin Rudnitsky, Russian and Soviet 
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by Babanova’s transvestite performance, the Boy is also the object of the play’s only flicker 
of trans-ethnic romance, that narrative staple that was to play a key role in The Red Poppy the 
following year. Here, however, East-West attraction is reduced to a purely physiological 
basis, the spoilt French daughter Cordelia fixating on the Boy’s “charming lips” and 
“exquisite head shape.”769  
Thus it is the Boy, played in fact by a woman, who fills what we might call the 
Madame Butterfly role in the play: an object of Western lust who ultimately commits suicide 
in self-sacrificial defence of offended native honour, thus reasserting the absolute division of 
East and West threatened by this trans-ethnic relationship.770 The dedication of this self-
sacrifice to the national group is sealed by the ethnographic detail of the song. Most 
commentators agreed that the Boy’s suicide was the most touching moment in the 
production, greatly enriched by this “ethnographic” death song. Nikolai Bukharin found the 
scene “devastating”: as he wrote in Pravda, “this pitiful song, sung by a mortally offended 
boy, and this quiet and uncomplaining preparation for death, are unforgettable.”771 P. 
Novitskii, who retrospectively appraised this as one of the peak moments in Soviet theatre, 
had no doubts as to the national significance of the Boy’s suicide, which he “experienced as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Theatre: Tradition and the Avant-Garde, trans. Roxane Permar (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 
198. 
 
769 Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva?, 89. 
 
770 I am invoking here Puccini’s operatic, tragic redaction of the story; in Pierre Loti’s original, 
Madame Chrysanthemum, there is no suicide, his Oriental lover remaining passive to the end. For an 
overview of the Madame Butterfly story in its various permutations, see Jonathan Wisenthal, ed., A 
Vision of the Orient: Texts, Intertexts, and Contexts of Madame Butterfly (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006). Roy Chan, borrowing Gina Marchetti’s reading of the “Butterfly myth” in 
Hollywood film as “a longstanding narrative by which the subordinate Asian is granted acceptance by 
White society, but only through sacrifice,” suggests we read Sin-Bin-U’s suicide as another instance 
of dying for love, in this case trans-national solidarity. In this case, the Butterfly sacrifice performs 
not separation, but communion. Chan, “Broken Tongues,” 47.  
 
771 Nikolai Bukharin, “‘Roar, China!’ v teatre Meierkhol’da,” Pravda, 2 February 1926, 3. “эта 
жалобная песенка, которую поет насмерть оскорбленный мальчик, эта тихая и безропотная 
подготовка к смерти—не забываются.” 
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the terrible and profound tragedy of a people [narod]. The song lingers in the memory for 
life.”772  
Nancy Jay argues that the logic of sacrifice is expressed through two aspects, joining 
and separating, that function as the inverse of each other: communal sacrifices serve to bond 
a community, while expiatory sacrifices seek to separate that bonded community from 
pollutions and dangers.773 If we accept Jay’s model, the Boy’s act of self-sacrifice clearly 
performs an expiatory function: it condemns the Captain and the Westerners as a group, and 
affirms their separation from the Boy’s own ethnicity, a separation his mediatory role briefly 
violated. The same sacrifice simultaneously performs a communal function, reaffirming the 
unity of the nation for whose sake and in whose name the Boy dies. As the liminal character 
who crosses the divide between the two worlds of the play, the Boy has to die to assert the 
total separation of those two worlds. This sense of transgression was doubled, in the 
Meyerhold Theatre’s production, by Babanova’s transvestite performance, which violated 
gender boundaries as well. His/her death puts an end to this confusion, asserting the clarity of 
group membership that is, for Jay, the essential function of sacrifice.  
The climactic self-sacrifice of the two chosen boatmen also enacts what Jay would 
call a communion: it conclusively binds together the boatmen, whose ethnographic markers 
make them representatives of the Chinese working masses more broadly. Their disunity is 
asserted at the play’s opening in the scene where Hawley throws money into the crowd, and a 
fight breaks out as individuals scramble for personal gain. For the rest of the play, however, 
the boatmen act and speak more or less as a group. Myong Jung-Baek argues that dialogue in 
Roar, China! serves primarily to bind the two opposing sides together internally, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
772 Quoted in Konstantin Rudnitskii, Rezhisser Meierkhol’d (Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1969), 345. 
 
773 Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 17–19. 
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utterances in intra-group conversations tend to reinforce rather than contradict one another.774 
This unconscious unity becomes conscious through the process of drawing lots, making 
explicit the mechanism of self-sacrifice for the community, the individual sacrificed for the 
social. This process of awakening to consciousness through communion enables the climactic 
image of the play, where Western imperialists, guns levelled, face off with а Chinese crowd 
chanting in unison: “Away! Away! Away!” (Вон! Вон! Вон!). The audial injunction of the 
title is achieved: China, the crowd, which began the play chanting its passive labour songs to 
the rhythm of authority, ends in unanimous, purposeful voice. A newspaper report of an 
atrocity is transformed into a mythical narrative about the power of revolutionary 
consciousness to prosper and grow from apparent defeats. 
Faced with the charge of altering the “facts” to suit his propagandistic purposes, 
Tret’iakov might well reply that what matters is not the precise detail, which is open to 
conflicting and biased reports, but rather the typicality of the incident. Indeed, Tret’iakov 
pointed for confirmation of Roar, China’s typicality to the shelling of Wanxian by a foreign 
gunboat in 1926, which occurred after the play was written. This event led some, Tret’iakov 
commented, to regard the play as “prophetic”; to which he replied that all it did was 
accurately convey “the remarkable monotony and consistency of the imperialists’ methods in 
colonial policy, especially those of the English.”775 This suggests that the documentary 
aesthetic, as applied to the theatre, must typify: it must convince the audience that what they 
see is metonymically representative of an existing social reality called China. In order to 
produce this conviction, both Tret’iakov’s script and the Meyerhold Theatre’s 1926 staging 
chose to accentuate a high degree of what I call “ethnographic authenticity,” in costumes, 
props, music and (sometimes) language. However, this demand for ethnographic authenticity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
774 Myong Jung-Baek, “S. Tret’jakov und China,” Ph.D. dissertation, Göttingen, 1987, 40. 
 
775 Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva, 67. 
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creates special problems in a theatrical setting. How is an “authentic” contemporary China to 
be represented on the stage, a conventional, artificial space? How are Russian actors, 
speaking for the most part in standard Russian, to represent the authentic historical 
experiences of the Chinese people? 
It may seem incongruous that these assertions of realism and authenticity appeared on 
the stage of the Meyerhold Theatre. Vsevolod Meyerhold is commonly viewed as the great 
champion of theatricality and open artifice in early twentieth century Russian theatre, 
forming a convenient diptych with Stanislavsky and his naturalist aspirations to mimic real 
life. In his programmatic early essays, Meyerhold advocated for the creation of a 
“conventionalized” or “stylized” theatre (uslovnyi teatr), a theatre in which the spectator 
would not be allowed to forget the circumstances and conventions of theatrical 
performance.776 Roar, China!, however, displays a politically motivated investment in the 
possibility of convincing its audience that it represents actually existing real life. In fact, if we 
look more closely at the career of the Meyerhold Theater, we may sense that this return to the 
real represents not so much a retreat to the positions of an earlier naturalism as a movement 
away from the hyper-aesthetic tendency of “baring the device” (otkrytie priema) towards a 
new form of avant-garde realism. As Roman Jakobson has argued, “realism” is not a fixed, 
singular mode; rather, realism constitutes a set of representational conventions that are 
accepted at some time as producing a verisimilar image of reality. All realisms, for Jakobson, 
are open to challenge and replacement by new conventions.777 Meyerhold’s laying bare of 
theatrical artifice in his famous early productions represented a concerted attack on the 
conventions of naturalism and their claims to verisimilitude. For Roar, China!, however, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 For Meyerhold’s programmatic early statements on theatricality, see the essays “The Stylized 
Theatre” and “The Fairground Booth,” in Vsevolod Meyerhold, Meyerhold on Theatre, ed. and trans. 
Edward Braun (Bury St Edmunds: Methuen, 1991), 58–63, 119–142. 
 
777 Roman Jakobson, “On Realism in Art,” in Roman Jakobson, Language in Literature, ed. Krystyna 
Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 19–27. 
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full exposure of the artificiality of the theatrical spectacle would fail to generate the correct 
levels of sympathy and solidarity. Vakhtangov’s openly false, theatrical China will not do; 
internationalist aesthetics must create a new realism onstage, in order to assert that the China 
the audience sees corresponds to an authentic reality.  
These movements towards a new realism chimed, in fact, with preceding 
developments at the Meyerhold Theatre. James Symons, for example, argues that the extreme 
theatrical abstraction of 1922’s The Magnificent Cuckold (Velikodushnyi rogonosets) was 
tempered in subsequent productions of the 1920s. For 1923’s Earth Upturned (Zemlia 
dybom—an earlier collaboration with Tret’iakov), Meyerhold combined the biomechanics, 
scenic constructivism, and bare stage of The Magnificent Cuckold with objects inserted into 
stage space from the world outside the theater: “real objects—guns, motorcycles, lorries, field 
telephones, stretchers, a harvester, a mobile kitchen—and costumes appropriate to the real 
apparel of the characters[.]”778A similar juxtaposition characterized 1925’s The Warrant 
(Mandat), in which “realistic props, costumes and makeup were placed on a frankly 
nonillusionistic stage” consisting of a rotating circular platform enclosed within rotating 
concentric rings.779  
Roar, China!, however, was not officially directed by Meyerhold. For the first time at 
the theatre that bore his name, Meyerhold delegated directorial responsibility to a student and 
protégé, Vasilii F. Fedorov.780 This does not seem, however, to have resulted in a great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 James M. Symons, Meyerhold’s Theatre of the Grotesque: the Post-Revolutionary Productions, 
1920–1932 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 97. 
 
779 Symons, Meyerhold’s Theatre of the Grotesque, 140. 
 
780 Fedorov had studied with Meyerhold at the State Advanced Directors’ Workshop 
(Gosudarstvennye vysshie rezhisserskie masterskie—GVYRM), and had worked on Meyerhold’s 
productions of Nora (1922), Smert’ Tarelkina (1922), Les (1924), and Mandat (1925). D. I. 
Zolotnitsky claims that this was the first and also the last time that Meyerhold handed over the 
directing reins to someone else for a production at the Meyerhold Theatre. D. I. Zolotinskii, Budni i 
prazdniki teatral’nogo Oktiabria (Leningrad: Iskusstvo, 1978), 43. Symons, however, argues that 
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deviation from the production style of the theatre as it had developed up to that time. For one 
thing, according to Aleksei Gvozdev, Fedorov clearly borrowed his production’s slow tempo 
and symphonic use of music, speech, voice and gesture from Bubus the Teacher (Uchitel’ 
Bubus), staged by Meyerhold the previous year.781 Fedorov himself concurred that he had 
used the technique of the “acting of pre-acting” (igra pred’igry), developed for Bubus the 
Teacher, in directing Roar, China!  
Furthermore, Meyerhold’s role as “artistic supervisor” may have had a major shaping 
effect on the production. Indeed, a conflict emerged over this very issue.782 Whatever the 
division of inspiration, the combination of realistic and openly artificial elements that 
Symons identifies in Earth Upturned and The Warrant seems also to have characterized the 
production of Roar, China! The stage was split into three areas. The Chinese quayside 
occupied the proscenium, nearest the audience, while the mechanized construction of the 
battleship Cockchafer loomed at the back. Separating them was a channel of real water across 
the stage, the means of transference between the two worlds, and the scene of the pivotal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Meyerhold performed a similar delegation of directorial responsibility for 1927’s Window Into a 
Village and 1929’s The Shot. Symons, Meyerhold’s Theatre of the Grotesque, 183. 
 
781 A. A. Gvozdev, Teatr imeni Vs. Meierkhol’da (1920–1926) (Leningrad: Academia, 1927), 41–2, 
46–7. 
 
782 Meyerhold’s contribution was apparently noted on the production’s poster, but its extent was 
contested by Fedorov. (The detail on the poster is mentioned in Lanina, ed., Meierkhol’d v russkoi 
teatral’noi kritikе, 568 n220.) Then, in August 1926 several members of the Meyerhold Theatre wrote 
to the editors of Kharkovskii proletarii and Pravda, claiming that Fedorov’s production had been 
greatly transformed by Meyerhold’s intervention during final rehearsals. In general, they credited 
Meyerhold with making cuts that reduced the amount of “feeriia” (féerie—pantomime, extravaganza) 
and increased the emphasis on the Chinese struggle for independence. They also claimed Meyerhold 
completely remade the European scenes, and improved the Chinese group scenes by suggesting that 
Fedorov use certain paintings by Giotto di Bondone as models. Lastly, Meyerhold was credited with 
shaping the popular role of the “Boy,” as played by Babanova. (See letter to Kharkovskii Proletarii, 
August 13, 1926, signed by 56 members of the Meyerhold Theatre, and letter to Pravda, August 24, 
1926, signed by 82 members of the Meyerhold Theatre.) Fedorov wrote an open reply to Zhizn’ 
iskusstva refuting these claims point by point, and left the theatre. (See Vasilii Fedorov, “Otvet na 
‘privet!’ — pis’mo v redaktsiiu,” Zhizn’ iskusstva 34 (1926): 12–13. 
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death of Hawley.783 During the climactic confrontation at the end of the play, the battleship 
moved forward to threaten the quayside.  
The Chinese side of this visually realized antagonism was characterized through the 
use of props, costumes and music that claimed varying degrees of ethnographic authenticity. 
Surviving cast lists suggest that the stage was filled with typical figures from Chinese reality, 
familiar already from Tret’iakov’s other works: a fan vendor, a barber, a chiropodist, a 
puppeteer, and a knife grinder appeared alongside the larger groups of porters, boatmen and 
police.784 Costumes and musical instruments were imported from China, and gramophone 
recordings of Peking opera were acquired to assist in putting music to the play.785 Some 
instruments were reported as making the journey across the Gobi by car, since “they cannot 
be brought by rail, in view of the revolutionary events in China”: the presence of their 
authenticity, such reports emphasised, had not been achieved without a degree of heroic 
struggle.786 Chinese students studying in Moscow were also, it seems, invited to rehearsals to 
confirm the authenticity of the “China” presented on the Meyerhold Theatre’s stage.787  
The Europeans, by contrast, were painted in the exaggerated style of Soviet satire: 
fox-trotting, cocktail-swilling psychopaths. These too were types, but types presented in such 
a way as to emphasise their theatrical artificiality. As Meyerhold himself acknowledged, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
783 “‘Roar, China!’ v Teatre Meierkhol’da: Beseda s rezhisserom V. Fedorovym,” Vecherniaia 
Moskva, November 12, 1925. 
 
784 RGALI f. 963, op. 1, ed. khr. 467, l. 12–13. 
 
785 “‘Roar, China!’ Instrumenty i kostiumy pribyli iz Kitaia.” Vecherniaia Moskva, December 10, 
1925.  
 
786 “‘Rychi, Kitai!’ Muzykal’nye instrument iz Kitaia. Na avtomobiliakh cherez pustyniu Gobi,” 
Vecherniaia Moskva, Dec 4, 1925. This crossing of the Gobi echoes the Great Flight, the film of 
which was playing in Moscow at the time, as well as Tret’iakov’s exit from China at the end of 
Chzhungo and Borodin’s retreat as described by Erdberg in the last of his Chinese Novellas, The Red 
Scarf (Krasnyi sharf).  
 
787 Rudnitskii, Russian and Soviet Theater, 197. 
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Fedorov chose “to render the European scenes in the style of masked theatre; in their relation 
to the events of the play the Europeans speak and act automatically, in accordance with well-
worn stereotypes[.]”788 The artificiality of the Europeans was intended to alienate the 
audience. The realism used to depict the Chinese, by contrast, was a deliberate device 
intended to render them the play’s only feasible objects of sympathy: “Genuine human 
feeling, which [the Europeans] lack, belongs entirely to the Chinese, which is why the 
Chinese scenes were staged within the framework of everyday life.”789 Even Chinese 
theatrical techniques, which interested many Soviet theatre practitioners of the period 
precisely for their open acknowledgement of theatrical artifice, were turned to realist ends in 
Roar, China!790 Chinese theatricality in Roar, China!, according to Meyerhold, was used to 
convey the atmosphere of what these Soviet theatre practitioners considered to be authentic 
Chinese social life: “Chinese theatrical methods, therefore, were only used for their specific 
realism and ‘ceremoniality’.”791 The open artificiality of Chinese theatrical technique was 
employed critically, to express a false ceremoniality operating in authentic Chinese social 
life.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
788 V. E. Meierkhol’d, “‘Rychi, Kitai!’ Beseda s korrespondentom ‘Vechernei Moskvy’ (1926 god),” 
in V. E. Meierkhol’d, Stat’i, pis’ma, rechi, besedy (Moskva: Izd-vo Iskusstvo, 1968), 2:99. 
“трактовать европейские сцены в характере театра масок; европейцы в своем отношении к 
происходящему разговаривают и действуют автоматически, согласно выработанным 
шаблонам[.]” 
 
789 Ibid. “Нaстоящее человеческое чувство, которого им недостает, всецело принадлежит 
китайцам, поэтому китайские сцены разрабатывались в бытовом и жизненном плане.” 
 
790 On the interest in Chinese theatre in the 1920s, see Vera Iureneva, Moi zapiski o kitaiskom teatre 
(Moscow: Tea-kino-pechat’, 1928). Iureneva argues that Chinese theatre allows contemporary 
Europeans to see that the essence of theatre is play or performance (igra). In her advocation of theatre 
as play and rejection of naturalist theatre as a degradation into “literature in images,” Iureneva’s 
analysis of Chinese theatre echoes many of Meyerhold’s earlier positions on the nature of 
theatricality, and anticipates the more famous interpretations of Chinese theatre made in the mid-
1930s by Brecht, to which we shall return in the Epilogue. Ibid., 36–8. 
 
791 Ibid. “Методы китайского театра, таким образом, применялись только в меру своего 
специфического реализма и «церемониальности».” 
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Critical reactions to the play coalesced around these issues of realism versus open 
artifice, and their implications for the correct way to represent China and internationalism as 
political issues. The most hostile review of all came from A. Tsenovskii in Trud, who 
lambasted the play as fundamentally false, despite its pretentions to authenticity: “There is 
real water, boats, a metallic tower on a gunship. There are real Chinese tombs, musical 
instruments, acrobats, even real Chinese people among the participants. There is no real 
play.”792 In particular, Tsenovskii violently rejected the production’s mixture of modes. 
Ethnography is all very well, he wrote, especially the “very interesting Chinese music” 
featured in the production; but ethnography should be shown separately.793 Likewise, 
acrobatics, for Tsenovskii, belonged in a circus, not on a theatrical stage. This confusion of 
modes led Tsenovskii into a kind of categorical crisis, unsure even what to call the spectacle 
in front of him: “And ultimately it is unclear what, exactly, this is supposed to be: an 
agitational play, ethnography, everyday life, an illustration to the newspaper reports, or 
simply a spectacle from the Theatre of Horrors? Whatever you like, just not a literary 
play.”794  
Tsenovskii was reviewing the general rehearsal; by his own admission, many of the 
elements he found distasteful and cheaply shocking, including exploding rockets and a 
painfully slow pace, were removed by the time the play opened to the public. But Tsenovskii 
remained steadfast in his assertion that the play was fundamentally false because it lacked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
792 A. Tsenovskii, “Roar, China,” Trud, Jan 24, 1926. “Есть настоящая вода, лодки, металлическая 
башня на канонерке. Есть настоящие китайские гробы, музыкальные инструменты, акробаты, 
даже настоящие китайцы в числе участвующих. Но нет настоящей пьесы.” This is the only 




794 Ibid. “И, в конце концов, нельзя понять: что же это, собственно, такое? Агитационный 
спектакль, этнография, быт, иллюстрация к газетным сообщением или просто зрелище с 
кабинетном театра ужасов? 
Все, что угондо, только не литературная пьеса.” 
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“artistic value,” it was not “literary.” It failed in its obligation to “seize the spectator with the 
inner essence and artistic elaboration of events, confrontations, and heightened class 
conflict.”795 Tret’iakov’s approach, which Tsenovskii dismisses as “a pale photographing, 
copying of reality,” produces not authenticity, but falseness: “Everything is pale, torpid, dry. 
Everything is artificial, contrived, with a certain note of falsehood, with certain gestures and 
poses—from the beginning to the end of the play.”796 Tsenovskii agreed that a play about 
contemporary China was needed for the Soviet stage; but he insisted that this was not the 
play. 
Tsenovskii’s negative review provoked a response from the Bolshevik Party itself, in 
the person of Nikolai Bukharin. Bukharin wrote in Pravda that Roar, China! was, on the 
contrary, very much the play about China that was needed. Tsenovskii claimed that the play 
was false because it was bad art. Bukharin insisted in reply that the play was an accurate 
representation of what he considered to be a genuine historical process: “the transformation 
of a herd of workers into a revolutionary proletariat.”797 The realism of Tret’iakov’s play was 
guaranteed for Bukharin by its correspondence with what he declared to be an objective 
historical truth: imperialist oppression in the colonized world must lead inevitably to 
revolutionary consciousness.  
Another official voice supporting the play was that of Hu Hanmin, a prominent 
Guomindang leader who was then mid-way through a six-month stay in Moscow. Hu also 
rejected the Tsenovskii position by acclaiming Roar, China! as successful realism, insisting 
that the play “has a profound feel for Chinese reality,” and should be viewed “not as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
795 Ibid. “Должен охватить зрителя внутренней сущностью, художественной разработкой 
явлений, сопоставлений, напряженной классовой борьбы.” 
 
796 Ibid. “И не может писатель заниматься бледным фотографированием, копированием 
действительности… Все бледно, вяло, сухо. Все искусственно, надумано, с какой-то 
фальшивой ноткой, с какими-то жестами и позами—от начала до конца спектакля.” 
 
797 Nikolai Bukharin, “Rychi Kitai!” v teatre Meierkhol’da,” Pravda, February 2, 1926. 
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something invented and distanced from life, but as a living, vivid reflection of our Chinese 
reality.”798 As proof, Hu insisted that Chinese audience would respond positively to the 
production. 
Other critical reactions returned constantly to questions of realism, artifice, and the 
role of ethnography. These reviews tended to view Roar, China! through a critical prism that 
separated naturalism, the attempt to produce a sealed mimetic representation of reality, from 
the open acknowledgement of theatrical artifice. The Meyerhold Theatre, for them, was 
largely connected with the second trend. Roar, China’s admixture of these principles, and 
introduction of “authentic” ethnographic elements, seems to have confused these critic’s 
notions of the theatrical. For example, Mikhail Borisovich Zagorskii, writing in Zhizn’ 
iskusstva, found a jarring contrast between the “constructivist” shape of the battleship, which 
exposed the principles of its composition, and the “naturalist” detail of a real stream of water 
running across the stage. The water’s naturalism was not honoured, however: in the scene of 
Hawley’s death, according to Zagorskii, he fell not into the river but into a space behind it, 
and his corpse was brought back onstage completely dry. Zagorskii also considered the 
ethnographic detail in the production excessive: it could not be reduced to exoticist 
chinoiserie, but still, why, in the Meyerhold Theatre of all places, was such weight given to 
things? Zagorskii condemned this attempt at ethnographic validation as a “sham naturalism,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
798 “Hu-Han-Min—o ‘Rychi, Kitai!’ (Stat’ia chlena politbiuro Gomindana),” Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda, February 5, 1926. “На мой взгляд она очень глубоко прощупывает китайскую 
действительность. […] Еще раз нужно сказать, что постановку эту следует рассматривать не 
как надуманную, оторванную от жизни, а как живое красочное отражение нашей китайской 
действительности.” Hu Hanmin was one of the prime contenders for leadership of the GMD after the 
death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925. He spent several months in Moscow over the winter of 1925–6, 
ostensibly to recover from illness and investigate conditions there, but in fact as a form of political 
exile following suspicions of complicity in the murder of Liao Zhongkai. Hu was greeted with great 
fanfare, and published a series of articles in Pravda on his impressions of Soviet Russia. This sojourn 
did not enhance his support for the alliance with Moscow, however; on his return to China, Hu called 
for the GMD to end its alliance with the USSR and the CCP. See David P. Barrett, “The Role of Hu 
Hanmin in the ‘First United Front’: 1922–27,” The China Quarterly 89 (March 1982), 51–62. 
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a cheap grasp for “authenticity.” On the other hand, the European figures were too 
conventionalized, simple clichés of “foxtrot Europeanism.”799 
The reviewer for Vecherniaia Moskva, K. Famarin, also objected to the production’s 
“stylistic contradictoriness.” This was exemplified once more in the opposition of naturalist 
water and constructivist ship, but also in the juxtaposition of scenes done in the style of 
“artistic physical-culture,” such as the unloading sequence that opened the play, with scenes 
constructed “in accordance with all the laws of naturalist theatre.”800 Famarin also rejected 
the production’s use of ethnographic details, which he dubbed “haphazard” and 
“fragmented,” with individual elements either reduced to an ornamental trinket, or 
threatening to swell to a disruptive size.801 Clearly, Famarin quips, the theatre could not resist 
the lure of authenticity: “the theatre had the opportunity to display individual, authentically 
Chinese objects, and did not want to turn it down. Though perhaps different ways could have 
been found to achieve this. An exhibition in the foyer, for example.”802 These symbols of 
authenticity, for Famarin, have no place on the theatrical stage; like Tsenovskii, he finds that 
they violate or disrupt the artistic unity of the play. 
In a similar vein, the poet and critic Sergei Gorodetskii also attacked Roar, China! for 
succumbing too much to “naturalist” solutions in set and props.803 The set’s gunboat failed as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
799 Zagorskii, “Rychi Kitai,” 11. 
 
800 Famarin, “Rychi, Kitai.” “После прекрасных картин в плане художественной физкультуры 
(хотя бы великолепное начало спектакля — разгрузка корабля), следуют сцены, построенные 
по всем правилам натуралистического театра[.]” 
 
801 Ibid. “случайны и совершенно разрознены отдельные этнографические подробности.” 
 
802 Ibid. “театр имел возможность показать отдельные подлинно китайские вещи, и не хотел 
отказаться от этого. Правда, для этого могут быть и другие средства. Ну, хотя бы устройства 
выставки в фойэ.” 
 
803 Sergei Mitrofanivich Gorodetskii was a Symbolist poet close to Meyerhold in his pre-revolutionary 
years. Gorodetskii worked with the LEFists Tret’iakov and Nikolai Aseev on Verturnaf (“Versal’skie 
turisty, na fugas naporovshiesia”), which was due to be staged by Meyerhold at the Theatre of the 
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constructivism, for Gorodetskii, because it was chiefly a decoration lacking functionality: it 
did nothing except move slightly forward in the middle of the play and move slightly away at 
the end. Moreover, its tower displayed a displeasing “lacquered naturalism.”804 Gorodetskii 
had the same problem as Zagorskii and Famarin with the “real” water running across the 
stage, asking, if this naturalist detail is so important, why is Hawley brought back onstage 
dry? Gorodetskii found a “photographic naturalism” everywhere, in costumes, props and 
make-up. This “excursion into ethnography” through the use of real, culturally authentic 
objects violated for Gorodetskii the principle of theatricality, based on a strict division 
between the theatrical and real worlds. “[T]he use of ethnography on the stage does not 
achieve its effect,” he claimed, “for this simple reason: real, everyday things are simply not 
visible, they are anti-theatrical.”805 The lingering ghosts of theatrical convention, meanwhile, 
returned at times to sabotage naturalism’s goals. When a policeman beat one of the 
condemned Chinese on the head with a stick, complete with accompanying sound, the 
laughter from the audience suggested to Gorodetskii that they saw not an event from Chinese 
reality but rather an echo of the Russian puppet show “Petrushka.”806  
These naturalistic elements in props and stage set aroused heated reactions from critics 
like Gorodestki and Famarin, whose ideas about theatricality did not permit such 
interventions of “the real.” But their presence in fact followed the trend noted by Symons in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Revolution in 1922, but never took place. Gorodetskii also authored the translation of Marcel 
Martinet’s The Night that was subsequently reworked by Tret’iakov to form the basis of The Easrth 
Upturned (Zemlia dybom). Symons, Meyerhold’s Theatre of the Grotesque, 95. 
 
804 Sergei Gorodetskii, “Teatr im. Meierkhol’da. ‘Rychi, Kitai!’” Iskusstvo trudiashchimsia 5 (1926). 
Reprinted in Lanina, ed., Meierkhol’d v russkoi teatral’noi kritikе, 199. “Неприятна эта башня и 
своим лакированным натурализмом.” 
 
805 Ibid. “Этот же фотографический натурализм проводится и во всем остальном — в костюмах, 
в бутафории, в гриме. Но применение этнографии на сцене не достигает эффекта по простой 
причине: реальные, бытовые вещи просто не видны, они антитеатральны.” 
 
806 Ibid., 200. “Местами получается обратный эффект: когда полисмен бьет палкой (со звуком!) 
по голове приговоренного, в публике смех, потому что здесь пахнет Петрушкой.” 
	  	   317	  
the Meyerhold Theatre’s trajectory through the 1920s. In a 1931 study Boris Alpers divided 
Meyerhold’s post-revolutionary career into a “Sturm und Drang” period of convention-baring 
theatricality, up until about 1925, and a later period, beginning with Bubus the Teacher and 
peaking with The Government Inspector (Revizor, 1926), in which Meyerhold became 
preoccupied with creating images of the doomed and vanished past. The transition between 
these two periods was marked, for Alpers, by a transformation in the meaning of scenery and 
objects on Meyerhold’s stage. In the early period, the stage set and the objects within it were 
given meaning by the actor’s interaction with them, revealing their purely theatrical nature. 
The wooden bench in The Magnificent Cuckold became a house; the sloping bridge in The 
Forest (Les, 1924) could be a road, a bridge, or a hill.807 Even the abundance of things from 
real social life in D. E. (Daesh’ Evropu, 1924), for Alpers, “confirmed the triumph of the 
actor over the authentic things of his epoch.”808 In the later period, by contrast, the actor’s 
role is no longer active but rather “acquires a decorative, pictorial character.”809 The actor 
becomes just “one of the pictorial resources at the director-artist’s disposal,” integrated into a 
stage design that is newly expressive on its own terms, not just in reaction to the actors’ 
actions. Things, by contrast, have acquired newly independent power: “Now things fill the 
stage with a significance that is self-sufficient and independent of the actor.”810 Things now 
“act” on the stage no less than the actor himself, moving to the fore of the spectacle’s system 
of signification; the “play with things” (igra s veshchami) that characterized the earlier period 
is replaced by the “play of things” (igra veshchei).811  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 Boris Alpers, Teatr sotsial’noi maski (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo khudozh. lit-ry, Sektor iskusstv, 
1931), 30–31. 
 
808 Ibid., 29. 
 
809 Ibid., 56. 
 
810 Ibid., 59. 
 
811 Ibid. 
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Alpers in fact excludes Roar, China! from his scheme, on the grounds that its topicality 
conflicts with the later period’s preoccupation with images of the doomed past.812 This might 
seem hasty, as the representation of the European group in Roar, China! fits quite well 
Alpers’ definition of the “social mask” that underpins the later Meyerhold: a “petrified social 
type” that the play portrays at the moment of its redundant disappearance from history.813 
(The canonical example, again, would be the personages in The Government Inspector as 
staged by Meyerhold later in 1926.) On the Chinese side, however, we can see that the 
objects onstage do have a power independent of or prior to their interaction with the actors, 
but in a somewhat different way. Their significance is overwhelmingly ethnographic; what 
they signify, metonymically, is “China.” The purported connection of these material objects 
to some kind of externally existing Chinese cultural reality, affirmed by reports of their 
arduous journey from China itself, performs a vital role in Roar, China’s rhetorical assertion 
of authenticity. They are there to tell the audience that this is China, and that the actors they 
surround, who inhabit their world, are the Chinese.  
Within the political context of 1926, when Soviet newspapers were declaring the 
nationalist Guomindang a legitimate revolutionary force and ally, the ethnographic details in 
Roar, China! serve to bestow a definite national identity on these Chinese coolies and 
boatmen as they move towards collective consciousness. The Comintern’s alliance with the 
Guomindang was justified by the theory, announced by Lenin at the Second Comintern 
Congress in 1920, that national revolution was a necessary stage in the overthrowing of 
imperial power in colonized and semi-colonized countries. Tret’iakov even admitted that he 
deliberately underplayed the elements of class division within Chinese society in the play, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
812 Ibid., 64. 
 
813 Ibid., 78. 
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order to focus attention on the key conflict of China versus the imperialists.814 The nation 
must be brought to liberated self-consciousness before a further movement can be made 
towards socialist internationalism. Accordingly, in Roar, China!, the Chinese mass’s journey 
towards collective consciousness in response to imperialist violence is imbued with an 
aesthetic assertion of their specifically national identity. The ethnographic authenticity of 
props, costumes and music asserts the sort of authenticity that formed around the concept of 
nationhood in the modern era, on the analogy of nation-as-organism: the Herderian idea that a 
nation, much like a modern individual, has a unique way of being that is unlike any other, 
and a distinct path of development congruent with its unique cultural history.815  
This point can be glimpsed in the reaction of another contemporary reviewer, P. 
Markov. Writing in Pechat’ i revoliutsiia (Print and the Revolution), Markov argued that the 
play produced sympathy most effectively through its use of ethnographic detail. The 
production’s primary significance did not lie, for Markov, in its flirtations with naturalism (be 
it the “real” water, visible only from elevated parts of the theatre, or the executions, 
conducted in uncomfortably naturalist detail). Rather Markov considered the centre of the 
play to be its “internal justification of ethnography.”816 While other critics, such as Famarin 
in Vecherniaia Moskva, found the use of ethnography jarring and inconsistent, Markov seems 
to argue that ethnography did not just provide a surface decoration in the play.  Rather its 
cultural authenticity produced a corresponding sense of internal, psychological authenticity in 
the individual Chinese characters, thus enabling the audience to develop a convincing 
empathetic connection with them: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva?!, 229–30. 
 
815 For an overview of Herder’s conception of national identity, see F. M. Barnard, Herder's Social 
and Political Thought: from Enlightenment to Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), esp. ch. 
3, “Organic Politics.”  
 
816 P. Markov, “Teatral’nyi sezon 1925/26 goda,” Pechat’ i revoliutsiia 3 (1926). Reprinted in Lanina, 
ed., Meierkhol’d v russkoi teatral’noi kritikе, 202. “основным методом спектакля было внутреннее 
оправдание этнографии.” 
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Let me explain: it is diverting and interesting to observe Chinese life as it is 
presented in the Meyerhold Theatre, without luscious decorations or exotic 
prettiness. We hear Chinese chants, we watch the street scenes of a Chinese port—
such is the ethnographic picture. But for all this, how much more interesting and 
indeed genuinely affecting it is to watch the individual images and their 
combination. The Boy, who is played by Babanova, and whose lyrical suicide scene 
is staged with directorial perfection, explains more than any poster-style 
agitationism. [...] Ethnography [in the production] was not taken for theatrical 
decoration; instead, through it, and sometimes thanks to it, the psychological kernel 
of the various images made its way to the spectator. Hence the Boy, singing a 
melancholy song as he hangs himself, or the leader of the Chinese town, down on 
one knee before a foreign sailor, linger so long in the memory.817   
 
The production’s use of ethnography, for Markov, does not estrange or distance in the 
manner of exotica, but neither does it collapse the audience’s relationship with these Chinese 
figures into one of identity. What it does, it seems, is create a sense of Chinese culture that is 
sufficiently authentic to enable the audience to empathize with the offence done to members 
of that culture by such exercises of foreign power.  
This empathy is enabled not by similarity, but by a sense of difference that 
nevertheless enables the other culture to be perceived as authentic. (The term Herder used for 
this process was Einfühlungsvermögen, rendered by F. M. Barnard as “‘the capacity to feel 
oneself into’ the minds, motives, moods, purposes, aspirations, habits, and customs of those 
different from ourselves.”)818 Hence the examples Markov gives are moments at which these 
individual characters stand as representatives of a specifically national humiliation: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
817 Ibid., 203. “Поясняю: занимательно и любопытно следить за китайским бытом так, как он 
показан в Театре имени Мейерхольда, без сладеньких украшений и экзотических красивостей: 
слушать китайские напевы, смотреть на уличные сценки китайского порта — такова 
этнографическая картина. Но за всем этим еще интереснее и уже по-настоящему волнующе 
следить за отдельными образами и их сочетанием. Тот Бой, которого играет Бабанова и 
лирическая сцена самоубийства которого поставлена с режиссерским совершенством, 
объясняет больше, чем плакатная агитационность. [...] Этнография воспринималась не как 
театральное украшение, а сквозь нее, а иногда и благодаря ей доходило до зрителя 
психологическое зерно разноликих образов. Поэтому так останутся в памяти повесившийся с 
унылой песенкой Бой, опустившийся на колени перед иноземным моряком начальник 
китайского города.” 
 
818 F. M. Barnard, Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2003) 5–6. 
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Daoin’s abasement, or the Boy’s suicide song, which Novitskii experienced as “the terrible 
and profound tragedy of a people [narod].”819 To take another musical example, working 
scripts from the production indicate that a huqin, accurately described as a “Chinese two-
stringed instrument,” sounded at moments connected to the boatmen’s crucial act of 
solidarity: their drawing of lots to decide who will submit to be executed.820 Their sense of 
collective solidarity at this moment is thus marked by the production’s aesthetic choices as 
not simply class-based but also intrinsically national. This connection between individual and 
nation is repeatedly asserted by the production’s use of an ethnographic-naturalist aesthetic: it 
guarantees the authenticity of such nationalist self-consciousness. 
 Following Markov, we might say that Roar, China! used a distinctive form of 
ethnographic naturalism to bind the fate of the individual onstage characters, not simply to 
each other, but to an authentic and credibly existing entity conceivable as the Chinese nation. 
In theatrical terms, however, as Zagorskii and Gorodetskii have already indicated, this 
striving for authenticity through naturalism poses some peculiar problems. The theatrical 
space remains a conventional, artificial representation of purported Chinese reality; the 
figures onstage remain, at one level of perception, Russian actors in “ethnographic” Chinese 
masks. The attempt to embrace total ethnographic naturalism runs the risk of pushing illusion 
to breaking point, forcing the masks to crack, and turning the simulation of Chinese reality 
into a grotesque parody. 
One crucial area where the cracks in this ethnographic naturalism began to show was 
language. Gorodetskii found inconsistencies in the speech of the Chinese characters, which 
alternated between “unbearable mutilation of language” and pure Moscow dialect.821 While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
819 Rudnitskii, Rezhisser Meierkhol’d, 345. 
 
820 RGALI f. 963, op. 1, ed. khr. 461, l. 2. 
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we cannot know how the actors delivered these lines onstage, it is possible Gorodetskii 
reveals his ignorance here of Chinese pidgin Russian—as Mark Gamsa shows, the Chinese 
characters in Tret’iakov’s script deliver several lines in accurate pidgin.822 Nonetheless, the 
point remains that the Chinese characters in Tret’iakov’s script use three forms of language: 
pure Chinese, heard in several utterances at the play’s beginning; Chinese pidgin Russian, 
used in interactions with the European characters; and conversations between themselves in 
clear, correct Russian.823  
Sergei Radlov, like Zagorskii and Gorodetskii, accused Roar, China! of succumbing 
to the “temptation to overload the production with naturalistic details from Chinese life.”824 
For Radlov, the dangers of this approach became especially clear in the case of language: 
It has also been tempting to convey the sound of Chinese speech. For a few 
seconds it seems that you are hearing authentic Chinese, but here is the dead-end 
of naturalism: the very next words, spoken in Russian, sound somehow especially 
greasy and Muscovite, and for a split second these Chinese recall Ostrovskii’s 
merchants. There is something unsettling in this: right after mangling his speech 
(“You pay, me row”) with the American, the same boatman expresses himself 
with perfect grammatical correctness to his comrades, while the coolie-stoker, as 
supposedly the most conscious, talks and moves throughout like the purest 
Russian, without the slightest connection to the other Chinese. 825 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 Gorodetskii, “Rychi, Kitai!,” 199. “несносное коверканье речи у одних, чистый московский 
говор у других китайцев.” 
 
822 Gamsa, “Sergei Tret’iakov’s Roar, China!,” 95, 106n17. 
 
823 For utterances in Chinese, mixed in with Chinese pidgin Russian, see Tret’iakov, Slyshish’, 
Moskva?!, 81–3. 
 
824 Sergei Radlov, “Rychi, Kitai!” Krasnaia gazeta, August 28, 1927. Reprinted in Lanina, ed., 
Meierkhol’d v russkoi teatral’noi kritikе, 203. “не хватило мужества удержаться от соблазнов 
перегрузить спектакль натуралистическими деталями китайского быта.” 
 
825 Ibid. “Соблазнительно было и передать звучание китайской речи — секундами кажется, что 
слышишь подлинный китайский язык, но здесь-то и тупик натурализма; следующие же слова, 
сказанные по-русски, звучат как-то особенно по-московски жирно, и китайцы мгновенно 
напоминают купцов Островского. В этом что-то неладное — только что, ломая язык («Твоя 
плати, моя вози») с американцем, тот же лодочник отлично и грамматически правильно 
объясняется со своими товарищами, а кули-истопник, должно быть как самый сознательный, 
все время и говорит и движется как чистейший россиянин без малейшей связи с остальными 
китайцами.” 
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Radlov identifies, albeit fails to delineate clearly, the three forms of language used in the 
play: “authentic” Chinese, authentic pidgin (the “mangled” utterance Radlov cites is, as 
Gamsa insists, a valid piece of Chinese pidgin Russian) and colloquial Russian. But there is 
something “unsettling” for Radlov in this slippage between ethno-naturalism (“authentic” 
Chinese speech) and theatrical convention (the audience accepts that the actors playing 
Chinese characters will speak in Russian, so that they can be understood). At these moments, 
it seems, the “ethnographic mask” slips to reveal all too clearly, not only that these are ethnic 
Russians playing ethnic Chinese, but also that symbolic Soviet Russians are hiding behind 
the masks of symbolic Chinese. 
The sense of sympathy at a distance generated by ethnographic naturalism’s aura of 
authenticity is thus complicated by a parallel sense of identification through language that 
situates the connection much closer to home. In return, the Stoker—characterized by Radlov 
as the most “Russian” of the Chinese characters, even in his movements—Sinifies Soviet 
Russia within the play, describing the Russian Civil War as a conflict in which “poor coolies, 
just like us, drove out their masters.”826 On the one hand, the pronounced and genuine 
cultural difference between the Chinese characters represented onstage and the Moscow 
audience watching them is accentuated through a range of devices; on the other hand, there is 
a gesture towards a kind of similarity beneath this “ethnographic mask,” a similarity that is 
structured around the primacy of Soviet revolutionary precedent.  
Indeed, we might consider this the basic dynamic of Soviet internationalist aesthetics: 
the simultaneous acknowledgement of national/ethnic distinctiveness and its implied 
overcoming through the force of Soviet revolutionary example. This echoes the dynamic of 
Stalinist policy in the East, and of Soviet nationalities policy more generally: national identity 
and uniqueness were affirmed as a necessary stage in the chain of development that would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 “Бедные кули, такие же как мы, прогнали господ.” Tret'iakov, Slyshish’, Moskva?, 129. 
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lead ultimately to a utopian sublation into a higher socialist unity.827 As Emma Widdis writes, 
“knowledge was consistently articulated as the means of liberating the [other] nation from 
repressive Imperial structures and building an equal [global] society… ‘Authentic’ 
ethnographic detail was presented as a prerequisite for the genuine equality of the 
peoples.”828 Herderian incommensurability of nations is both acknowledged and transcended 
by the imagined universalism of the future. And the Russian proletariat, as the vanguard of 
revolutionary progress, serves as the ethnically marked bearer of this post-ethnic potential.  
Thus Roar, China! presents a strange mix of authenticity and ventriloquism: the 
Chinese boatmen are imagined and presented as ethnographically authentic while also being 
shown in the process of acquiring the speech and behavioral patterns of the Russian 
proletariat. This transformative drive within the documentary aesthetic was asserted 
forcefully at a performance of Roar, China! on 21 March 1926, three days after the March 18 
Massacre of student protestors by police in Beijing. At this performance, the actor playing the 
student interpreter read out a telegram announcing the massacre to the assembled boatmen, 
and also read them some excerpts from an article by Karl Radek, rector of Sun Yat-sen 
University in Moscow.829 Meyerhold’s theatre had used the telegram trick before, to integrate 
theatrical performance into the newly documentable immediacy of life: an early performance 
of 1920’s The Dawns (Zori) was interrupted by the reading of a telegram announcing the Red 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
827 On Soviet nationalities policy, see Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How 
a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2. (Summer 1994): 414–452; 
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–
1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: 
Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2005). 
 
828 Widdis, Visions of a New Land, 114.  
 
829 “V teatre im. V. S. Meierkhol’da,” Pravda, March 26, 1926. A glance at this issue confirms the 
topicality of the Chinese theme: the front page reports on protests in Beijing and round the world 
against the shootings of March 18; page two features an article by Radek on the military situation in 
China. 
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Army’s seizure of Perekop in Crimea.830 But the addition of excerpts from Radek announces 
the transition from documentary/recording to fantasy/prescription, a transition of key 
importance to our understanding of the play itself. By presenting Chinese boatmen finding 
consolation for domestic acts of horror and outrage in the words of Soviet intellectuals, this 
tiny device conjures up the desired image of an internationalism driven by information 
networks that connect ultimately to a centre in Moscow. The ethnographic mask, symbol of 
national authenticity, becomes, at certain moments, a mirror. The Moscow audience of 1926 
saw characters with all the ethnic signs of Chineseness, listening to an article by Radek, in 
Russian; tangible Others behaving just as they themselves were supposed to behave. 
III. The Red Poppy – the soloist sacrificed for the masses 
 On first glance, we find several basic elements in The Red Poppy that are strikingly 
reminiscent of Roar, China! Indeed, Souritz speculates that the Bolshoi’s decision, in 
February 1926, to jettison Gal’perin’s libretto on the French revolution in favour of Kurilko’s 
on the Chinese may have had something to do with the success of Roar, China!, which had 
premiered on 23 January.831 The ballet presents China as a place where the two opposing 
sides in the global class struggle are pitted against one another across a single stage, their 
opposition driven towards confrontation by an act of violence committed in the shadow of a 
huge steel ship.832 The spectacle opens with an extended sequence in which this ship is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
830 Alpers, Teatr sotsial’noi maski, 24. Symons claims that a messenger read out news from the front 
at every performance. Symons, Meyerhold’s Theatre of the Grotesque, 42. 
 
831 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 243. 
 
832 The sense of repetition was not lost on contemporaries. One of a series of comic sketches 
published in Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov to mark The Red Poppy’s debut 
reads as follows:  
“Когда в зале стало темно и на сцене вырисовалась громада советского корабля, кто-то 
тихо сказал: 
— Совсем ''Рычи, Китай!'' 
— Только немножко наоборот, сказал другой голос.  
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unloaded by Chinese coolies. At the conclusion of the drama, a climactic act of self-sacrifice 
seemingly completes the movement of the Chinese masses towards self-consciousness, and 
gestures towards their future revolution.  
The first major difference is that the ship towering over the back of the stage is a 
Soviet merchant vessel, moored in a Chinese port. The ballet’s first act takes place in the 
shadow of this ship, and sets the narrative in motion through a Soviet intervention in the 
oppositional status quo.833 The two sides are juxtaposed in the opening sequence as labour 
and leisure: as coolies unload the ship, under the commands and whips of their overseers, 
Europeans and bourgeois Chinese are entertained by dancers in an adjacent bar. When one of 
the coolies falls under the overseers’ whips, tension mounts between the two sides. The 
Soviet Captain reacts to this situation by sending his sailors to help the coolies with their 
unloading. In the process, he rejects the offer of the British director of the port, Sir Hips, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
В пьесе Третьякова корабль был английский—символ угнетения и порабощения китайского 
народа. В ''Красном маке''—корабль советский!” 
[When the lights went down and the giant Soviet ship appeared on the stage, someone said 
quietly: 
“Just like Roar, China!” 
“Only the other way around,” said another voice. 
In Tret’iakov’s play the ship was English, a symbol of the oppression and enslavement of the Chinese 
people. In The Red Poppy the boat is Soviet!] Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 
25 (1927): 7. 
 
833 In offering plot synopses of The Red Poppy, it must first be acknowledged that the Moscow 
production of 1927 was altered and expanded for the Leningrad production of 1929, and changed 
again for a revival in 1949, following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Even 
more far-reaching alterations were made in 1957, when the ballet was renamed The Red Flower 
(Krasnyi tsvetok), in reaction to protests from the PRC Government against the associations of the 
poppy with opium and British colonial aggression (see below). I am concerned here, however, with 
the two productions from the 1920s. For the 1927 Moscow production, I have used the excellently 
researched synopsis of Souritz (Soviet Choreographers, 238–40), supplemented by contemporary 
reviews and participant accounts. For the Leningrad production of 1929, I have relied mainly on the 
reviews in Zhizn’ iskusstva, as well as the summaries of A. A. Gvozdev, Krasnyi mak: v pomoshch’ 
zriteliu (Moscow/Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo khudozhestvennoi literaturoi, 1931) and 
V. Bogdanov-Berezovskii, Krasnyi mak (Leningrad: Biuro obsluzhivaniia rabochego zritelia pri Upr. 
leningr. teatrov, 1933). I have also used L. Entelis, 100 baletnykh libretto (Leningrad: Muzyka, 1971), 
which contains details not found in other accounts, but is unclear on which precise production is being 
summarized and which sources have been used. Running orders for the numbers in the ballet can be 
found in RGALI f. 2085 op. 1, and also in Le pavot rouge (The red poppy): ballet en 3 actes et 8 
tableaux avec apotheose (Moscow: Edition de musique de l'etat R.S.F.S.R., 1933). 
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they collaborate to restore order by force.834 These two opposing sides—Chinese coolies and 
Soviet sailors vs European imperialists and Chinese bourgeoisie—are characterized by their 
own dances and musical motifs. The coolies work to a heavy, slow tune, reminiscent once 
more of a Russian dubinushka, while the Europeans are entertained by “exotic” dances in the 
bar. The Captain’s appearance, which disrupts this static opposition of labour and leisure and 
places the two sides on a path to confrontation, is announced by the first few bars of the 
Internationale.  
The dancer Tao Hua (variously spelt Tai-Khua, Tai-Khoa, Taia-Khoa, оr Taia-
Khua—I will return to the issue of her name and its contested meanings below), the focal 
point of both dance and narrative, begins the ballet caught, like Babanova’s Boy, between 
these two opposing camps. She dances for the pleasure of the Europeans and Chinese 
bourgeoisie in the bar, her “fan dance” forming part of their exotic entertainment alongside 
such diversions as “dance of the Malaysian women.” The poet Emi Xiao protested that Tao 
Hua’s status as a dancer implied, from a Chinese perspective, that she was a prostitute; and 
indeed, an early summary of the libretto published in March 1926 refers to the central 
character as a “hetaera.”835 Such an association between dancers and prostitution was not 
uncommon in the social history of ballet.836 Even if this implication is not made explicit, it is 
important to note that Tao Hua begins the ballet as the servant of the imperialist camp, paid 
to provide them pleasure. She is also, it seems, engaged to the “adventurist” Li Shan-Fu, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
834 This detail is mentioned in Entelis, 100 baletnykh libretto, 83. 
 
835 Emi Xiao, “Zapiska predsedatelia Vneshnepoliticheskoi komissii TsK VKP(b) V. G. Grigor’iana 
V. M. Molotovu k zapisi besedy sotrudnika VOKS Erofeeva s Emi Siao o balete R. M. Gliera 
‘Krasnyi mak.’ 16 marta 1951g.”  
Document held in RGASPI, accessed online April 9, 2014 at 
http://www.rusarchives.ru/evants/exhibitions/prc60-f/89.shtml; “Balet Krasnyi mak v Bol’shom 
teatre,” Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov, 2–8 March 1926, 24, 12. Quoted in 
Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 232. 
 
836 On the association of ballet dancers with prostitutes, see Sally Banes, Dancing Women: Female 
Bodies on Stage (London: Routledge, 1998), 7, 64. 
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close Chinese friend of Sir Hips. Tao Hua is so moved by the Captain’s gesture of solidarity 
with the coolies, however, that she showers him with flowers, and places a single red poppy 
in his hand. According to some summaries, the Captain then hands the red poppy in turn to a 
Chinese coolie, transforming the poppy into a symbol of the union of the Soviet state and 
Chinese working masses, rather than the private token of romantic affection that it might 
remain if the exchange happened only between Tao Hua and the Captain.837 A series of 
dances by sailors of various nationalities ensues, culminating in the famous and wildly 
popular “Yablochko,” danced by the Soviet sailors. 
In this microcosm of global conflict, Tao Hua is drawn out of subservience to one 
side and towards solidarity with the other. In the second act, she witnesses an assassination 
attempt on the Captain, planned by her fiancé and Sir Hips. Traumatized by this attack on the 
object of her growing affections, she smokes opium, initiating a dream sequence of exotic 
and fantastical dances that supposedly embody her internal conflict between the forces of 
tradition and the lure of the new. The third act opens with a party at the home of Sir Hips. Li 
Shan-Fu and Sir Hips try to co-opt Tao Hua into assisting their second attempt on the 
Captain’s life by delivering a poisoned cup to him. Sir Hips seeks to seal the deal by gifting 
her a precious ring.838 Tao Hua runs to the Captain, confesses her love, and begs him to leave 
the party. He is obliged by his duties to reject her love, but returns to her the red poppy. 
Seemingly fulfilling the conspiracy, Tao Hua dances for the Captain, and is to complete her 
routine by giving him the poisoned cup. After dancing tantalizingly closer and further away, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
837 Both Gvozdev and Bogdanov-Berezovskii, summarizing the Leningrad production, describe the 
Captain taking the red poppy out of the bouquet given to him by Tao Hua in Act One, and then giving 
it in turn to a Chinese coolie. It is possible that this sequence was introduced for the Leningrad 
production in 1929; accounts of the Moscow production do not seem to mention it. It also raises a 
continuity issue: if the poppy is given to a coolie in Act 1, how by Act 3 has it made it back into the 
hands of the Captain, who then returns it to Tao Hua? See Gvozdev, Krasnyi mak, 11; Bogdanov-
Berezovskii, Krasnyi mak, 16–17. 
 
838 Entelis, 100 baletnykh libretto, 85. 
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she gives him the cup, but knocks it away as he raises it to his lips. In the ensuing confusion, 
Li shoots at the Captain, but misses. In the final scene, Tao Hua is standing on the quayside, 
bidding goodbye to the Soviet ship. As she stands watching the departing ship, Li approaches 
and stabs Tao Hua with a dagger. Dying, Tao Hua is surrounded by children, to whom she 
gives the red poppy whose symbolism was set earlier by the Captain. Tao Hua’s death is 
succeeded by the sounds of uprising, as a group of “red pikes,” Chinese peasant-
revolutionaries, storms the port.839  
 Despite its canonization as the first truly Soviet ballet, Soviet critical reaction from 
the 1920s on has tended to acknowledge The Red Poppy as a flawed piece, an incomplete but 
necessary step away from the negative traditions of classical ballet and towards something 
acceptably revolutionary. This judgement of N. Volkov, published in Izvestiia shortly after 
the ballet premiered in June 1927, typifies the assessment of The Red Poppy as a halfway 
house: 
The Red Poppy seemingly embodies all the contradictions of ballet as an art form: 
one moment it surges forward, raising the battle-cry of realism, the next it retreats 
to classical positions; one moment it triumphs, demonstrating that а theme from 
reality can still engender vivid form, the next, frightened by its own boldness, it 
turns instead to a reverential review of the ballet archive.840 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
839 At least, this is how the ending is described in the musical score from 1933 (Le Pavot Rouge), and 
in Entelis, 100 baletnykh libretto, 86. V. Iving, reviewing the changes that were made between the 
premiere of The Red Poppy in June and its return to open the Bolshoi’s new season in September, 
laments the fact that the final scene was not cut, with its “concluding procession of fussing figures, 
who are supposed to represent Chinese revolutionaries, and yet fashionable women’s stockings peek 
out treacherously from under their formless grey overalls, which recall masquerade dominos, and we 
glimpse the European suits of male and female artists who are clearly hurrying to get home and have 
thrown the domino over their everyday clothes[.]” V. Iving, “Krasnyi mak v novoi redaktsii,” 
Izvestiia, September 6, 1927. Gvozdev (Krasnyi mak, 1931) does not mention the red pikes, who 
perhaps did not appear in the 1929 Leningrad production, which is the one Gvozdev is summarizing. 
 
840 N. Volkov, “The Red Poppy,” Izvestiia, June 22, 1927. “«Красный мак» является как бы 
воплощением всех противоречий балетного искусства: он то рвется вперед, провозглашая 
лозунг реализма, то отступает на классические позиции, то достигает победы, показывая, что и 
реальная тема может породить яркую форму, то, наоборот, пугаясь своей смелости, занимается 
благоговейным пересмотром балетного архива.” 
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The key term here, for Volkov, is realism: The Red Poppy opens but does not quite fulfil the 
possibility that a “realistic” theme, taken from actually existing reality, can provide the 
content for ballet. Like many subsequent reviewers, Volkov found the ballet’s positive 
achievements in the direction of realism to be concentrated in the first act. The juxtaposition 
of labour and leisure in music, the introduction of labour itself as a theme for balletic 
representation, and the rousing image of mass solidarity between Chinese workers and Soviet 
sailors, suggested to Volkov that “a ballet of this kind, realistic in theme and movement, 
could be theatre for the masses, accessible, relevant and emotionally exciting.”841 A. A. 
Gvozdev likewise applauded the first act’s “mass pantomime” as “socially meaningful and 
dramatically stimulating.”842 If this trend had continued, for Gvozdev, the production would 
have been a triumph. 
Most critics concurred, however, that this advance was squandered in the second act, 
which amounted to a series of divertissements without the thematically justified narrative 
drive of Act One. In dramaturgical terms, this constituted a return to the structure of ballets 
by such composers as Cesare Pugni and Ludwig Minkus, which had dominated the Russian 
Imperial Ballet under Marius Petipa in the later nineteenth century.843 The contemporary, 
realistic theme of uniting the trans-national laboring masses was likewise replaced by typical 
narrative devices from the store-house of ballet: the love intrigue, the jealous lover’s 
conspiracy, the symbolic dream.844 From a dance perspective, E. Beskin in Vecherniaia 




842 Gvozdev, Krasnyi mak, 4. 
 
843 S. Levin, “Dva baleta Gliera,” in Muzyka sovetskogo baleta (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
muzykal’noe izdatel’stvo, 1962), 130–1.  
 
844 The device of a ballet dream had firm roots in the balletic past – pertinent local predecessors 
include the dream sequences in Don Quixote and La Bayadére, both composed by Minkus and staged 
by Petipa at the Imperial Ballet. See Levin, “Dva baleta Gliera,” 128.  
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movements of fizkul’tura (physical education) was squandered by the second act’s return to 
classical dances. Indeed, the contrast between the two only served, for Beskin, to show the 
redundancy of the latter.845 
This jarring contrast between the first two acts, noted by almost all reviewers, can 
only have been enhanced by the fact that they were choreographed by different ballet 
masters. For the 1927 Bolshoi production, L. A. Lashchilin choreographed the first and third 
acts, while the second was choreographed by V. D. Tikhomorov. It was Tikhomirov, 
supported by his wife Gel’tser, who insisted that there be a traditional divertissement of this 
form in the production, the dream sequence being absent from earlier versions of the 
libretto.846 Souritz also attributes the differences between Acts One and Two to the 
involvement of the theatre director Aleksei Dikii, who outlined the first act but grew 
frustrated with the project and ultimately refused to direct the later scenes.847 (The 1929 
production in Leningrad repeated this stylistic rift: Act One was choreographed by F. B. 
Lopukhov; choreography of the second and third acts was shared between L. S. Leont’ev and 
V. I. Ponomarev.)848  
The conflict between the first and second acts was not just a conflict between 
different styles of choreography, however, but also between differing conceptions of 
authenticity. For those who saw authenticity in the first act’s attempt at realism, with its 
representation of contemporary China as a contested site of exploited labour, the dancing 
poppies, lotuses, phoenixes, and swordsmen of Tao Hua’s opium trance were a shameful 
retreat to the distancing, anti-realistic exoticism of the ballet past. These scenes, lamented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
845 Em. Beskin, “Novye puti v balete (‘The Red Poppy’ v Bol’shom teatre),” Vecherniaia Moskva, 
June 17, 1927. 
 
846 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 235. 
 
847 Ibid. 234–5. 
 
848 Gvozdev, Krasnyi mak, 10–16. 
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Gvozdev, succumbed to theatrical chinoiserie, failing to overcome “the traditional 
interpretation of China on western stages as an outlandish, fantastical country, full of exotic 
‘wonders’[.]”849 By contrast, for Tikhomirov and Geltser, who sought with Tao Hua’s dream 
to reassert the relevance of classical ballet to revolutionary thematics, the second act 
represented an attempt to combine the techniques of authentic classical ballet with an 
aesthetic sensibility drawn from pre-modern Chinese art.  
Writing retrospectively twenty-five years later, Tikhomirov defended the staging of 
the second act as an approximation of what he considered to be authentic Chinese aesthetics: 
For the fantastical scenes of Tao Hua’s dream I began from the stories of the 
Chinese writer Liao Chzhao, and tried to reconstruct on the stage, through the 
language of choreographical dance, everything I knew about China and her 
centuries-old culture. A series of movements close to the Chinese plastic arts were 
used in staging the dances. We also introduced acrobatic movements into the ballet 
that are found in Chinese folk dances. 850 
 
“Liao Chzhao” most likely refers here to Liao Zhai Zhi Yi, an early Qing collection of stories 
by Pu Songling, in which everyday life is constantly interrupted by various encounters with 
the supernatural. (A Russian translation by prominent Sinologist V. M. Alekseev had been 
published in Petrograd in 1922.)851 Tikhomirov’s aesthetic authenticity is oriented towards 
the past, to China’s cultural history: the evocation of “folk” [narodnye] dances seeks 
validation in forms that stretch deep into the national past. Likewise, Gel’tser stressed that 
she had “long loved Chinese art,” collecting some artefacts on a tour to Harbin.852 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
849 Ibid.  14. 
 
850 Writing in the 25-year anniversary issue of Sovetskii artist dedicated to The Red Poppy, Sovetskii 
artist 23 (11 June 1952): 3. “В фантастических картинах сна Тао-Хоа я шел от рассказов 
китайского писателя Ляо Чжао, пытаясь языком хореографического танца воссоздать на сцене 
все, что я знал о Китае и его многовековой культуре. В постановке танцев был использован ряд 
движений, близких к пластике китайского искусства. Мы ввели в балет и акробатические 
движения, свойственные китайским народным танцам.” 
 
851 Pu Songling, Lis’i chary: iz sbornika strannykh rasskazov Pu Sunlina (Liao chzhai Chzhi i), trans. 
V. M. Alekseev (Petrograd: Gos. izd-vo, 1922). 
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Gel’tser, the fundamental features of Chinese art were “ornateness, patterning, 
decorativeness, precisely crafted details.”853 Rehearsing The Red Poppy, she said, she came 
definitively to understand how the rococo style and “affected gestures” of 18th-century 
Europe had flowed there from China.854 It is this image of China—aestheticized, refined, 
exquisitely detailed—that Tikhomirov and Gel’tser sought to express, the very opposite of 
the harsh, brutal, ugly China of toiling coolies and colonial violence that took shape in Roar, 
China! and the first act of The Red Poppy. The ballet was thus internally riven by competing 
aesthetic approaches to representing China. 
Tikhomirov and Gel’tser consciously intended the second act to show that classical 
ballet was capable of representing contemporary, revolutionary themes—in this case, Tao 
Hua’s internal struggle with the weight of tradition and superstition, as she sought to make 
the transition to the new men and their new truth.855 After being caught up in a procession to 
a Buddhist temple, signifying the hold of religion, Tao Hua ascended to a kind of “Chinese 
heaven” in the shape of a magical garden. The fantastical, dancing inhabitants of this garden 
retained definite ideological significations, according to Tikhomirov and Gel’tser: butterflies, 
lotuses and dandelions stood for old China, while the red poppies represented the 
revolutionary future. Tao Hua fled from a group of phoenixes, which had pursued her from 
the temple: at these moments, the poppies bowed their heads. At the climax of the act, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852 V. V. Nosova states that Gel’tser toured in Harbin in 1923, and also visited Beijing, gaining 
impressions there that were used in the construction of the character of Tao Hua. See V. V. Nosova, 
Baleriny, accessed online April 16, 2013 at http://bungalos.ru/b/nosova_baleriny/27, 
http://bungalos.ru/b/nosova_baleriny/29.  
 
853 “‘Krasnyi mak’: k postanovke v Bol'shom teatre. Beseda s E. V. Gel'tser,” Programmy 
gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 23 (1927): 8.  “Я давно любила китайское искусство, 
изучала его, собирала его произведения, когда жила в Харбине, продолжаю собирать и сейчас. 




855 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 241–2. 
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however, a boat appeared bearing the Guomindang flag.856 The other inhabitants of the 
garden drooped, but the poppies stretched upwards, and turned towards the boat, following 
Tao Hua’s gaze towards the future.857  
Elaborating this interpretation of the dream in the contemporary press, Gel’tser 
acknowledged that the depiction of the heroine’s inner life was “extremely unrealistic,” with 
her “psychology hidden behind symbols,” but insisted that inner psychological experience in 
ballet simply “cannot be transmitted realistically. The means at ballet’s disposal are 
necessarily limited. Gesture and mime can only express generally comprehensible feelings 
and emotions. Abstract thought cannot be communicated.”858 The only recourse was to 
symbolism. This symbolic interpretation of the dream sequence was communicated in the 
copy of the libretto distributed to audiences of the first Bolshoi production. Even so, wrote 
“Sadko” (the critic V. I. Blum) in Zhizn’ iskusstva, none of this symbolic meaning was 
actually communicated by the second act’s parade of exotic divertissements.859 Likewise a 
critic in Pravda, while accurately summarizing the authors’ intention to represent the battle 
between progress and tradition within Tao-Hua’s psyche, pointed out simply that “for a 
spectator who is not familiar with the libretto it says nothing at all.”860  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
856 According to Sadko, “Krasnyi mak v bol’shom teatre,” Zhizn’ iskusstva 26 (1927): 4. Sadko is 
reacting to the premiere in June 1927, when the alliance between the Comintern and the Left 
Guomindang in Wuhan was still intact. 
 
857 I follow here the interpretation of the dream sequence given by Gel’tser, in “‘Krasnyi mak’: k 
postanovke v Bol'shom teatre. Beseda s E. V. Gel'tser,” Programmy gosudarstvennykh 
akademicheskikh teatrov 23 (1927): 8.   
 
858 Ibid. “Правда, форма, в которй показана эта внутренная жизнь героини, крайне нереальна, 
правда, психология скрыта за символами. Но всего этого и нельзя передать реалистически. 
Средства балета поневоле ограничены. Жестом и мимикой можно выразить лишь обще-
понятные чувства и страсти. Отвлеченная мысль не поддается передаче.” 
 
859 Sadko, “Krasnyi mak v bol’shom teatre,” Zhizn’ iskusstva 26 (1927): 4. 
 
860 Vik., “Krasnyi mak,” Pravda, 21 June 1927. 
	  	   335	  
It is of course difficult to know if audiences saw the dream sequence as a struggle 
between liberation and oppression, or if they just enjoyed watching dancing poppies and 
leaping swordsmen. Suspicions certainly abounded that the latter was closer to the truth. 
Even Gorodetskii, one of the few critics who praised the ballet as a victory for classicism in 
the revolutionary present, saw dancing flowers as a step too far: 
But animated flowers do not please the eye. In 1927! In Moscow! In the first 
revolutionary ballet! There is a real danger that, at a time when contemporary tastes 
have not yet settled, all this marmalade might appeal. What a shame that this ballet, 
which transmits to the masses the elevated ideas of worker solidarity and the 
struggle against slavery, carries for one minute (and alas, that minute is an hour!) 
the whiff of the previous century’s effete prettiness.861  
 
Others suspected that the “marmalade” did indeed appeal to a certain kind of spectator. In 
Mayakovsky’s play The Bathhouse (Bania), staged by the Meyerhold Theatre in 1930, The 
Red Poppy became satirical shorthand for philistine bad taste, the play’s boorish hero 
praising the ballet’s dancing “syphilids” as a slip for “sylphs.”862Another Meyerhold 
production, Vsevolod Vishnevskii’s Last and Decisive (Poslednii i reshitel’nyi, 1931), also 
took a parodic swipe at The Red Poppy’s idealized image of navy life.863  
Satirize the leftists might, but The Red Poppy’s popularity was undeniable. In the 
1927–28 season it played over 60 times; by December 1928 it had reached its 100th 
performance. (Typically, ballets on the Bolshoi’s repertoire were performed 15–20 times a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
861 Sergei Gorodetskii, “Pobeda klassiki,” Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 25 
(1927): 5. “А на живые цветочки не хотелось смотреть. В 1927 году! В Москве! В первом 
революционном балете! Самое опасное то, что при неустановившихся современных вкусах, 
весь этот мармелад может понравиться. Как досадно, что из того же самого балета, из которого 
пойдут в массы высокие идеи солидарности трудящихся, борьбы против рабства, на минуту 
пахнет (увы! Минута эта — час!) и расслабленной красивостью прошлово века.” 
 
862 Vladimir Maiakovskii, “Bania,” in Sobranie sochinenii v 8 tomakh (Moscow: izd-vo Pravda, 
1968), 7: 98. I am indebted to Daria Khitrova and her paper “Two Worlds in Two Words: Stal’noi 
skok (1927) on Diaghilev’s Stage,” delivered at the January 2013 AATSEEL Convention in Boston, 
for drawing my attention to this reference. 
 
863 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 251. 
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season, which would comprise around 80 shows in total.)864 In all, the original production 
played over 300 times on the Bolshoi’s stage between 1927 and 1937.865 Red-Poppy themed 
perfume, soap and confectionary appeared in the autumn of 1927, to capitalize on the show’s 
popular success.866  
How much can really be said to account for the show’s popularity? It seems 
impossible to determine objectively whether audiences were drawn to The Red Poppy 
because of internationalist sympathy with the oppressed Chinese, or because they wanted to 
see dancing lotuses—or, indeed, foxtrots and Boston waltzes, the stock dance signifiers of the 
decadent Imperialist West. Besides internationalist sympathy and voyeurism, there is also the 
possible motive of national identification and pride: it does not seem unreasonable to suggest 
that audience members who accepted some measure of Soviet identity were pleased to 
identify with the vision of the USSR’s place in the world that The Red Poppy presented. In 
particular, Souritz argues that the ballet’s success could be linked to public sentiment over the 
recent assassination of Soviet consuls in Guangzhou and Poland.867 Such sentiments can 
perhaps be detected in the unanimously acknowledged popularity of the Soviet sailors’ 
“Yablochko” dance, which brought the first act to a climax.  
This dance on a Russian folk theme came at the triumphant conclusion to a series of 
dances by representatives of various nationalities, which followed on from the scene of the 
Captain’s transfer of the red poppy. First the Malay women, freed from dancing for paid 
entertainment in the bar, dance with the coolies. Next a series of sailors, each representing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
864 E. Surits, “Nachalo puti: balet Moskvy i Leningrada v 1917–1927 godakh,” in Sovetskii baletnyi 
teatr 1917–1967 (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1976), 70. 
 
865 Katonova, Balety R. M. Gliera, 7. 
 
866 Souritz, Soviet Choreographers, 250. 
 
867 Surits, “Nachalo puti,” 71. 
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different nation, perform a series of individual dances.868 Finally the “Yablochko” dance 
closes this display of internationalist diversity with a celebration of Soviet strength and 
aptitude. National dances had played a central role in ballet during the Romantic era; in the 
time of Petipa, they had been used chiefly as divertissements.869 Here national dances are 
placed in sequence to visualize internationalism as a unified celebration of diversity that 
culminates with “Yablochko,” a Russian folk dance expressing the primacy of Soviet Russia 
in this new order. That the highlight of the show would be a group male dance is also a 
significant departure from the days of Petipa, when the ballerina ruled supreme. It fits well, 
however, the context of the Soviet 1920s, with its cult of fizkul’tura and Meyerhold’s 
biomechanics (a similar sequence with dancing sailors graced Meyerhold’s 1924 production 
D.E. [Daesh’ Evropu]).870 Reintegrating the national dance into a new, internationalist world 
order, “Yablochko” brought the first act to a close with a vision of internationalism firmly led 
by collective, male Soviet example. 
Where does China fit into this vision of internationalism? In the first act we have a 
clear image of China as a place where labouring masses, oppressed by British imperialism 
and the treachery of Chinese compradores, are awoken under the direct inspiration of the 
Soviet Union. This element is far more explicit than it was in Roar, China!, where Soviet 
example was filtered through the Stoker. The Captain’s decision to send his sailors to help 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
868 Lashchilin asserts that the group of international sailors for the Moscow production comprised a 
Malaysian, an Indian, a Japanese, an Australian and an American. (“Beseda s L. A. Lashchilinym,” 
Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov, 1926, 58 [2–8 November], 9.) In Leningrad 
the line-up seems to have been an awkward German, a well-trained Englishman, a black woman from 
one of the junks, a Chinese pirate and an Indian. (Bogdanov-Berezovskii, Krasnyi mak, 10.) 
 
869 See Lisa C. Arkin and Marian Smith, “National Dance in the Romantic Ballet,” in Rethinking the 
Sylph: New Perspectives on the Romantic Ballet, ed. Lynn Garafola (Hanover, NH: University Press 
of New England, 1997), 11–68. 
 
870 Surits, “Nachalo puti,” 69. 
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the coolies unload breaks the racist paradigm of the imperialist status quo; but it also 
transforms the nature of labour itself, from miserable oppression to joyous collaboration.  
As S. Levin demonstrates, this transformation is reflected at the level of Glière’s 
score. The first “Dance of the Coolies” is a slow, dragging work song, “a kind of Chinese 
dubinushka” in the assessment of S. Katonova.871 As Boris Gasparov notes, the Russian 
barge-haulers’ song “Dubinushka” was revalorized in the revolutionary period as a symbol of 
the awakening mass element: “in the context of Russian revolutions—first in 1905, then in 
and after 1917—this labour song, with its ominously pushing rhythm, was interpreted as an 
emblem of the awakening masses whose thrust is aimed at the edifice of the old order.”872 
This sonic association of the labouring coolies with the Russian dubinushka, conjuring the 
image of toiling Volga barge haulers made iconic by Il’ia Repin, could only have increased 
the audience’s sense that this oppressive situation must point towards radical change. The 
motif builds in intensity, punctuated by wind and percussion striking the bass line like the 
whips of the overseers.873 Later, when the sailors intervene to assist, and exploited labour 
becomes collaborative labour, this same bass motif is repeated yet transformed, its sense of 
“unbearable tension” and “strenuous exertion” replaced by “a single, precise, deliberate 
movement.”874 The motif of the work song returns a third time in the triumphant “Coolies’ 
Victory Dance,” cementing the transition from oppression to joy.875 The Russian folk motif 
of dubinushka, hidden within the Coolies’ Dance, opened Act One with an equation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871 S. Katonova, Balety R. M. Gliera (Moscow, 1960) 10. Full quote: “Танец кули — это своего 
рода китайская «Дубинушка.» Ярко выраженный национальный колорит, тяжелые октавные 
ходы, настойчивое повторение выразительного мелодического оборота, звучащего как 
сдавленный стон, ритм подневольного, натруженного шага придают танцу сурово-
мужетсвенный характер.” 
 
872 Gasparov, Five Operas and a Symphony, 190–1. 
 
873 Levin, “Dva baleta,” 131–2. 
 
874 Ibid., 132. 
 
875 Ibid. 
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contemporary Chinese and pre-revolutionary Russian oppression. The open, triumphant folk 
motif of “Yablochko,” revalorized as an expression of the manly vigour of the young Soviet 
nation, closes the act, expressing the Chinese coolies’ potential future. 
If this joyous conjunction of Chinese coolies and Soviet sailors suggests a new 
internationalist dynamic expressed through dance, the lead character of Tao Hua and her 
romantic narrative seem to return to the paradigms of the ballet past. Combining an Oriental 
love affair with a fantastical dream sequence, Tao Hua’s story tapped into two of the 
strongest thematic traditions of nineteenth century ballet: the Oriental and the supernatural, 
both of them erotic.876 Indeed, it is striking how much of The Red Poppy is covered by 
Deborah Jowitt’s description of the generic nineteenth century Oriental ballet: 
For almost a century, the stages of opera houses and popular theatres—in America 
as well as Europe—teemed with enslaved heroines, treacherous rivals, disguises, 
fateful talismans, lovers offering to sacrifice their lives of their purity for each 
other, intrigues, threats of hideous punishment, opium dreams, spectacular scenic 
effects, and, of course, dances galore.877 
 
A glance at the iconic nineteenth century ballet productions that characterized the Imperial 
Ballet under Marius Petipa offers several narrative parallels with The Red Poppy. Compare, 
for example, the plot to La Bayadére (in Russian, Baiaderka), first performed in St 
Petersburg in 1877 and restaged in Russia in 1900, 1904 and 1932. In La Bayadére, the titular 
temple dancer’s love for a young warrior is blocked by the jealous High Brahmin of the 
temple; a pivotal plot function is played by a basket of flowers given to the dancer, which 
contains a poisoned snake that bites her during her dance; after her death, her depressed lover 
falls into a trance, wherein he meets the Bayadére again in an enchanted kingdom.878 Or take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
876 The two themes, clearly related as transplantations of erotic issues into other worlds, are contrasted 
as “In Pursuit of the Sylph” and “Heroism in the Harem,” in Deborah Jowitt, Time and the Dancing 
Image (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1988), ch. 1. 
 
877 Ibid., 54. 
 
878 Entelis, 100 baletnykh libretto, 143–46. 
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the plot of The Pharoah’s Daughter, staged iconically by Petipa in 1862, and revived in 
Leningrad in 1925 under the direction of Lopukhov (who was subsequently to choreograph 
the first act of Leningrad’s The Red Poppy in 1929). An English noble travelling in Egypt 
falls asleep under the influence of opium, and dreams that he is an ancient Egyptian in love 
with the pharoah’s daughter. Their love is hindered, however, by the scheming of the King of 
Nubia, a jealous rival for her affections. The pharoah’s daughter drowns trying to escape the 
king’s clutches, but is magically revived for a happy resolution.879  
An exotic Oriental location, a love affair hindered by a jealous rival, opium... Here we 
sense The Red Poppy’s conundrum: it seeks to invoke enough of the tropes from ballet 
tradition to be recognizably ballet, and yet clearly there is something problematic in 
perpetuating the forms of a performance art so closely intertwined with pre-revolutionary 
Imperial culture. As Lynn Garafola points out, Petipa’s ballets combined a strict hierarchy of 
dancers, headed by the solo ballerina, with a thematic preoccupation with marriage as a 
source of continuity. Such concerns, for Garafola, suggest that “what is really at stake in 
these ballets is the idea of autocracy itself.”880  The Red Poppy sought to both inherit and 
transform this tradition by pushing the issue of marriage into the background, and replacing it 
with the soloist’s duty towards the masses.  
 This is the ethical thrust of Tao Hua’s story, which dominates the rest of the ballet 
after the mass scenes of Act One. If the coolies’ quasi-dubinushka brings them close to Volga 
barge-haulers in disguise, Tao Hua has the most recognizably “Chinese” theme in the score: a 
high, elegant pentatonic melody that introduces her in Act One and recurs throughout the 
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ballet.881 This theme combined with her “refined, conventional gestures” and “small, 
coquettish movements” to give Tao Hua, for one reviewer, the air of a “porcelain Chinese 
doll.”882 We sense here an established stereotype of East Asian femininity: delicate, pretty, 
polite. But Tao Hua also has a second theme, a lyrical melody for violins, close in spirit to 
Tchaikovsky. Levin parses the relationship between these two melodies as the juxtaposition 
of outer and inner experience. Tao Hua’s Chinese theme becomes her own form of 
ethnographic mask, the stereotypical mask of chinoiserie that she wears for the benefit of 
foreigners, expressing “polite courtesy, ‘doll-ness,’ affectation.”883 The Tchaikovskian, 
romantic theme then becomes the expression of her true, inner world of “authentic emotions 
and experiences.”884 On this reading, romantic ballet positions itself as a necessary stage in 
the movement from the falseness of chinoiserie towards the truth of revolution. 
For all the satirical swipes aimed at The Red Poppy from the stage of Meyerhold’s 
theatre, symbolically speaking the figure of Tao Hua has much in common with Babanova’s 
Boy in Roar, China! Both are feminized representatives of China, their ethnic character 
expressed in part through music, who find themselves torn between the opposing camps in 
the global struggle, and must sacrifice themselves in order to prove their correct loyalties. 
Tao Hua also, of course, invokes a whole range of heroines from the Oriental ballet 
spectacles of the nineteenth century. As Jowitt points out, these Orientally enslaved or 	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Moscow in 1931, was convinced that Tao Hua’s theme was based on “Three Variations on the Plum 
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somehow compelled women appealed to audiences “not only because of the aura of glamour 
and intimations of promiscuity that surrounded them, but because of the extra piquancy the 
characters’ status as chattels gave to their bravery and resourcefulness.”885 And indeed Tao 
Hua’s disobedience against her prospective owner, her fiancé Li Shan-fu, leads directly to her 
death at his hands. This is precisely the Eastern oppression from which Soviet 
internationalism, the latest incarnation of Western progress, sought to liberate Chinese 
women. The freedom that the nineteenth century Oriental ballerina fights for, however, is 
primarily the private freedom to choose her own mate. Ultimately, Jowitt argues, she fights 
for the freedom to submit to the man of her choosing.886 The Red Poppy takes this one step 
further: Tao Hua fights and dies ultimately not for a new male master but for a new ideology, 
albeit one represented throughout in staunchly masculine terms. This revalorization of the 
exotic heroine can be sensed in the scene where Tao Hua dances for the captain in Act Three. 
What appears to be a dance of flirtation and titillation, as she dances repeatedly closer and 
then further away, is in fact a dance of indecision, as she wrestles with the competing 
demands of patriarchal obedience and awakening romantic-revolutionary sentiment.887 Dying 
for private love and freedom is transformed into the liminal heroine’s self-sacrifice for the 
correct social group.  
This motif of tragic sacrifice certainly echoes other images of revolutionary China in 
the 1920s. But the issue of gender seems crucial here. The paradigm of self-sacrifice that we 
see at work among the boatmen in Roar, China! or the partisans of Bronepoezd 14-92 are 	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militaristic and even explicitly homosocial. Women seem excluded from these brotherhoods 
of comrades, a pattern that Eliot Borenstein has identified running through 1920s Russian 
fiction.888 Tao Hua’s explicitly female sacrifice more closely echoes established narratives of 
doomed trans-cultural love. Besides the Oriental exotica of nineteenth century ballet, there 
are clear echoes of the Madame Butterfly story: an Oriental woman falls in love with a 
Western naval officer, whose departure hastens her death. (A Soviet production of Puccini’s 
Madame Butterfly from 1922 was revived in 1925 at Leningrad’s Akademicheskii teatr maloi 
opery.)889 But the Pilkington figure leaves for private reasons, because of his other family; 
the departure of the Captain, by contrast, is parsed by Bogdanov-Berezovskii as his deliberate 
choice of public duty over private happiness.890 Thus we might sense instead the outline of 
the story of Dido and Aeneas: the European man leaves his Asiatic bride to pursue his duty to 
the future, his departure followed swiftly by her death. A third paradigm would be the 
American legend of Pocahontas: the native woman in love with the newly arrived white male 
offers herself in sacrifice to spare his life, thereby rejecting the authority of her native culture 
and legitimizing the rise of a new form of political domination led by the group to which her 
lover belongs. Indeed, Philip Young notes that the outlines of the allegedly historical 
Pocahontas story—an adventurer captured by a foreign king is saved by his beautiful 
daughter, who renounces her culture for his—constitute “one of the oldest stories known to 
man,” citing such examples as Aeneas, Odysseus, and the medieval trope of the “enamoured 
Moslem princess.”891 
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Yet The Red Poppy’s invocation of these narrative tropes serves also to highlight the 
innovations in the Soviet version of trans-cultural romance. If Gina Marchetti is correct is her 
assessment that the Butterfly myth, as replayed in classical Hollywood cinema, represents 
“the necessary sacrifice of all people of color to assure Western domination,” then we might 
add that its Soviet redaction seemingly asserts the need for people of color to be sacrificed in 
order to ensure the triumph of Soviet-led internationalism.892 Tao Hua does not kill herself 
because she is spurned by her lover, but ensures her death because she protects him: her death 
represents not a return to native patriarchal authority, as it does in Puccini’s opera, but rather 
ensues from her final switch of allegiance from Chinese patriarchy to Soviet-led (though still 
resolutely masculine) internationalism. This switch of allegiance to assist the foreign 
interloper brings her closer to Pocahontas; but the introduction of class as an element means 
that Tao Hua does not simply betray her “people,” as Pocahontas does. Rather she betrays the 
class she serves at the ballet’s beginning—the Western imperialists and their Chinese 
compradors—in order to further the new alliance of the Chinese and Soviet masses. And 
whereas Dido’s death prefigured Carthage and Rome’s future rivalry, the death of Tao Hua 
points towards a future in which China and the Soviet Union will stand as allies in global 
revolution. 
Thus The Red Poppy takes up the traditional trans-cultural love plot in order to assert 
its transcendence by new forms of attachment. As Catharine Nepomnyashchy notes, The Red 
Poppy exploits the gender dynamics of its spectacle to assert the Soviet mission in the East: 
“[t]he hallucinatory, potentially lethal passion of the feminized East is vanquished on all 
fronts by the civilizing mission of Bolshevism.”893 This vanquishing includes a 	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transformation in the character of the Oriental heroine herself. Kurilko and Glière could not 
discard the tragic lyrical heroine, but they do attempt to transform her significance in the 
course of the ballet, by staging the victory of internationalist sentiment over romantic love. If 
the Madame Butterfly myth suggests, as it does for Marchetti, the replacement of native 
religion with the Western cult of love, The Red Poppy represents a triangulation of that 
relationship.894 Tao Hua’s love is set in motion by the Captain’s gesture of solidarity with the 
Chinese coolies. While it seems clear that her feelings remain romantic in nature, they 
combine attachment to the man with attachment to the cause he represents. Her death in the 
third act results from a confluence of romantic and political impulses: she is shot by Li Shan-
Fu for betraying their engagement, but also for betraying his side of the internationalist class 
divide.  
This revalorization of love from romance to revolution is completed by the death 
scene, a variation on the trope of female sacrifice. The gendered element in Tao Hua’s self-
sacrifice—the female who sacrifices herself to preserve the male—differentiates it from the 
homosocial, mutual self-sacrifice that brings Roar, China! to a climax, and invites us to look 
more closely at the issue of gender and sacrifice. Here a comparative move may prove 
helpful. Analysing this question from a religious perspective, Nancy Jay has argued that “[i]n 
no other major religious institution is gender dichotomy more consistently important, across 
unrelated traditions, than it is in sacrifice.”895 For Jay, sacrificial rites play especially 
prominent roles in patrilinear societies keen to preserve a clear line of father-son succession 
and property inheritance. These societies continue to rely, however, on women’s reproductive 
powers in order to perpetuate themselves; but a matrilinear system introduces uncontrollable 
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complications into the system of property inheritance. Thus sacrificial rites are employed to 
replace actual childbirth, often stigmatized as unclean, with a ritual birth that links its male 
participants in patrilinear relations: “sacrificing produces and reproduces forms of 
intergenerational continuity generated by males, transmitted through males, and transcending 
continuity through women.”896  
With 1920s Soviet internationalism we are of course a long way from the pre-
industrial societies that form the basis of Jay’s argument. Yet her insights on the gender 
dynamics of sacrifice may still help to shed light on the symbolism of Tao Hua’s death, by 
allowing us to see The Red Poppy as dramatizing the reproduction and dissemination of 
revolution in terms that both suggest and circumvent biological reproduction. The 
revolution’s reproduction is initiated by the paternal figure of the Captain. It is he who 
invests the red poppy—given to him by Tao Hua as a symbol of sexual affection—with the 
symbolism of revolutionary solidarity, a sacred property that it is in his power to bestow. This 
symbol is then passed in a masculine line, more paternally than fraternally, to a Chinese 
coolie. It only returns to Tao Hua after the Captain has told her he must leave, dashing her 
sexual ambitions permanently and leaving only the revolutionary side of her dual romantic-
revolutionary motivation intact. At her death, children appear and surround Tao Hua. This 
Red Butterfly has conceived no biological child for her European lover; instead, she passes 
on the symbol that is the red poppy, a symbolically invested “seed” launched on its path by 
the Captain, to a group of Chinese children gathered around her as she dies. These children 
receive their inheritance from the Captain-father, transmitted through Tao Hua’s agency, but 
without any need for her biological reproductive capacities.  
But why the urge to overcome or evade biological reproduction? Perhaps because it 
summons implications of fidelity to the family and, more widely, to the tribe, the ethnic 	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group—all ties that must ultimately be transcended by the trans-national class affiliations of 
Soviet internationalism. These ties are overwhelmingly represented in the ballet by men: the 
Captain, the coolies, the triumphant display of joyous masculine power that is the 
“Yablochko” dance. As Borenstein has noted in the context of 1920s fiction, revolutionary 
culture sought to establish new forms of filiation that could bypass the biologically related 
family and its necessary dependence on women.897 In passing her lover’s seed on to children 
that are not biologically her own, Tao Hua affirms the primacy of ideological over biological 
reproduction, and sanctifies this inheritance of the father’s property with her sacrificial death. 
(It is perhaps interesting to note that, in earlier versions of the libretto, Tao Hua gives the red 
poppy to assembled women and children; the women were removed from the final 
product.)898 The fact that she is a ballet heroine only adds to the magnitude of her sacrifice; 
Tao Hua’s drama essentially enacts the self-overcoming of the romantic, ethereal, elusive 
ballet heroine, called to abandon love and fantasy and devote her reproductive energies—
without the complications of sex—to the real present.  
By thus overcoming the very paradigm of the ballet heroine that it invokes, Tao Hua’s 
death also resolves the division within the ballet between the two ways of representing China. 
Tao Hua as realized by Gel’tser, with her refined gestures, doll-like elegance, and symbolic 
dreams, represents the old image of China, the eighteenth-century paradigm of refined, 
restrained beauty. She dies in the service of the new image of China, shot by a Europeanized 
compradore as chaotic crowds of angry partisans storm the stage. The battle for authenticity, 
it seems, is won by the side of the new. 
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On this question of authenticity, a concluding note needs to be made about the choice 
of the red poppy itself as the symbolic seed of revolution. Once Communist rule in China was 
established in 1949, voices connected with the CCP began to object that the poppy was not a 
suitable symbol for Chinese national liberation. In 1949, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were 
offered the opportunity to see a production of The Red Poppy during a visit to Moscow. They 
declined, but sent Mao’s secretary, Chen Boda, who was reportedly offended by the “bright 
yellow paint” worn by the dancers portraying Chinese characters, which made them look like 
“monsters and bogeymen.” Chen also objected to the ballet’s title, arguing that the poppy was 
offensive to the Chinese as a notorious symbol of national oppression, standing for the British 
importation of opium into China, the social damage done by the narcotic, and the two 
humiliating wars that ensued from Chinese attempts to restrict the trade.899 The poet Emi 
Xiao, conversing with a VOKS representative in March 1951, insisted that the name be 
changed, in view of the “hatred of the Chinese for the poppy, as the raw material from which 
opium is made.”900 
Effectively, these CCP spokesmen were asserting their newly empowered authority to 
determine the authenticity of such images of China. In October 1953, a meeting was held 
between Leonid Lavrovskii, artistic director of the Bolshoi ballet and director of the 1949 
revival, and Tszen Siu-Fu (pinyin: Jian Xiufu), a graduate student at the Academy of Social 
Sciences who had watched the revived ballet some weeks previously. Jian, after praising the 
production's artistic qualities, launched his critiques from the perspective of authenticity. By 
staging a ballet about actual history, he argued, you are making a transition from lyrical ballet 
to historical ballet; thus it is important to make sure that the details are faithful to reality. 	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From history we learn that the struggle of the Chinese people against what Jian, speaking in 
the context of the early Cold War, calls “American imperialism,” began with opium. And the 
red poppy is one of the plants from which opium is made. For a spectator with an awareness 
of this historical signification, the symbolism of the red poppy in the ballet becomes 
dangerously confused: “Opium is a social evil, а source of oppression, yet in the ballet the 
Soviet captain gives Tao-Hua a red poppy. Of course he gives her the flower as a sign of 
friendship, but here you have to understand the mentality of the Chinese people.”901 Note 
that, for all the complex iterations made by the poppy, which seem to have changed in 
different production, here it is the transfer of the poppy from the Captain to Tao Hua that Jian 
emphasises. In so doing, Jian hints at the taboo at the heart of internationalist poetics, the 
same paradox identified by Malraux in The Conquerors: the possibility that the Soviets, who 
position themselves as anti-imperialist liberators, are in fact engaged in a new form of 
imperialism. Jian’s identification of the “true,” Chinese symbolism of the poppy opens up a 
new, troubling interpretation of The Red Poppy: a European captain sails into port and 
symbolically gives the Chinese people opium, just as his British predecessors, the despised 
imperialists, had done for over a hundred years. 
These Chinese objections hit their mark. When a new production of the ballet 
appeared in 1957, the title was changed to The Red Flower (Krasnyi tsvetok), and Tao Hua’s 
romantic interest in the captain, with its echoes of prostitution, were replaced by a love affair 
with a male Chinese revolutionary hero, Wang Licheng. (After the Sino-Soviet split, 
offending Chinese sensibilities apparently became less of a priority, and the name was 
changed back.)902 But how could such a trans-culturally insensitive choice of symbol have 	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been made in the first place? In the interview, Lavrovskii replied that the poppy had been 
chosen for its colour, for the symbolism of red, insisting: “we simply did not think about the 
national significance of this flower.”903 But Lavrovskii was not involved in the original 
production of The Red Poppy in 1927. It seems incredible that nobody involved in staging a 
ballet about imperialism in China, featuring an extended opium dream in which huge red 
poppies dance across the stage, made the connection between poppies and opium, and 
between opium and imperialist incursions into China. Could a production seeking to display 
an “authentic” China really have missed such a key aspect of the modern Chinese historical 
experience? 
There were plenty of people the Bolshoi team could have consulted: just before the 
opening of the Leningrad production in 1929, the Sinologist Boris Vasil’ev gave a talk on the 
current situation in China at an event dedicated to the ballet. Surely Vasil’ev could have 
mentioned this unfortunate association?904 Furthermore, contemporary Soviet media were not 
silent on the connections between opium and British imperialism in China: in a Vecherniaia 
Moskva article from July 1925, S. M. Glan describes the history of the opium trade in China 
as a deliberate imperialist policy to pacify the population.905 Tret’iakov, writing in Rabochaia 
Moskva on May 21, 1927, lays into the colonial exotic novel’s glamorization of opium dens, 
pointing out that “the feted delights of opium smoking represent one of the most terrible 
crimes of the British against the Chinese people.”906 Neither of these articles explicitly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Entelis, 100 baletnykh libretto (Leningrad: Muzyka, 1971)—the name had been changed back to The 
Red Poppy and the male Chinese hero had disappeared, presumably in response to the Sino-Soviet 
split. 
 
903 RGALI f. 2085, op. 1, ed. khr. 1170, l. 37. 
 
904 Programme preserved in RGALI f. 2085, op. 1, ed. khr. 1285, l. 25. 
 
905 See for example S. M. Glan, “Deti velikogo Suna,” Vecherniaia Moskva, July 16, 1925.  
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connects opium production with poppies: but surely it can’t be possible that no one on the 
Bolshoi team was aware that opium is made from poppies? 
Indeed, opium smoking is negatively marked in The Red Poppy: Tao Hua is driven to 
it out of despair and fear, and the dream it induces is intended as a frightening evocation of 
the oppression she experiences in a patriarchal society ruled by tradition. The poppies within 
the dream, however, play a markedly positive role, as Gel’tser herself explained: bowing 
their heads while the phoenixes of tradition run rampant, they look upward when the vision 
of the ship, symbol of the internationalist future, appears. This coincides with the symbolic 
function of the poppy in the ballet as a whole, a positive symbol of trans-national friendship. 
Perhaps the makers of The Red Poppy wanted to show that the Soviet message of solidarity 
was sufficiently powerful to revalorize the symbolic meaning of the poppy, removing it from 
the tainted sphere of opium production and attaching it instead to the positive message of 
revolution? Perhaps we should read the ballet as an affirmation of the power of 
internationalist aesthetics to appropriate and invert imperialist images? 
Such a reading suggests the The Red Poppy claimed the right to transcend the 
“national significance” of the poppy that Jian and Lavrovskii discussed. This move was 
perhaps made easier, furthermore, by the original context of Russian language and culture. 
The Russian word “мак” (mak) holds none of the historical associations with the opium trade 
that have encrusted themselves around the English word “poppy.” “Mak” to a native Russian 
speaker has benign, festive connotations. A “makovka” can be a church’s onion dome or a 
pastry treat studded with poppy seeds. The colour of the red “mak” suggests a healthy glow 
closer to the English rose: “Лицо твое как маков цвет” (Your face is poppy-coloured), says 
the Nurse to Tati’iana in Chapter Three of Evgenii Onegin, taking her blush at being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
906 Tret’iakov, “Zhelt’ i sin’.” Tret’iakov also depicts poppy-growing for opium production in his 
“bio-interview,” Den Shi-khua, which he was writing in 1927 but would not publish until 1929. Sergei 
Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua: bio-interv’iu (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1930), 365–6. 
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discovered finishing her letter to Onegin for the flush of returned health after a good night’s 
sleep.907 A red “mak,” healthy and festive, would make an entirely suitable gift of friendship, 
the symbolism of red for socialist revolution dovetailing with older associations of the word. 
The word’s celebratory connotations in Russian, it appears, were allowed to override any 
negative associations that might have accrued from different cultural contexts. 
Once again internationalist aesthetics stumble on encountering issues of translation. 
Take the heroine’s name. “Táo huā,” in Chinese, means “peach blossom” (桃花)—a 
thoroughly appropriate name for a figure closely associated with feminine softness and 
traditional Chinese aesthetics. Except that this is apparently not what the group behind The 
Red Poppy thought it meant. Instead, they seem to have been convinced that this name, spelt 
variously Tai-Khua, Tai-Khoa, Taia-Khoa, оr Taia-Khua, in fact translated as “red poppy.”908 
Gel’tser stated explicitly in an interview that her character’s “name is Taia-Khoa (the Red 
Poppy).”909 In an early version of the libretto, Tikhomirov refers to the heroine as “Khun-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
907 Aleksandr Pushkin, Evgenii Onegin, Chapter Three, Stanza XXXIII, in A. S. Pushkin, Sobranie 
sochinenii v 6 tomakh, volume four (Moscow: izd-vo Pravda, 1969), 63. I am grateful to Boris 
Gasparov for this reference, and for the suggestion that the misunderstanding of the poppy’s 
symbolism may have its roots in such cultural connotations. 
 
908 In Programmy gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 58 (2–8 November 1926): 8, Gel’tser’s 
character is referred to as “Tai-Khua” (Тай-Хуа). By issue 23 (7—13 June 1927): 8, her name is 
“Taia-Khoa” (Тая-Хоа). Thus is she named on the front page of issue 25 (21–27 June 1927), and 
throughout that issue. By the time of the 100th Bolshoi performance in December 1928, the 
character’s name is given in the programme as “Taia-Khua, an actress” (Тая-Хуа, актриса—RGALI 
f. 2085, op. 1, ed. khr. 1229, l. 62). In 1949, for a production at the Kirov theatre in Leningrad, she is 
“Tao-khoa” (Тао-Хоа—RGALI f. 2085, op. 1, ed. khr. 1229, l. 189ob); in Saratov, “Taia-Khoa” 
(Тая-Хоа—RGALI f. 2085, op. 1, ed. khr. 1229, l. 217ob). In his 1953 interview with Lavrovskii and 
Glière, Tszen suggests changing the name from Tao-Khoa to Tao-Khua: “Затем имя Тао-Хoа. 
Трудно произносится, вы сами наверное это чувствуете. Гораздо лучше Хуа – это цветок, и это 
будет нормальнее и легче произносится” (Then there is the name Tao-Khoa. It’s hard to 
pronounce, you probably sense that yourselves. Much better would be Khua: it means flower, and it 
will be more correct and easier to pronounce.) RGALI f. 2085, op. 1, ed. khr. 1170, l. 41.  
 
909 “‘The Red Poppy’: k postanovke v bol’shom teatre; Beseda s E V Gel’tser,” Programmy 
gosudarstvennykh akademicheskikh teatrov 23 (7—13 June 1926): 8. “Ее имя Тая-Хоа (Красный 
мак).” 
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Taia-Khoa / The Red Poppy” (“khun,” or “hóng / 红,” being the Chinese word for “red”).910 
As late as 1952, we find Kurilko speaking of “Tao-Khoa, which in translation means ‘Red 
Poppy’[…]”911  
Where this idea originated, we cannot say. (“Poppy” in Chinese, to the best of my 
knowledge, is “yīngsù / 罂粟” or “yīngsù huā / 罂粟花.” The name of the ballet in Chinese is 
“Hóng Yīngsù / 红罂粟.”)912 If we accept, however, that the ballet’s authors thought Tao Hua 
meant not “red poppy,” but “red mak,” with all its benign connotations and none of the 
accumulated legacy of the opium war, the translation makes more sense. This persistent 
mistranslation speaks volumes about what the ballet’s creators wanted to believe their 
spectacle meant, and which potential meanings they did not address or sought to transcend. 
The group seems to have fixated on this neat equation: 
Tao Hua = red “mak” = benign symbol of liberation, 
to the extent of simply blocking out the possibility that: 
Tao Hua ≠ red poppy =malicious symbol of foreign oppression. 
Leaving aside accusations of laziness or bad research, these complications remind us that 
claims to authentic transmission of foreign realities are always compromised by necessary 
acts of translation. In The Red Poppy, moreover, the desire for the correct mythical content 
proved stronger than the drive towards representing an authentic China on Chinese terms. In 
this prominent expression of internationalist aesthetics, the accurate representation of a 
foreign reality proves less important than the assertion of Soviet culture’s right to shape the 
image of the world on its own terms. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
910 RGALI f. 2729, op. 1, ed. khr. 18, l. 1. 
 
911 Sovetskii artist 23 (11 June 1952), 2. 
 
912 This is the title as rendered by Bei Wenli, who also calls the heroine 桃花 (Táo huā). Bei, “E-Su 
yishu,” 57–8. 
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The red poppy/red mak incident suggests that even the most generalizable symbols 
are caught up within webs of linguistic and cultural signification, and cannot simply cross 
between cultural systems without loss or gain. This poses serious problems for an 
“internationalist aesthetics” that might truly seek to be international: as the example of The 
Red Poppy shows, an artistic statement intended as an expression of solidarity may have very 
different connotations when it confronts an audience outside its original culture. (Roar, China! 
translated more successfully: as both Xiaobing Tang and Mark Gamsa have shown, Chinese 
translations of the play were among the many international productions to reach enthusiastic 
audiences in the two decades after its Moscow debut.)913 The Bolshoi collective’s 
indifference to this dynamic of trans-cultural interpretation may be taken as a form of 
ethnocentrism, a chauvinistic sense of Soviet entitlement to dictate the meaning of 
international symbols on the basis of national culture. But this culturally conditioned 
blindness on the part of the Bolshoi’s creative team may also intimate the blind spot of Soviet 
internationalism as a whole, the dark side that it simply could not acknowledge: the 
possibility that it was only a recast, innovative form of the imperialism that it denounced, 
bringing its own red narcotic to subdue the Chinese.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
913 See Tang, “Echoes of Roar, China!,” 484–88; Gamsa, “Sergei Tret’iakov's Roar, China!,” 94–99. 
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Chapter Five 
Chinese Confessions: Den Shi-khua and Biographical Allegory 
 
 One genre has so far remained conspicuously absent from this survey of China in the 
media system of 1920s China: the novel. Despite its commanding position in European 
literature and the Russian realism of the previous century, in the 1920s, according to the 
Formalist critic Iurii Tynianov, “[t]he novel finds itself in an impasse: what is needed today is 
a sense of a new genre, i.e., a sense of decisive novelty in literature.”914 Other prose forms, 
including the diary, the memoir and autobiography, challenged for a space in the system of 
genres. Sure enough, those novels on China that did appear, as we shall see, were peripheral, 
minor works, often written for children, teenaged readers, or the newly literate. These texts 
nonetheless display the narrative shape that, according to Katerina Clark, was to define the 
novel upon its return to dominance after the promulgation of Socialist Realism in the early 
1930s: the master plot of a revolutionary road to consciousness.915 
 This outline can also be sensed, however, in another long prose text that was 
presented as very much not a novel: Sergei Tret’iakov’s “bio-interview” Den Shi-khua, 
offered to its readers as the mediated autobiography of a Chinese student.916 As both the 
longest text produced under the short-lived banner of the “literature of fact,” and the longest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
914 Iurii Tynianov, “Literaturnoe segodnia,” Russkii sovremennik 1 (1924): 292. Quoted in Cristina 
Vatulescu, Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet Times (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 7. 
 
915 Clark, The Soviet Novel, passim. 
 
916 Tret’iakov’s book provides a vivid example of the dilemma encountered when trying to decide 
how to render Chinese names given originally in Cyrillic. Should we transcribe what seems to be the 
original Chinese name into pinyin romanization, or transliterate the Cyrillic rendering of the Chinese 
name directly into a Library-of-Congress romanization? For example, the title and subject of 
Tret’iakov’s book is, in Russian, “Дэн Ши-хуа.” A transliteration of the Cyrillic would give “Den 
Shi-khua.” However, if we transliterate between the Palladiia system (for transcribing Chinese into 
Russian) and the pinyin Romanization system, we get “Deng Shi-hua” in pinyin, which fits the 
rendering given by Chinese sources in Chinese characters (“邓世华”). I have decided, however, to 
transliterate directly from Cyrillic, chiefly to indicate that these names are, in the main, 
transliterations that lack originals: it is not usually clear what their respective Chinese characters 
might be, and their rendering in Cyrillic does not always accord with the Palladiia system. This 
coincides with the translational dynamic in Den Shi-khua itself, which claims to be an authoritative 
Russian rendering of a Chinese account that cannot be accessed on its own terms. 
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and most complex Soviet text about China from the 1920s, Den Shi-khua demands serious 
consideration as part of any attempt to define an internationalist aesthetics that coalesced 
around the image of China. What we find, in Den Shi-khua, is that the terms of 
internationalist aesthetics are stretched to the point of collapse. The Soviet power of 
observation is largely abandoned, and the need for dialogue with a knowledgeable Chinese 
intermediary, a “native informant,” is acknowledged. That informant’s true life story, it is 
promised, will provide both the objective knowledge and the affective sympathy necessary 
for internationalist solidarity. Nonetheless, the Soviet interviewer retains the authority to 
shape and mould—to translate, effectively— his student’s life-narrative, and does so in close 
accordance with a vision of history embedded in the Marxist-Leninist analytical perspective. 
This authority is challenged, however, by the book’s ending, which shows the Chinese 
student escaping from his Soviet teacher’s representational control. 
 Tret’iakov began the first published extract of Den Shi-khua with another call for new 
knowledge of China. His language here imagines knowledge as fully corporeal, an effect of 
physical force on the social body: 
We, who are suckling the incalculable Chinese revolution on the black soil of our 
October, feverishly and legitimately force into ourselves any knowledge about 
China, as an anaemic forces syringes of arsenic under his skin.  
Our previous knowledge of China is like a crippled arm. It must first be broken, 
and then re-set correctly.917 
 
Vivid biological, physiological metaphors express the Sino-Soviet relationship in this 
formulation. The Russian revolution feeds and nurtures the Chinese, at once a mother feeding 
a child and the earth nourishing crops; but it can only do so through constant injections of 
information about the object of its nurture and nourishment. Correct knowledge of China is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
917 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Neskol’ko slov,” introduction to “Den Sy-Khua. (Bio-interv’iu.),” Novyi lef 7 
(1927): 14. “Мы, на черноземе нашего Октября, вскармливающие непомерную китайскую 
революцию, лихорадочно и законно вгоняем в себя любое знание о Китае, как малокровный 
вгоняет под кожу шприцы мышьяка. 
Наше прежнее знание Китая похоже на изуродованную руку. Ее надо сперва сломать, а потом 
снова срастить правильно.” 
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something that needs to be forced into the body politic to ensure its proper functioning. Such 
knowledge is not an external tool, to be picked up and put down again as needed, but an arm, 
an incorporated element of the body, and one that must be violently corrected if that body is 
to function healthily. These corporeal metaphors pave the way for a text whose genesis and 
production is supposedly based on contact, on a close human link between the Soviet 
representer of China and the Chinese people themselves. 
  Subtitled a “bio-interview,” Den Shi-khua is presented as the product of an extended 
series of interviews between Sergei Tret'iakov and a former pupil from his Russian class at 
Beijing University. This avowedly factual biography chronicles Den's life as a “road-to-
consciousness” narrative, from rural childhood in Sichuan through progressive political 
awakening as a student in Beijing and, later, Moscow. In the process, Den Shi-khua provides 
extensive ethnographic portrayals of traditional Chinese life, and accounts of crucial political 
events of the early twentieth century, including the 1911 Revolution and the May 4 
Movement of 1917. Tret'iakov claims that this authentic testimony of a Chinese subject will 
provide the true knowledge necessary to heal the USSR's crippled knowledge of China. His 
erstwhile pupil is unable, however, to formulate his life-story himself. The expert mediation 
of his former teacher, Tret'iakov, is required to turn Den's life into useful knowledge. Thus 
another allegory is introduced for the Sino-Soviet relationship: the pupil and the teacher. If 
Soviet Russia needs improved knowledge of China in order to play its nurturing role, it seems 
young, revolutionary China needs the guidance and supervision of its predecessor in order to 
attain self-awareness and enter political adulthood. 
Faced with the demand for necessary and useful knowledge about China, Tret’iakov 
presented his readers with a collaborative autobiography. This choice of genre was very 
much of its time. From its inception, the Soviet state used confessional autobiographies as a 
hermeneutic technique to assess individuals’ internal dispositions towards the revolution. As 
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Peter Holquist notes, class origin alone was insufficient to determine an individual’s purity; 
background had to be combined with an interpretative reading of the individual’s life 
trajectory, the course of which could redeem a negative origin or enact a fall from favourable 
beginnings. 918 In the words of Maksim Gorky, biography became “etched into one’s skin and 
muscles,” an identifying feature on the same order as physical appearance.919 
Autobiographies were collected for the state’s human archive in various forms, from the 
ubiquitous questionnaires that Soviet citizens were obliged to fill out, to the obligatory 
autobiography demanded from subjects of police investigation. For Igal Halfin, the 
Bolsheviks’ use of autobiography amounted to a “Communist hermeneutics of the soul”: 
individuals’ accounts of themselves provided access to their “inner moral disposition,” thus 
enabling the Party to distinguish true revolutionaries from imposters.920 At the same time, 
individual autobiographies took on the form of conversion narratives, recounting the 
individual soul’s passage from darkness to light.921 
This centrality of individual biography to the state’s ethical and administrative system 
permeated the sphere of cultural production. Thus Katerina Clark reads the nascent forms of 
Socialist Realism as coalescing around the basic paradigm of allegorical biography. In early 
exemplars of Socialist Realism such as Gorky’s Mother (Mat’) and Dmitri Furmanov’s 
Chapaev, Clark senses “the informing scheme of human biography that underlies each work 
and has its roots in Marxist-Leninist historiography and revolutionary lore.”922 This 
biographical pattern, Clark concludes, structures a “road to consciousness” master plot that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
918 Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique,” 41–2. 
 
919 Ibid., 42. 
 
920 Igal Halfin, Terror in my Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 7. 
 
921 On the eschatological shape of Marxism-Leninism, see Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light: 
Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).   
 
922 Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel, 44. 
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uses biographical form to enact allegorically the historical progress envisioned by Marxist-
Leninist theory.923 Cristina Vatulescu, in turn, finds the negative mirror image to Clark’s 
positive heroes and their exemplary lives in the biographical form of individual secret police 
files, which gravitate towards standardized trajectories of corruption and betrayal.924  
Tret’iakov’s mediated autobiography of his Chinese student must, I argue, be read 
within this cultural context of biography as a hermeneutic system of political and ethical 
judgement. Tret’iakov claims that his “literature of fact” seeks to explore material processes, 
not interiority: he presents his bio-interview as primarily an ethnographic and historical 
document, whose purpose is to introduce detailed and accurate factual knowledge about 
China into Soviet Russia. But can a text in this form escape the burgeoning political pressure 
on the shape of an individual’s life trajectory? Does Tret’iakov unwittingly, or wittingly, 
become his student’s interrogator? And if the salvational shape of the exemplary biography 
is, as Clark suggests, an allegory for the Marxist-Leninist model of history, can the 
ethnographic and historical elements perhaps be taken as an ethical judgement on the 
revolutionary trajectory of China itself? These are the questions this chapter sets out to 
explore, by examining how Tret’iakov’s claims to the referential truth of his narrative stand 
up against the complexities of the collaborative situation and the shaping pressures of the 
salvational biographical master plot. 
I. The Chinese Road to Consciousness 
What would Clark’s master plot look like, if transposed to China? In fact, 
Tret’iakov’s bio-interview was not the only text from this time that attempted to map out the 
road to consciousness on Chinese territory. A multitude of revolutionary adventure tales 
published in the USSR in the late 1920s and early 1930s, aimed predominantly at younger 
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readers and the newly literate, use biographical narratives as educational allegories to 
represent China's progress into revolutionary modernity. Unlike Den Shi-khua, these other 
texts are fictional. Broadly following Clark’s “road to consciousness” master plot, these 
Chinese tales consistently describe a movement out of the ignorance of tradition towards a 
revolutionary awakening into modernity, focused around the life and, usually, death of a 
young male protagonist.  
This pattern can be found, with slight variations, in such titles as A Coolie’s Revenge, 
Some Remarkable Episodes from the Life of Li-Siao, A Head in a Cage, The Boy from Nan-
fu, The Death of Li-Chan, Lu Sin’s Fourth Bullet, and Rickshaw Driver, all published 
between 1927 and 1931.925 Their “master plot” goes roughly as follows: a male child from 
the country, raised in the limited world of Chinese tradition, is forced by poverty or rebellion 
to enter the world of the town. Typically he is betrayed, either in the village or in the town, 
and sold into industrial or servile labour. In this process of proletarianization, our hero 
encounters a revolutionary who explains to him the true nature of things in China and the 
world. Before 1927 this is often a member of the Nationalist Guomindang; after 1927 it is 
typically a Communist, though this function can also be performed by a newspaper article or 
a slogan on a banner.926 Free at last to concentrate on what really matters, our hero almost 
inevitably dies in the process of fulfilling the work of the revolution, finding himself and his 
place in the class struggle at the moment of death. The “coolie’s revenge” is the organization 	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of a strike, for which the hero is executed by police; “Li-Siao” is shot carrying news of the 
1911 revolution against the Manchus; the “Rickshaw Driver” is mown down by police bullets 
when he finally joins a protest; “Lu Sin” uses his fourth and final bullet to shoot down an 
enemy plane and protect his Red partisan comrades, thus ensuring his own death. 
These narratives of Chinese enlightenment were supposed in turn to enlighten their 
Soviet audience about China. Most were aimed at younger readers, though some appeared 
under the “Doloi negramotnost’” imprint, intended to help the newly literate with language 
acquisition. Soviet culture’s educational drive sought to form a correct revolutionary 
consciousness in its audience. These two groups, the young and the newly literate, were 
prime targets for consciousness formation, which proceeded together with and through the 
acquisition of reading and writing skills. Literacy campaigns, like education in general, were 
“explicitly aimed at inculcating a revolutionary consciousness.”927  
Accordingly, these texts are presented as reliable sources of authentic knowledge 
about contemporary China. Most contain extensive footnotes and are frequently accompanied 
by a glossary of Chinese terms in the back, to aid the reader’s acquaintance with this foreign 
reality. The abundance of cultural detail present in these stories thus acquires a scientific 
gloss: Chinese village life, religious practices, bandit culture and urban semi-coloniality can 
all be presented as objects of knowledge rather than simply an exotic appeal to the reader. 
The need to generate reader engagement can be sensed, however, at the level of genre: these 
Chinese life-narratives mainly take the form of adventure novels, which Evgeny Dobrenko 
identifies as one of the most popular genres among children aged 12–15 in the mid-1920s.928 
Dobrenko adds that the adventure genre’s popularity was much higher among boys than 
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girls.929 And indeed, these texts display a pronounced masculine bias in thematics and 
characterization, continuing the early Soviet cultural trend noted also in The Red Poppy: what 
Eliot Borenstein calls “the triumph of affiliation over family ties.”930 The male Chinese hero 
must leave the familial embrace of the village, the seat of traditional culture, in order to enter 
the adventurous, violent, masculine world of revolutionary modernity. Thus beneath the 
exotic surface of Chinese cultural difference, the Soviet reader could sense the familiar shape 
of the master plot: China was superficially different yet fundamentally organized according 
to the same historical principles. Reading these narratives thus affirmed through fiction the 
commensurable nature of the socio-economic bases beneath varying cultural superstructures, 
the very principle that underpinned the Marxist-Leninist theory of international revolution. 
The ubiquity of violent self-sacrifice in these texts can be traced to the secular 
appropriation of the religious trope of martyrdom by the radical Russian intelligentsia of the 
nineteenth century. Clark notes the importance of martyrdom as a mode of vindicating the 
revolutionary narrative, in which “[d]eath as the supreme sacrifice acts as the ultimate 
sanction.”931 In the production novel of developed socialist realism, however, it is usually a 
subordinate or substitute who dies, while the hero endures, symbolizing the endurance of the 
Soviet state.932 The death of the main character at the moment of political enlightenment in 
these Chinese tales echoes more closely the plot of Gorky’s Mother, a key early text in the 
socialist realist canon. Mother describes the failed revolution of 1905, just as these Chinese 
texts centre around what were, from a Soviet perspective, the failed Chinese revolutions of 
1911 and 1925–7. As with Gorky’s Mother, then, such fictional martyrdoms endowed these 
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historical defeats with a sacred aura that necessitated further struggle and a belief in final 
victory.  
Besides violent sacrifice, the second necessary component is correct guidance. First, 
the false teachers of Chinese tradition must be rejected. Li-Siao's first step towards social 
rebellion comes when, taking the blame for a classmate's error but refusing to submit to 
corporal punishment, he bites his vindictive, opium-addicted teacher on the leg.933 The 
teacher of Galina Serebriakova’s “Rickshaw Driver” instructs the protagonist to empty 
himself of thought, like a horse, in order to pull his rickshaw more efficiently—the inverse of 
the revolutionary call to awakened consciousness.934 Tret’iakov’s own poem for young 
readers, “Li-Yan is Stubborn” (“Li-Ian upriam”), drags its young protagonist through the 
seven typical misfortunes of contemporary China: drought, famine, pitiless landlordism, 
bandit attack, corrupt justice, conscription into a warlord’s army, and wage slavery to foreign 
capital. Each setback is accompanied by a pithy statement from a “teacher,” Wu-chan, urging 
Li Yan to accept misfortune as the natural way of things.935   
In place of these charlatans, new teachers must be found who impart revolutionary 
truth. In several instances, this comes directly from a Soviet source. In Aleksandr Drozdov’s 
Executioner’s Son (Syn palacha), the titular hero, Li, is freed from a life of lonely social 
exclusion by the return of his older brother, Hong Fangseng, who has been fighting with the 
Red Army in Russia. Though Hong is brutally tortured and later executed for his 
revolutionary activity, the novel’s conclusion makes it clear that Li hopes to travel to Russia 
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and study there, thus extending the USSR’s educational role.936 The soldier hero of “The 
Death of Li-Chan,” convinced by a Soviet border guard that war with the USSR is 
unnecessary, instead incites a rebellion in his own camp. In Aleksandr Lebedenko’s Four 
Winds (1929), two Soviet students travel across the Gobi to China, where they foil an 
imperialist plot while educating their new Chinese comrades in the virtues of organization.937 
Lebedenko’s rollicking adventure yarn reverses the defeat of Soviet policy in China, which 
culminated in Borodin’s flight with other Soviet advisers across the Gobi. 
These embodied apostles of the Soviet revolution can guide their Chinese 
counterparts; but it is the Chinese who must provide the life-sacrifices necessary to enable 
their revolution’s birth, the birth of the Chinese revolution from the Russian. Tret’iakov 
introduces his “bio-interview” with metaphors of the Chinese revolution nurtured to life on 
Soviet soil, and steps himself into the role of the positive, Soviet teacher. And indeed, Den 
Shi-khua echoes many features of the revolutionary sacrifice master-plot described above. 
True to the model, an individual’s “road to consciousness” is used to represent the historical 
transformations of the first decades of China’s twentieth century. These similarities are 
offset, however, by a very different claim to referential truth. Ostensibly the product of an 
extended series of interviews, Den Shi-khua is presented to the reader as the authentic life 
story of a historical individual as recorded and “shaped” by his former teacher, Tret’iakov. 
As opposed to the epic story-telling past tense of the fictional texts, Den Shi-khua offers the 
reader a first-person autobiographical narrative told largely in the present tense. The climax 
of revolutionary conversion, sanctified by self-sacrifice, is also notably withheld. 
A brief summary of the plot nonetheless reveals the distinct outlines of a 
revolutionary Bildungsroman. The book’s early chapters, which describe Den’s childhood in 
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a scholarly family in rural Sichuan, are enveloped in traditional culture, expressed through an 
abundance of ethnographic detail. Den’s home and family, their work in the fields, festival 
rituals, and the young boy’s early experiences of traditional education are all described at 
length. Such non-narrative material as farming techniques, folk songs, and Tang poems make 
their way into the text. Modernity is introduced into this rural world by Den’s own father, 
who returns from his studies in Japan to startle the assembled villagers with his European 
clothes and the gramophone he produces from his luggage. Den senior is also politically 
modern. A nationalist revolutionary and member of the Tongmenghui (同盟会), the 
revolutionary alliance founded by Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo in 1905, Den’s father participates in 
the revolution of 1911, described here from a provincial perspective. The death of Den’s 
mother, meanwhile, severs a key emotional link with the traditional world of childhood. 
After his father is arrested and later goes into hiding, Den is sent for his own 
protection to a monastery. As it did for Auslender’s Li-Siao, living with the monks exposes 
their Buddhism to Den as a lazy and mendacious charade.938 But the monastery also becomes 
his “first lesson in socialism.”939 Put to work by the monks, he comes to appreciate the 
hardships of peasant life and understands for the first time that the food he has always 
enjoyed without thinking is produced by human labour. Removal from his own class 
environment thus produces in Den a crucial advance in consciousness. 
The conflict between tradition and modernity is not over, however. Out of the 
monastery and his father out of hiding, Den submits to a traditional wedding. Alienated now 
from the forms of traditional life, he narrates the wedding ceremony as a physical ordeal and 
personal humiliation. His political awakening is instead further galvanized by the student and 
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worker protests initiated on May 4, 1919.940 Next Den heads to Beijing University, 
determined to study literature despite his father’s insistence that he choose engineering. 
Widespread student enthusiasm for anarchism, in particular the writings of Kropotkin and 
Tolstoy, encourages Den to enrol in the Russian section. There his teachers include A. A. Ivin 
and Tret’iakov. Through them, and through professor Li Dazhao, Den is turned away from 
anarchism and towards Marxism. After the violent suppression of demonstrations in 
Shanghai (May 1925) and Beijing (March 1926), Den travels to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-
Sen University, but returns to China on hearing of Chiang Kai-shek’s Shanghai coup in April 
1927. The narrative ends mid-flow: Tret’iakov admits that he does not know where Den is or 
what has become of him. 
The biographical “road to consciousness” narrative can clearly be discerned in the 
shape and direction of this allegorical Chinese life, drawn through education out of the 
childhood of traditional rural innocence, China’s past, into the dynamic, transforming present 
of China’s semi-colonial modernity. Although Den’s first days at school are marked by 
shocked exposure to brutal corporal punishment, it is really his older uncle who fills the role 
of bad teacher, a traditional scholar who writes verses, drinks, smokes opium and despises his 
brother for supporting the nationalist revolution that abolished the system of scholarly ranks. 
The role of positive teacher is meanwhile split among several characters. His father plays a 
key early role, but Den’s own political path takes him ahead of his father’s political focus on 
overthrowing the Manchu Qing dynasty and on to the key issue of ending foreign economic 
domination. (In this, Den typifies a generational change in the priorities of Chinese 
revolutionaries.) Later, his stint in the monastery provides an important series of insights. But 
Den’s education is given crucial new direction at Beijing University when he encounters 
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Marxist professors, including Tret’iakov, and finally makes the connection with Moscow, a 
connection consummated by a pilgrimage. 
Despite being a self-professed experiment in generic form, Den Shi-khua clearly uses 
narrative and thematic elements that overlap with the youth-oriented literary accounts of 
China discussed above. One particularly reminiscent example is Nikolai Zhurakovskii’s 
Wings of Fire (Krylia ognia, 1928), a “novel from the life of Chinese youth” that interweaves 
its characters’ individual biographies with the key historical events in China in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century.941 Two cousins, Hu Shi and Hong Ming, begin the novel 
growing up in a scholarly family surrounded by the simplicity and timelessness of village 
life, described in lengthy ethnographic detail. As the plot progresses and history accelerates, 
they are drawn to the city, the university, and the revolution. Hu Shi’s revolutionary 
consciousness is awakened through his love for Mary Wang, the radical daughter of a rich 
Shanghai family, but he succumbs to tradition in returning to the village for his arranged 
marriage. Hong Ming meanwhile joins the reactionary wing of the Guomindang and 
masterminds their anti-leftist purge, in the course of which Hu Shi is killed. Mary Wang 
marries a coolie, Dzuiu, but is killed during the May 30 massacre of 1925; it is left to Dzuiu 
to pursue the path of consciousness and join the Chinese Communist Party at the novel’s end.  
As with Den Shi-khua, Wings of Fire is packed with ethnographic information on 
various aspects of Chinese culture, and represents major historical events in detail: the May 
Fourth movement, the gain and loss of Beijing by Wu Peifu, the May 30 massacre. 
Zhurakovskii does not shy away from inserting historical characters into his fictional 
narrative; most notably, Dr Sun Yat-sen cures Dzuiu of fever early in the novel and returns 
on his deathbed to give his final testimony, a written letter to the Soviet Union praising Lenin 
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Yuan Shikai both appear, and General Wu Peifu makes a villainous cameo, tempting Hong 
Ming over to the side of reaction. 
Den Shi-khua replaces these somewhat improbable encounters of fictional characters 
and historical personages with what it claims to be factual encounters between historical 
figures, including that of its protagonist and Tret’iakov himself. Thus the two texts, while 
employing the same biographical-educational structure and containing similar ethnographic 
and historical information, make very different claims about their authenticity and authority 
as representations. Indeed, these claims represent the two sides in a crucial and heated debate 
over the literary representation of reality taking place in the Soviet Union at the time. 
Zhurakovskii’s book stands close to the “proletarian realism” promoted by the Russian 
Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP, before 1928 VAPP). RAPP’s theorists argued that 
contemporary literature should represent the “living man”: the contemporary human 
individual represented through realism in his psychological development. This portrayal of 
psychological development would in turn illustrate the development of history, since inner 
and outer were assumed to coincide in their dialectical development: in the words of 
Aleksandr Fadeev, “To portray the ‘living man’ means in the last analysis to show the whole 
historical process of movement and development.”942 Tret’iakov, by contrast, was one of the 
foremost advocates of the “literature of fact” position championed by LEF, which demanded 
that facts drawn from real life should replace the invented stories that had previously formed 
the principle material for literature. Аs Tret’iakov declares in his introduction to Den Shi-
khua, “The invented tale and composed novel are hateful.”943 Any invented character was 
from this perspective an abstraction and dangerous illusion: Tret’iakov insisted that the only 
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acceptable material for literature was attested facts about real people, or as he put it, “the 
living ‘living’ man.”944  
Both these positions based their authority on the claim to be representing authentic 
historical truth. Both Den Shi-khua and Wings of Fire encourage their audience to read these 
individual life-stories as allegories of Chinese society and its real historical development. But 
Zhurakovskii’s characters claim authenticity on the grounds of plausibility, as the kind of 
people who would have lived and acted in those historical circumstances. Tret’iakov presents 
his text as Den’s account of his own life, “formed” by Tret’iakov’s authorial control. This 
produces a tension, however, between that account and its framing: the “documentary” nature 
of the text is asserted in the introduction, then falls largely from view, to be replaced by a 
first-person, present-tense narrative that reads at times much like an autobiographical novel. 
Some critics have suspected Tret’iakov of failing to uphold his documentary 
obligations, slipping at times into the imaginative territory of the novel. Myong Jung-Baek, in 
a 1987 dissertation on “S. Tret’iakov and China,” considers Den Shi-khua a “reportage novel,” 
founded upon a combination of “factual reality as an object and the novel form as an external 
structure,” while the “confessions of the living person Den Shi-khua” provide its 
“content.”945 But Myong also identifies scenes and dialogues that Den could not possibly 
have experienced or recalled in such detail from others’ accounts. These sequences are, 
notably, those closest in pace and content to the historical adventure novels of Tret’iakov’s 
competitors: the revolutionary battles fought by his father and his father’s series of escapes 
from imprisonment.946 Elizabeth Papazian, noting in particular a long and vivid sequence 
where Den’s stepmother contrives a complex plot to spring the father from jail, argues that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Zhivoi ‘zhivoi’ chelovek,” Novyi Lef 7 (1928): 44–5. 
 
945 Myong Jung-Baek, “S. Tret’jakov und China,” 93. 
 
946 Ibid., 98–9. 
	  	   370	  
Den’s eyewitness viewpoint is completely abandoned at such moments, producing “highly 
novelistic moments” organized by a seemingly omniscient narrator.947 And once we have 
accepted the intrusion of authorial imagination into the shaping of these scenes, what is to 
prevent us from suspecting its presence everywhere else? Why should we continue to accept 
the text’s claims to documentary authenticity? 
Perhaps a radically dubious reader, noting these novelistic flights from Den’s eye-
witness perspective, will begin to question whether Tret’iakov has not simply made the 
whole thing up—including Den himself? In fact, Den’s existence is corroborated by other 
historical sources. Another of Tret’iakov’s Beijing students, mentioned in the book, was Cao 
Jinghua, who also studied in Moscow and went on to become a prominent translator and 
professor of Russian literature.948 The Soviet scholar Roman Belousov quotes a letter he 
received from Cao in 1959 that recalls Tret’iakov’s time in Beijing. According to Belousov’s 
account of this letter, Cao claims that Den was indeed a student from Tret’iakov’s class who 
went on to study in Moscow in 1926, but adds that his real name was Gao Shihua. In 1927, 
after Gao had returned to China, another former student arrived in Moscow and advised 
Tret’iakov to change the name, to protect Gao from repercussions in Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-
Bolshevik campaigns.949  
Sure enough, the name “Gao Shihua” appears (alongside Cao Jinghua) in a typed list of 
Tret’iakov’s Beijing students preserved in his archive.950 Also present in Tret’iakov’s archive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
947 Papazian, Manufacturing Truth, 50. 
 
948 For details on Cao’s life and involvement with Russian literature, see Gamsa, Russian Literature in 
China, 76–9. 
 
949 Roman Belousov, “Sergei Tret’iakov o Kitae,” 567. 
 
950 RGALI f. 2886, op. 1, ed. khr. 14. Furthermore, in the extract “Den Shi-khua’s wedding,” 
published separately in 1928, Tret’iakov appears not to have completed his edit: he has the narrator 
lament the fact that his wife has been introduced into his bed merely “so that the squeak of a 
successor to the line of Gao may be heard in the house” (чтобы в доме запищал продолжатель рода 
	  	   371	  
is a photograph that seems to show, through the overlay of three images, three stages in the 
life of a Chinese man: a teenager stands in the centre, with the image of a young child 
overlaid in the top left corner, and the image of an older man’s face overlaid bottom right. On 
the back of this photo-biography is written, in pencilled Cyrillic script, “Den Shi-khua.”951 
The photograph of the teenager also appears, without the overlaid child and man’s face, at the 
head of Agnes Smedley’s review for the New York Herald Tribune of A Chinese Testament, 
the English-language translation of Den Shi-khua published in the USA in 1934. In this 
review Smedley, a left-wing American journalist who spent several years in China and also 
visited Russia, claims to know of Den and indeed vouches for his continued existence after 
the end of Tret’iakov’s narrative.952 
It seems reasonable, taking Cao and Smedley’s testimonies alongside Tret’iakov’s own, 
to accept that a series of interviews really did take place over six months in 1926 between 
Tret’iakov and a Chinese student whom he had taught in Beijing.953 But Tret’iakov’s 
contemporary readers would not have had access to any of this information. Nor would that 
have any way of verifying the degree of authorial manipulation that Tret’iakov exerted on the 
materials gleaned from Den during those meetings. Tret’iakov’s own statements about his 
work would have been their only authority for the authenticity of the information it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Гао). Sergei Tret’iakov, Svad’ba Den Shi-khua (Moscow: izd-vo Rabochaia Moskva, 1928), 56. In 
the full edition of 1930, the name in this passage is changed to Den. 
 
951 RGALI f. 2886 op. 2 ed. khr. 89 l. 1. The image of the child is reproduced in Tret’iakov’s 
collection of China sketches, Chzhungo, where it appears in the chapter “Отцы и дети” (“Fathers and 
Sons”) with the caption: “Богатый китайчонок” (“a rich Chinese child”). Tret’iakov, Chzhungo 
(1927), 64. If the photograph really does represent Den/Gao at three different stages in his life, it is 
possible that it is in Tret’iakov’s archive because it was intended for publication as part of Den Shi-
khua, but was removed for the same reason the protagonist’s name was changed. 
 
952 Agnes Smedley, “The Coming-of-Age of a Chinese Intellectual: An Epoch of Oriental History 
Reflected in an Autobiography,” New York Herald Tribune, June 24, 1934, Section VII (Books). 
 
953 In the unpublished note “Kak ia pisal Dena,” dated 24 June 1934, Tret’iakov states that “Den Shi-
khua and I worked together for half a year, meeting almost every day.” (Мы работали с Дэн Ши-хуа 
полгода, сходясь почти ежедневно.) RGALI f. 2886, op. 1, ed. khr. 22, l. 2. 
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contained. Den Shi-khua is a translation without an original. We can only get at Den through 
Tret’iakov: he has no independent voice outside of the Russian text of Den Shi-khua, no 
opportunity to challenge Tret’iakov’s rendering of his account of himself. Since writing 
(unlike photography or film) is not indexical but symbolic, there is nothing in the substance 
of the text itself to suggest a material connection to an external, historical reality. We must 
take that connection on trust, which is another way of saying that we must be convinced of it, 
convinced of the author’s authority. 
Tret’iakov is thus obliged to conclude with his readers what Philippe Lejeune calls a 
“referential pact.” For Lejeune, any text that claims to refer to an external reality—be it 
scientific, historical, biographical, or autobiographical—concludes, implicitly or explicitly, a 
referential pact with its readers. This pact, on the basis of which the reader assents to accept 
the text’s claims to referential truth, includes “a definition of the field of the real that is 
involved and a statement of the modes and the degree of resemblance to which the text lays 
claim.”954 In the case of historical, scientific, and journalistic texts, these claims can be 
verified by competing external evidence. In the case of autobiography, Lejeune argues that 
the “autobiographical pact” occurs when the reader consents to assume the identity of author, 
narrator and protagonist. But this identity cannot be deduced from or affirmed by anything 
within the text. It is produced by the literary institution of autobiography itself, at the level of 
publication—for example, through the identity of the author’s proper name on the cover and 
the narrator-protagonist’s name in the text.955   
Den Shi-khua does indeed feature its narrator-protagonist’s name on the cover. But its 
status as autobiography is complicated by Tret’iakov’s mediation and the additional questions 
about transmission, translation and authenticity that it raises. Is Den the “real” author, or is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
954 Phillipe Lejeune, “The Autobiographical Pact,” in Lejeune, On Autobiography, ed. Paul John 
Eakin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 22. 
 
955 Ibid., 11–12. 
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Tret’iakov? What’s more, Tret’iakov’s “bio-interview” has no literary institutions behind it 
that might determine the reader’s mode of reading the text as referential. Thus Tret’iakov is 
obliged to conclude what we might term his own “bio-interview pact” with the reader. Like 
Lejeune’s autobiographical pact, this referential pact with the reader is concluded outside the 
limits of the main body of the text, in an introduction, which formulates and asserts the truth 
claims of Den Shi-khua.  
II. Confession and the Production of Truth 
The first thing to say about the introduction is that it is not single but multiple. Den Shi-
khua was first published as a series of extracts in various periodicals from 1927–9, and then 
appeared in complete book form in three different editions in 1930, 1933 and 1935.956 The 
first published extract and all subsequent complete editions are preceded by introductions. 
The introduction to the 1930 edition, dated November 1928, slightly alters and expands the 
original preface to the first extract, printed in Novyi Lef in 1927. Whereas in 1927 Tret’iakov 
pointedly calls Den a “revolutionary,” by 1928 a passage has been added admitting Den’s 
failure to overcome his class background and convert to Communism from the 
“Guomindangism” of his father—a change clearly necessitated by the GMD’s betrayal of the 
Communists in the spring of 1927. At the same time, a new paragraph insists on the typicality 
of Den’s biography for his generation of Chinese intellectuals, including the Communists.957 
The 1933 introduction (dated 1932) offers more historical detail—about events that are by 
now receding into history—and removes the arresting rhetoric about the crippled hand and 
the primacy of the literature of fact. The 1935 introduction (dated to November 1934) keeps 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 Besides the first extract, which appeared in Novyi Lef, extracts from Den Shi-khua were serialized 
in a range of periodicals including Pioner, Rabochaia Moskva, Pionerskaia pravda, Chitatel’ i 
pisatel’, Molodaia gvardiia and Krasnoe studenchestvo. Full editions then appeared in 1930 
(reprinted 1931), 1933, and 1935. In addition, extracts from the book were published as separate 
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publication history, see Tolochinskaia, ed., Russkie sovetskie pisateli, 349, 389. 
 
957 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 4. 
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these changes, adding some observations about the empathetic similarities between Den’s 
childhood and Tret’iakov’s own, and seems deliberately to consign the literature of fact 
argument to the same past as the events of 1927.958  
In other words, there is not one “bio-interview pact,” but several, and they take the 
reader progressively away from the radical literature of fact position proclaimed in 1927. (For 
the 1933 and 1935 editions, the subtitle “bio-interview” was removed from the title page, 
though the term survives as a description of the project within the introductions.) In 1927 the 
writer is hailed as a materialist craftsman, а “‘discoverer of new material,’ who moulds it 
carefully and without distortion.”959 By 1934 he is composing the image of Den through 
psychological empathy, remarking: “Тhe structure of our thoughts and feelings turned out to 
be similar.”960 Papazian interprets these shifts as Tret’iakov’s accommodation with the 
seismic changes in Party literary policy in the early 1930s, namely the institution of Socialist 
Realism and its novelistic hero as the dominant literary form. By 1934, she argues, 
“Tret’iakov practically acknowledges that the hero of Den Shi-khua is a complex, subjective 
creation of an individual author—essentially the hero of a novel.”961  
Despite these changes in emphasis, certain elements of the introduction remain the 
same throughout the various editions from 1927 to 1935. Notably, these consistent elements 
already contain this tension between materialist-productivist and psychological approaches 
that Papazian identifies as the difference between the earlier and later editions. The 
unchanging core of Tret’iakov’s introduction is the description of the division of labour 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
958 Henceforth I will refer to the introductions by the dates affixed to them in the text, rather than by 
the date of edition publication. 
 
959 Tret’iakov, “Den Sy-khua,”14. “Настоящий сегоднящий ремесленник — ‘открыватель нового 
материала,’ бережный, не искажающий формовщик его.” 
 
960 Sergei Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua (Moscow: Sovetskaia literatura, 1935), 3. “Строй мыслей и 
чувств оказался схожим.”  
 
961 Papazian, Manufacturing Truth, 46. 
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between Den and Tret’iakov. First, Den is presented as the “source of raw factual material” 
(сырьевщик фактов), to which Tret’iakov applies his constructive expertise. In 1927 he is 
the “moulder” (формовщик) of this material, while in the 1930s he proclaims “I constructed 
the book out of this raw material” (Я строил книгу из этого сырья).962 This metaphor of 
Den as a reserve of material that his former teacher exploits is later developed more fully: 
“He nobly offered to me the immense depths of his memory. I burrowed into it like a miner, 
sounding, blasting, chipping, sifting, precipitating.”963 Tret’iakov has already described his 
work as “deep drilling” (глубокое бурение), supplementing the surface overview of articles 
and sketches.964 Now he uses this mining metaphor to starkly define the active and passive 
roles in the relationship. Den is figured here as rich but inert material, whose only action is to 
“nobly” open himself to Tret’iakov’s busy, expert penetration. Such industrial analogies are 
to be expected from an advocate of “production art.”965 But there is also a power dynamic at 
work in this metaphor of authorial authority that uncomfortably recalls imperialist models of 
economic domination, of the very kind whose application to China Tret’iakov is ostensibly 
keen to protest. Tret’iakov, the European expert, is needed to transform Den’s rich Chinese 
resources, sadly under-developed, into a product that his Soviet audience can use. 
Abandoning industrial metaphor, Tret’iakov next analogizes the productive relationship 
between himself and Den as a series of discourse situations: “I was by turns investigator, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
962 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua (1935), 3. 
 
963 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 3. “Он блaгородно предоставил мне великолепные недра 





965 In the 1923 article “Whence and Whither,” Tret’iakov asserts that Futurism’s goal had always 
been, “not the creation of new pictures, poems and stories, but the production of the new man, using 
art as one of the instruments in this productive process[.]” Sergei Tret’iakov “Otkuda i kuda? 
Perspektivy futurizma,” Lef 1 (1923): 195. “Итак, не создание новых картин, стихов и повестей, а 
производство нового человека с использованием искусства, как одного из орудий этого 
производства, было компасом футуризма от дней его младенчества.” 
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priest, form-filler, interviewer, interlocutor, psychoanalyst.” (Я был попеременно 
следователем, духовником, анкетщиком, интервьюером, собеседником, 
психоаналитиком.)966 With the exception of “interlocuter” (собеседник), which suggests a 
dialogic situation where both sides have equal authority and involvement, all these roles 
imply a balance of power weighted institutionally towards the listener. In a series of social 
scenarios including criminal justice (investigator/следователь), religious confession 
(priest/духовник), state monitoring (form-filler/анкетщик), and psychoanalytic treatment 
(psychoanalyst/психоаналитик), Tret’iakov stands in the position of the listener invested 
with power, who demands that the speaker produce the truth about himself. At the same time, 
in these discourse situations, the speaker has to externalize his internal truth himself; in 
contrast to the preceding mining analogy, the listener, for all his superior power, cannot 
simply go in and get it.  
The dynamic Tret’iakov describes here is strikingly reminiscent of Michel Foucault’s 
analysis of the confession as a “technology of the self,” a fundamental mechanism of power 
for the production of truth in Western culture.967 From its origins in Christian practice, 
Foucault sees the confession form spreading into such diverse areas of social life as “justice, 
medicine, education, family relations, and love relations,” playing a fundamental role in the 
“procedures of individualization by power.”968 In all these variant spheres of activity, the 
confession as a discursive act retains a distinctive distribution of power: it is “a ritual that 
unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual 
presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the 
confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
966 Tret’iakov, “Den Sy-khua,” 14. 
 
967 The phrase “technology of the self” is from Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the 
Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth,” Political Theory 21, no. 2 (May 1993): 203. 
 
968 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 59. 
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console, and reconcile[.]” This power dynamic is complicated beyond mere domination, 
however, by the fact that the agency for confession nonetheless lies with the speaker, who 
must enact this technology on himself in correlation with the demands of power—indeed, it is 
in this confluence between techniques of coercion and self-fashioning that Foucault locates 
the operation of government.969 The ultimate goal of confession is a transformation of the self 
into alignment with external demands: “the expression alone, independently of its external 
consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, 
redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him 
salvation.”970 
Igal Halfin has recently applied Foucault’s model of the confession as a 
hermeneutical technology of the self to the autobiographies that prospective Party members 
were obliged to compose in the 1920s and 1930s. Halfin argues that Soviet Marxism shares 
with Christianity an eschatological model of history, in which the original Fall from classless 
existence into a exploitative class society was to be redeemed by the final achievement of 
Communism, a task assigned to the messianic class of the proletariat. Within this 
eschatological model, the salvation of the individual depended on their aligning their internal 
self, or soul, with the external truth of History, on attaining a trajectory wherein “the human 
soul moves through time from the darkness of capitalism to the light of communism.”971 But 
salvation, as noted previously, did not depend purely on class origin, as the individual was 
granted free will to approach or abandon the revolution: hence the central significance of 
biography. For Halfin, interiority remains a crucial element in Soviet ethics, and confession 
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970 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 61–2. 
 
971 Halfin, Terror in my Soul, 11.  
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remains the technique that ascertains the degree to which the individual’s inner self 
corresponds to the objective external narrative of eschatological history. 
Salvation in the Soviet context could only be attained through membership of the 
Bolshevik Party, which as the representative of the proletariat played the messianic role in 
history. Thus prospective Party members were expected to recount their own autobiographies 
in order to show the extent to which their internal biographies matched up with or diverged 
from the salvational master narrative: 
The hermeneutics of the soul emerged as a manifest, objectively verifiable way of 
distinguishing true revolutionaries from imposters. The Party had to take the stories 
comrades told about themselves as evidence of their otherwise hidden moral 
character. Because self-introspection was ineluctably linked with self-narration, 
autobiographies, their syntax, their meaning, and the ways in which they were 
publicly interrogated became a crucial component of the Communist hermeneutics 
of the soul. Composing their own detailed life stories, each comrade had to 
understand where he came from, what had brought him into the Party, and what his 
duties were towards the movement.972 
 
The utopian horizon of this narrative is the completely transparent individual, the full 
alignment of inner self and outer world. But for now, individuals remain opaque. Their 
internal souls can only be revealed through the ritual of discourse that is autobiographical 
confession.  
This technology of confessional autobiography extended beyond Party membership 
applications to permeate Soviet society, including institutions of higher education. As 
Hellbeck notes, “Every Soviet citizen who applied to become a university student […] had to 
compose an autobiography.”973 Indeed, Halfin sees students as prime targets for the 
hermeneutic technology of confession, since they were regarded as “undecided souls,” 
divorced from the healthy influence of concrete labour, prone to the corruptions of 
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abstraction.974 The archive of the Sun Yat-Sen University for the Workers of China, where 
Den was studying when the interviews with Tret’iakov took place, is filled with such 
autobiographies. Sadly, I was unable to find Gao Shihua among them, or among the lists of 
students for 1926 and 1927, the years in which, according to Den Shi-khua, Gao attended the 
university.975 But their form recalls the narrative shape of Den Shi-khua, as well as the 
autobiographies analysed by Halfin.  
These files include two forms of biographical information. There are self-composed 
autobiographies, in Chinese or in English, and there are biographical forms that seem to have 
been filled out in collaboration with an official. The students composing their 
autobiographies in 1926 and 1927 were encouraged to include such information as: family’s 
economic status; personal experiences and changes in thought; experience of joining 
organizations and service; reasons for coming to Moscow to study; theoretical attitudes 
towards the revolution; any critical comments; relations with Russian comrades; and history 
of arrest.976 A form (anketa) from 1926 demands similar information: name, gender, date of 
birth, nationality; languages spoken, read and written; place of birth, social status, and social 
origin (i.e. social status of parents); profession and occupation before entering the university; 
marital status and number of children; education, general and political; history of military 
service; social and political organizations joined and dates; experiences of repression; union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
974 Halfin, Terror in my Soul, 29. 
 
975 This task is complicated by the fact that the Chinese students at the university took Russian names, 
and are often listed simply under those names. Clearly a practical measure to aid language acquisition 
and evade the difficulties native Russian speakers might face with pronouncing Chinese names, this 
practice also invokes religious practices of conversion, the assumption of a new name signifying the 
assumption of a new identity, a transformed or alternative self. This notion of renaming as part of the 
process of conversion into Bolshevik culture finds support in some of the choices of name, which 
include Lunacharskii, Karakhan, Liuksemburg, Pisarev, and Frunze. Others, however, chose less 
staunchly Bolshevik aliases, including Dostoevskii and Zamiatin. (RGASPI f. 530, op. 1, ed. khr. 3; 
RGASPI f. 530, op. 1, ed. khr. 13.) Den Shi-khua never mentions an assumed Russian name for its 
protagonist. 
 
976 RGASPI f. 530, op. 2, ed. khr. 6; RGASPI f. 530, op. 2, ed. khr. 23, l. 5. 
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membership and activity; places known in China and abroad; and history of literary 
publications.977 Appended to each form is a characterization (kharakteristika) of the student, 
written by the official who filled out the form. This gives an assessment of the individual’s 
degree of “Marxist preparation” and offers one of a limited range of character assessments: 
“disciplined and self-possessed” (дисциплинированный и выдержанный), “active” 
(активный), “has a strong character” (обладает сильным характером).978  
We can sense in these lists of essential biographical information the outline of the 
narrative trajectory that shapes Den Shi-khua. As Halfin notes, the key elements in a 
student’s autobiography were origin, childhood experiences and socio-political stance of 
parents, and then the experiences that had drawn that individual away from this family origin: 
studies, employment, and political activity.979 This is precisely what Den’s story gives us: his 
childhood and family life, his father’s political activity, his formative experiences in the 
monastery and during the May Fourth movement, and his politicization at Beijing University. 
Furthermore, Tret’iakov’s introduction shows a clear awareness of this autobiographical 
tradition. One of the roles Tret’iakov ascribes to himself is “form-filler” (anketshchik), which 
seems that it could only refer to the official who helps an individual fill out a form, as 
described above. This places Tret’iakov in the position of the official who not only gathers 
biographical information, but also passes judgement on the interviewee’s level of Marxist 
preparation and strength of character. Another designation, “investigator” (sledovatel’), 
carries the darker echo of the police investigator, extracting the confession of a fallen soul. 
Vatelescu argues that the Soviet “secret” police were never interested in secrecy per se, 
seeking instead to produce a “spectacle of secrecy” that enabled awareness of the secret file 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
977 RGASPI f. 530, op. 1, ed. khr. 6, l. 41.  
 
978 RGASPI f. 530, op. 1, ed. khr. 6, l. 42, 60, 61. 
 
979 See the list of topics guiding the autobiographies of students at Sverdlov University, Halfin, Terror 
in my Soul, 44. 
	  	   381	  
and the processes of its formation to permeate Soviet society.980 Tret’iakov openly 
acknowledges the police investigation as a model for his activity; if Vatulescu is right, then 
his contemporary readers, alert to the not-so-hidden presence of the secret police, would 
surely have picked up on such a parallel. 
But what is the purpose of this distinctly confessional situation? For Foucault, the 
confession is about the production of interiority, one of the “procedures of individualization 
by power” that produce subjectivities separated by selfhood from a social world to which 
they are nevertheless bound.981 Halfin in turn claims that the Soviet system’s ideology was 
effectively internalized in its subjects through this imperative to consider and express the 
state and movements of the soul. Interiority, however, is precisely what Tret’iakov declared 
himself to be fighting against. As he argued in his article “Biography of a Thing” (“Biografiia 
veshchi, 1928), Tret’iakov saw the novel’s focus on the subjective experience of a single 
individual as a bourgeois, idealist obfuscation of the material and social nature of human 
reality. “In the novel, the lead character consumes and subjectivizes all of reality,” he claims, 
enabling irrational emotion to triumph “over human intellect, knowledge, and technical-
organizational experience.”982 Tret'iakov claimed that he was seeking to overturn this 
primacy of the internal and emotional over the social and rationally organized by shifting 
attention away from the “world of emotions and experiences” and onto the “world of things 
and processes.”983  
This reorientation towards the material and social reveals what we might call the 
ethnographic purpose of Den Shi-khua. Tret’iakov is constantly pushing Den to look, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
980 Vatulescu, Police Aesthetics, 2. 
 
981 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 59. 
 
982 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Biografiia veshchi,” in Chuzhak, ed., Literatura fakta, 67–8. 
 
983 Ibid., 66. 
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within, but without, to see what surrounds him with fresh eyes as an objective social 
mechanism. Indeed, precisely this lack of attention to internal psychology drew criticism 
from factography’s literary rivals. A review in the RAPP journal Oktiabr’ lambasted 
Tret’iakov for “paying completely insignificant attention to the intellectual and emotional life 
of his hero,” thereby continuing “the typical LEFist tendency of not seeing the person behind 
the things.”984 Here we can sense once more the model of interiority as the seat of truth that 
Halfin borrows from Foucault, and that Tret’iakov seeks to overturn. Tret’iakov’s truth is 
located externally, in objective social relations and processes. In this materialist conception 
of the confession, Den is not an interiority in need of expression, but rather a kind of 
recording device, whose memory-impressions of social life are the raw material from which 
Tret’iakov’s editing produces “truth”, i.e. useful knowledge. Confession and material 
production sit side by side in Tret’iakov’s description of the book’s genesis. He asks his 
reader to believe that he is using the forms of the first to achieve the second, moving 
biography away from the soul and towards the social, away from the novel and towards 
ethnography. 
III. Ethnographic Authority 
Tret’iakov’s ethnographic purpose requires that Den’s life story begin from the fact of 
his cultural difference and specificity. As Tret’iakov describes the beginning of their 
collaboration in his introduction, Den failed at first to understand the ethnographic nature of 
the material he was required to produce: “He greeted my suggestion to write an accurate 
biography of a Chinese student with enthusiasm. But alas, the first words that he uttered 
were: ‘Our family is intelligentsia and petty-bourgeois.’”985 Den/Gao would most likely have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
984 “Bibliografiia: Den Shi-khua,” Oktiabr’ 5–6 (1930): 279.  
 
985 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 3. “Он с энтузиазмом встретил мое предложение написать точную 
биографию китайского студента. Но увы первыми словами, которые он произнес, были: ‘Семья 
наша интеллигентная и мелкобуржуазная’.” 
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filled out a biographical form like the one described above on his arrival at UTK. Such a 
ready answer certainly suggests that he has his form-filling responses prepared, that he has 
formed an understanding of the Soviet system’s autobiographical imperative and is treating 
this bio-interview as an extension of the information collation he has already experienced 
since applying to Sun Yat-sen University and arriving in Moscow. But Tret’iakov’s response 
to this first statement suggests that he has a different conception of what he is doing. He 
rejects it with a despairing “alas” (увы); in the later introductions he explains that such a 
beginning is “lacking in detail and specificity” (неподробно и неконкретно).986 These 
abstract class categories will not do as a beginning; they are insufficiently accurate, and 
insufficiently Chinese. 
Instead, Den’s own narrative begins with a translation and analysis of his proper 
name: 
Меня зовут Дэн Ши-xуа. Я — Ши-хуа из рода Дэн, что в сычанской деревне 
Дэн Цзя-чжень на реке Янцзы. Имя Ши-хуа дал мне при рождении старший 
дядя, вечно пьяненький философ и неудавшийся мандарин. Ши-хуа значит 
«Мир Китая.» Одновременно это обозначает «Светлый цветок.» 
«Мир Китая,» «Светлый цветок» — стрaнные это имена в наши дни, когда в 
Китае война.987 
 
[My name is Den Shi-khua. I am Shi-khua from the line of Den, which hails from 
the Sichuan village of Den Tszia-chzhen’ on the Yangtze river. The name Shi-khua 
was given to me at birth by my uncle, an eternally drunken philosopher and failed 
mandarin. Shi-khua means “China's peace.” At the same time it means “Light 
flower.”  
`“China’s peace,” “Light flower” — these are strange names in our days, when 
there is war in China.] 
 
Lejeune emphasises the importance for autobiography of the proper name, which he sees as 
“linked, by a social convention, to the pledge of responsibility of a real person.”988 But here 
we have not just a proper name, but a translation of a proper name—an opening more suited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
986 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua (1933), 4; Den Shi-khua (1935), 5. 
 
987 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 5.  
 
988 Lejeune, On Autobiography, 11. Emphasis in original. 
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to the mediated responsibility of the bio-interview. Soviet discourse on China in the 1920s 
often used Chinese names as a metonymic illustration of the impossibility of understanding 
China.989 Den Shi-khua announces its intention to dispel this ignorance by tackling the 
Chinese name first, and rendering it understandable through translation. Nonetheless, this 
translation maintains its cultural specificity and difference, not least its apparent capacity for 
double signification.990 Next Den, as narrator, continues his analysis of his name: we learn 
that “khua” is his personal name, while “shi” is his generational name, also held by his sister 
and male cousins, just as “pu” is the generational name of his father and uncles. It is not 
enough, in other words, for Den’s name simply to be given. The kind of pact Tret’iakov 
makes with his readers requires that the name be submitted to a kind of ethnographic 
translation. 
This, then, is our first example of the kind of “detail and concreteness” Tret’iakov 
wants. He begins not from abstract categories, from the universalizing anketa, which moulds 
everyone to the communist master plot, but from a position of culturally specific difference 
and distance, a position that requires a significant degree of translation. Tret’iakov’s purpose 
is ethnographic: the essence of his method as he describes it is to “find in reality an object 
that possesses the maximum number of typical features, analyse it, and demonstrate how 
general laws of development operate in an authentic segment of reality.”991 He wants to use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
989 See for example Vladimir Maiakovskii’s use of Chinese names in his poem “Muscovite China,” 
discussed in Chapter One. 
 
990 Tret’iakov seems to bend his translator’s rights here to suit his narrative purposes. Chinese sources 
I have consulted concur in rendering the Chinese name of Tret’iakov’s hero as 邓世华, Dèng Shìhuá. 
(E.g. Gao Mang, “‘Te Jieke’—Beida de Sulian jiaoshou,” in “Xin ling de jiao chan” [Zhong yang bian 
yi chubanshe, 2005].) One of the meanings of the character 世, shì, is “world”; one of the meanings of 
华, huá, is “China.” The double translation then rests on the fact that the sounds shi and hua could 
also be attached to homophonic characters: 花, huā, means “flower,” though I am not aware of a 
character pronounced shi that could mean “light.” In any case, Den-Tret’iakov perform a translator’s 
sleight of hand by translating 世/shì as “мир/mir,” which can have the meaning “world,” but then 
using the other connotation of “mir,” “peace” (which 世/shì to my knowledge does not have) to make 
the joke about the unsuitability of such a name in a time of war.  
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Den’s biography as an exemplar, a typical life trajectory that can illuminate the experience of 
an entire class within a particular society during a specific historical period. Indeed, at the 
end of his introduction Tret’iakov claims that Den’s biography is so typical for young 
Chinese intellectuals — both revolutionary and reactionary — that Chinese Communists have 
reacted to extracts with total identification: “Yes, that is our childhood, our school days, our 
life” (Да ведь это же наше детство, наша школа, наша жизнь).992 The high degree of 
ethnographic detail that Tret’iakov includes, in the book’s early chapters in particular, is all 
intended to illustrate this typicality of Den’s story for his cultural group. This is why we 
begin with a translation of Den’s name, an unravelling of its Chinese-ness.  
This movement from confession to ethnography does not, however, remove the 
element of salvation. James Clifford has suggested that the entire Western tradition of 
ethnographic writing can be read as an “allegory of salvage,” in which Western science 
preserves through textualization a more innocent, “primitive” culture at the moment of its 
corruption by modernity.993 Tret’iakov’s allegory of salvation works in the opposite 
direction: he seeks through Den’s story to narrate the movement of Chinese culture out of the 
darkness of tradition towards the light of socialist modernity, under the guiding influence of 
Marxist-Leninist scientific knowledge. The scope of Den’s typicality, however, is determined 
by class. Indeed, Den’s narrative follows the trajectory Halfin identifies for intelligentsia 
autobiographies in the 1920s, which began at a greater distance on the “spectrum of purity” 
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992 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 5. This section is missing from the 1927 introduction—perhaps not 
enough Chinese Communists had had time to read it—but retained in 1932 and 1934. 
 
993 James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Allegory,” in Clifford and Marcus, eds, Writing Culture, 109–
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from correct consciousness and thus had further to travel.994 Soviet Russia remains the light; 
Den’s story replays in microcosm the Chinese nationalist intelligentsia’s attraction towards 
that light. 
Tret’iakov is not unique in using an individual life as a metonymic representation of 
an entire group’s cultural experience. The collaborative autobiography of Zheng Yuxiu, 
Memories of Childhood and Revolution (Souvenirs d’enfance et de la revolution, 1920—
translated into Russian in 1929 as Kitaianka Sume-Cheng), also tells the story of a young 
revolutionary intellectual’s education as an allegory of China’s movement into modernity, 
though the end-point in this case is France and democratic liberalism, not Russia and Soviet 
Marxism.995 Lejeune notes the use of such collaborative autobiographies to examine 
working-class lives in Western sociology from the 1920s, and Clifford discusses the 
prominence of the method in post-modern ethnography. Both note the imbalances of power 
inherent in such situations. For Lejeune, this practice amounts to a “vast collective 
transference of memory” that defines the class that does not write as the cumulative Other 
whose lives can now be consumed by the class that both writes and reads.996 Invoking the 
trope of salvation, he insists: “At the same time that it is a form of rescue or help, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
994 Halfin, Terror in my Soul, 28. 
 
995 Zheng Yuxiu (鄭毓秀), also known as Zheng Sumei (鄭蘇梅) or Soumay Tcheng, was the first 
Chinese woman to receive a bachelor’s degree and doctorate in law from the Sorbonne. In a brief 
introduction, B. Van Vorst, the “transcriber” of the narrative, affirms Zheng’s existence by updating 
the reader on her achievements since the events of the main text ended; these include representing 
Chinese women at the Versailles Peace Conference. (Soumay Tcheng, Souvenirs d'enfance et de 
révolution, transcrits par B. Van Vorst [Paris: Payot, 1920].) Zheng later became a judge in the 
Republic of China, and was married to the Chinese ambassador to the USA, Wei Tao-ming. A 
continuation of Zheng’s autobiography in English, entitled My Revolutionary Years: the 
Autobiography of Madame Wei Tao-ming, was published in 1943.  
The 1929 Russian translation Kitaianka Sume-Cheng probably appeared too late to influence 
the composition of Den Shi-khua, if we take the date of the introduction to the first complete edition 
(15 November 1928) as an end-point. Both books appeared in close succession, however, and both 
with covers designed by Aleksandr Rodchenko—a concise illustration of the heightened attention 
paid to China at that time. 
 
996 Lejeune, On Autobiography, 211. 
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intervention is an act of violation or voyeurism, a form of abuse of power.”997 This form of 
textual production creates and maintains what Lejeune dubs an “ethnological gap” between 
the expert who writes and the subject who remembers but does not write, and it is a gap that 
it is in the interests of the expert to preserve.998 For Clifford these collaborations remain 
“fictions of dialogue” in which the “monological authority” of the ethnographer as writer is 
retained, expressed most crucially in the “synecdochic interpretive authority” that allows the 
ethnographer to interpret this life as representative of a whole culture.999 Both analyses echo 
Foucault’s analysis of the confession dynamic: even if the agency to confess is with the 
speaker, authority lies with the listener, who in these cases is also the writer.  
Tret’iakov’s introduction is intended to establish this ethnographic authority, the 
authority both to shape Den’s life-story and to interpret it as typical for his cultural milieu. 
But what qualifies Tret’iakov to exercise this authority? The 1927 and 1928 interviews offer 
little more than the fact of Tret’iakov’s presence in Beijing and the validity of the literature of 
fact as a method. In 1932, greater emphasis is given to the “stock of observations” garnered 
in Beijing that Tret’iakov turned to in shaping the book.1000 The 1934 introduction adds a 
more empathetic form of contextual understanding, a “peculiar call-and-response” between 
Den’s intelligentsia childhood and Tret’iakov’s own in the family of a provincial Russian 
school-teacher.1001 However, the 1933 and 1935 introductions also dwell on the linguistic 
difficulties involved in the processing of Den’s raw material. We are told that Den did not 
speak Russian very well, and often resorted to drawing to try and express his meaning: “Den 	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spoke Russian with difficulty. Not letting the pencil out of his hand, he would draw as he 
narrated: a fireplace, a sword, a bed, a drag-net, a monastery, a flute, a nut. Often he would 
subsequently have to ask someone better informed what the thing in his drawing was called 
in Russian.”1002 In a draft article from 1934 revealingly entitled “How I Wrote Den,” 
Tret’iakov admits that sometimes he was the sketch artist, drawing various things and asking 
Den to choose the image that best suited what he was trying to describe.1003 Communicating 
in Chinese does not seem to have been a viable alternative: although Tret'iakov uses 
occasional Chinese phrases throughout his China texts, his limited linguistic skills and need 
for interpreters are repeatedly emphasised, and there is no indication in Den Shi-khua that 
Chinese was used during the interviews. So we are asked to take this combination of broken 
Russian and sketched images as the source material from which Tret’iakov “formed” the 
narrative text Den Shi-khua, guided by the assistance of his own memories? This might seem 
a tall order; yet the first-person narrative that begins once this introductory frame is over 
proceeds in fluent and grammatically precise Russian.  
The RAPP review of Den Shi-khua in Oktiabr’ drew attention to this problem, 
identifying Den Shi-khua as a kind of “double ‘translation’: from Chinese into bad spoken 
Russian, and from the latter into literary Russian.”1004 This produces, for the anonymous 
reviewer, “a transformation of speech style, which one might expect to characterize Den-Shi-
Khua, but actually constitutes the free creation of Tret’iakov, hiding with excessive and 
harmful modesty behind the back of his documentary object.”1005 The Oktiabr’ reviewer, 	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1004 “Bibliografiia: Den Shi-khua,” 279. It is not inconceivable that Tret’iakov added the section on 
Den’s linguistic limitations to the 1932 introduction in response to this article and similar criticisms. 
 
1005 Ibid.  
	  	   389	  
troubled like Lejeune and Clifford at the imbalance of power in this dialogic relationship, 
argues that Tret’iakov uses his harmful translation practice to suppress Den’s authentic, 
emotional self, glimpses of which can still be obtained from the text. Den, an aspiring writer 
and lover of literature, would surely have written himself differently. “In this sense,” the 
reviewer concludes, “Den-Shi-Khua and Tret’iakov are not co-workers, but rivals.”1006  
In the 1927 introduction, Tret’iakov claims he wants to correct this imbalance, to 
close Lejeune’s ethnological gap. Noting with a Mayakovskian flourish that Den “considered 
the brush of a writer equal to the bayonet of a soldier” (Кисточка писателя казалась ему 
равной штыку солдата), Tret’iakov excuses his incomplete narrative with the hope “that the 
continuation will be written by Den Shi-khua himself” (Я желаю, чтобы это продолжение 
было написано самим Дэн Сы-Хуа).1007 But Den cannot write it yet, he insists, because he 
lacks the ability “to see what surrounds you, to discern the details of your own life” (Видеть 
то, что тебя окружает, разглядеть подробно свою жизнь).1008 Den, narrator and 
protagonist, lacks the estranged perspective on his life that Tret’iakov insists is necessary for 
ethnographic authorship. This is why, in the bio-interview, the author function must be 
fulfilled by Tret’iakov. The unpublished note on “How I Wrote Den” humorously describes 
Tret’iakov asking Den an exhausting number of questions in order to elucidate details that for 
Den are invisible because familiar. Den never thinks to mention the ceiling on his childhood 
bed, nor the ink flowers that his mother drew on his palm so that she could check later 
whether he’d been swimming in the river.1009 These are precisely the kind of details that to an 
inhabitant of the culture appear ordinary, but illustrate its difference to a foreign audience. 
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1007 Tret'iakov, “Den Sy-khua,” 15. 
 
1008 Ibid., 14. 
 
1009 Tret’iakov, “Kak ia pisal Dena,” 2–3. 
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Den has to learn from Tret’iakov which details are worthy of narration and which can be 
omitted. 
Thus Den Shi-khua contains two processes of education, divided, to use the 
terminology of Émile Benveniste as adopted by Lejeune, between the level of utterance and 
the level of enunciation.1010 At the level of utterance, in the text itself, we have the narrative 
of Den’s progressive enlightenment out of the mists of tradition towards modern, and 
ultimately Marxist, forms of social knowledge. At the level of enunciation, in the speech act 
of the series of interviews that produce the book, we have Den receiving practical training 
from Tret’iakov in the methods of the literature of fact. Both these narratives of education 
suggest or even demand allegorical readings. Den’s educational trajectory through life is 
presented to us as ethnographic allegory: a metonymic exemplar of the Chinese 
intelligentsia’s passage into intellectual and political modernity. Den’s training as a 
factographic writer through his work with Tret’iakov, meanwhile, offers a political allegory, 
recalling the work of Soviet political and military advisors such as Mikhail Borodin and 
Vasilii Bliukher with the Guomindang in 1924–27. These allegories of education both 
position China as eager pupil and Soviet Russia as experienced, benevolent teacher. The 
utopian horizon of these allegories, never reached in the text, would be the erasure of this 
pedagogical gap between the two, the moment when Den begins to write his own life.  
IV. Distance: Translation, Naivety and Irony 
Den Shi-khua, then, is shaped by the establishment and gradual reduction of various 
distances. Firstly there is the cultural distance between the reader and Den, established from 
the start by the exploration of his name and the world of his childhood. This distance is both 
established and traversed by the act of translation. In a short note “On Translation,” published 
while work was in progress on Den Shi-khua, Tret’iakov suggests that translating between 	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differing cultural practices of everyday life (byt) tends to produce an exotic, distancing effect 
by estranging the word from its contextual function. “Exoticism,” he argues, “is precisely the 
transmission of the everyday as something unprecedented, its estrangement [ostranenie].”1011 
To avoid this exoticization, the translator should try wherever possible to translate standard, 
everyday terms and items (bytovye standarty) from the foreign language by equivalent 
standards in the target language. “Spasibo,” for example, should not be translated into 
Chinese as “may God save you,” but simply as “thank you”—it is the term’s social 
communicative function, not its semantic content, that needs to be translated. “The 
unconvertible remainder will then be that specificity that distinguishes the cultures.”1012   
This remainder is especially great in situations whose socioeconomic set-ups radically differ, 
for example when dealing with different stages of development: “Council of workers’ 
deputies,” for example, cannot be translated by “guild.”1013 Thus exoticism can be explained 
as temporal distance within a universal stage theory of historical development: two cultures 
that have passed through the same developmental stages will, by this logic, be more 
“translatable” to each other.  
This theory of translation is employed in Den Shi-khua to suggest that China, for all its 
apparent difference, is moving through the same historical stages earlier traversed by Russia. 
In the early chapters, a large number of Chinese terms describing the world of Den’s 
childhood world are given in the original with explanatory Russian translations. We learn that 
“litan” means “prayer hall” (молитвенный зал), that “chu-pu” is the “book of measures” 
(книга метрик), that the “shen’-kan” is the family altar, and that a “ma-gua” is a “shiny 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1011 Sergei Tret’iakov, “O perevode,” Novyi Lef 7 (1928): 41. “Экзотика и есть передача быта 
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1012 Ibid. “Необратимый остаток и будет та специфика, которая различает быты.” 
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black satin vest with long sleeves that cover the hands.”1014 When Den’s grandmother tells a 
fairy-tale, however, it is given as an entirely Russian “skazka,” complete with Baba-yaga 
frightening the children with her wily cannibalism.1015 When Den witnesses a bandit 
execution, the bandits are given the Chinese appelation “tu-fei,” but their leader is an 
“ataman,” calling into comparison the Russian image of the Cossacks.1016 Later, Den’s life in 
the Buddhist monastery combines translated Chinese terms—“si-fu” (translated as 
наставник, spiritual mentor), “ho-shen” (equated to монах, monk)—with terms imported 
directly from the Russian Orthodox tradition: “молитва” (prayer), “богомолцы” (pilgrims), 
“настоятель” (senior priest), “библия” (bible), “монастырь” (monastery).1017 Here the 
critical intention is clear: at the very moment that Den is experiencing his “first lesson in 
socialism,” these lazy, venal Buddhist monks are to be identified with the degenerate priests 
of Bol’shevik propaganda. By translating Chinese byt into the everyday language of pre-
revolutionary Russia, Tret’iakov implies that China, for all its cultural distinctiveness, is 
embarked on the same historical path. Absolute cultural difference is translated into relative 
developmental distance. 
This relative distance is also represented in the educational shape of the bio-narrative 
itself. Beginning in the ignorance and naivety of Den’s childhood, the reader must be kept 
constantly aware of the distance to be travelled before Den can reach Moscow in 1926 and 
begin recounting his story. This distance, which produces what we might call the 
autobiographical irony of the narrative, is emphasised through the naivety given to Den’s 
narrative voice. From the start this voice is strikingly different from the assertive, almost 	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aggressive tone of Tret’iakov’s introduction, with its programmatic statements and jarring 
metaphors. Den’s voice is slower, more gentle, without the agit-prop dynamism of 
Tret’iakov’s journalistic style. The commitment to factuality means that Den’s narrative 
voice is composed largely of simple, factual statements and direct speech. Consistent with the 
programmatic statements in “Biography of a Thing,” there is little in the way of internal 
psychology. This does not mean that Den’s voice is simplistic. It shows a tendency towards 
parataxis, but also indulges in long, languorous poetic phrases.1018 However, in its 
commitment to factuality it possesses a marked earnestness, at times somewhat wooden and 
distinctly humourless. By contrast with Tret’iakov’s interventions in his own voice, which 
bristle with ironic energy and avant-garde playfulness, Den is strikingly sincere, even naive. 
This naivety is crucial: it generates an ironic distance between Den and the reader, a space 
opened up by Tret’iakov’s organizing author in order to encourage a critical perspective on 
Den. The story of education must inevitably begin from a position of relative innocence; but 
the ironic stance produced by the autobiographical frame allows the future overcoming of 
that innocence to be borne always in mind.  
For example, the ironic distance produced by naivety enables the reader to perceive 
the degree to which young Den is enveloped within the conventions of traditional culture. 
The early chapters are saturated with detailed ethnographic descriptions of daily life and 
rituals. Rice farming and mealtimes are related with the same degree of detail as festivals, 
funerals and weddings. Myong calls this a “montage of journalistic reports,” and argues that 
these passages could be detached from Den Shi-khua and understood equally well as free-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1018 For example, the analysis of his name at the beginning of the first chapter is conducted in dry, 
terse phrases. But once we switch to location and a description of native place, the register changes to 
poetic: “I was born in the large Den family home in the depths of January, when the mighty Yangtze, 
shallowed out and blue-tinted as if in sickly emaciation, runs roaring through the ravines of its steep 
Sichuan banks.” (Я родился в большом родовом доме Дэн в январские дни, когда обмелевшая и 
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крутых сычуанских берегов.) Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 5. 
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standing newspaper articles.1019 However, within the text as a whole these passages 
contribute towards the ethnographic allegory of Den’s education by enacting a growing 
critique of traditional daily life, or byt. Byt was one of Tret’iakov’s primary aesthetic and 
ideological enemies. In the article “Whence and Whither?” Tret’iakov dubs byt a “deeply 
reactionary force,” a “structure of feelings and actions that have been automatized through 
repetition in connection with a specific socio-economic base, entering into habit and attaining 
remarkable durability.”1020 Byt can also become objectified in “the form of the things with 
which man surrounds himself, onto which, regardless of their usefulness, he transfers the 
fetishism of his sympathies and memories, until in the end he becomes literally the slave of 
those things.” In place of byt Tret’iakov demands bytie, “dialectically felt reality in the 
process of continuous becoming.”1021 We can perhaps sense here an affinity with 
Shkolvskii’s theory of artistic estrangement (ostranenie), which also seeks to overturn 
automatization and make the human environment newly accessible to cognition. Tret’iakov 
salvational ethnography begins with its subject trapped within this cultural automatization, 
only to show this enveloping unity fracture under the pressure of developing consciousness. 
The hypnotic power of byt and its investment in objects emerge strongly in this early 
description of bedtime at the end of Den’s typical day: 
Out in the courtyard, cicadas ring out the darkness like relentless little bells. 
Squeaking mosquitos cluster in corners. Mama sits beside me, stroking her hand 
over the blanket, and sings a song with no words. I gaze at the fine linen bed-
curtain. It is decorated with plum-tree branches: pink flowers, blue leaves. From the 
wooden ceiling of the bed there hangs a basket of white flowers, i-lai-sian. These 
flowers were odourless during the day, but now, through the knots of the basket, 
they release a fresh, perfumed aroma. 
Above the bed of every Chinese at night hangs a basket of i-lai-sian. 
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Mama’s song mixes with the scent of the i-lai-sian, with the darkness, with the 
cicadas and the distant sound of the Yangtze slipping by. I fall asleep.1022 
 
The cosy security that saturates this passage is produced by a combination of family and 
culture, reinforced by the natural signifiers of place. As he lies drifting towards sleep, his 
attention wanders from his mother’s comforting presence to the signs of typical culture that 
surround his bed. The plum-tree branches drawn on his linen bedcurtain are a stock image of 
East Asian visual culture, and we are explicitly informed in a free-standing line that the 
hanging basket of yelaixiang flowers above the bed connects Den’s experience to that of 
every member of his cultural group.1023 The soothing sound of his mother’s song interweaves 
with this typical scent and familiar local sounds — the cicadas, the Yangtze river — to lull 
young Den to sleep at a homely co-ordinate triply established by nature, family and culture.  
The sleeping child must be awoken, however, from the hypnosis of traditional life. The 
narrative chips away at this total childish naivety in stages. This gradual progress out of 
naivety means that successive ethnographic passages also serve to illustrate the development 
of Den’s relationship towards his society. The chapter on his mother’s funeral describes in 
great detail the coffin, the clothes she wears, the composition of her pillow, and the 
characters written on the tablet beside the coffin. But when Den’s turn comes to read from the 
“Buddhist prayer-book,” this largely visual ethnographic report is interrupted with a 
significant moment in the hero’s progressive disenchantment with religion: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1022 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 30. “Со двора неистовыми бубенцами обзванивают темноту 
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...The good will become happy, and the unhappiness of the evil will know no 
bounds... 
What lies are written in this book! Take Mama – she was good, virtuous, humble, 
yet who could call her life happy? 
I read these words of comfort, do not believe them and cry tears of rage.1024 
 
By the time of Den’s arranged wedding, conducted without his consent and after his May 4 
political awakening, traditional culture has become something that inflicts physical pain on 
the bodies of its victims. His ceremonial shirt and ma-gua rub together “as if made of chain-
mail, rather than silk.”1025 The drummers of the “frenzied” orchestra sound as if they are 
attempting to “mutilate” their drums; fireworks resemble “the clatter of machine guns.”1026 
An endless succession of ceremonial bowing causes Den to almost cry out in pain; “you have 
to be a good athlete,” he remarks with bitter humour, “to survive a game as gruelling as a 
Chinese wedding.”1027 Making the rounds of his guests at the wedding dinner, he compares 
himself, “sick, green, and exhausted,” to the bandits whose execution he witnessed several 
chapters earlier.1028 He ends the night shivering in bed with fever, faintly aware of the 
stranger who is now his wife lying beside him. 
Such passages combine “authentic” ethnographic description with the progressive 
removal of Den from tradition’s clutches. A more ironic attitude is produced by passages 
where the reader senses that Den’s “enlightenment” is misguided or temporary. For example, 
an extended description of the Dragon Boat Festival is interrupted by Den’s proud 
observation that he no longer gets the ceremonial presents designated for small children: as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1024 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 98. “‘...Добрые станут счастливы, а несчастью злых не будет 
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young student, he receives brushes, paper and ink. “I walk about with dignity,” he declares, 
“and scorn the young children with ‘milk on their breath.’”1029 This newfound pride in the 
relative prestige afforded him within the hierarchical structure of traditional society continues 
in the next chapter, “I Go Visiting” (“Khozhu v gosti”). “Ah, how pleased I am with myself!” 
he declares, revelling in his invitation to take tea with the adults. “No jokes, no giggles! My 
answers are considered, my intonations precise. [...] How good it is to be a grown-up!”1030 
The reader reads this line with irony, not only because we know that Den is not yet truly a 
grown-up, but also because we detect the entrenched pride in social position that enables such 
hierarchical systems to reproduce themselves.  
Two chapters later, Den and some classmates are travelling home from school by boat. 
Of the coolies who row their vessel, he says: “We do not notice them, and they interest us 
very little. After all, there is not one son of a coolie among us.”1031 Moving away from the 
pan-Chinese significance of the yelaixiang, we are witnessing the formation of class 
consciousness. As Halfin notes, the individual born into the intelligentsia had further to travel 
to attain correct, proletarian consciousness.1032 Correspondingly, this moment serves to show 
young Den’s distance from the working masses, a distance that begins to be closed during his 
experiences in the monastery. Put to work by the monks, he appreciates for the first time the 
back-breaking nature of the peasant labour he had previously experienced only as an 
observer. Yet at the end of the day, his food is less tasty than it was when he was wealthy and 
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did no work. This is Den’s “first lesson in socialism,” the realization that quantity of work 
and quality of reward do not strictly correlate.1033  
Lessons in socialism intensify once he reaches Beijing University. Here Den, following 
the fashion among his peers, becomes an enthusiast of anarchist ideas, particularly the works 
of Kropotkin and Tolstoy. The young student declares that Bolshevism and anarchism say 
essentially the same thing, and that “Tolstoy is Russia’s most revolutionary writer.”1034 This 
political naivety is dismantled by his first properly Bolshevik teacher, A. A. Ivin (referred to 
in the text under his Chinese name, I Fa-er). Ivin, rubbing his hands with the aptly 
formational attitude of “a cook who has thrown some vegetables into a pot of boiling water 
and is waiting for them to cook,” firmly denies that Tolstoy’s philosophy is revolutionary.1035 
The professor's intervention causes Den to undertake a critical re-reading: 
I pick up “Resurrection,” and read it all the way through again. Turns out the 
Professor was right. Nekhliudov, generously giving away his land to the peasants, is 
a fabrication. Tolstoy is a utopian. That doesn’t happen. The peasants should seize 
the landowners’ land themselves, without waiting for all the landowners to become 
Nekhliudovs.1036  
 
Tolstoy has committed the anti-factographic sin of fabrication (vydumka), representing in 
literature what could never happen in the concrete circumstances of social life. Anarchism 
was frequently dismissed in Bolshevik discourse for just this non-correspondence between 
word and reality: “Except for pretty phrases, anarchists had nothing to say,” concludes one of 
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Halfin’s autobiographers, attracted like Den to anarchism as a temporary wrong turning on 
the road to correct consciousness.1037 Den is learning all the lessons his teacher-interviewer, 
Tret’iakov, would have him learn; indeed, Myong highlights this passage as one moment 
where the voice and worldview of Tret’iakov protrude most blatantly into Den’s narrative.1038  
This ironic attitude towards Den’s narrative of education is enhanced by its complex 
use of the present tense. Rather than situating Den as narrator consistently in the moment of 
enunciation in 1926, recounting his past life to Tret’iakov in the past tense, the use of the 
present tense locates narrator and protagonist together within the time and space of the past 
he is recounting. Constant interventions break this totality of present experience, however, to 
remind the reader of the interview situation established by the framing introduction. Thus, as 
Myong notes, Den is split between a narrating Den, whose perspective is external and 
retrospective, and an experiencing Den, whose experiences each event as if new.1039 Even as 
he narrates his discovery of Tolstoy in present time, the Den of 1926 knows that its 
overturning by Ivin is imminent. For large portions of the text, this split between narrator and 
protagonist is effaced. But there are moments when the narrating Den comes to occupy the 
same ironic attitude towards his experiencing self that the reader is also encouraged to adopt, 
rupturing the narrative’s mimetic transparency and reminding the reader of the specific 
situation of the bio-interview.  
The complexities of this set-up are neatly illustrated in a passage from the second 
chapter, which describes Den’s home life in Sichuan: 
Вот сейчас май, у вас в Москве холодно, над Чистыми  прудами идет снег, а у 
нас в Сычуане хозяйки рвут с желтых гряд и кладут на стол свежие 
огурцы.1040 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1037 Halfin, Terror in my Soul, 68. 
 
1038 Myong, “S. Tret’jakov und China,” 106. 
 
1039 Myong, “S. Tret’jakov und China,” 101. 
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[Now it is May. In your Moscow it is cold, snow is falling on Chistye prudy. But in 
our Sichuan the farmers are tearing fresh cucumbers from their yellow beds and 
setting them on the table.] 
 
The present tense, the deictic “vot” and the temporal marker “seichas” all here indicate the 
narrative time as Den’s childhood and the place as Sichuan. But “u vas” refers to the direct 
speech situation of 1926, indicating Tret’iakov and, by extension, the reader, who in reading 
the text steps into the listener position originally occupied by Tret’iakov. What’s more, Den 
here deploys knowledge of Moscow, its geography and its weather, that his childhood self 
could not possibly have possessed. The closure and smoothness of Den’s narrative is once 
more disrupted. This trick is constantly repeated, in the early chapters in particular. We must 
periodically be reminded in this way of the framing temporality in order to maintain the 
correct, ironic attitude towards Den’s naivety, an attitude that relies on our constant 
awareness of his trajectory towards his eventual destination, the interview with Tret’iakov in 
Moscow. 
The framing situation is further recalled by footnotes from Tret’iakov himself that 
occasionally interrupt the narrative. Some anticipate accusations of the falliability of 
memory. When Den describes an essay that he wrote in school, Tret’iakov interjects that 
Den’s memory may have been affected by the passage of time, as the theme and exposition 
do not seem to coincide.1041 Later Tret’iakov, highlighting his secondary research, corrects 
Den’s dating of a protest to the summer, insisting that other sources put it in January.1042 
Tret’iakov is also capable of criticizing his interviewee’s objectivity, as when he notes that 
Den’s hatred for the man who sought to execute his father allows him to quote an unrealistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1040 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 10. 
 
1041 Ibid., 106. 
 
1042 Ibid., 322. 
	  	   401	  
figure for the productivity of that man’s land.1043 Other footnotes support statements that may 
seem incredible. When Den reports protestors in the post-May Fourth boycotts “crying with 
rage” (“plachut ot zloby”) beside bonfires of Japanese goods, Tret’iakov feels obliged to 
footnote that several other young Chinese have told him of such tears.1044 When Den gives 
the number of guests at his wedding as 1,600, Tret’iakov intervenes to confirm that this 
figure’s credibility has been verified, adding: “I draw attention to this as an aesthetically 
dangerous instance that induces thoughts about fabrication [vydumka].”1045 These footnotes 
pull us out of the immediacy of Den’s narrative, told in its vivid present, and back to the 
interview situation in 1926 Moscow. At one point, Den’s recently deceased mother is 
mentioned, and the footnote tells us that here the narrator’s eyes glistened once more with 
tears.1046 The cumulative effect is that the narrative is not allowed to become transparent; the 
peculiar situation of its composition is constantly recalled, and Tret’iakov’s editorial 
authority over Den’s naïve account is repeatedly asserted. 
Tret’iakov’s strangest interruption, however, is his own appearance in the narrative. 
This appearance employs a small-scale variation on the movement from naivety to 
understanding that we have seen operating in Den’s narrative as a whole. Den declares that 
he has reached his third year in the Russian section, and the students are awaiting the 
appearance of their new professor, “Te Ti-ko,” recently arrived from Moscow. They are 
nervous; they know he speaks “not a word of Chinese,” and they worry they will not be able 
to understand his lectures. Eventually, an “unusually tall bald man” appears in the classroom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1043 Not included in the 1930 edition, this footnote appears in the 1935 text, reprinted in Sergei 
Tret’iakov, Strana-perekrestok: documental’naia proza, ed. T. S. Gomolitskaia-Tret’iakova 
(Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1991), 241. 
 
1044 Ibid., 228. 
 
1045 Ibid., 240. 
 
1046 Ibid., 131. 
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and, after an over-fast start, finds a speaking speed that his students can understand.1047 Soon 
they warm to him, nicknaming his Te Zhu-gan, “Te Bamboo Pole,” in honour of his 
height.1048 
How long before the reader realises “Te Ti-ko” is Tret’iakov? If they do not decode his 
Chinese name straight away, perhaps they will guess by the time he starts telling his students 
about the Wanxiang incident of 1924—the event dramatized in Roar, China!, which had 
played in Moscow by the time Den Shi-khua appeared. Tret’iakov, whose voice has already 
been heard in the introduction and returns in a series of footnotes, here shows himself to the 
reader in almost parodic fashion through the estranged perspective of Den, reciting his 
ideological convictions in comically delayed classroom Russian: 
Рассказывая, Тэ часто начинает торопиться, но тут же, заметив морщины 
напряжения между нашими бровями, одергивает себя. 
— Ни о-дно про-из-ве-де-ние ис-кус-ства не бы-ваьет бес-пар-тий-ным. Каж-
дая ме-ло-дия... непонятно? Песня... музыка... каждый актер, каждая стро-ка, 
всякая кар-ти-на про-де-лы-ва-ет ра-бо-ту... непонятно? Действует.... служит. 
В интересах... на пользу... ка-кого ни-будь клас-са.1049 
 
[When talking, Te often begins to speed up, but as soon as he notices the frowns of 
concentration between our eyebrows, he restrains himself. 
“No ar-tis-tic work can be without party af-fil-i-a-tion. Ev-e-ry me-lo-dy... 
understand? Songs... music... every ac-tor, every line, any pain-ting con-ducts its 
work... understand? acts... serves... in the interests.... to the ad-vantage... of some 
class or oth-er.”] 
 
Here we can sense how the appearance of Te Ti-ko re-enacts, in comic form, the problem of 
communication that was touched on in the introduction and lies at the heart of Den Shi-
khua’s documentary credibility. Te Ti-ko is here to teach his Chinese students, but also to 
learn from them—he takes great interest in their lives, accompanying them to the theatre and 
to demonstrations. But how will the Soviet teacher’s message transcend the cultural divide, 	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1048 Ibid., 336. 
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when events such as Wanxiang seem completely normal to his students, and his height 
encourages them to think he will be martial and short-tempered, like the similarly tall 
Shandongese? In fact, the communication divide is overcome almost as soon as it is 
identified—an acceptable speed of Russian is found, and the students warm to Te Ti-ko’s 
jokes and tales of Moscow. Thus the anxieties that readers might be expected to have about 
Den Shi-khua’s credibility as a translation are here raised precisely in order to be resolved 
within the text.  
 Two chapters later, the ironies develop further when Tret’iakov takes over the 
narration himself—or rather, “Tret’iakov” becomes the narrator of the text that Tret’iakov the 
author is already shaping and writing. This open usurpation by Tret’iakov of a narrative he 
already controls is presented, moreover, as Den’s initiative. Den’s voice returns as quoted 
speech within Tret’iakov’s narrative to announce that, since his professor observed Den’s life 
during the major political events of 1925, he can narrate this period. Tret’iakov even seems to 
gesture to the irony of this account of the power dynamic in their relationship. Pledging to 
talk about Den, he immediately goes on to talk about himself. “Fine,” Tret’iakov-as-narrator 
announces. “Let Den himself be silent, and let Professor Te Ti-ko tell Den’s story.” The next 
paragraph begins: “How is Te Ti-ko formed from the surname Tret’iakov?”1050 What follows 
is, in fact, a parodic re-enactment of the beginning of Den’s narrative. Tret’iakov explains 
that his full name rendered phonetically in Chinese would require eight hieroglyphs, and 
would sound “cumbersome, pretentious, incomprehensible, like the name of a joint-stock 
company.”1051 Instead, three characters are chosen that approximate phonetically his surname 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1050 Ibid., 344. “Ладно. Пусть помолчит сам Дэн, и пусть про Дэна расскажет профессор Тэ Ти-
ко. Как из фамилии Третьяков делается Тэ Ти-ко?” 
 
1051 Ibid. In this jocular use of comparison we sense something of the change of style that marks the 
transition from Den’s narration to Tret’iakov’s. Den, though fond of metaphor, never employs this 
light, humourous touch. His metaphors are poetic and serious, like the long drama on the Shanghai 
massacre that Te Ti-ko suggests could better be replaced by short agit-pieces, possibly with a satirical 
bent. (Ibid., 355.) 
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while keeping within the standard form of Han Chinese names (typically two or three 
characters): 
 Мне опытный китайский книжник подобрал Тэ Ти-ко. В переводе это значит 
— «железо, острый, победить», благозвучно, поэтично, подходяще. 
 Ти-ко — мои имена, Тэ — моя фамилия. Обращаясь ко мне, зовут — Тэ 
сянь-шен (мистер Тэ) или Лао Тэ (господин Тэ).1052 
 
[An experienced Chinese book-lover chose Te Ti-ko for me. In translation it means 
“iron, sharp, conquer”; harmonious, poetic, appropriate. 
Ti-ko is my given name, Te my surname. When people address me, they say Te 
sian’-shen (Mr Te) or Lao Te (Te, sir).] 
 
This clearly echoes the translational act that began Den’s narrative, only in reverse: the 
Russian writer, whose project as a whole is to translate Den into Russian, here explains how 
he was translated into Chinese. Tret’iakov’s decision to insert himself into Den’s narrative as 
a character and then a narrator serves to draw attention once more to the complex 
translational game that lies behind the creation of the text. But in doing so, it highlights with 
playful irony the fact that Tret’iakov has been shaping and translating the narrative all along. 
As much here as at the start, it is Tret’iakov who is in control, rendering these translations on 
his own terms and with his own rhetorical purposes.  
We also see Den from an estranged perspective in the chapters Tret’iakov narrates. Den 
did not catch his eye at first, we are told; he “holds himself aloof, a little cool, completely 
unobstrusive.”1053 When Tret’iakov visits Den’s dormitory in the company of some Russian 
women who examine and touch all his things, Tret’iakov senses in Den’s smile “restrained 
pity, perhaps semi-contemptuous, towards a breed of people who have not been brought up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1052 Ibid. The Sinified version of Tret’iakov’s name given by sources such as Gao Mang is 特捷克, 
Tiě Jiékè. “特/tiě” means “iron”; “捷/jié” means “quick” or “nimble,” which is not far from ostryi in 
the sense of keen or acute; “克/kè” can mean “to subdue” or “to overthrow.” The second syllable as 
Tret’iakov renders it, “ti,” seems somewhat distant from pinyin “jie” or from its Paladiia equivalent, 
“цзе” (“tsze”), though the distance is not insurmountable. 
 
1053 Ibid., 346–47. “Он держится в стороне, суховат, совершенно лишен назойливости.” 
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properly.”1054 Exposing once more the problematics of cross-cultural interaction, these hints 
of aristocratic hauteur also recall earlier intimations of Den’s class-based pride, long since 
submerged in his own narrative beneath nationalist outrage and revolutionary enthusiasm. 
They disrupt the linear progress from traditional child to revolutionary adult, interrupting the 
master plot with residual complications of class allegiance and cultural difference. These 
problems return in the text’s epilogue, where they threaten to undermine the entire edifice of 
authority on which Den Shi-khua is constructed. 
 
 
V. The Limits of Authority 
This estranged perspective on Den is resumed in a “post-script” to the text, where 
Tret’iakov once more takes up the narration. Den’s final chapter, un-numbered and entitled 
simply “Final” (Poslednee), gives his impressions of Moscow in rushed, almost note-like 
form. “My time is running out,” Den explains: the events of April 1927 in Shanghai call him 
back to China.1055 His narrative ends with uncertainty: he knows he must go back to China, 
but “cannot name the date nor hour of departure” (Ни дня, ни часа отъезда я назвать не 
могу).1056 Tret’iakov’s post-script, in turn, begins with waiting, uncertainty, and the slow 
realisation of Den’s absence, once more echoing Den’s own narration in the repetition of the 
double-negative “ni... ni...”: “One day Shi-khua did not come. Nor the next day, nor the day 
after that, nor even a week later. I began to understand that he had left” (Однаждый Ши-хуа 
не пришел. Ни завтра, ни послезaвтра, ни через неделю. Мне стало понятно — он 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1054 Ibid., 347. 
 
1055 Ibid., 386. 
 
1056 Ibid., 389. 
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уехал).1057 Den slips out of the narrative in the chapter break between these two utterances. 
As Tret’iakov remarks in his 1927 introduction, “He left Moscow for China unnoticed and 
without a sound, just as he used to enter my room in Beijing without a sound, stepping softly 
on his cloth shoes[.]”1058 Den’s final utterance serves, meanwhile, as one last proof of his 
naivety. Tret’iakov reports that Den considered Wang Jingwei the last GMD leader that could 
be trusted, and claimed to believe in him “like a father.”1059 Tret’iakov adds laconically that 
Wang betrayed the revolution sixty days after Den left Moscow. 
The final word, meanwhile, goes unexpectedly to Tin Iuin-pin (Ting Yunping), another 
of Tret’iakov’s students from Beijing. Tin’s story, itself a road-to-consciousness biography in 
miniature, was told in the chapters narrated from Tret’iakov’s perspective. A shy, nervous 
student, driven into hysterical fever at Sun Yat-sen’s funeral, he emerged from sickness as an 
uncompromising Communist, banging on tables with a large pole to carry his point in 
meetings. Tin’s status as “reforged” socialist hero is confirmed on his reappearance: “This is 
Tin Iuin-pin. His story is a complex tale of campaigns, camps, escapes, conspiracies. A man 
who has been thoroughly flattened out in the rollers of wars and uprisings. He is calm, his 
shoulders have broadened, his speech is assured.”1060 The central section of this post-script 
thus becomes a sort of mini-bio-interview with Tin, in which he recounts his eyewitness 
knowledge of the last days of executed CCP leader Li Dazhao, and sketches out the current 
situation in his home province of Hunan. Den’s status as the sole provider of “raw material,” 
the only prism through which to view China, is hereby disrupted by the intrusion of another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1057 Ibid., 390.  
 
1058 Tret’iakov, “Den Sy-khua,” 15. “Он уехал из Москвы в Китай так же незаметно и бесшумно, 
как бесшумно входил в Пекине в мою комнату, мягко ступая матерчатыми туфлями[.]” 
 
1059 Tret’iakov, Den Shi-khua, 390. 
 
1060 Ibid. “Это Тин Юин-пин. Его рассказ — сложная повесть о походах, лагерях, бегствах, 
конспирациях. Человека хорошо раскатало в вальцах войн и восстаний. Он спокоен, плечи его 
развернулись, голос уверен.” 
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authority. Indeed, the credits to the 1930 edition list Tin Iuin-pin below Den Shi-khua as 
responsible for “factual material” (фактический материал).1061 
Most strikingly, Tin provides an alternative perspective on Den, one that throws into 
disarray the entire system of authority on which Den Shi-khua has been constructed. Tin’s 
first recollection of his friend disparages his political credentials: “He had no interest in 
politics. He loved art. He set up a dance group and danced very well himself.”1062 This charge 
is not in itself new: Den himself reports in his final chapter how the “political” students at 
Sun Yat-sen University would mock him and his fellow “literati” for turning to the cultural 
sections of the newspaper before the section on foreign affairs.1063 Tret’iakov’s reaction, 
however, suggests a nervous awareness of the limitations of his bio-interview technique: “But 
why didn’t he say a word to me about this?” Tin replies: “He was ashamed to admit to such 
trifling pursuits: a revolutionary, and suddenly, dancing?”1064 This revelation was anticipated 
in a letter from Den asking Tret’iakov to find the students a Russian dance instructor. There, 
Den claimed he was not a dance enthusiast, that he was asking on behalf of some female 
students; but Tret’iakov added a footnote to warn us that “here Den Shi-khua sinned against 
truth, as the reader will see in due course.”1065 The example used to open the issue of Den’s 
mendacity is comic, in other words; but it opens a huge crack in the authority on which the 
text is founded. What else might Den have lied about, in order to convince Tret’iakov of his 
credibility as a “revolutionary”?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1061 Ibid., 2. 
 
1062 Ibid., 391. “— Его не интересовала политика. Он любил искусство. Он создал танцовальный 
кружок и хорошо танцовал.” 
1063 Ibid., 386. 
 
1064 Ibid., 391. “— Но почему он мне ни слова не сказал об этом? — Ему стыдно было 
признаваться в таких пустяках: революционер, и вдруг — танцы.” 
 
1065 Ibid, 341. 
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Tin goes on to give a brief portrait of Den, in a manner described by Tret’iakov as 
“friendly” yet “patronizing,” the judgement of a party member on a non-party member: “Den 
is an anarchist intellectual. Modest. Generous. Blunt. Direct. Short-tempered. Unmercenary. 
For him, the person is more important than the deed. Anyone grubby getting into the party 
can spoil the whole party in his eyes.”1066  This assessment seems to overturn the linear 
narrative of naivety-become-understanding that shaped Den’s narrative as “formed” by 
Tret’iakov, which consigned Den’s anarchism to a brief phase overturned by correct 
Bolshevik instruction. That narrative ended with Den as a committed revolutionary, returning 
to China in outrage at Chiang’s coup. Tin’s portrait suggests instead an intellectual idealist, 
“aloof” as he was through Tret’iakov’s classroom eyes. Myong’s suggestions that Den’s 
condemnation of Tolstoy, or socialist conversion in the monastery, sound too much like the 
direct voice of Tret’iakov, now take on a disturbing second possibility: perhaps Den was 
simply parroting Tret’iakov’s own lectures back to him? The possibility is even raised, 
though dismissed by Tin, that Den might betray the revolution and turn against the 
Communists. 
 Seeking to reassert some authority by proving his understanding of his bio-subject, 
Tret’iakov suggests this aloofness may have biographical origins: “But perhaps this mistrust 
was formed by personal experience. Den is lonely. He loves nobody.” “Not true,” Tin shoots 
back. “He has a fiancée, his third cousin... an artist... wealthy... in Beijing... She used to stay 
in his room, and on those occasions he would not unbolt the door straight away when you 
knocked.”1067 Who is this cousin-bride? Not, it seems, the woman he was forced to marry, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1066 Ibid., 391. “— Дэн — анархический интеллигент. Скромен. Щедр. Резок. Прям. 
Вспыхивает. Бессребреник. Для него человек выше дела. Один чумазый, попавший в партию, 
может всю эту партию опорочить в его глазах.” 
 
1067 Ibid. “— Но, может быть, недоверчивость сложилась на личной почве. Дэн одинок. Он 
никого не любит. — Неверно. У него есть невеста, его троюродная сестра... художница... 
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and later divorced; nor the childhood sweetheart whom he lost because his father 
disapproved. This seems to be a relationship that took place while Den was a student in 
Beijing: a period he recounts in detail, but with no mention of a new fiancée. Indeed, in the 
chapter entitled “Wife,” the voice of Den as present narrator flatly claims that “even now it 
seems to me that I have never loved any woman, nor has any woman ever loved me.”1068 
Tret’iakov’s ignorance of this fact suddenly throws the reader’s sense of Den’s naivety, 
which has been steadily nurtured by the text from its earliest pages, into doubt: what if Den is 
not so naive? What if he is the one who has been stringing Tret’iakov along, telling him what 
he thinks he wants to hear? Perhaps the aspiring writer has matured faster than his teacher 
thought, and composed for Tret’iakov’s ears a thoroughly credible fiction on the theme of 
“the education of a young Chinese revolutionary”? Indeed, Tret’iakov’s unpublished note on 
“How I Wrote Den” comments retrospectively that in speaking of his romantic life, “Den 
heroicized himself by portraying a man whose capacity to love had been mercilessly stamped 
out by his environment. But this was not true.”1069 Tret’iakov seems to concede after the fact 
that authorship may not have been all his, that Den was perhaps already writing Den all 
along. 
Tin’s brief intervention strongly suggests that Den has not told Tret’iakov everything. 
Accordingly, the post-script ends in total ignorance. Tret’iakov has heard nothing from Den, 
does not know where he is, and can only offer suggestions. Perhaps he is publishing, perhaps 
teaching, perhaps working as a clerk for General Feng Yuxiang. But perhaps, Tret’iakov 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
богатая... в Пекине... Она бывала у него в комнате, и в эти разы на стук он двери отпирал не 
сразу.” 
 
1068 Ibid., 259. “даже сейчас мне кажется, что никогда не любил я ни одной женщины, ни 
женщины меня.” 
 
1069 Tret’iakov, “Kak ia pisal Dena,” 4. “Рассказывая мне о своих брачных и любовных делах, Дэн 
себя героизировал изображая человеком, у которого среда бесжалостно растоптала его 
способность полюбить. А это было неверно.” 
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suggests with what seems now a more transparent attempt at wish-fulfilment, he has become 
a Communist and is raising partisan troops in Hunan and Jiangxi, the Red enclaves of 
southern China. Or perhaps, again, he has fallen already to the reaction: the final image of the 
book imagines Den’s severed head hanging “with unblinking gaze” in a bamboo cage on a 
Chinese market square.1070 Thus Tret’iakov’s ending manages to invoke the heroic death that 
concluded the revolutionary sacrifice narratives, but as only one of many possibilities, from a 
position of ignorance. A text whose set-up and execution seems to assert the authority of the 
Soviet teacher-confessor, his power to shape and translate the life-story of his Chinese pupil, 
ends by exposing the limits of that authority. It is not that Den’s “true voice” comes through; 
more that Tret’iakov’s monological translation of a dialogical situation concludes by 
undermining itself. Den, rather than being translated seamlessly into the language and 
ideological framework of his confessor, slips from view into a discursive space of 
speculations and conflicting perspectives.  
In fact, Tret’iakov’s conclusion restores to Den the interiority that his introduction’s 
reworking of the confessional situation sought to expunge. The essence of confession as a 
technology of the self is that it necessitates the existence of a concealed interiority that can 
only be evaluated and controlled by bringing it to the surface through verbalization. 
Tret’iakov’s extraction metaphors sought to repudiate this psychological model, in part 
through a change in agency. Den was the holder of raw material, whose only action was to 
“open” the depths of his memory to Tret’iakov. The latter then took on all the agency of 
selection and evaluation—presumably by asking directed questions, metaphorized as 
choosing sites for drilling, boring, etc. This is fundamentally different from the confession 
scenario, where the confessing subject is responsible for bringing information up from the 
depths—only once the confessing subject has chosen to present something can the confessor 
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evaluate it, and the confessing subject may choose to be selective, to conceal. (Confession 
under duress only proves this point: if the subject of confession were not capable of 
concealment, torture would never be necessary.) Tret’iakov’s metaphor of his working 
relationship with Den suggests that, once Den has taken the decision to “open his memory,” 
he is deprived of agency, powerless to select what he will reveal and conceal from his master-
moulder.  
But the conclusion overturns this metaphor of their relationship, opening for the reader 
the possibility that Den has, in fact, concealed information. At the final moment, the 
interiority that Tret’iakov seemed so keen to dismantle is hereby restored. As Joseph Brodsky 
commented when writing autobiographically of his own education, “The real history of 
consciousness starts with one’s first lie.”1071 Den’s concealment suggests the assertion of his 
own consciousness in creative activity, against the prescriptive demands of his Soviet 
teacher. It seems that Den has in fact already taken over, as Tret’iakov avowedly hoped he 
would, the composition of his own self-image. The practical training given to Deng has been 
turned against his Soviet teacher, just as the Guomindang turned on the Communists with 
military resources and training acquired from the Comintern. 
There is a darker element to this disorienting conclusion, however. Tin’s intervention 
echoes the unmasking of false autobiographies as described by Halfin. Autobiographies were 
reviewed before a panel of judges, who often supplemented the information contained in the 
autobiography with the testimony of acquaintances of the individual in question. Such 
testimony could undermine an individual’s attempt at self-presentation, revealing a sinister 
non-transparency.1072 From this perspective, with Tin providing destabilizing evidence and 
the reader sitting in the position of judge, Den’s elusiveness becomes downright suspicious. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1071 Joseph Brodsky, Less Than One: Selected Essays (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1986), 7. 
 
1072 Halfin, Terror in my Soul, 59–63. 
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Here we must recall historical context. When Tret’iakov began work with Gao in 1926, the 
Guomindang were seen as Soviet allies and the best hope for socialist revolution in China. By 
the time he comes to write the conclusion, dated 17 January 1929, the Guomindang under 
Chiang Kai-shek was a traitor and an enemy. The valency of Den’s biography has changed; 
he now represents a class that cannot entirely be trusted. We might even detect here a faint 
evocation, as Tret’iakov admits defeat over China and over Den, of the old exoticist 
metaphor of the “inscrutable Oriental.” The “real” Den retreats back to China and back into 
the opaque depths of his now absent self, guarding his authentic inner truth from his Soviet 
confessor.  
 Updating Tret’iakov’s open conclusion in her review of the American translation, 
Agnes Smedley claims to know what happened to Den:  
No, Tan, did not become a Communist. When I left China last year, Tan—that is 
not his real name—was editing a Peking newspaper in defence of the Chinese 
militarist, Feng Yu-hsiang. While many intellectuals did become Communists and 
are fighting with the workers’ and peasants’ Red Army in interior China, Tan 
remained among the confused, unclear groups of intellectuals who seem willing to 
act as spokesmen and apologists for any bandit militarist who sets up his own 
government.1073  
 
Tret’iakov’s speculations were not far off the mark: Den is publishing, and working for Feng 
Yuxiang. Den remains, in his mendacity and elusiveness, a decent metonym for the Chinese 
intelligentsia that slipped away from Soviet Russia, leaving only a few dedicated 
Communists fighting in the countryside or hiding in Moscow. Tret’iakov will not interfere 
with reality to the extent of giving Den the “necessary,” mythical ending of the sacrifice 
narrative. Indeed, his factographic method finds validation in the text’s very incompleteness: 
facts are always partial and should be cross-checked with other sources, rendering the 
literature of fact an open, on-going process. The allegory of history it produces operates in a 
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less heroic tone: the metaphorical triumph of confession over extraction ultimately expresses 
the limitations of Soviet power to shape the Chinese revolution of the 1920s. 
Den Shi-khua begins as an expression of the hegemonic ambitions of Soviet 
internationalist aesthetics, claiming for itself the authority to shape Den’s fragmented 
evidence into an authentic life story, to translate his life into literary Russian and, in the 
process, discern its true meaning. The book ends by exposing the limits of those ambitions, 
leaving Tret’iakov, who once yelled on behalf of the Chinese, reduced to confused ignorance 
as his Chinese informants take over the narration of their own and each other’s lives. None of 
the tools through which the authority of the Soviet perspective on China was earlier 
asserted—his periods of presence and observation in Beijing, his first-hand bodily experience 
of revolution, his sympathy, his grasp of Marxist doctrine——can help Tret’iakov to fix Den 
as an object of knowledge. Ultimately, for all that Den’s own account remains inaccessible 
behind the mediation of his former teacher, Den Shi-khua retains the impression of its 
dialogic origins, declining to resolve into a single authorized truth. Tret’iakov and Den’s bio-
interview suggests that a truly inter-nationalist aesthetics, one founded on dialogue across 
cultures rather than the decisive authority of the Soviet position, must necessarily be open-
ended and incomplete, a competing interplay of narratives instead of a decisive master plot. 
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Epilogue 
Abandoning Internationalist Aesthetics? 
 
 When the last edition of Den Shi-khua appeared in 1935, the events of 1927 were 
almost a decade in the past. The Guomindang government of Chiang Kai-shek still controlled 
China; their enemies the Chinese Communists had been forced to undertake the Long March 
to the north-west in order to evade destruction. In the Soviet Union, the authority of Stalin, 
cemented in the expulsion of the Left Opposition after the China disputes of 1927, remained 
uncontested. In the sphere of cultural production, the doctrine of Socialist Realism, with its 
promotion of the novel form and the positive hero, had relegated the literature of fact to 
redundancy and suspicion. As we saw in the previous chapter, Papazian reads Tret’ikaov’s 
1935 introduction to Den Shi-khua, the longest and most complex work in the literature of 
fact, as an accommodation with these new realities of cultural politics. 
 Though contact between the CCP and the Comintern endured, Soviet influence in 
China was negligible compared to the heights of the mid-1920s (those heights would be 
regained in the 1950s, after the Communist victory in China, only to be lost again following 
the Sino-Soviet split). The Soviet and Guomindang governments, meanwhile, found common 
cause in their opposition to Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, but were not prepared to 
take this as far as formal alliance.1074 Correspondingly, China’s presence in the Soviet 
mediasphere was greatly reduced by 1935, compared to ten years previously. Pravda’s digital 
archive records 384 mentions of China in that year, less than half the total for 1927.1075 There 
were no high-profile writers or film-makers travelling to China to represent the coming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1074 Katerina Clark suggests that the visit of Mei Lanfang, discussed below, was an attempt to 
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Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931–1941 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 193. 
 
1075 Pravda Digital Archive, accessed 24 February, 2014 via Columbia University Library Services: 
http://dlib.eastview.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/browse/publication/9305. 
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revolution, no hit shows or hyped films asking audiences to imagine and reimagine their huge 
neighbour in East Asia. The traffic of Soviet observers to China appeared to have stopped. 
 There was, however, one famous item of traffic in the other direction. In March 1935, 
the acclaimed Chinese actor Mei Lanfang made a famous trip to Moscow, giving a series of 
performances. Sergei Tret’iakov, as an old Soviet “China hand,” was among the meeting 
party, and published several articles in the Soviet press praising Mei’s art.1076 Sergei 
Eisenstein tried to film Mei at work, and wrote an article, “The Magician of the Pear 
Orchard” (“Charodei grushevogo sada”) on the significance of Chinese theater’s art of 
images for Soviet artistic production. Bertold Brecht was also in the Moscow audience; the 
experience led him to expound the concept of Verfremdungs-effekte or “estrangement effect” 
in his 1936 article “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting.”1077 Other famous Soviet and 
European theatre directors attending Mei’s performances included Vsevolod Meyerhold, 
Konstantin Stanislavsky, Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko, Aleksandr Tairov, Gordon Craig 
and Erwin Piscator.1078 
 Much has been written about this famous and productive instance of trans-cultural 
contact. Haun Saussy reads the encounter to reveal the simultaneous coexistence of 
incommensurable modernisms, each of which relies on a foreign cultural influence to subvert 
or reject a local tradition. For the Soviet avant-garde, Saussy suggests, Mei’s art offered a 	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1935; “Polmilliarda zritelei. K gastroliam Mei Lan'-fana v SSSR,” Literaturnaia gazeta, March 15, 
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1077 As Haun Saussy observes via Janne Risum, Verfremdung translates more accurately not as 
“alienation” but as “estrangement,” thereby indicating Brecht’s double indebtedness to Moscow: to 
Mei Lanfang, and to Viktor Shklovskii’s Formalist concept of ostranenie. Janne Risum, “Brechts 
‘kinesiske’ Verfremdung: Hvordan og hvorfor” (Brechťs ‘Chinese’ V-effect: how and why), in 
SceneSkift: det 20. Ärhundredes teater i Europa, ed. Alette Scaveniuis and Stig Jarl (Copenhagen: 
Multivers), 198. Quoted in Haun Saussy, “Mei Lanfang in Moscow, 1935: Familiar, Unfamiliar, 
Defamiliar,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 18, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 9. 
 
1078 This list is taken from Lars Kleburg, “Zhivye impul'sy iskusstva,” Iskusstvo kino 1 (1992): 132. 
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covert opportunity to return to questions of form and composition that had been rendered 
taboo by Socialist Realism’s mimetic fixation.1079 For Brecht, Chinese acting suggested a 
mode for disrupting and critiquing bourgeois culture. Radical Chinese intellectuals, by 
contrast, rejected Mei’s brand of theatre as false and illusory, precisely in the name of a 
realism influenced by imported Western models.1080  
 Katerina Clark analyses Mei’s visit as a key example of what she calls the “Great 
Appropriation,” the multi-faceted attempt in the 1930s to position Soviet culture as the 
inheritor and culmination of all the positive cultural achievements of world history. In the 
context of this attempt to enshrine Moscow as the new capital of world culture, she suggests, 
Soviet cultural practitioners were willing to overlook the politically negative elements in 
Beijing opera—its feudal origins, its linguistic distance from the vernacular, its banning of 
women from the stage—for the sake of “potentially appropriating for Soviet culture a 
venerable tradition with centuries-old pedigree.”1081 At the same time, Clark concurs that 
these Soviet intellectuals used Mei’s visit to launch covert critiques of Stalinist cultural 
politics. In particular, she suggests, Eisenstein’s “Magician of the Pear Orchard” article 
identifies in Chinese culture a certain fluidity in the relationship between sign and meaning, 
thereby implicitly opposing the one-to-one correlation between text and meaning on which 
the authority of Stalinist culture depended.1082 The power of these signs, including the 
conventional gestures of Mei’s art, depend for Eisenstein on repetition, and hence on 
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1080 Saussy, “Mei Lanfang in Moscow,” 8–29. 
 
1081 Clark, Moscow, 194. 
 
1082 Ibid., 199–205. 
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memory: it is the power of “deep historical memory” that, for Clark, Eisenstein finds voiced 
in the Chinese mode of expression that Mei represents.1083 
Both Saussy and Clark concur that avant-garde figures such as Tret’iakov and 
Eisenstein sought used Mei’s visit to strike a blow for the importance of conventionalism 
(uslovnost’) in theatre, the open acknowledgement of theatrical device advocated in the 
writings of the early Meyerhold, as against the naturalist school of Stanislavsky, whose 
premises were newly endorsed by the mimetic demands of socialist realism.1084 However, the 
conventionalism that these Soviet theatre artists praise in Mei’s performance, a performance 
they take as representative of “Chinese theatre,” is an organic conventionalism, one that has 
not mechanically been imposed or intellectually conjured up, but has developed over 
centuries of refinement. At the round-table discussion, A. Tairov describes the Chinese 
theatre he sees exemplified in Mei’s performance as a “synthetic theatre” that has developed 
from “folk origins” and is entirely “organic.”1085 Eisenstein praises the “vivifying, organic 
quality” (живительность и органичность) of Chinese theatre in contrast to the more 
“mechanical” Japanese theatre, introducing here for analogy the relation between Greek and 
Roman drama.1086  Culture here is not a machine, as productivists like the early Tret’iakov 
might have insisted; nor is it a false layer imposed on an exploitative socio-economic reality, 
as a Leninist argument might have claimed. Culture is an organism, and the power of cultural 
forms is drawn from the depths of their roots.  
Tret’iakov’s reaction is particularly striking, given the unstinting antagonism towards 
traditional Chinese culture that runs through his texts from the mid-1920s. Tret’iakov’s 
articles from that earlier time criticized traditional Chinese theatre as a form of “aesthetic 	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1085 Kleberg, “Zhivyi impul’sy,” 133-34. 
 
1086 Ibid., 135. 
	  	   418	  
narcosis”: a spectacle, functionally equivalent to religion in European societies, that rendered 
the population docile while enforcing feudal morality and class relations.1087 Notably, the age 
and popularity of the tradition both contributed in Tret’iakov’s analysis to the hold of this 
harmful aesthetic illusion: because the spectators knew every moment in the repertoire, there 
was no call for new plays or formal innovations, and performances were evaluated purely for 
their aesthetic qualities.1088 From a factographic perspective, this amounts to what Fore calls 
a “representational metaphysics,” a sealed system of representation that enables perception to 
become automatized, concealing the constructedness of the art form and its functions in the 
social world.1089 Such theatrical performances, Tret’iakov observes, had no connection to 
contemporary, everyday Chinese life: the same shopkeeper could curse the modern-day 
general whose soldiers robbed him, and then cheer the character of “The General” in the 
theatre that same day, without making any link between the two experiences.1090  
The one innovator Tret’akov mentions in these earlier articles is, in fact, Mei 
Lanfang, whom he credits with introducing a langorous new form of singing. (As Saussy 
confirms, Mei, greeted in 1930s Moscow as a representative of an ancient art, was regarded 
in China as an innovator.)1091 But this is not greeted as progress; instead, Tret’iakov 
expresses the hope that Mei’s innovations are merely a stylization that amount to “a sign of 
the death of the national [narodnyi] theatre.”1092 Tret’iakov in the mid-20s wants to de-sinify 
(raskitait’) Chinese theatre, but fears that its roots are too deep to be removed; his hopes lie 	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1088 Tret’iakov, “Teatr,” in Chzhungo (1927), 94. 
 
1089 Fore, “All the Graphs,” 50. 
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instead with the cinema, where foreign, including potentially Soviet, influence can penetrate 
more easily.1093 
While Chinese theatre’s negative class origins of Chinese theatre and its equation to 
religion are still acknowledged in 1935, they are now less significant for Tret’iakov than its 
sheer mass popularity, a quality that instils this art form with national meaning.1094 This 
popular power is a direct result of the antiquity of theatrical forms. Hence Tret’iakov begins 
one article, revealingly entitled “One and a half billion spectators,” by enveloping his reader 
in the mists of time: “You are entering a theatre whose untraceable sources are lost from view 
several millennia before our era, and whose full bloom was already in evidence ten centuries 
ago.”1095 Through centuries of repetition, these forms have become deeply embedded in the 
popular consciousness; even when contemporary actors attempt a modern agitational play, 
Tret’iakov concedes, the intonations, gestures, and mise en scene of traditional theatre can 
still be sensed. 
In the mid-1920s, this would have been considered a defeat. Indeed, a long passage at 
the end of Chzhungo’s article on theatre breathlessly describes a “street agit-play,” written by 
two of Tret’iakov’s students in the wake of the May 30 massacre in 1925, as an energetic 
display of contemporary characters and contemporary events that contains no traces of the 
theatrical past. By 1935, Tret’iakov argues that the forms of traditional Chinese theatre can 
be retained, without retaining the “poisonous” content of feudal class relations: “The epochs 
change, the old meaning is worn away, but the form remains, and suddenly this old form can 
be filled in a new epoch with new meaning.”1096 This process of pouring new wine into old 	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1095 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Polmilliarda zritelei.” 
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bottles seems a succinct summary of the Great Appropriation that Clark describes: any art 
form from any age can potentially be filled with new, socialist content. Mei’s achievement, 
meanwhile, has been to enable this ancient and deeply national art to transcend its national 
boundaries and enter world culture: 
The greatness and significance of Mei Lanfang […] lies in the fact that he has been 
able to make Chinese theatre a global phenomenon. In his person, Chinese theatre 
has for the first time broken through its national borders and entered into the 
consciousness of the Euro-American theatrical spectator as something other than an 
“exotic” spectacle. Mei Lanfang has stepped forth onto the world stage as the 
delegate of a great art that half of humanity claims as its own, an old art, refined 
and full of meaning. Knowledge of this art constitutes a basic requirement for 
general cultural literacy.1097  
 
The “death sign” that Tret’iakov hoped Mei’s art might be in 1927 has by 1935 become the 
sign of Chinese theatre’s second life, its sublimation from the national to the global level of 
human culture. The “petrified” art form that Tret’iakov earlier considered reduced to 
meaningless aestheticization has, a decade later, become venerable, “refined,” and “full of 
meaning.” 
If we look back at the tensions between naturalism and open conventionalism that 
circulated around the China productions of the mid-1920s (Chapter Four), we may find that 
the reactions to Mei’s visit perform a curious synthesis of the contradictions noted in the 
productions of Roar, China and The Red Poppy. Roar, China! rejected the open 
acknowledgement of theatrical artifice, which had earlier been championed by the Meyerhold 
Theatre and was to be praised in Mei’s performances by Brecht, in favour of an ethnographic 
naturalism more suitable to its agitational purposes. Elements of Chinese theatricality, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1097 Sergei Tret’iakov, Mei Lan’-fan i kitaiskii teatr (Moscow: izd-vo VOKS, 1935). Copy held in 
RGALI f. 2886, op. 1. Ed. khr. 70.,  l. 2. “Величие и общезначимость Мэй Лань-фана состоит в 
том, что он сумел сделать китйский театр мировым явлением. Впервые в его лице китайский 
театр прорвал национальное ограждение и вошел в сознание театрального зрителя Америки и 
Европы не как «экзотическое» зрелище. Мэй Лань-фан вышел на мировую арену, как делегат 
громадного искусства, родного половине человечества, искусства старого, изощренного и 
6многозначительного, знание которого является требованием общей культурной грамотности.” 
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according to Meyerhold himself, were used for a realistic purpose, to display a certaion 
ceremoniality and falseness at work in Chinese social life. Roar, China! invested heavily in 
producing an aura of Chinese “authenticity” through the use of authentic props and authentic 
music played on authentic Chinese instruments, which had made the long journey from China 
just as Mei and his troupe did. This authenticity, however, was not linked to any explicit 
sense of a cultural tradition extending into the past: the only figure who appeals to tradition is 
the Buddhist monk, who is unambiguously portrayed as a liar and a fake. National 
authenticity in Roar, China! has no real historical dimension; it serves entirely to bind 
together the Chinese as a national group, which is a necessary stage in their revolutionary 
progress into the future. 
The explicit valorization of Chinese tradition, however, was Tikhomirov and 
Gel’tser’s intention in their staging of Act Two in Moscow’s original Red Poppy. Can we say 
that the reception of Mei Lanfang shows the second act of that ballet winning out over the 
first? It certainly seems that it was this China of venerable aesthetic tradition, valorized by 
Tikhomirov and Gel’tser, that the Soviet public were encouraged to see in Mei’s visit, not the 
labouring, proto-proletarian China of coolie dubinushkas. Tikhomirov and Gel’tser, however, 
sought to express an aesthetic that they considered specifically, irreducibly Chinese. 
Eisenstein and Tret’iakov, by contrast, suggest that Mei’s art, with its deep historical roots in 
China, can nonetheless transcend those national boundaries and offer useful models for the 
reimagined internationalist aesthetics of the 1930s. In the culture of the Great Appropriation, 
it is the deep national roots of this art—its authenticity, from a Herderian perspective—that 
guarantee its capacity to transcend the national. 
When looked at from the perspective of the 1920s texts that have formed the bulk of 
this dissertation, the most striking aspect of the Soviet reaction to Mei’s visit is the 
rediscovery of China’s history, of China’s antiquity as a positive value. In Eisenstein’s case, 
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this dovetails with his longstanding interest in archetypal forms of symbolic and artistic 
thought.1098 Tret’iakov, meanwhile, reworks his earlier analysis to find an accommodation 
with the Stalinist emphasis on national character and the positive valorization of folk 
tradition. Either way, this transforms the temporal structure through which China is 
perceived. The China of the 1920s Soviet imagination finds its past relegated to a negative 
baggage that must be stripped away; it exists in a present that both echoes the recent Russian 
past and points necessarily towards an imminent revolutionary future. The China embodied in 
Mei Lanfang, who was taken to represent and express Chinese theatre and, in Eisenstein’s 
article, an entire “Chinese” system of representation and thought, traces its roots into the deep 
cultural past, from which it brings forth forms of thought and expression, tempered by time, 
that can enlighten the socialist present and future.  
This pattern endures in the next major Soviet documentary film about China: Roman 
Karmen’s China in Battle (Kitai srazhaetsia, 1941). Made while China was resisting invasion 
by Japan, the film invokes the same tropes of national-historical greatness that Soviet 
propaganda mobilized in the war against Nazi Germany. Karmen’s film opens with shots of 
pagodas atop misty hills, boats moving slowly along rivers, and the Great Wall, as a 
voiceover intones: “The Great Chinese Wall: for fifteen centuries it has stood as a monument 
to the ancient civilization of a people that created, many millennia ago, the foremost values of 
science and culture.”1099 It is China’s ancient greatness that is expected to inspire trans-
national solidarity at a time of war. Shots of ruined palaces and temples in northern China tell 
of “heroic feats, of wars of liberation, of the culture and civilization of ancient China.”1100 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1098 Ibid., 204–6. 
 
1099 Kitai srazhaetsia, directed by Roman Karmen, 1941. RGAKFD N. Uchetnyi 5128, reel 1. 
“Великая китайская стена — пятнадцать веков стоит он как памятник древнейшей 
цивилизации народа, создавшего много тысячелетиями назад первейшие ценности науки и 
культуры.”  
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Oskar Erdberg also noticed these ruins in his final Chinese novella, as he charted the retreat 
of Borodin and the Comintern mission out of China through the Gobi in 1927. But Erdberg’s 
account stressed discontinuity: these ruins recall unjust, unequal societies, and their lingering 
traces are to be overthrown by the Chinese students, returning from Moscow, whom Erdberg 
meets in the depths of the desert.1101 In Karmen’s film, by contrast, these ruins assert a 
continuity of greatness, and the possibility of national resurrection.  
Where once Tret’iakov sneered at tourists from his superior position of observation, 
Karmen’s film uncritically joins a group of white-hatted tourists inspecting some Buddha 
statues, “created by unknown sculptors many centuries ago.”1102 In another redirected echo of 
1920s precedents, Karmen films a Chinese city as a dynamic flurry of rickshaws and coolies. 
But the purpose here is not to embark on a critique of oppression. Instead, these shots display 
the normal life of urban China on the verge of savage disruption by Japanese bombs. “An 
hour ago, the life of this city flowed along peacefully,” mourns the narrator over shots of fire, 
smoke, destruction and death.1103 Class analysis is subsumed by the need for national unity. 
 By the time Karmen’s film appeared, many of the cultural producers involved in the 
re-imagining of China in the 1920s had been lost in the Purges. Tret’iakov remained a voice 
on Chinese themes in the mid-1930s, hosting Mei Lanfang, writing the afterword to a 
translation of Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth, and working, it seems, on a second Chinese 
“bio-interview.”1104 Participating in a 1936 journal questionnaire entitled “What are writers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1100 Ibid. “о героических подвигах, об освободительных воинах, о культуре и цивилизации 
древнего Китая.” 
 
1101 Erdberg, Kitaiskie novelly, 166–171. 
 
1102 Karmen, Kitai srazhaetsia, reel 1. “созданы неизвестными скульптурами много веков тому 
назад.” 
 
1103 Karmen, Kitai srazhaetsia, reel 2. “Час тому назад, мирно текла жизнь этого города.” 
 
1104 Pearl S. Buck, Zemlia, trans. N. L. Daruzes, with an afterword by Sergei Tret’iakov (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1936). 
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working on?,” Tret’iakov announced that he had been working for three years on “a book 
about the heroic campaigns of Soviet China”: a hint, perhaps, at the Great March. This work 
was to mark a return both to China and to the genre of the bio-interview that Tret’iakov had 
announced with Den Shi-khua. “To a significant extent,” he promised, “this book will 
constitute a bio-interview based on materials I have collected about concrete participants in 
this campaign and their biographies.” With this second bio-interview, however, Tret’iakov 
intended to correct the political mistake of the first, which had offered an intimate portrait of 
someone who, by the time the book appeared, had become a class enemy. By so doing, 
Tret’iakov would once more assert that history in China was moving in the right direction: 
“In contrast to ‘Den Shi-khua,’ the son of a Guomindang intellectual, the hero of the new 
book—a poor peasant, a farm labourer, who becomes a partisan and Red Army soldier—is 
one of the decisive figures of awakening China in that generation which follows historically 
after the generation of Den.”1105 Tret’iakov had already signed a contract for this volume with 
Gosudarstvennaia izdatel’stvo (the State Publishing House) in 1935. According to that 
contract, which gave a deadline of June 1, 1936, the project bore the distinctly non-
documentary title of Chinese Tales (Kitaiskie povesti).1106  
It is unclear how far Tret’iakov got with this second Chinese bio-interview; his wife, 
Ol’ga Tret’iakova, noted in a letter two decades later than it remained unfinished at the time 
of his death.1107 Whatever had been written was most likely destroyed with the majority of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105 Sergei Tret’iakov, “Sovetskii Kitai (otvet na anketu ‘nad chem rabotaiut pisateli),” Kniga i 
proletarskaia revoliutsiia 7 (1936): 164. “Основная работа, которой я занимаюсь в течение трех 
лет, это книга о героических походах советского Китая. В значительной мере эта книга будет 
представлять собой биоинтервью на основании материалов, собранных мною о конкретных 
участниках этого похода и их биографиях. В ней я развиваю жанровую линию, начатую мною 
в «Дэн Ши-Хуа». В отличие от «Дэн Ши-хуа», сына интеллигента-гоминдановца, герой новой 
книги — бедный крестьянин, батрак, становящийся партизаном и красноармейцем, — одна из 
решающихся фигур пробуждающегося Китая в том поколении, которое следует исторически за 
поколением Дэна.” 
 
1106 RGALI f. 613, op. 3, ed. khr. 7, l. 155–6. 
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Tret’iakov’s papers following his arrest and execution in 1937.1108 The charge leveled against 
Tret’iakov, that of being a Japanese spy, stemmed directly—we might even say ironically, 
given the anti-imperialist tenor of his work—from his involvement with China. According to 
his NKVD file, Tret’iakov confessed to being recruited into Japanese intelligence in 1924, 
presumably during his time in Beijing, and to passing information to his Japanese handlers 
about the development of Soviet-Chinese relations.1109 Espionage for the Japanese was also 
one of the charges leveled at Boris Pil’niak, who was arrested and executed in 1937. Another 
was aiding the family of an “enemy of the people,” namely Karl Radek, the former rector of 
Sun Yat-sen University and prominent public authority on China in the 1920s, who was tried 
at the Second Moscow Trial in 1937 and subsequently murdered in prison.1110  
Other political figures connected to 1920s China were also eliminated: Lev Karakhan, 
the former Ambassador to China, was arrested and executed in 1937; Vasilii Bliukher, who 
had played a key role in reforming the Guomindang army before the Northern Expedition, 
suffered the same fate in 1938 (Borodin survived until after the war, dying in a prison camp 
in 1951).1111 Nikolai Kostarev, who dedicated his Chinese Diaries to Bliukher, was arrested, 
it seems, in 1939.1112 Several of the peripheral figures in this study, including Vsevolod 
Meyerhold, whose theatre first staged Roar, China!, and Isaac Babel, who was so obsessed 
with his Chinese story in 1919, were also arrested and killed. By the end of the 1930s, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1107 RGALI f. 2886, op. 1, ed. khr. 70, l .2. 
 
1108 The loss of large quantities of Tret’iakov’s personal archive at the time of his arrest is described in 
the written introduction to his file in RGALI, f. 2886, op. 1. 
 
1109 Papazian, Manufacturing Truth, 66. 
 
1110 Reck, Boris Pil’niak, 3–4. On Radek’s arrest, trial and death, see Vadim Z. Rogovin, 1937: 
Stalin’s Year of Terror (Oak Park, MI: Mehring Books, 1998), 116–127. 
 
1111 Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution, 426–7. 
 
1112 My only source for this is a remarkable LiveJournal blog dedicated to Soviet publications on 
China from the 1920s: http://alter-vij.livejournal.com/142783.html (accessed 4.17.2014). I am very 
grateful to this source for providing leads, discovering rarities, and posting many book covers. 
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generation of political and cultural agents who had sought, in real and imaginary terms, to 
shape revolutionary China in the 1920s had been decimated. When China became once more 
a focal point of Soviet attention in the 1950s, following the Chinese Communist victory in 
1949, a very different generation with very different concerns would take up the task of 
understanding and representing China in its difference and similarity. 
 For a final word on the internationalist aesthetics of the 1920s, we might return to 
Isaac Babel. Babel produced one other “Chinese” text in the 1920s: the screenplay for The 
Chinese Mill—A Mobilization Drill (Kitaiskaia mel’nitsa—probnaia mobilizatsiia), a 1928 
film comedy directed by A. Levshin. The film does not survive, and was not well 
received.1113 Nonetheless, a reading of Babel’s screenplay reveals a gently satirical take on 
the images of China presented to the Soviet public in the 1920s, and on the feelings of 
internationalist solidarity they were supposed to provoke. Babel’s screenplay offers a fitting 
conclusion to this study: rehearsing in comic terms the Soviet loss of China in 1927 and the 
turn towards the First Five-Year Plan, it also offers a rare interpretation of how the images of 
China produced by internationalist aesthetics were received and made their effect. 
In keeping with the “documentary” impulse of the time, it seems Babel took his 
subject from an article in the newspaper Komsomol’skaia Pravda.1114 Indeed, the script 
places repetitive emphasis on various modern media forms and their affective potential: 
radio, newspaper, and photo-magazine all feature prominently. The opening scene shows a 
peasant attaching a radio antenna to the dilapidated roof of a former landlord’s house, and 
typical village figures gathering to connect through technology with the voice of Moscow as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1113 See for example the criticisms in “Na prosmotrakh: Kitaiskaia mel’nitsa,” Kino 23 (June 5, 1928): 
5. The critics in Kino accuse the film of producing a “parody” of the Soviet village, and, moreover, 
one that rural residents will find it difficult to follow.  
 
1114 Khris. Khersonskii, “Kitaiskaia mel’nitsa,” Kino 30 (July 24, 1928): 3. 
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it emerges from the loudspeaker.1115 This familiar assertion of “connection” (smychka) 
between village and capital anticipates a cut to Moscow, where a more trans-national form of 
connection is introduced. At the Bolshoi Theatre, a meeting of Moscow’s Chinese 
community has gathered to protest English atrocities in China; through the radio microphone 
onstage, their words reach the peasants in the village. What’s more, sitting among the 
Chinese students in the Bolshoi is Yegor Zhivtsov, secretary of that same village’s 
Komsomol cell. Zhivtsov befriends the Chinese student sitting beside him; they meet again 
on a train out of Moscow, and the student, bound for Hankou, tells Zhivtsov about the 
situation in contemporary China.  
Bringing his newfound sense of solidarity with the Chinese people back to the sleepy 
village, Zhivtsov gives a rousing speech exhorting his fellow komsomoltsy to mobilize for 
military action “in defence of the Chinese Revolution.”1116 The mobilization point is to be the 
broken mill at the edge of the village. Seized with enthusiasm, the villagers prepare for war in 
comic, chaotic fashion: spurs are attached to bast shoes and a rooster’s leg; the infantry report 
for duty wielding rifles and accordions; a cavalry is formed from five forest wardens wearing 
German helmets that date back to the First World War.1117 A dreamy drunkard, Yeryoma, 
digs up a machine gun in the churchyard and pledges it to the war effort. Seeing that the 
mobilization and accompanying war frenzy has disrupted the less heroic work of 
reconstructing the village, Zhivtsov, bedecked with medals, makes a second speech to his 
assembled troops at the broken mill: 
Citizens! Volunteers! Last night I was in touch with the all-union central executive 
committee of the Party… Our Chinese brothers are managing by themselves… The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1115 Isaak Babel’, The Chinese Mill: A Mobilization Drill, trans. Nathalie Babel Brown, Ulbandus 
Review 1, no. 2 (Spring 1978): 102–3. The following summary is based on this publication, which 
gives Babel’s original Russian text alongside a parallel English translation. 
 
1116 Ibid., 130-31. “мобилизацию на защиту китайской революции.” 
 
1117 Ibid., 144–47. 
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all-union committee definitely suggests that we take care of our current business—
namely repair the mill to do our job 100%...1118 
 
The war-mongering fantasist Yeryoma is disappointed, but the Komsomol members turn 
their energies to fixing the mill. Rifles are replaced by spades and hammers; the script ends in 
a flurry of joyous labour, as the mill is prepared and the water wheel begins to turn.  
Babel’s script shows an awareness of many of the China images explored in this 
dissertation, suggesting they had attained a degree of fixation in popular consciousness. The 
student’s parents, for example, run a laundry in Moscow, which is shown in sentimental, 
sympathetic tones of hard immigrant graft. Moisture and tears are neatly interwoven: when 
their son comes to say goodbye, the woman’s tears fall on the linen she is ironing, and she 
irons stoically over them; at their final parting, the son leaves a soapy hand-print on his 
mother’s shoulder.1119 The expression of oppressed Chinese labour, meanwhile, is reduced to 
one of its standard images, the belaboured rickshaw driver. When the Chinese student tells 
Zhivtsov on the train about the situation in China, his description is not conveyed through 
titles; in general, there is little dialogue in Babel’s script, which leans towards explanation 
and connection through images. Instead, we are shown what the student is trying to describe. 
Idyllic scenes of the train rushing through the Russian countryside at night are intercut with 
shots of a rickshaw puller dragging his vehicle up a hill. His passengers are “an Englishman 
and a bulldog.”1120  
Later, as Zhivtsov prepares for his speech, he leafs through an issue of Prozhektor 
devoted to China.1121 The photographs in the journal recall the images summoned by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1118 Ibid., 148–49. (My emphasis.) “Граждане! Добровольцы! Ночью связь со ВЦИКом… 
Китайские братья самосильно управляются… Определенно ВЦИК СССР предлагает 
заниматься текущими делами — починить мельницу на 100% задания!” 
 
1119 Ibid., 106–9. 
 
1120 Ibid., 110–11. 
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student’s tale on the train: “Zhivtsov’s distorted face bent over a photograph. A detail: the 
face of the rickshawman bathed in sweat.” 1122  According to Babel’s script, these 
photographic images of Chinese oppression are to be set into motion as the visualized content 
of Zhivtsov’s imagination. These shots of the rickshaw driver in Zhivtsov’s mind are then 
intercut with pastoral scenes of the villagers sitting down to dinner, producing for Zhivtsov, 
whose perspective the film spectator shares, a disconnect between this peaceful happiness 
and Chinese suffering:   
 The woman doing the cooking sets out a big bowl of cabbage soup. 
 A rainbow circle of sunshine floats in the middle of the bowl, in the greasy  
soup. 
A detail—the upward journey of the rickshawman. 
Zhivtsov’s face bent over the photograph. Through the network of his  
dishevelled hair can be seen a page of a magazine with a picture of  
Chinese workers killed in a shootout with foreign troops. 
The merry meal of the Komsomols, mouths chewing, eyes laughing,  
shining drops dripping from spoons.1123 
 
Distant China is here, for Zhivtsov as he looks at the photograph, but also for us, the 
spectators, as we watch the film (or, in this case, imagine the film from the script).   
These images of the rickshaw driver return to him as he delivers his speech, in three 
inserted shots. First, after his opening words, we see a neutral shot of “the face of the 
rickshawman”: the image in Zhivtsov’s mind is also, it seems, the image he seeks to conjure 
in the mind of his audience through his speech.1124 Next, after Zhivtsov proclaims “When our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1121 China featured heavily in the pages of Prozhektor in 1927. Quite possibly, Zhivtsov is looking at 
Prozhektor issue 5, published 15 Маrch 1927, which was dedicated largely to China in the wake of 
what seemed like a Communist victory in Shanghai. Ivin’s text on “Revolutionary Beijing” was 
published in this issue (see Chapter Two). 
 
1122 Babel’, Chinese Mill, 126–29. “Искаженное лицо Живцова над фотографией. Деталь — лицо 
рикши, облитого потом.” 
 
1123 Ibid., 128–29. “Стряпуха ставит большую миску щей. В середине миски, в жирных щах 
плавает радужный круг солнца. Деталь — восхождение рикши. Склонившееся над 
фотографией лицо Живцова; сквозь сетку разметавшихся его волос видна страница журнала с 
изображением рабочих китайцев, убитых в перестрелке с иностранными войсками.” 
 
1124 Ibid. “Лицо рикши.” 
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Chinese brothers are being drenched in blood,” a more disturbing shot flashes up: “The face 
of the rickshawman—terrible, naked, black, round—like a polished cast-iron sphere from 
which stream sun and sweat.”1125 The dehumanized, frightening aspects of this image may 
recall the grotesque Chinese migrants in Civil-War Russia that filled Chapter One: when the 
affective power of internationalist aesthetics allows this Chinese rickshaw driver to appear in 
Russia, to Zhivtsov, to his audience, and to the film’s spectators, it is in a form reduced by 
suffering almost to inhumanity or monstrosity. Lastly, this monster of suffering seems to 
come straight for the observer: “The rickshawman has fallen,” Babel’s script tells us, “and 
crawls straight towards Zhivtsov on all fours.” But how can the rickshawman crawl towards 
Zhivtsov? Are they in the same shot? It is not clear how Babel’ intended this sequence to be 
filmed, or indeed how it was filmed, but one possible interpretation is to see the rickshaw 
driver crawling directly towards the camera, i.e. towards the audience. From Babel’s 
description, it is a sense of horror bordering on terror that internationalist aesthetics produce, 
provoking Zhivtsov to call for mobilization to save China. 
New networks of trans-national connection, expressed by the presence of Chinese in 
Moscow and enabled by the trans-Eurasian railroad, combine with the affective power of 
these images of China, conveyed by mass media and magnified by imagination, to produce in 
Zhivtsov this visceral sense of internationalist solidarity. At the same time, however, the 
powerful internationalist sensibility created by mass media is constantly undermined by the 
film’s humour, which depends on the gap between these dreams of solidarity and what is 
actually achievable. The jarring effect produced by this meeting of internationalist aesthetics 
and parodic comedy was noted by Khrisanf Khersonskii in a contemporary review, which 
offers a rare glimpse of how Babel’s script was realised onscreen: “The eccentric jollity of 
Babel's comedy and the jokey levity of its characters' thoughts are incongruous with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1125 Ibid., 130–31. “Лицо рикши — страшное, голое, черное, круглое, как отполированный 
чугунный шар, по которому стекают потоки солнца и пота.”  
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shocking footage of executions and the Chinese workers’ bitter struggle, taken from authentic 
newsreel, that is edited into Chinese Windmill.”1126 This authentic newsreel footage sounds a 
lot like the closing reel of Shanghai Document, which came out a few months earlier. Such 
documentary evidence of Chinese suffering, Khersonskii implies, should evoke sentiments 
more elevated than laughter.  
Indeed, Babel’s script works constantly to forestall elevation. The heroism of 
Zhivtsov’s call to arms is patently absurd: his rousing speech, full of passionate sympathy for 
“our Chinese brothers” who are being “drenched in blood,” is delivered atop a haystack into 
which he gradually sinks up to his waist.1127 These images of China, moreover, are revealed 
to offer little understanding of practical reality. When a group gathers to study a map of 
China (we may recall that such a map hung also on Pavel Korchagin’s wall), one peasant 
suggests they attack Beijing via the south-western province of Sichuan—a route that suggests 
little connection between the map-image and any sense of China’s geographical reality.  
In sum, internationalist sentiment, fired by the aesthetic power of mass-media images, 
is revealed in Babel’s script as a kind of madness, an excess of enthusiasm that must be 
tempered with a call to practical, present work. The trans-national sympathy produced by 
Zhivtsov’s encounter with the Chinese student does not lead to any concrete action. In any 
case, the script assures us, there is nothing to be done: “Our Chinese brothers are managing 
by themselves.” Although the positive references to the Guomindang in Babel’s script 
suggest that is was written before Chiang turned on his Communist allies, this line remained, 
according to Khersonskii, in the final film of 1928.1128 Such a statement seems remarkable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1126 Khersonskii, “Kitaiskaia mel’nitsa.” “Эксцентрическая весельба бабелевской комедии и 
анекдотическая легкость в мыслях ее действующих лиц не вяжутся с теми жуткими кадрами 
подлинной хроники тяжелой борьбы и казней китайских рабочих, которые вмонтированы в 
«Китайскую мельницу».” 
 
1127 Babel’, Chinese Mill, 130–31. “Когда китайские братья обливаются кровью…” 
 
1128 Khersonskii, “Kitaiskaia mel’nitsa.”	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after the events of 1927, with the Chinese Communists persecuted and their Soviet allies 
expelled. The evocation of internationalist solidarity, of China’s war as our war, is no longer, 
it seems, to be taken seriously. 
Deliberately or not, Chinese Mill expresses in comic fable the defeat of Soviet policy 
in China in 1927, and the consequent turn away from internationalist intervention towards a 
policy of internal consolidation and construction. The villagers’ decision to abandon the 
march on China and instead reconstruct their broken water mill anticipates the imperatives of 
the First Five-Year Plan, and serves as a neat endorsement of Stalin’s policy of socialism in 
one country, which was rising to undisputed dominance at this time. Socialism, it seems, 
must first be constructed in the USSR, before dreams of world liberation can be entertained. 
The ambitions of internationalist aesthetics, which sought to connect the Soviet public with 
their Chinese neighbours on both cognitive and emotional terms, are discarded as a youthful 
fantasy. 
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